TABLE OF CONTENTS(Click on Section)

PURPOSE

BACKGROUND

CHAIRMAN'S OPENING STATEMENT

WITNESSES

The Subcommittee will meet on Thursday, February 23, 2006 at 9:00 a.m. in the Whittier City Council Chambers, 13230 Penn Street, Whittier, California, for a hearing on “The Big One: How Do We Ensure a Robust Federal Response to a Catastrophic Earthquake in the Los Angeles Region?” The purpose of this hearing is to solicit state and local government input for improving the federal government’s capability and readiness in responding to catastrophic disasters, as well as for enhancing state and local response capabilities.

The response to Hurricane Katrina revealed a number of failures and shortcomings in the federal, state, and local response to a catastrophic disaster. The House Select Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina issued its report on February 15, addressing three groups of issues related to the federal response: 1) the preparedness level (i.e. planning, capabilities, and readiness) of the federal government prior to the disaster; 2) leadership, or key decisions by senior officials about how and when to engage federal response assets; and 3) the execution of the response plans and authorities. The Select Committee’s report elaborates on the following findings summarized here:

• The potential catastrophic consequences of a large hurricane striking New Orleans were well known and accurately predicted.
• The incomplete pre-landfall evacuation led to deaths, thousands of dangerous rescues, and horrible conditions for those who remained.
• Federal, state, and local officials’ failure to anticipate the post-landfall conditions delayed post-landfall evacuation and support.
• While significant catastrophic disaster planning was done, it was incomplete.
• Despite several preparedness initiatives and significant homeland security grant programs, important Department of Homeland Security (DHS) operational capabilities and readiness declined in recent years or were never adequate for a natural disaster of this scale.
• Catastrophic disasters such as Katrina require a proactive response as opposed to the typical reactive federal response.
• Informed presidential involvement is needed for an effective catastrophic disaster response. Key response decisions by senior officials were made late, ineffectively, or not at all.
• The process for requesting Department of Defense (DOD) assistance was slow and cumbersome.
• An inadequate professional disaster workforce and unfamiliarity with disaster plans and procedures resulted in a poorly executed and coordinated response.
• Inadequate capabilities and readiness resulted in the federal response being overwhelmed in critical areas such as logistics, communications, situational awareness, and command and control.

Similar to the effects of Hurricane Katrina, a catastrophic earthquake in Southern California would paralyze the region, destroy the infrastructure, and leave tens of thousands homeless. Without reforming and upgrading the national emergency framework, the country may face another failed response to a catastrophic disaster.

The risks of earthquakes in the Los Angeles region are well know, documented, and researched, and threats to the population of the region are great. Southern California has over 300 faults capable of producing damaging earthquakes, more than any other metropolitan area in the United States. While small earthquakes in the region are quite frequent, the local and state governments have focused considerably on the ‘big one.’ Seismologists have uncovered a dangerous fault system, the Puente Hills fault, located directly beneath Los Angeles. Models of a 7.5 earthquake in the Los Angeles basin predict over 18,000 dead, quarter losses of a quarter of a trillion dollars, and the need to provide shelter for over 300,000. Other models predict similar losses, all of which dwarf losses from the 1994 Northridge earthquake.

The Northridge earthquake was the first earthquake to occur directly under an urban area since 1933 and produced the strongest ground motions ever instrumentally recorded in an urban setting in North America. Damage was wide-spread, sections of major freeways collapsed, parking structures and office buildings collapsed, and numerous apartment buildings suffered irreparable damage. The earthquake left 57 dead and over $40 billion in damage.

Although shaking is the primary concern in an earthquake, the subsequent related events can cause additional destruction and harm to the population. Earthquakes can cause fires, landslides, dam failures, and tsunamis. Severe structural damage to chemical and hazard material refineries and storage facilities can trigger oil and chemical releases. Earthquakes can also cause certain soils to liquefy, resulting in an inability to support structures or rupture underground oil and natural gas pipelines. Dam or levee failures can lead to widespread flooding. These events must be incorporated into the global concept of an earthquake, and planned for accordingly.

In order to ensure that the response to the next catastrophic disaster, whether in Southern California or elsewhere, does not fail, the emergency management capabilities and readiness at the federal, state, and local levels must be improved. As Congress reviews and scrutinizes reform proposals for the emergency management system, a number of reform principles should be considered.

Presidential involvement and professional disaster advice is essential.

Catastrophic disasters require presidential involvement to mobilize the assets of the entire federal government, particularly DOD assistance. Additionally, the president needs solid professional disaster advice to make the right decisions. Under the Homeland Security Act and the National Response Plan the secretary of homeland security is the president’s principle disaster advisor. Yet it is unlikely the secretary will ever be a disaster professional, because the department’s top priority is terrorism prevention not disaster response.

The process for requesting active duty military assistance should be expedited and military action must be in support of civil authorities.

During large disasters DOD assistance is needed to save and sustain lives. Active-duty military assistance is critical for meeting the massive logistical requirements of a catastrophic disaster, but the current process for requesting such assistance is overly bureaucratic and slow. For example, the negotiations for the DOD mission assignments for Hurricane Katrina began on Thursday, September 1, and were not completed until the following Monday, one week after landfall. During catastrophic disasters, administrative procedures must be streamlined in order to not delay the provision of necessary military support to civil authorities. In addition, there appears to be little support for having the military take over federal disaster operations, or for the federalization of state disaster activities.

Disaster preparedness functions need to be closely integrated and managed with response functions.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was created in 1979 for the specific purpose of unifying disaster preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation programs from all over the federal government. However, since the enactment of the Homeland Security Act and culminating in the new Preparedness Directorate of the DHS, the preparedness function has been removed from FEMA. Emergency management professionals have consistently argued that preparedness and response should be integrated as part of the four cornerstones of emergency management, or the cycle of improvement will be lost and planning will be completed in a vacuum. Emergency management professionals question how FEMA is to build relationships with state and local governments without involvement in preparedness.

Additionally, most preparedness initiatives and funding focus on improving state and local preparedness, but fall silent on federal preparedness. The response to Hurricane Katrina illustrated the need to focus not only on state and local preparedness, but also on federal preparedness. Work must be done to make sure that all agencies and departments within the federal government understand their roles under the National Response Plan and have processes in place to implement them.

FEMA’s essential response capabilities must be restored and enhanced.

Work must be done to rebuild a professional disaster workforce and the federal government’s essential disaster response capabilities, such as logistics and communications. Without a well-trained professional disaster workforce at all levels of government, it will not be possible to successfully implement response plans in an effective and timely manner. There is no substitution for professional training, experience, and judgment.

It is essential to rebuild and in some instances develop capabilities that the government has never had before. For example, catastrophic disasters require a 21st century logistics capability that can move extremely large amounts of resources and pinpoint their location at any given time. FEMA has never had that capability, but it needs to develop it or have access to such a system at a moments notice.

There needs to be a robust communications infrastructure that is portable, survivable, and allows for the integration of diverse communications systems. During the investigation of the Katrina response, the Select Committee learned that FEMA’s national response teams had lost their dedicated communications packages to budget cuts, and that many team members were not even issued Blackberries.

The tension between the nation’s all-hazards emergency management system and terrorism preparedness must be resolved.

An all-hazards approach fully addresses terrorism, but preparing for terrorism alone does not address all aspects of the other hazards. The federal homeland security grant programs have driven a wedge between state homeland security advisors and state emergency management directors. The federal government has spent over $10 billion on first responder grants since 9/11 (mostly on equipment), but the nation’s core emergency management capabilities have improved little.