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Briefing by Roger Winter, USAID Assistant Administrator For The Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance Bureau
The Humanitarian Situation in Sudan
Foreign Press Center Briefing
Washington, D.C.
July 29, 2004
MR. DENIG: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen, and welcome to the Washington Foreign Press Center.
As you know, earlier this week, we held a briefing on Sudan with Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs Kim Holmes and with Deputy Assistant Secretary Charlie Snyder from the State Department's African Bureau. That briefing focused on the UN Security Council resolution regarding the Darfur region in Sudan, as well as on the origins of the rebellion in the Darfur region.
We wanted to follow up today with a briefing that would focus on the humanitarian situation in Sudan to give the full picture, since the humanitarian situation, after all, is the concern of the international community. We were hoping to have Administrator Andrew Natsios from USAID with us today. Unfortunately, at the last moment, he was called away, but we're very pleased that on short notice we could be joined by the Assistant Administrator of USAID, Roger Winter, who is in charge of the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance. He basically is responsible for humanitarian assistance around the world. He has been to Sudan within the last 30 days and heads out again within a week to check up on the situation. So we're very pleased to have Roger Winter with us here today. I'll let him make some opening remarks, after which we'd be very glad to take your questions.
Roger.
MR. WINTER: Thank you. Actually I am in Sudan usually every month and have been for a good period of time. Let me just give you a perspective on the current humanitarian situation. I'll do it in sort of major themes, and then, as he said, take any questions you have.
Our humanitarian program, and, in fact, the world's humanitarian program, depends on three factors: it depends on access to the population in need, it depends on the security environment in which the humanitarian program is functioning, and it involves the availability of adequate resources in order to do the program that's necessary. We tracked down, not exactly on that three series, but on issues that relate to it.
First of all, the population at risk continues to grow. It's already large, of course, but it continues to grow. We know of at least 1.2 million displaced people in 134 different sites. The sites can be small but they can range as large as 60- to 70,000 in a single site. And I'll come back to what the implications of that number mean when I talk about "in a single site."
The World Food Program (WFP) expects that the number of people in need of food assistance will rise to more than 2 million by the beginning of October. To some degree, the fact that we have additional access is what is responsible for our being able to report higher numbers. If you don't have access, you don't know what's there exactly. When you do have access, you see not only need, you see the people that have those needs.
What I can tell you is that there is also a lot of moving around of the displaced population. So, for example, just to cite one particular camp, a camp called Kalma which is in southern Darfur, when I was there a couple of months ago, the population was in the neighborhood of 4- to 5,000. In just over the last month it has grown from 26,000 to 60,000 in that one camp. Now, some of that is new displacement, because we're aware of new displacement, which means what one of my future points will be, that the violence continues. But it's also the fact that there is some movement around of the population; they're looking for their best security situation.
So the population, indeed, continues to grow. Additionally, the violence continues. Now, to be fair, it is somewhat diminished. Clearly, violence that relates directly to regular Government of Sudan military forces has significantly diminished. The real problem continues to be the so-called Jingaweit militia. The Jingaweit militia are clearly an affiliated body when it comes to the government. And I'll come back to that also, but it is the militia that which has actually caused most of the displacement.
Daily we receive reports. And I'm not going to share this with you, but just to give you -- this is an incident log of recent dates which reports on access violations or security violations and who's doing what to whom. It's a substantial report that's updated daily -- just to depict two incidents in the last ten days or so. In a particular village outside Jenina, which is in west Darfur, five women were attacked, five women were attacked trying to visit their home farm area to see any possibility of what's left of their goods and property. Two were raped. The other three had their genitals mutilated. It's this kind of violence that continues to go on. There is a lot of violence against women that's been going on in Darfur. Another example, just a few days ago there was an attack on people who were trying to return to their home area. The home area is called (inaudible –Sanikaru?), also in west Darfur. Of those nine people, two were killed, seven were injured and the injured reported that it was done by armed men on horseback and camels.
This kind of violence goes on just sort of perpetually in Darfur. The Government has the responsibility of disarming this militia called the Jingaweit. That disarmament has, obviously, not fully occurred yet.
