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| Congresswoman Heather Wilson`s Opening Statement, House Subcommittee on Energy & Power |
July 13, 1999 |
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| Mr. Chairman I appreciate the opportunity to comment today on re-organization of the Department of Energy to more adequately ensure that nuclear programs are sufficiently protected from espionage.
I am pleased that within the last week, the Secretary of Energy has abandoned his strong opposition to any organizational change that would clarify lines of authority and accountability within the nuclear weapons complex through the formation of an independent agency within the Department of Energy. This should make it easier to craft constructive legislation on this subject.
I have not spoken before on this issue. Because I have worked with the nuclear weapons complex in the past and I am the only member of the Commerce Committee that represents one of these laboratories, I thank the chairmen for allowing me to take some time today.
While the Cox and Rudman reports have brought renewed awareness of the management and organizational problems within the nuclear weapons complex, these concerns are not new.
Let me review some of this material, all of which has called for radical re-organization of the Department of Energy.
The Chiles Commission, which reported earlier this year, said, in part:
Reorganization of DOE is needed to eliminate excessive oversight and overlapping, unclear government roles. The Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs (ASDP) should be given direct line management authority over all aspects of the nuclear weapons complex, including corresponding elements of the DOE field structure.
This sort of recommendation is not new. The House Armed Services Committee`s DOE Defense Nuclear Facilities Panel back in 1990 commissioned a study on nuclear weapons safety. Sidney Drell of Stanford University chaired the study, which reported, in part:
We concur with the recommendation of the 1985 Clark Task Group to "strengthen DOE`s management attention to its national security responsibilities"...These steps should include raising the stature of the nuclear weapons program management within DOE, for example by establishing a separate organizational entity, e.g., and Administration with a clearly demarcated budget, reporting directly to the DOE Secretary."
Three years ago the Senate Appropriations Committee directed a review by the Institute for Defense Analysis that found that DOE`s current management "practices are constipating the system."
One might ask why, in light of all these studies, reforms have not been implemented. To respond, I would turn to another study of the DOE; this one chaired by Bob Glavin, then the Chairman of Motorola, which found that:
"There have been many studies in the Department of Energy laboratories. As one reads these reports, one recognizes that the items which were recommended in previous reports are, for the most part, recommended in most subsequent reports. As each past study has taken place, people of good intentions make sincere efforts to `fine tune` the system. However, the Department and the Congress should recognize that there has been little fundamental improvement as a function of past studies. We suggest that the country try one or more concepts that are radically new...to achieve significant improvements."
Today, a New Mexican and former member of this committee, Secretary Richardson is implementing a new round of reforms at DOE. Mr. Chairman, you should know that, while I have been critical of some past Secretaries for failing to give sufficient attention to these matters, Secretary Richardson is clearly indicating a willingness to tackle these issues.
The fact is that every new Secretary and Assistant Secretary, recognizing that there are some serious problems, tries to implement reforms. The result has been an ever increasing number of management overlays. Beginning with Secretary Harrington, who created a separate Assistant Secretary for Environment, Safety, and Health, the Department has increasingly relied on structures to oversee other structures. We now literally have overseers overseeing the overseers.
As an example, I will cite again the review by the Institute for Defense Analysis whichfound that:
Many DOE and contractor officials describe Defense Programs oversight as creating an inverted management pyramid, because the number of reviewers exceeds the number of hands-on workers. For example, contractors have cited examples where work done by two or three people becomes the subject of review meetings involving 40 or more Defense Programs officials.
That example cites only the problem internal to Defense Programs. The problem expands exponentially when reviewers from other oversight functions are included. I can tell you that it is sometimes hard to figure out just who is responsible. We have programs within one office, complying with policies set by a second office, in accordance with procedures set by a third office, verified by a fourth office. When I look at something like that, I have to wonder, "Who is in charge?"
This myriad of oversight and review does not improve performance. To the contrary, in some cases it diminishes performance. It is my view that it is frequently easier to be an overseer than the responsible party. As overseers have multiplied, the line between oversight and responsibility has been blurred and sometimes disappears. The frequent result is that, when mistakes are made, everyone thinks they were an overseer, and nobody takes responsibility.
I might also add, Mr. Chairman, that this duplication of oversight is tremendously expensive both in its direct costs and because of the delays and inefficiencies it engenders.
While I have come to the conclusion over the last several months and as the result of input and conversations with many constituents and others who understand these things better than I that now is the time to make some serious management change, we should also be fully mindful of the potential consequences of that change. Reorganizations are disruptive to people. They require lots of time and attention by managers and create anxiety among employees. Having overseen a major reorganization in state government, I know that is true. But I have been convinced that straightening lines of authority is important enough to warrant this potential disruption.
So what shall we do to improve this situation. Our approach should be guided by 3 principles:
1. Any legislation must strengthen management lines of authority and accountability, not just move boxes around on an organizational chart. This must be about changing the way that our nuclear programs are managed and strengthening the authority of those in a clearly defined chain of command.
2. Our multi-program laboratories must continue to be able to do work on a wide range of subjects for many customers. Fully one third of the work conducted at our national laboratories is not for the nuclear weapons program. There are tremendous advances in knowledge developed in the defense of the country that have applications in other areas. Great progress has been made in migrating that knowledge to other areas. Whether it is research in engine efficiency, supercomputing, micro-machines, semiconductors, or non-proliferation, the labs must continue to be able to do "work for others". Indeed, if we implement this right, we should enhance their ability to do so.
3. The independent agency within the DOE must have necessary support and staff functions within it to operate independently. The whole point is for the new head of this agency to be accountable, and not subject to other directorates within the DOE.
Let me say a final word, Mr. Chairman about the alternatives in front of us. Some have proposed that this complex be turned over to the Department of Defense. I believe that is wrong for the same reasons it was wrong when the atomic energy commission was created. Those responsible for deciding how nuclear weapons should be used in war should not have the authority for designing and building them. The reasoning was sound then and it is now.
There are others that would turn our national laboratories into civil service institutions as government run labs. If there is one thing that has protected the laboratories from being completely choked by DOE management, it is that they are operated by contractors who bring some non-government management experience to the laboratories. Sandia`s relationship with AT&T; and then Lockheed-Martin has been a relationship that has benefited the lab and the country. We want to make sure that we do not damage that which we are trying to protect.
Mr. Chairman, the national laboratories, especially the ones in my state, literally saved millions of lives through their work in World War II and during the Cold War. They abound with dedicated, patriotic, and truly gifted men and women, working for this nation`s security as their top priority. We should not scapegoat the labs or the people that work there. We need a fundamental re-emphasis on the nuclear weapons work at DOE, recognizing that the rules and regimes that govern the rest of the DOE cannot be entirely used in the nuclear weapons complex.
I believe that the best approach now on the table comes from the Senate -- the Kyl, Domenici, Murkowski amendment -- because it is a true "Chain of Command" approach, with all the discipline this entails. I truly believe that this approach, if ithad been used in the past, may well have avoided some of the security problems we have now discovered and that this approach will help us avoid them in the future.
I hope that the Committee will find my comments useful as it continues its work. |
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