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| Iraq: A time for Clear Goals and Focused Strategy |
January 05, 2007 |
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Remarks of Congresswoman Heather Wilson
National Press Club
Over the next few months, the United States will make some of the most important national security decisions of this decade. Those decisions will play out principally in Iraq, but will affect our broader national security and foreign policy.
The decisions we make will affect the size, composition and equipment of the American military for many years.
These decisions will impact our relationships with our allies, the perceptions of our enemies, and the stability of the Persian Gulf region.
Over the last month, I`ve spent a lot of time thinking about Iraq, reading widely from both classified and unclassified sources, meeting with experts inside and outside of government, spending time with our intelligence agencies and our men and women in the military listening to what they think and drawing on their experience.
I returned Monday from my most recent trip to Iraq. I went to Falluja, al Kut, Baghdad and Balad.
At each stop along the way, I was reminded of how fortunate we are to have such dedicated, capable and decent men and women serving us in uniform. They are all committed to their missions and they are performing admirably.
Our forces have the "can do" attitude that we have come to take for granted but never should. They are doing difficult work a long way from home and have been at it for a long time.
There are good reasons to be restrained in public comments about military strategy and operations when we have young Americans in combat. Honest debate about policy can be confused with lack of support for the troops.
There have been times that I have questioned the administration`s conduct of the war over the last three and a half years - the inadequacy of force levels immediately after the fall of Saddam, the decision to disband the Iraqi army and the slow reconstitution of the Iraqi Army, the need to expand the size of the active duty Army and Marine Corps, and the failure to understand the strategic significance of treatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib. All of these decisions were made at senior policy levels, not by people in the military doing the job.
I`m from the old school that believes partisan politics should stop at the water`s edge. The security of this country is too important to make it subservient to domestic political maneuvering.
It`s time for a complete review of American strategy in Iraq. That means we must:
Fully understand the situation we face in Iraq and be honest with ourselves and the American people about the challenges we face.
Clearly define and build a broad consensus on exactly what the vital national interests of the United States in Iraq are and, conversely, what is not vital.
Develop strategies, plans and resources to pursue those vital national interests fully vetting the alternatives and the risks of those alternatives.
The Situation in Iraq
Iraq is a country of 26 million people in a land area about twice the size of the state of Idaho. About 6.5 million people live in the capitol, Baghdad.
Ethnically, Iraq is 75-80% Arab and 15-20% Kurdish with the remainder Turkoman, Assyrians and others.
Iraq is 97% Muslim by religious faith. It is one of four countries in the world where there are more Shi`a (60-60%) than Sunni (32-37%) Muslims. Shiite populations constitute a majority in Iran, Iraq, Bahrain and Azerbaijan. Worldwide, about 10-15% of all Muslims follow the Shiite branch of Islam. Sunnis and Shiites share most basic religious tenets. Their differences have sometimes been the basis for sectarian violence and political infighting.
Governance
The Iraqi people have made substantial progress in governing themselves over the past two years. They have written a Constitution, conducted elections under that new Constitution and formed a government. The Iraqi people as a whole voted in the face of death threats and Iraqi elected officials serve in spite of risks to themselves and their families. If you are wondering whether there are Iraqi`s who are willing to take great risks to build their future, you should visit the military hospital at Balad. Two thirds of the casualties brought to our great surgeons and trauma teams are Iraqi, not American.
Our admiration for their progress and their courage cannot blind us to some other realities.
The central government in Iraq is weak. In part, that weakness is inherent in the Constitution under which the Prime Minister does not form his own government. Ministers of Health, Interior and Defense for example are chosen separately and do not serve at the pleasure of the Prime Minister.
Ministers are loyal to different parties and factions. Corruption, a long established practice in that region of the world, is endemic. Both the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Defense are heavily penetrated by militias loyal to factions rather than loyal to the national government. As one officer involved in training local Iraqi police told me, "The head of training for the police in this province has no experience and is not qualified for the job. He has the job because he is a member of the Badr Organization."
Another officer involved with training the Iraqi border patrol said, "The commander in my sector was given a list by the Ministry of the Interior of 42 people he was supposed to hire. They were all militia."