All right, another point. There is a new threat regarding the displaced population, and that is the threat of forced return. Let me explain this one to you. In all three of the states of Darfur, north, west from my perspective, west and south -- in all three of the states it appears that preparations are being made by the Sudan Government to forcibly move, relocate, or maybe press to return to their home areas the population that we're talking about that's been displaced. By and large, there are no people among those that we -- our DART team, our Disaster Assistance Response Team that's on the ground there -- or that NGOs have talked to that want to return. They don't want to return because the security environment remains terribly inhospitable.
Nevertheless, there does seem to be an intent on the part of the government, and in two of those states, they have said so publicly that they intend to return, or move to new locations, substantial elements of the displaced population. If that happens, it's going to be a real problem because people are terrified. You've heard the World Food Program head and others say that this is the most terrified population they've had to deal with, so the security situation means that the potential for forced return is a new problem we're confronting, and we view it as a very dangerous one.
A new point. The Government of Sudan’s obstructions to the humanitarian program have reduced somewhat, but they continue. For example, there has been some improvement on the issue of visas and the issue of internal travel permits. Some of those things have improved, but in no case are they adequate. However, other things continue to happen that have to be consistently overcome. For example, humanitarian programs of the World Food Program were constrained to using only Sudanese trucks for a while, when you could get trucks from Ethiopia from other locations. We've overcome that one now, as we've overcome some of the visa problems.
But for example, in the area of international health personnel coming in to help, there are always new problems arising, and the most recent one is that the Government of Sudan is requiring physicals of international health personnel that come in to assist the IDP population. One has to wonder what's wrong with this picture.
A new point. There are major gaps yet in the humanitarian assistance that's being provided. Not only is there not access everywhere, not only is there a lot of insecurity that impedes that access, but in addition, not being able to access populations means that a lot of their needs are not being met.
The U.S. provides about 80 percent of the food aid that's currently been provided to people in Darfur. But if you were to take any of the basic issues, like, for example, what portion of the food needs are being met in south Darfur? Well, right now, we think we're meeting 77 percent of the food need. But if you look at north Darfur, we think we're meeting 35 percent of the food need, for example. So, you could take any one of the criteria and say, "What about sanitation?" All right, well, let me explain this one a little bit because it will precede a point I want to make.
In an emergency like this, it is often the case that people think, well, the big problem is food. If we just get the food in there, everything will be all right. And it isn't that simple, by any means.
Now, what you have is a situation where people have generally been without adequate food for six to nine months already. They are already weakened. They are in a situation where there is inadequate shelter. Where they lived, they had a home that was probably almost a cement-likeish circular home with a grass roof. But where they are now, there's nothing like that. So what they would normally do is they would normally build what we'll call a "local structure." They would do that from grass, except this is an arid area. There ain't a lot of grass around. So there are virtually no adequate shelters out there, which is one of the reasons why USAID has already provided shelter materials for 700,000 people. It's one of the biggest things we focused on.
Why are we so concerned about shelter? Well, we're concerned about shelter because the rains are coming now. Now, already weakened bodies, without shelter, the rains are coming, and I mentioned the issue to you of sanitation. By and large, the population that's been displaced had been in smaller villages, widely dispersed over a very large area. They're not used to using latrines and they don't [use them] in their home area. And they were also widely dispersed, so the impact of not using latrines did not affect anybody else. But now, just to use the one camp that I was talking about a moment ago, you have 60 or so thousand people, cheek-by-jowl -- that's an Americanism, cheek-by-jowl -- you know, cramped up together, and there are no latrines in these areas. These are camps that were put together rather quickly, and we're just now getting access to them and being able to begin to put latrines in.
So the latrine coverage ranges from 10 to 20 percent. But in many cases, the people haven't really learned to use them yet. So you have this environment, packed together, without shelter, six- to nine-months weakened bodies, in that increasingly wet environment, because it is the rainy season now, and you have no latrines that are being used, or there are a few latrines but they are not used. This is what kills people. That complex of factors that result from the displacement and the lack of access and the lack of security, collectively together, the diseases get started. And it's measles, and it's malaria, and it's meningitis, and it's cholera, and it's all of those things. That's what gives you the big body count.
