Testimony of Donald M. Kerr, Assistant Director, Laboratory
Division, FBI
Before the United
States Senate Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative
Oversight and the Courts
Regarding FBI Laboratory Support in TWA 800
May 10, 1999
"FBI Laboratory Support
in TWA 800"
Statement
of Lewis Schiliro
Good Afternoon, Mr. Chairman
and Members of the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity
to appear before you this afternoon to address the role of
the FBI Laboratory in the investigation of TWA 800.
As you may know, I did not become Assistant Director of the
FBI's Laboratory Division until October 1997, more than a
year after the explosion of TWA flight 800 off the Long Island
shore. I am familiar with the performance of Laboratory personnel
in that investigation, however, and am happy to answer any
questions you may have in that regard. Before discussing the
details of the Laboratory involvement in that investigation,
I would first like to provide a brief overview of current
Laboratory operations.
I. Current Overview of the
FBI Laboratory
First, and foremost, the FBI Laboratory is stronger, more
efficient, and better organized than it has ever been before.
This is due in part to the important role of oversight, including
that provided by this Committee, in ensuring the effective
performance of all components within the Laboratory. Perhaps
the most significant achievement during my tenure as Assistant
Director has been the formal accreditation of the Laboratory
by the American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors/Laboratory
Accreditation Board (ASCLD/LAB).
Even before it became an official
recommendation by the Department of Justice, Office of the
Inspector General (OIG), accreditation by ASCLD/LAB was among
the top priorities of Director Freeh. During the past several
years, the Laboratory has undergone numerous internal and
external reviews, enhanced its quality assurance system, and
modified its policies, practices and procedures in preparation
for accreditation. The FBI Laboratory includes eight disciplines
for which accreditation is available through ASCLD/LAB. Those
disciplines -- Controlled Substances, DNA, Serology, Firearms/Toolmarks,
Latent Prints, Questioned Documents, Toxicology, and Trace
Evidence -- were all fully accredited by ASCLD/LAB on September
11, 1998.
Two of the scientific disciplines
that I believe are of particular interest to the Committee
-- explosives examinations and metallurgy -- are not accreditable
by ASCLD/LAB. With regard to explosives examinations, however,
the chief of the FBI's Materials and Devices Unit, Dr. Tom
Jourdan, has been tirelessly pursuing a program to provide
for accreditation of explosives and hazardous devices examinations.
Toward that end, Dr. Jourdan has examined protocols and policies
of forensic laboratories worldwide and engaged in the exchange
of information with France, England, Ireland, Israel, and
Australia. As a result of these efforts, Dr. Jourdan hopes
to present ASCLD/LAB with an accreditation program for explosives
and hazardous devices at its annual meeting this September.
As for metallurgy, it is not
presently an accreditable discipline under ASCLD/LAB for several
reasons. First, forensic metallurgy is a narrow field of science
with a very limited number of qualified experts. Second, metallurgical
examinations are varied and often require a number of novel
examination approaches. Since examination protocols must necessarily
be general in their application, ASCLD/LAB has not developed
a program for certifying the metallurgical examination procedures.
Although only eight of the Laboratory's
disciplines were subject to, and approved for, ASCLD/LAB accreditation,
all of the other disciplines throughout the Laboratory, including
explosives and metallurgy, are held to similar standards.
A. Restructuring of the Laboratory
Division
In February, 1997, the FBI Laboratory
sought approval from the U.S. Department of Justice and the
Office of Personnel Management to establish four senior-level
scientists positions in the following disciplines: biological
sciences, chemical sciences, physical/materials sciences,
and computer/information sciences. Due in large part to the
exemption from Title V hiring restrictions granted by the
Congress, the Laboratory was able to select individuals who
possess exceptional qualifications for these positions.
In addition, the Engineering Sections at the Engineering Research
Facility at Quantico, Virginia have recently been assimilated
into Laboratory operations. This restructuring will be particularly
beneficial following the relocation of the FBI Laboratory
to its new facility in Quantico. Construction is currently
underway with a target relocation date of 2001.
B. Expansion and Upgrading
of Programs
During the past several years, the nation has witnessed several
major catastrophic events which have required the immediate
deployment of Laboratory personnel. The explosion aboard TWA
800, as well as the bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma
City, highlighted the critical need for immediate assistance
of scientific experts and evidence technicians at such mass
disaster scenes. As a result, the FBI Laboratory established
five Rapid Deployment Teams (RDTs) to respond to future crises.
Each of the teams includes Laboratory examiners and technicians,
as well as a senior-level Laboratory manager who serves as
Team Leader and liaison with the on-scene commander. Although
the teams are configured primarily to address bombing and
hazardous materials incidents, personnel from any discipline
may be assigned depending on the type of event requiring their
assistance.