The Iraqi central governments and its ministries do not have the capacity and, in some cases, perhaps the will to support operations in the 18 provinces. Even though the central government has money, it can`t seem to spend it. There is no national banking system so soldiers and police are paid sporadically and in cash. They must travel home to give their pay to their families.
The combination of factionalism within the ministries and weak logistics systems are used to undermine units in the field. As another officer told me, "If I train a really good Iraqi police SWAT team that`s going after the `wrong` people, they can be strangled by logistics. No bullets. No gasoline. No SWAT team."
The national police are heavily infiltrated by the militias, particularly Jaish al-Mahdi or JAM, which is loyal to Shia firebrand Muqtada al-Sadr.
A principal characteristic of a sovereign government is that it has a monopoly of the use of force within its borders. The central government of Iraq has not yet consolidated this monopoly for itself.
The Iraqi Army is more reliable and has made significant progress over the last 18 months. But the quality and capability of its units varies. Even units that are fully manned usually have half of their soldiers on leave at any time. During Operation Together Forward, the joint Iraqi-American operation to secure Baghdad this summer, some Iraqi Army units refused to be deployed to Baghdad, a clear indication of the weakness of the central government and the questionable effectiveness of these units.
Levels of Violence
There is not a single insurgency or source of violence in Iraq. There are a number of interrelated and overlapping conflicts.
In the south, while there has been less violence, different Shi`a factions, principally those associated with Muqtada al-Sadr (JAM) and the Supreme Council for Islamic Resistance in Iraq (SCIRI) (the Badr organization) periodically fight each other for local advantage and attack coalition forces as well.
In the northern Kurdish region the Kurdish Peshmerga has made the area mostly secure and stable. We can expect violence to increase in Kirkuk in the run-up to the referendum on whether this oil rich city will be associated with the Kurdish region.
Anbar province, the large province in western Iraq that borders Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, is predominantly Sunni. While there is a Sunni insurgency and rejectionists in this region, it has also been fertile territory for al Qaeda in Iraq and foreign fighters. In recent months, some key Sunni tribal leaders have started working together to resist al-Qaeda in this region, opening opportunities for United States forces to work more cooperatively with local leaders to fight al Qaeda.
Overlaying these regional fights is a rise in sectarian violence that has increased substantially since the bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra in February 2006. Anger and distrust between Sunni and Shiite is very high and plays out in death squad killings, torture, intimidation and what amounts to ethnic cleansing of neighborhoods in Baghdad.
This summer, the Iraqi government with the multinational force in Iraq launched Operation Together Forward to reduce widespread sectarian violence in Baghdad. U.S. Forces, including the American striker Brigade, were sent to Baghdad as part of an effort to "clear and hold" those neighborhoods. The operation failed, as did Operation Together Forward II this fall. Levels of sectarian violence are high and are not improving.
The concept was for U.S. forces to "clear" violent neighborhoods and the Iraqi Army would "hold" the neighborhoods providing security after they had been cleared out. The Iraqi Army forces didn`t show up in the size required and were not able to provide security. As one Army officer told me, "It wasn`t clear and hold. It was clear and fold."
Confidence in the ability of the central government, the Army and the national police force to provide security has declined causing people to rely on local militias and neighborhood security to protect their families. In some cases, JAM, Muktada al-Sadr`s militia, has built confidence and support by blocking emergency response by the central authorities while JAM members help victims, thereby increasing local trust of the militias and further undermining the credibility of the government.
Finally, while the Sunni insurgency may have been spurred by al Qaeda in Iraq and various Shi`a groups get support from Iran, at this point, the violence in Iraq is largely internal and self-sustaining.
In summary:
The overall security situation in Iraq is grave and is not improving. Strategies to quell violence have not been effective.
While some violence is anti-coalition, the most dangerous trend has been the rise of sectarian violence between Sunni and Shiite militias and death squads in a cycle of violence and retaliation.
While the unity government of Nouri al-Maliki says all the right things, there are strong doubts about the ability of the unity government to reduce widespread sectarian violence.
Further political evolution in Iraq is likely as factions maneuver for power relative to one another and decisions are made on critical issues including federalism, distribution of oil revenues, and the militias. Iraq will make more and more of its own political choices, less and less influenced by America.