The question is, how many people may die in relationship to this situation, and the truth of the matter is nobody knows because we do not have comprehensive access now and we have not had comprehensive access all along. We have made our own projections -- the professionals who work in this field, there are epidemiologists who do this kind of work in Africa, specializing in the Horn of Africa and so forth -- and our projection is that by the end of the year, starting from earlier in the year, in the neighborhood of 300- to 350,000 excess deaths will occur.
Do we think that's on track now? Yes, we do. I mean, it's clear that some number of thousands, up to perhaps 30,000, have been killed -- which is different than dying from the humanitarian causes -- up to 30,000; that's a UN figure. They usually use a range of 10- to 30,000 killed.
Now, the humanitarian-related death rate, which is malnutrition-related but can be any of the causes, the disease causes and so forth that I mentioned, takes the curve up rather dramatically during the course of this year. We've had our epidemiologists check what we know of what's occurring on the ground as recently as last week and we think that curve is on track.
So what you've got is, on top of [those] killed you've got an excess death figure that probably, by this time -- I have to say probably because this is the best we can do when you don't have a comprehensive survey and surveillance system in place -- we think probably another 50,000 or so have died from humanitarian-related reasons and that number will start to jet up a good bit over the next few months and then it will start to tail off because a lot of the most vulnerable people, the so-called "stick children" -- what they get to be, "stick children" -- will have died by then and hopefully the humanitarian program will be able to access everybody.
So this is a substantial humanitarian emergency. I know it's getting a lot of play in a variety of ways. It's becoming a political issue of one sort or other in relationship to the peace process in Sudan and all of that, but first and foremost it's a humanitarian disaster of the first magnitude. And we expect it to go on perhaps 18 months at least, as a minimum, and that's because the planting seasons for this year have already been lost. That means this population, which is normally a rather self-sufficient population, will continue to be dependent for another whole planting season, and that's why we're projecting that this will be at least an 18-month episode and potentially more, depending on how much access, how much security and how much resources are provided.
Resources are an issue in this case. The U.S. has already committed about $143 million out of the $299 [million] we've pledged, but that pledge number, in my opinion, will ultimately go higher because the numbers will warrant that over time.
That's longer than I probably should have talked, but I'd be happy to try and take and answer any questions that people have. Thank you.
MR. DENIG: As usual, we'll ask you to use the microphone and identify yourself and your news organization. We'll start over here with Mexico.
QUESTION: My name is Gregorio Meraz, reporter from Television News Network from Mexico. I would like to ask you, do you have already -- are there any other international institutions providing some help or -- in sanitation or in similar areas?
MR. WINTER: Yes. First of all, the principal partner in all of this is the UN system. In the humanitarian field there's a lot of interdependence on the various capabilities. What we offer through USAID is not just support on the ground and direct funding of programs on the ground, but we also directly fund the United Nations system. So, as a result, we fund UNICEF, we fund WFP; as I said, we provide 80 percent of the food aid so far. And that's the UN system that actually provides it. We provide it to them. The same thing is true with almost every major UN organization that relates to the humanitarian field. In addition to that, the European Union and ECHO, the European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid Office, are also partners in this. And then, of course, there's a wide range of nongovernmental organizations. If you're talking American-wise, you'd be talking about CARE and Save the Children, World Vision, you know, organizations like that. And, of course, many from Europe and elsewhere are also part of the humanitarian response.
QUESTION: But I suppose -- how important is in providing that relief the situation on security? Do you need additional security in order to warranty to see that most of the help is going to -- is really going to the population and is not being held by the government or people?
MR. WINTER: Right. Well, security is critical for multiple reasons. One is that it directly impacts on the population that you're trying to help. They're terrified to see the very guys who did the displacement in the first place to be riding around and being still present and conducting some of the violence that I was referencing. So security is key for that.
It is also key for the humanitarian responders. The UN has a security system. They have a security staff that's very experienced and they go out and they make judgments about what roads can be used or not used. And if they close a road, it's not only the UN system that won't use the road; the NGOs will not use the road, and we will not use the road; we depend on the UN Security System for that kind of thing.