The FBI's Evidence Response Team Program has continued to
expand and Evidence Response Teams have been deployed around
the world to major bombing crime scenes, most recently in
East Africa. There are presently over 100 teams located in
the various FBI Field Offices. Approximately 700 Agent ERT
members have received post-blast bombing crime scene training.
In February, 1997, the Explosives Unit of the FBI Laboratory
was restructured, separating the Bomb Data Center (BDC) from
the unit and merging the remainder of the unit with most functions
of the Materials Analysis Unit to form the Materials and Devices
Unit (MDU). The Chief of the MDU, Dr. Tom Jourdan, holds a
Master's Degrees in Synthetic Organic Chemistry and Nuclear
Chemistry, a Ph.D. in Chemistry, and has completed the U.S.
Navy's Explosive Ordnance School, Basic Demolition Course.
Under Dr. Jourdan's leadership, the MDU has increased its
personnel resources and technical capabilities. The MDU has
four broad areas of responsibility: examinations of evidence
associated with bombing matters, elemental analyses, scanning
electron microscopy, and metallurgical/materials science examinations.
The bombing matters examinations involve the identification
and intended function of recovered bomb components, as well
as direct field support in bombing crime scenes. During the
last couple of years, the following individuals have been
added to the staff of the MDU:
FOUR BOMB COMPONENT AND RECONSTRUCTION EXAMINERS WHO HAVE
RECENTLY JOINED THE MDU:
- John K. Underbakke -
B.S. in Criminal Justice.
Over 12 years of explosives training and experience in the
military.
Chief of the Army EOD Training Department and the Hazardous
Devices School.
Experience as field Evidence Response Team member.
- Rex A. Stockham -
B.S. in Chemistry.
Formerly worked as a Physical Science Technician in the
MDU prior to going to Agent's Training.
- Michael W. Hughes -
B.S. in Chemistry.
Formerly worked as a Physical Science Technician in the
MDU prior to going to Agent's Training.
- John W. McSwain -
B.S. in Accounting.
Special Agent Bomb Technician (SABT) for over 5 years.
Extensive experience in major bombing matters to include
OKBOMB, SOURGAS, and East Africa Embassy Bombings.
- Mark Withworth -
B.S. in Aeronautical Engineering
SABT for four years.
Extensive experience in bombing matters, to include a number
of international bombing scenes
- METALLURGISTS:
- Dr. Mike Smith -
Senior FBI metallurgist who is presently receiving cross-
training as an explosives device examiner.
- Eric Jensen -
M.S. in Physics
In addition to its present staff,
two applicants have been selected to join the MDU and are
currently in a background investigation phase. One individual
has a Ph.D. in Inorganic Chemistry and postdoctoral work in
the areas of energetic materials, as well as analytical chemistry.
This individual directs research and development for the testing
of energetic materials and has conducted contract research
for a number of domestic and international agencies. He brings
with him significant hands-on experience with explosives.
The other applicant has an M.S. degree in Physics. He is also
a research scientist who has directed operations and research
programs which involve the field testing of improvised explosives.
In addition, he has managed the mathematical modeling of these
energetic materials.
The staffing concept of the
MDU has been to meld together individuals who possess extensive
experience in hands-on, post- blast bombing crime scene search
and component recognition/ reconstruction with scientists
who possess strong explosives backgrounds and academic credentials
that complement and support the collection and examination
processes, as well as research and development activities.
It should be noted that in any major bombing investigation,
the Laboratory employs an interdisciplinary team approach
in which the MDU examiners work with colleagues from the Chemistry
Unit and other forensic units of the Laboratory, as well as
field crime scene search and bomb technician personnel.
In furtherance of its training
mission, the MDU has centralized the FBI's post-blast investigations
training and staffed it with the SABT instructors who also
conduct the forensic bomb device examinations and reconstructions.
As a separate unit, the BDC
has expanded and upgraded a number of its programs. SABTs
have received expanded training and now, upon request, can
assist as well as provide training to state and local bomb
squads. The BDC provides program management and oversight
to the Hazardous Devices School (HDS), at Redstone Arsenal,
Alabama, which is the only source of certification for public
safety bomb technicians. It also recently hosted a National
Bomb Squad Commanders' Conference which was attended by over
130 participants. In addition, the BDC has been actively involved
in a variety of research and development projects seeking
to increase the technical capabilities of public safety bomb
squads to safely detect, diagnose, and defeat bombs, with
an emphasis on chemical and biological devices and large vehicle
bombs. As part of its mission, the BDC provides planning and
operational assistance to public safety bomb squads during
special events, such as the recent NATO 50th Anniversary Summit
in Washington, D.C.