America`s Vital Interests
Too often in the last three and a half years, our goals in Iraq have been described in lofty and idealistic terms that go far beyond America`s vital national interests.
Most of us in the Congress voted to authorize the use of force against Saddam Hussein because the intelligence said he had or was seeking to acquire chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and that he intended to use them against the United States.
In my case, it was the intelligence on biological weapons that was the deciding factor, reaching the high threshold required for pre-emptive military action.
As we all now know, the intelligence was wrong in several important respects. Perhaps in part because it was wrong, there has been a tendency to move beyond a hard-nosed, clear-eyed view of our national interests in Iraq to emphasize loftier dreams for the Iraqi people.
To be sure, I`m glad that Saddam is dead and gone, and I hope the Iraqi people build a unified state with a society that respects minorities with robust democratic institutions. But there is a difference between what we would wish for the Iraqi people and what we need for American security.
The American military should only be used to protect America`s vital national interests, under American command, with the resources necessary to win and come home again.
When it comes to clearly defining our vital national interests in Iraq, we have lost our way in mushy rhetoric. These words matter because they set the goals we ask our military to achieve and drive the strategies and resources to achieve them. There has been far too little debate and discussion on what our vital interests are and what they are not in Iraq.
Every discussion of what path forward we should choose in Iraq should start with clearly defining our vital national interests. As the saying on the classroom wall goes, "If you don`t know where you are going, you`re likely to end up somewhere else."
In thinking about America`s vital interests in Iraq, it seems to me there are only two:
Iraq must not become a safe haven for al Qaeda or its affiliates.
Iraq must not be a source of instability in the region.
These vital interests are really quite narrow - some might argue too narrow - and probably most notable for what they do not include.
It`s not vital to America that Iraq be able to defend itself from outside powers. Iraq is unlikely to have an Army that can defend against external threats for a long time and we should not define success this broadly or even raise the possibility of arming them with indirect fire weapons, tactical air forces and so forth.
It is not vital to American interests that Iraq remain unified except to the extent dissolution of Iraq as a strong nation contributes to regional instability or creates ungoverned areas where al Qaeda could thrive. Iraq was created after World War I from three Ottoman provinces of Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul. The country has a history of instability as a result of ethnic, religious and regional rivalries. It is not vital to American national interests that we resolve these tensions and probably not reasonable to expect to do so.
There are a variety of governing models from a loose confederation to de facto local arrangements that are consistent with the vital national interests of the United States.
The Iraqi constitution allows for regional arrangements and we need not spend too much capital resisting new arrangements that might emerge.
Perhaps most significantly, it is not vital to American interests to stop all sectarian violence in Iraq. Certainly if sectarian violence escalates to a conflagration that affects stability in the region, it could affect our vital interest in regional stability. But the Iraqi`s must decide to quell sectarian violence. While we might assist and support Iraqi efforts, we cannot and should not do this for them. They must take the lead.
We admire our military because they are forward leaning and "can do". But in this instance, we cannot do for the Iraqi`s what they will not do for themselves.
There are other things that do not appear in a clear statement of America`s vital interests like making Iraqi into a model of democracy in the region and ensuring its economic prosperity. Both of these things are desirable. Iraq certainly has the oil, natural gas, and two fertile river valleys to sustain itself and prosper economically. But these desirable things are not vital to America`s national interests and what is vital should drive American strategy.
If everything is a priority, nothing is a priority. What is vital, it seems to me, boils down to two things: No al Qaeda safe haven and an Iraq that is not a source of instability in the region.
American Strategy
The shear breadth of the policy options for Iraq put forward in recent months by thoughtful people is striking.
Quit and withdraw. Reposition in neighboring countries. Increase U.S. forces temporarily. Increase forces substantially and with no deadline.
Side with the Shia because they are likely to win. Befriend the Sunnis. Destroy the Sunnis.
Withdraw U.S. forces from the cities. Start with Baghdad and the cities first.
Divide the country into three pieces. Insist on unity.
These debates are healthy when they get beyond the brainstorming stage - which they rarely do -- but the breadth of the options out there is partially due to a lack of clarity and consensus about America`s vital interests.
