Testimony
of Louis J. Freeh, Director, FBI
Before the Senate
Committee on Appropriations
Subcommittee for the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and
State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
February 4, 1999
"President's Fiscal Year
2000 Budget"
Good morning, Mr. Chairman and
members of the Subcommittee. I am pleased to have this opportunity
to join Attorney General Reno and Secretary of State Albright
in discussing the threat to the United States posed by terrorists
both abroad and at home.
At the outset, I would like to thank you and the Subcommittee
for your extraordinary support for the FBI's counterterrorism
programs and initiatives. Over the past several years, you
have generously provided us with additional agents, technicians,
and analysts, as well as the technical and forensic tools,
that allow us to respond quickly and effectively to acts of
terrorism against the United States and its citizens wherever
they occur -- including, most recently, in Dar es Salaam,
Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya. Annual funding for the FBI's
Counterterrorism program has grown from $78.5 million in 1993
to $301.2 million in 1999. The number of agents funded for
counterterrorism investigations has grown from 550 in 1993
to 1,383 in 1999. You have also provided additional funding
for many programs in the FBI Laboratory and Critical Incident
Response Group that directly support the FBI's capability
for responding to the threat and acts of terrorism. I am confident
that our efforts will justify your past commitment and continued
support to this important area of the FBI's responsibility.
I would also like to commend the Subcommittee for its leadership
in directing the preparation of the 5-year interagency plan
that was submitted to the Congress on December 30, 1998. As
you are aware, the preparation of the plan coincided with
the preparation of two major Presidential Decision Directives
regarding counterterrorism (PDD-62) and critical infrastructure
protection (PDD-63). The plan was also prepared at the same
time the FBI and many other agencies were responding to the
terrorist bombings of United States Embassies in East Africa.
I believe the Subcommittee will find the recommendations of
the plan to be particularly timely, consistent with these
recent executive orders, and reflect many of the lessons learned
from our most recent experiences.
To help put today's discussion in perspective, I would like
to start with a summary of the FBI's deployment and investigation
of the recent terrorist bombings in East Africa and follow
with an assessment of the current international and domestic
terrorist threat and lessons learned from our recent experiences.
Finally, I would like to describe current FBI counterterrorism
initiatives, including those proposed in our 2000 budget request
to Congress.
The Bombings in East Africa
On August 7, 1998, at approximately 10:40 a.m., local time,
a bomb exploded near the United States Embassy in Dar es Salaam,
Tanzania. Almost simultaneously, a bomb detonated near the
United States Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya. The toll in both
bombings, in terms of lives lost, persons injured, and damage
to buildings, was substantial. In Dar es Salaam, 11 persons
were killed, 7 of whom were foreign service nationals employed
by the United States at the Embassy. Another 74 persons were
injured, including 2 American citizens and 5 foreign service
nationals. In Nairobi, where the United States Embassy was
located in a congested downtown area, 213 persons were killed,
including 12 American citizens and 32 foreign service nationals
employed at the Embassy. Approximately 4,500 persons were
treated for injuries, including 13 Americans and 16 foreign
service nationals.
Immediately upon notification of the bombings, agencies of
the United States Government began to marshal their resources
to respond to these acts of terrorism. Two Foreign Emergency
Support Teams (FEST) departed Andrews Air Force Base at approximately
2:30 p.m. EST on August 7. FEST is a multiagency team, including
members of the FBI, that is deployed to international emergencies
involving United States interests to advise and assist local
Ambassadors and embassy personnel in dealing with crisis situations.
FEST is coordinated by the United States Department of State.
The FBI had eight representatives on the two FEST teams. We
were also able to include 19 others as part of a FBI advance
team.
Based upon our jurisdiction for the investigation of certain
crimes committed against American persons and property abroad,
the FBI began the deployment of agents, Evidence Response
Teams, technicians and laboratory examiners, and other personnel
and equipment to Dar es Salaam and Nairobi. We activated our
Strategic Information and Operations Center at FBI Headquarters
to coordinate FBI efforts with our Counterterrorism Center
and other government agencies. Among the first steps we took
was to direct our Legal Attaches in Cairo, Egypt, and Pretoria,
South Africa, to respond to the scenes in Dar es Salaam and
Nairobi, respectively. Our Legal Attaches were the first non-resident
United States law enforcement officials to arrive on scene.
Upon arriving, these individuals were able to establish a
cooperative relationship with appropriate Tanzanian and Kenyan
law enforcement authorities and United States Embassy personnel,
including Diplomatic Security Service agents serving in these
posts. Our Legal Attaches also assisted in establishing logistical
support for FBI rapid deployment teams that subsequently arrived
in both locations. The first increment of the FBI investigative
team arrived in East Africa 40 hours after the bombings.