When it comes to the humanitarian workers or their contractors, for example, truck drivers and stuff like that, we continue to have a lot of problems with vehicles being stopped, guys being robbed or, in some cases, we've had some killed. They tend to be locals, so you don't necessarily see it in the media reports in quite the same way as if they were internationals. But it does affect the entire way the humanitarian program works at every aspect.
MR. DENIG: Let's go to the Washington File in the middle, please.
QUESTION: Yeah, Mr. Winter. Jim Fisher Thompson, Washington File. It seems like most of your effort is being done kind of from the interior of the country, as you've noted. You have most of your DART teams, you know, are in there in the interior of western Sudan there and, you know, you say they're, of course, terrified to have to work in that environment. Now, there was a WFP convoy that, if I understand correctly, just left Benghazi and Libya is going to make a 3,000-kilometer run trying to get in, you know, from the west. And you do have some people working, you know, through Chad.
Has it been taken into consideration maybe trying to bring in more supplies, you know, through Chad from the west and circumventing coming, you know, from the interior of Sudan into western Darfur? Is there a political constraint against doing more of that or --
MR. WINTER: Well, first of all, to answer directly your question, yes, we have considered all of those options. As far back as January, I and a counterpart from the State Department were in Chad for the specific purpose of trying to make judgments about whether there could be a cross-border operation from Chad into Darfur directly.
More recently, some of my staff were in Libya, WFP has been in Libya -- both WFP and we are trying to explore the possibilities and we believe it is possible. It's, frankly, logistically more possible from there than Chad. Chad is very difficult -- when you get into eastern Chad, it's a very remote area, the roads are particularly problematic and so forth. So we've explored both of those and crossing from CAR, the Central African Republic, also.
There is an issue. The question is that the Sudan government has to be willing to allow that kind of assistance to pass, to enter Darfur, because that's their territory legally, but that kind of collaboration has not yet been achieved. When we talked to the Chadians about it earlier on, they said if it were under international auspices, they would allow that, but only if the Government of Sudan allowed. I think that's the general principle that's going to be the case. We believe that the corridor from Libya could turn out to be a very important corridor. For one thing, the road all the way down is paved and that's a big bonus. That corridor could also be used to benefit the refugees that are in Chad, more directly, even might be easier than going through Chad because of the way Chad is located in the center of the continent and so forth.
So yes, there would be benefits if we could do that. So far, we haven't been able to achieve it. We've explored those options and we know what we would do if, in fact, we were allowed to do it.
MR. DENIG: Okay. Let's go to the lady next to the pillar.
QUESTION: Thank you, Mr. Winter. My name is Esther Guithi, I work for the Voice of America, Africa division, and I have two questions for you. First, the Sudanese Foreign Minister, Osman Ismail is on record as saying that the Sudan Government will retaliate if there are foreign troops sent to quell the crisis in Darfur. I would like to know your comment on that. What do you read into that statement?
Number two, can you also update us on the U.S. proposal to the UN Security Council on the sanctions against Sudan if they do not disarm the Jingaweit militia?
MR. WINTER: I can talk a bit about those, but I won't be able to be entirely definitive and complete, because that's really a State Department function and responsibility. Yes, we've seen public reports and private reports, in the first instance that you mentioned, about a potential reaction from either the government-related or not related to the government people who would find international humanitarian intervention to be a hostile act. They would view it as a hostile act.
To be quite honest with you, I don't really know, obviously, what really will happen. I think things are pretty dicey at the moment in Khartoum as well as in Darfur, and I have no idea what action they may or may not take. What we do know is that there have been recent demonstrations within the last couple of days, even today, in which people at a local level are saying the kinds of things that you refer to. The assessment -- I'm not talking about [the assessment by] U.S. Government people, but [by] other people -- is that they are somewhat inspired by the government, but there is no U.S. documentation to that effect right now, that I'm aware of. And does that have to be taken seriously? Yes, it has to be taken seriously. Sudan has, unfortunately, turned out to be a very violent country for a very long period of time, and we would certainly take it seriously.
What do I think is going to happen? Again, I can't speak definitively on it. I understand that the UN Security Council is going to vote tomorrow, and the Secretary of State has indicated that it is a government responsibility to clean up the security issues constructively in western Sudan, and there's also been an indication that reaction from other ambassadors related to Security Council governments seems, at this point, to be positive. And so I don't know what else to do but to wait till tomorrow morning, sometime tomorrow.