We should also be clear that no strategy is without risk. There are no easy or obvious paths here.
Denying Al Qaeda Safe Haven
Al Qaeda in Iraq principally thrives in the Sunni regions of the country. Defeating al Qaeda and denying them sanctuary must be a central objective for U.S. Forces in Iraq. This must be an area of focus and, to some extent, we have lost that focus over the last six months as we have emphasized the fight for Baghdad.
Using U.S. special forces, conventional U.S. military forces and American intelligence capabilities, the United States should target, kill or capture and detain al Qaeda leadership in Iraq.
U.S. forces have had some significant success in recent months capturing middle and high ranking al Qaeda operatives in Iraq in spite of the reduction of emphasis and fewer troops in the Sunni dominated areas of the country.
But there is an infuriating fact seldom discussed: fully half of the high value al Qaeda targets in Iraq have been captured and released before. As one senior officer put it, "I have great photographs of half the people we are hunting. They are wearing orange jumpsuits in the mug shots we took of them when we captured them the first time."
We are operating a catch and release program for al Qaeda in Iraq. This is inexcusable and frustrating as all get out for our men and women in the fight.
American soldiers are capturing terrorists trying to kill Americans and Iraqis and they are turned over to an Iraqi run detention system that is likely to release them.
Indeed, some officers whose opinions I trust describe detention as training camp for al Qaeda where they share information and contacts improving their skills and enhancing their position within al Qaeda when they are released.
We cannot afford to spend half our resources hunting al Qaeda we have already caught before. We need to change our detention policy so that there are no high value targets with orange jumps suit mug shots in "wanted" posters hanging on the walls in the operation centers of our special forces units in Iraq.
Using classic counter-insurgency strategies and tactics, the United States military and intelligence services should build relationships with tribal and local leaders in the Sunni dominated regions who will deny al Qaeda safe haven for the long term.
We are having some recent and fragile success with this approach to security in al Anbar. Sunni tribal leaders, with the support and encouragement of U.S. forces, are recruiting men from their tribe into security units.
These counter-insurgency efforts building on established local tribal relationships and indigenous leadership must be supported financially directly by the U.S. military. Large U.S. aid programs run at the national level have been slow and ineffective at engaging the Iraqi people and getting things done.
The American military has the capability to use funds to support counter-insurgency operations at the community level rapidly and where needed without a lot of hassle. This mechanism has been used successfully in Iraq before, although it is not universally supported. It`s a turf and power thing. To a certain degree, we have a choice. We can micro-manage contracts from Washington and Baghdad or we can get things done rapidly and effectively giving authority within broad guidelines for Lieutenant Colonels to use their judgment.
While al Anbar is a very large area, it is sparsely populated with about 1.2 million people, the vast majority of whom live on the Euphrates river valley. An intense counterinsurgency strategy in the Sunni areas can help to root out al Qaeda today and make their brand of extremism unwelcome for the long term.
Strengthen both technical intelligence collection and human intelligence collection in the Sunni regions of Iraq.
Intelligence is the first line of defense in the war on terror and we are doing a lot of things right. But there continues to be a need to strengthen technical intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance collection so that more requirements can be met.
More importantly, we continue to lag behind in human intelligence collection capability.
We are five years after 9/11 and we still are desperately short of linguists in strategic languages. We need more soldiers trained in basic 30 and 60 day language programs in order to effectively conduct a counter-insurgency effort.
At a higher level, we need more military members and intelligence specialists who are fluent in languages like Arabic, Farsi, Pashtun and Dari. Heretofore, this has just not been a national priority and it must change.
Train and expand the Iraqi Army
The training of the Iraqi Army has gone slower than any of us want. They are still heavily dependent on the U.S. for logistics and their capability and effectiveness is limited by the practice of allowing military members to go home for about two weeks of each month.
Still, the Iraqi Army offers the best possibility for the Iraqi government to consolidate its authority and quell violence.
The United States should continue to accelerate training and equipping the Iraqi Army so that they can take responsibility for internal security.