The Hazardous Materials Response
Unit (HMRU), which was formed in 1986, has expanded its programs
to counteract the threat of terrorism involving nuclear, biological
and chemical weapons. The HMRU has provided on-scene field
support and special event support on an ever-increasing basis.
It has provided training and equipment to FBI agents so that
they can respond to criminal acts involving the use of hazardous
materials.
As a result of its emphasis
on nuclear and mitochondrial DNA programs, the FBI Laboratory
has personal identification capabilities that can materially
assist in the identification of remains. Such capabilities
are available to support the identify of victims of mass disasters,
such as bombings and air crashes and complement the capabilities
of the FBI Disaster Squad.
C. Partnerships
The FBI Laboratory is committed
to and has long promoted interaction with other Laboratories
on specific cases and in technical working groups examining
broader issues. The Laboratory has established working partnerships
with other forensic laboratories, including the New York State
Police, the Texas Department of Public Safety, the Illinois
State Police, and the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension.
These partnerships provide for bilateral exchanges in areas
of quality assurance, audits, and training, resulting in stronger
forensic programs for all.
The Laboratory has also been
instrumental in the formation and technical leadership of
numerous scientific working groups within the forensic community.
The purpose of the scientific working groups is to develop
and standardize protocols and analytical practices in disciplines
such as materials analysis; friction ridge analysis, study
and technology; imaging technologies; digital evidence, bombing
and arson matters. Many FBI Laboratory examiners serve in
leadership roles in these groups as they seek to bring together
national and international experts to develop procedures,
protocols, training and accreditation guidelines.
Similar arrangements have been
developed between the FBI Laboratory and members of the Federal
scientific community. Through partnerships with the Department
of Energy, the Department of Defense, and the Environmental
Protection Agency, the FBI has been able to share information
and enhance forensic applications, the transfer of technology,
research and development, and specialized training.
The FBI Laboratory's involvement
in the TWA-800 investigation was an outstanding example of
good quality assurance practice. The same procedures that
are routinely utilized to ensure the integrity of evidence
and guard against contamination in the FBI Laboratory were
employed during the examinations at the Calverton Hangar,
where the aircraft examination and reconstruction efforts
took place. The FBI Laboratory assumed responsibility for
preparing the hangar, and utilized examiners from the Chemistry
Unit for analysis of control swabbings taken from the walls
and interior portions of the hangar. The Laboratory arranged
for a hazardous material contractor to cover the hangar floor
with protective material to guard against contamination.
During and since the TWA-800
investigation the FBI Laboratory has been acquiring the most
modern laboratory equipment and instrumentation to support
forensic analyses, particularly those relating to bombings
and weapons of mass destruction matters. In addition, Mobile
Modular Laboratories have been configured for deployment to
support on-site forensic analyses and examinations in a wide
spectrum of environments.
As part of its research and
development mission, the Laboratory has targeted critical
areas which will enhance its support of major crime investigations.
These efforts presently involve 16 internal research and development
activities, as well as 30 counterterrorism research projects
that have been outsourced to DOE national laboratories, private
sector vendors and academic institutions. These initiatives
focus on:
- Field Portable Explosives
Detection Technology
- Forensic Evidence Analysis
and Crime Scene Technology
- Information Infrastructure
Technology
- Specialized and Examiner
Training
- Victim and Terrorist Identification
- Remote, Render-safe Technology,
Detection of Explosives and Neutralization Techniques
- Hazardous Materials Response
- Computer Analysis Response
Team (CART)
- Latent Print Automation
II. Laboratory Support of
TWA-800 Investigation
The FBI Laboratory responded
quickly to the TWA 800 disaster on July 17, 1996. That evening,
the Evidence Response Team (ERT) from the Newark Division
of the FBI arrived at the scene. The following morning, three
examiners from the Materials and Devices Unit at FBI Headquarters
arrived in Calverton and were joined later that morning by
three examiners from the Chemistry Unit.
The first week following the
crash was devoted to the recovery of bodies. This was the
first priority of all personnel who arrived at the scene.
As a result, the only debris recovered was that which contained
bodies and that which was floating and washed up on the beach.
During the course of the investigation,
approximately 5,000 hours of on-site support was provided
by Laboratory examiners. Laboratory support was maintained
by teams who were rotated in and out during the investigation.
Over a million pieces of debris were recovered. Explosive
residue chemists conducted an exhaustive survey of wreckage
that entailed over 9,000 swabbings and examinations. Tens
of thousands of pieces of debris were visually inspected by
bomb technicians, with 116 subsequently submitted to the Laboratory
for further analysis.