MR. DENIG: Okay, we'll take the gentleman here, and then we'll go over there again.
QUESTION: Hi. Do --
MR. DENIG: Could you identify yourself, please?
QUESTION: Oh, Alex Halperin, Financial Times. Would foreign troops have the potential to alleviate the humanitarian crisis, in the sense of, shorten it from the 18 months you said it will take?
MR. WINTER: Well, I can speculate about that a little bit, I suppose. First of all, the AU has now gotten some monitors on the ground; I think the number is about 60. The intention is that number, along with some security, will rise to 300 or 300 plus. Rwanda and Nigeria have both indicated that they might supply some protective force for that.
Darfur is a very big place. They would be pretty thinly deployed. So, would it be adequate to provide a level of security? My senses say no, but it would be a good start. It would be an international presence within. From my experience, an international presence in most situations, if deployed energetically, can, in fact, materially impact on the security situation. When international eyes are there -- that's why we'd like to have a few more journalists there, too -- when international eyes are there, it is a helpful thing, and it does seem to come down on violence, in many cases. Therefore, I don't think that would be adequate to do everything that's needed to cut that body count down far.
There has not been any commitment at this point, although every option that I can think of has been discussed, to actually have the military participate in the humanitarian response itself. Generally, or at least within the humanitarian community, it gets problematic when you start to mix the military in a humanitarian function.
On the other hand, the potential for supporting an African Union military deployment, I think, has been actively considered, and I can't tell you with what consequences. But I think the African Union would require a lift, you know, airlift capacity, and a variety of other support arrangements if they were to deploy an adequate number to do the job.
MR. DENIG: I might point to the transcript of Tuesday's briefing that we had here with Assistant Secretary Holmes and Deputy Assistant Secretary Snyder, which commented on those questions as well. And Secretary Snyder made the point that in his experience in Africa, even a small monitoring force can be very effective in signaling international attention and in cutting down on the violence. And he pointed out the example of the successful ceasefire monitoring regime in the Nuba Mountains with a small monitoring team.
And then, in terms of forces overall, the hope, of course, is that the Government of Sudan itself will take control of the security situation, exercise its sovereignty in ending the violence that's going on, and, as Secretary Snyder said, if they feel they can't handle it alone, then they should by all means call on their friends to come in and assist them in doing so.
Let's go to Said over there.
QUESTION: Yes, good afternoon, my name is Said Arikat from Al-Quds daily newspaper. Sir, the Egyptian Government seems to be cautioning against what they call excessive pressure on the Government of Sudan; in essence, asking for an indefinite period of time for the Sudanese Government to comply.
Do you see this as a point of contention with the U.S. Government, especially in light of the Secretary's visit?
MR. WINTER: I really can't comment on that. That really is a security -- I mean a State Department thing. Let me tell you -- I said I can't comment and then I'm going to comment -- a little bit.
In my experience -- I've worked in Sudan for 23 years. This government came to power on June 30th of 1989 and it's my experience that they don't react in this kind of circumstance without pressure. That's my opinion. And we saw it throughout the war with the south on a number of occasions. So my personal perspective is that the pressure is useful.
I don't know, as a humanitarian worker, how to judge what is too much because people -- you're hearing -- just as what you said, people are suggesting that too much pressure could be problematic. It's also true that not enough pressure can be problematic, and I think there's a calibration that I'm not capable of really speaking to.
MR. DENIG: All right, let's go to Hoda up front here, please. Thank you.
QUESTION: Thank you. Hoda Tawfiq, Al Ahram, Egypt. If I can follow up on the role of the African unity and also Egypt and maybe Arab countries. How do you assess that role? Can this be a substitute for sanctions and giving time to the Government of Sudan to do something? And my question is, you said that this problem has been going on for 23 years?
MR. WINTER: No, no, no. I said I've been working in Sudan for 23 years.
QUESTION: Yeah. But how long this crisis have been?
MR. WINTER: This crisis began in February of last year, February 2003. It exploded in November/December of last year. So it's been highly visible to the international community for the last seven, eight, nine months.