I am not convinced that embedding large numbers of U.S. soldiers in Iraqi units is the most effective way to train Iraqis. I`m not convinced that it is not effective either. There are differing views by thoughtful people and I don`t have the experience to know. But it is an important question for the military and its training elements to assess. We should pursue training strategies that are most likely to make Iraqi units effective and independent in the shortest time.
There are two disadvantages of embedding Americans in Iraqi units. First, it is harder to protect and support the Americans to the standards we expect for our soldiers when they are detached. Second, some American trainers who have been embedded express concern that it is difficult to get the Iraqis to stand on their own and take responsibility because they think the Americans will do things for them. An embedded American trainer told me, "I have to decide that I`m not going to do the maintenance for them even though I can. That`s hard to do."
Assist the Iraqi Army and Ministry of Defense in establishing logistics and service support for the Army.
While we have focused on training military units - and Iraq may need more of them than they initially planned - the systems for payroll and logistics support just do not exist. We need to put effort into helping them develop those systems so that the Iraqi army is fed, paid, has gasoline and trucks and uniforms.
The Iraqi police and border patrol are infiltrated by militia and ineffective. We should not expect that the police will be effective as other than a mechanism to employ and occupy young men anytime soon.
Support the Iraqi Government as they address Sectarian Violence
The United States should not take the lead in resolving sectarian violence between Shi`a and Sunni or between different militias vying for power in Shi`a areas. The Iraqi government and Iraqi leaders must take the lead. We cannot and should not do this for them.
American soldiers should not be in a situation as reportedly happened on October 24th when they raided an area looking for a leader of a Shi`a militia group and were told by the Iraqi government to stand down.
We cannot do for the Iraqi`s what they will not do for themselves. If they do not choose to disarm the militias and stop the death squads, Baghdad will continue to be a violent place. It is unlikely that this violence will rise to a level where Iraq becomes a source of regional instability even if it does threaten the internal stability and political direction of the country. As cold as it sounds, the sectarian violence is not something we can stop by getting in the middle of it and it is not vital to American national interests that we do so.
If the Iraqi government decides to commit their forces to securing Baghdad and controlling the sectarian violence, they may ask for support from us. We should consider the nature and scope of that support and the rules of engagement by which we might operate. But we must resist the temptation to do it for them. They must lead.
Hold and Build: Secure Stable Areas
Operation Together Forward, the effort to secure Baghdad, failed because there was no "holding" after a neighborhood was "cleared". The Iraqis did not show up. And the "building" never really happened at all. It was a failed "kinetic" approach without adequate resources from the Iraqis to follow through. We probably made plenty of enemies without making people feel safer or more confident in the ability of the government to protect them.
Rather than "clearing" neighborhoods where there is sectarian violence, we should focus on strengthening indigenous security in cooperation with the Iraqi government and the Iraqi Army in neighborhoods and villages where there is stability or leadership to work with. This is an inside-out approach that builds indigenous capacity rather than an outside-in approach.
In the Kurdish region, the Peshmerga protect the Americans, not the other way around. That is a relationship we built over a decade. Al Qaim on the Syrian border used to be a hotbed of foreign fighter activity. Now it is largely peaceful and led by strong local tribal leaders who cooperate with the Americans and own their community.
In 2003 and 2004, immediately after the fall of Saddam when there was no Iraqi government, I believe a large U.S. presence that took charge and visibly controlled the streets killing or disarming any Iraqi with a weapon would have made a difference. When it comes to occupation, quantity has a quality all of its own.
But we are beyond that now. Iraq has its own government with an Army that is getting better. They must own their own neighborhoods. We can help them, but we cannot do it for them.
In Closing
Over the next 3 to 4 months we will make important decisions about what is vital to the United States in Iraq and how we are going to secure those vital interests. We need to focus on what is vital, not what is desirable and implement strategies that secure our interests.
Congresswoman Heather Wilson is a Republican who represents New Mexico in the Congress. She serves on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in addition to the Energy and Commerce Committee. A graduate of the Air Force Academy and a Rhodes Scholar with Master`s and Doctoral degrees in international relations, Wilson served on the National Security Council Staff for the elder President Bush from 1989-1991. She is the third generation in her family to serve in the Air Force. Her husband has been in the military for over 30 years and is still in the Air Force Reserve. They have three children and reside in Albuquerque. |
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