It is important to note that
the FBI Laboratory's on-site support was provided despite
numerous other demands on its resources. Several examiners
and evidence technicians were reassigned to New York from
the ongoing investigation of the Kobar Towers bombing in Saudi
Arabia. Others reported to New York from Atlanta where the
Olympic Games were underway. Approximately one week after
the TWA-800 crash, the bombing of Centennial Park in Atlanta
occurred.
One of the major issues which
arose during the recovery phase, was the storage of the quickly
accumulating evidence. An FBI Agent from the Long Island Resident
Agency arranged for the use of an empty Grumman/U.S. Navy
hangar for evidence storage and ultimately for reconstruction
of the aircraft. The FBI and ATF then provided mobile equipment
for use in analyzing evidence at the site, while the U.S.
Navy engaged a private contractor to map out the location
of the debris on the ocean floor.
Security in and around the testing
areas of the hangar was tight. Only designated laboratory
personnel were allowed access and no weapons or ammunition
were allowed inside the hangar. Personnel from the FBI's Chemistry
Unit manned the testing area of the hangar from July 18, 1996,
the day after the crash, until November 8, 1996. Throughout
that time, all ships and vehicles used to transport evidence
were swabbed to ensure that no pre- existing residues were
present. In addition, over 9000 swabs and vacuum samples were
collected and tested, including all recovered seats and floorboards
and over 500 swabs were taken of the center fuel cell alone.
Over 60 Laboratory Division
employees from the Evidence Response Team, Materials and Devices,
Bomb Data Center, Chemistry, Trace Evidence, Latent Fingerprint
and Special Photographic units worked on the case back in
Washington, providing many additional thousands of hours of
support.
On August 23, 1996, we announced
that scientific analysis conducted by federal examiners had
found microscopic explosive traces of unknown origin relating
to flight 800. We also advised, however, that based upon all
of the scientific and forensic evidence analyzed up to that
time, we could not conclude that the flight had crashed as
a result of an explosive device.
Shortly thereafter, on August
30, 1996, we announced that additional microscopic explosive
traces of unknown origin had been found. We again reiterated
that we still could not conclude that the aircraft was brought
down by an explosive device.
These announcements came after
extensive discussions among senior level scientists and the
on-scene commanders. The Laboratory personnel noted that the
finding of explosives residue without the corresponding blast
damage could not yet be explained and cautioned against jumping
to false conclusions.
The New York Office management
carefully weighed the information provided by the Laboratory
and, together with Director Freeh, decided to issue the above
announcements. These events portray a careful, deliberative
process in which scientific findings were given proper consideration
and, ultimately, an appropriate public release of the information
was made.
During the initial months, continued
scientific testing continued to confirm that there was evidence
of explosives residue with no evidence of bomb blast or missile
effects. It was not until September 1996, that the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) announced that in June 1996,
the Boeing 747 known as TWA flight 800 had been used in a
Bomb Dog training exercise. Although this announcement solved
the anomaly of the bomb residue, it did not solve the mystery
of the cause of the explosion.
The Laboratory's finding and
reporting of these residues constituted the consummate double
blind test. Through the practice of good science and protocol,
the Laboratory confidently reported its findings at a time
when there was no explanation for the presence of such residues.
A number of metallurgists from
a number of different organizations worked on, or were consulted
about, the TWA-800 crash. These metallurgists worked well
together and were in agreement with the Laboratory explosives
examiners that there was no indicia of blast effects or missile
strike.
III. Lessons Learned
Earlier this year, an after-action
meeting was held at Calverton to discuss the events surrounding
the investigation of TWA flight 800 and to identify optimal
practices for a future major aircraft downing investigation.
The agencies attending the meeting were as follows: the FBI,
the National Transportation Safety Board, the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms, the Federal Aviation Administration,
the Department of Defense-Office of Special Technology, Defense
Intelligence Agency - Missile and Space Intelligence Center,
Naval Air Warfare Center, Air Force Research Laboratory, and
the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. I would like to
note that all attendees expressed satisfaction with the meeting
and found it to be very constructive and productive. There
was no sign of hostility, nor disagreement, among the participants.
At this meeting the need for
a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the FBI and the
NTSB was recognized. This MOU would set forth each agency's
role and responsibilities and define the interaction that
should occur between the two agencies during the investigation
of a transportation disaster.
The FBI and the NTSB also agreed
to pursue cross-training of personnel in order to provide
investigators with a better understanding of each agency's
mission and responsibilities. As a result, the FBI's Evidence
Response Teams will participate in NTSB Crash Investigation
Courses and NTSB investigators will attend FBI ERT training.
This cross-training will commence next month.
In closing, I would like to
say that in the TWA-800 investigation and the more recent
East Africa bombings, the FBI has demonstrated its ability
to address major challenges wherever they may occur. The lessons
learned have enhanced our capabilities and identified optimal
practices that will help the FBI Laboratory to meet the challenges
of the future.
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