QUESTION: Yeah, okay. So that's --
MR. WINTER: Yeah, let me --
QUESTION: Speak about the African unity.
MR. WINTER: A couple of comments. First of all, if I were to make a suggestion, I would suggest that Egypt could be very useful and help empowering the African Union to fulfill its role in Darfur. If there is concern about an international intervention of some sort from outside the region, well, let it come from within the region. That might be a better option. And Egypt is just up the road, or just up the river -- down the river. And I'm sure Egypt could be helpful in mobilizing other North African countries and that would give credibility to the entire effort. And I don't know whether it would be acceptable to the Government of Sudan or not, but I would think that would be a preferable option than to think of people coming from further afield.
Secondly, I would say, at least in my experience, what happens in Egypt is always of interest and import to how things are viewed in Khartoum, and I would desperately like to see more concern about what's happening in Darfur from both the African governments and also the governments of the Middle East or the Islamic community generally. This all would come off much better if it were a shared international responsibility in terms of ending this particular crisis and saving the lives of all those people that we're talking about being at risk.
QUESTION: Just a follow-up. Maybe these countries you speak about, they will be intimidated by the sanctions resolution or the threat of sanctions or whatever. Would you wait a little while to give these people a chance to work?
MR. WINTER: I'm not in a position to deal with that follow-up question. I think if you were on the humanitarian side -- and I'm already talking about something in the neighborhood of 70- or 80,000 dead, and every day that goes by that number gets bigger -- one would have to ask the question, "How long do you wait?" It has been a while. So I understand the perspective you're expressing. I think there are two sides that, to the question.
MR. DENIG: Again, I'd refer to Tuesday's transcript of the briefing here where this was referred to. There certainly is time. For one thing, there's a 30-day period proposed in the resolution, and only at the end of those 30 days would the Secretary General report to the Security Council and the Security Council would then consider what, if anything, to do. So there is time there. But, on the other hand, as Mr. Winter has pointed out, the clock is ticking in terms of people dying.
Let's go back to VOA for a minute and then we'll go to France in the middle.
QUESTION: Thank you, sir. Mr. Winter, you just mentioned that pressure can sometimes be useful, and I'm wondering if you can give us a sense of whether the U.S. feels that it has to act with extra caution when dealing with the Khartoum government regarding the Darfur crisis because, on the other hand, the Khartoum government seems to be progressing well with the Sudan peace talks with the southern rebels. I don't know if that waters down the pressure.
MR. WINTER: Well, from the U.S. Government's perspective, it is not one or the other; it's both. We want both. We want to see the peace with the SPLM finalized and implemented and we want the death and violence in Darfur to end, and we have related the two because the expectation -- I mean, I myself have worked on the peace process in the south for the last three years and I can tell you we want it-- we want it signed, sealed and delivered and implemented.
But, whereas the expectation has been that there would be a significant peace dividend that would come with the final signing of the peace between the government and the SPLM, that peace dividend, we have said clearly to Khartoum, is not going to be there for them as long as the Darfur situation continues.
MR. DENIG: All right, let's go to France in the middle.
QUESTION: Claude Porsella, Radio France Internationale. To go back to what my colleague from Mexico was talking about, international cooperation, I've read in the U.S. media on several occasion certain criticism about the lack of generosity of the European and, in particular, of France. Do you share this assessment?
MR. WINTER: Well, France usually provides support to humanitarian situations through the EU and, as I indicated, the EU is a partner with us. So usually, it's not a bilateral kind of contribution from France. It's a contribution through the EU.
Now, whereas we, for example, have provided most of the food aid, we, frankly, desperately need the EU and the countries of the EU to provide cash.
Why am I saying this? The American Food Aid program is a commodity-based program by law, and even if I wanted to change it, I don't have the power to change it. The food aid pipeline for Darfur will break about mid-September. What does that mean for cereals? It will break. What that means is, we and others have provided oils and pulses -- you know, pulses are special beans and so forth like that, and special commodities for the children who are starving that need a therapeutic kind of a -- But the basic cereals -- you know, wheat, maize, and so forth -- the pipeline will break in mid-September at this point. So what we have been doing is approaching our EU colleagues and asking them if they can put up cash to help make sure the pipeline does not break, because we'll come through with more of the commodities [later], but because of the long time it takes to come from the U.S., we're not able to get it there in time for September 15th or so.
So, if the EU would be very quick in terms of contributing resources for that, and some governments are unilaterally doing that, it would be a big help, because in the absence, the pipeline break would be very, very serious.
Is the food available? Yes, it's available right in Sudan. The Government of Sudan is a custodian of a major sorghum surplus this year. They don't just provide it to the needy Sudanese in Darfur, but they'll sell it. And that's what we call local purchase and that means you can ship it right up the road without having to travel across the Atlantic Ocean to the other side of the world and everything.
So yes, some European governments have come through on that. France's contribution is not, to me, particularly identifiable because it's merged in with EU contributions and we view the EU as a partner. Would we like to see a quicker disbursement of the commitments made by the EU? Absolutely. We have, in the United States, quick disbursing mechanisms. I must say, to be quite honest and frank, the disbursing mechanisms are slower with the EU and it would be a big help if they were moving quickly, because that's what the situation demands, I would suggest.
For Al Ahram, I would suggest that that issue of a local purchase, that surplus of sorghum, might be something that Egypt could take a look at, because if that sorghum were provided by the Government of Sudan into Darfur quickly, that would be the quickest way to get food to the population and avoid the pipeline break I'm talking about.
MR. DENIG: Washington File again?
QUESTION: Yeah, Jim Fisher Thompson again. Mr. Winter, you were really one of the first government officials here, top officials, I think, to call attention to this, which you called -- a thing that I covered over at USAID, I think, around the turn of the year. You used the term, I think, "ethnic cleansing" and "genocide." I believe you had just come back from a trip and you said you had been in a chopper and seen villages that had been burned out.
Some people are beginning to make parallels with Rwanda about this now. In other words, this is not only just -- you know, starvation caused by drought or something. You've just said there's food in the country, but that this is a political campaign aimed at a certain group of people.
Are we -- and you've just, you know, termed it a disaster in the making. Are we, in fact, potentially looking at another Rwanda here? In other words, a large-scale massacre of one group at least condoned by the central government while the rest of the world kind of is preoccupied or doesn't come to help on time?
MR. WINTER: My view is that the Secretary did the right thing when he asked for a legal determination, and let me explain why. But I do think at least the use of the term "ethnic cleansing" is appropriate. It's not a legal word and if you're on the ground, ethnic cleansing describes what you will see. What has happened is widespread. It is targeted. It is accompanied with actions that seem quite purposely to ensure that the population does not return to those particular areas. For example, the people who are being displaced are farmers and one of the things that is uniformly targeted by the people doing the violence is the destruction of irrigation systems. What's the point of that? Well, you can draw your own conclusions. And, of course, sometimes the raiders say, "This is our place now, you go and you can't come back."
If you go on the ground, you will find villages in close proximity, with one village or a group of villages entirely destroyed, and another one over here that is entirely untouched, and the ethnicities are different. So, yes, it does seem to be targeted. Yes, it does seem to be widespread clearance of the population off the land.
But I'm not a lawyer and I'm not the human rights guy. I'm the humanitarian guy. So we'll try to meet the needs of anybody that's affected by the conflict. The Secretary has said that he has requested a formal legal opinion as to whether the word "genocide" occurs, and you saw, probably last week, that both houses of the Congress passed resolutions that said they viewed it as genocide. I'm quite willing to wait at this point because we're already doing everything we can from the humanitarian side to meet the needs of the population.
In some ways, it falls back to the issue of intent. That's what the Genocide Convention speaks to. And I can tell you, because I worked during the genocide in Rwanda, if you were a Tutsi and you fell into the hands of the (inaudible), you were dead. There was no question about it. And you don't see quite that pattern here. So the question of intent is a legitimate thing for the Office of Legal Counsel to try to determine here. Hope you understand my point.
MR. DENIG: All right. Any other questions?
(No response.)
MR. DENIG: Okay. In that case, I want to thank Assistant Administrator Winter.
MR. WINTER: Thank you very much.
MR. DENIG: And thank you, ladies and gentlemen.
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