At our peak, the FBI had approximately 500 personnel on the
ground in East Africa. Among the individuals deployed were
members of our Joint Terrorism Task Forces from New York City.
We also were assisted by explosives experts from the United
Kingdom. Over the course of the eight-weeks immediately following
the bombings, the FBI:
· logged 61 flight missions, of which 16 were transoceanic;
· transported over 1,000 agents, technicians, examiners,
and other employees deployed to and from East Africa; and
· moved 295 tons of equipment, supplies, and related
items to support our investigative teams.
From the two crime scenes in Tanzania and Kenya, as well as
from investigation and searches conducted in surrounding African
nations and Pakistan, we collected and transported back to
the FBI Laboratory more than three tons of evidentiary materials
for examination and analysis. Our on-scene deployments in
Dar es Salaam and Nairobi temporarily created what would have
been among the largest FBI field offices in the United States.
As you can imagine, providing extended operational and administrative
support to such a large overseas contingent was especially
challenging and trying. It was not something that we accomplished
on our own. In a large-scale overseas deployment such as East
Africa, we must depend upon support and cooperation from our
partners in the Departments of Defense and State. I would
like to acknowledge the tremendous job performed by the men
and women of the Departments of Defense and State under very
adverse and trying circumstances. And, I am equally proud
of the way our own personnel rose to meet the challenges presented
by this difficult investigation.
We received exceptional cooperation and assistance from the
governments of Tanzania and Kenya in conducting our investigation.
They allowed us to recover and remove evidence for examination
and transport it back to the United States. They also allowed
us to conduct interviews and searches. The relationship established
by our Legal Attache from Pretoria with Kenyan authorities
was instrumental in that country's decision to allow the removal
of two suspects for prosecution in the United States. We were
also able to conduct investigation and searches in several
other countries and locations.
As a result of these investigative efforts, 11 individuals
associated with al-Qaeda, including Usama bin Laden, have
each been indicted for conspiracy to kill United States nationals,
the bombings of the United States Embassies in Tanzania and
Kenya, and murder. One other individual, also an al-Qaeda
member, has been indicted for conspiracy to kill United States
nationals, perjury before a Federal Grand Jury, and lying
to a Special Agent of the FBI. The progress and results that
have been obtained in this case are the result of cooperation
among many agencies, including the FBI, the Criminal Division,
the United States Attorneys' offices in New York City and
Washington, D.C., the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department
of State, and Department of Defense, working together unselfishly
in response to brutal acts of terrorism committed against
the United States. Unfortunately, the bombing of United States
Embassies in East Africa is only the latest in a series of
international terrorist incidents directed against United
States interests and policies.
The International Terrorist Situation
The current international terrorist threat can be divided
into three general categories that represent a serious and
distinct threat to the United States. These categories also
reflect, to a large degree, how terrorists have adapted their
tactics since the 1970's by learning from past successes and
failures, from becoming familiar with law enforcement capabilities
and tactics, and from exploiting technologies and weapons
that are increasingly available to them in the post-Cold War
era.
The first threat category, state sponsors of terrorism, violates
every convention of international law. State sponsors of terrorism
currently designated by the Department of State are: Iran,
Iraq, Syria, Sudan, Libya, Cuba, and North Korea. Put simply,
these nations view terrorism as a tool of foreign policy.
In recent years, the terrorist activities of Cuba and North
Korea appear to have declined as the economies of these countries
have deteriorated. However, the terrorist activities of the
other states I mentioned continue, and in some cases, have
intensified during the past several years.
The second category of the international terrorist threat
is represented by more formal terrorist organizations. These
autonomous, generally transnational, organizations have their
own infrastructures, personnel, financial arrangements, and
training facilities. These organizations are able to plan
and mount terrorist campaigns on an international basis and
actively support terrorist activities in the United States.
Extremist groups such as Lebanese Hizballah, the Egyptian
Al-Gama' Al- Islamiyya, and the Palestinian Hamas have supporters
in the United States who could be used to support an act of
terrorism here. Hizballah ranks among the most menacing of
these groups. It has staged many anti-American attacks in
other countries, such as the 1983 truck bombings of the United
States Embassy and the United States Marine Corps barracks
in Beirut, the 1984 bombing of the United States Embassy Annex
in Beirut, and the 1985 hijacking of TWA Flight 847 during
which United States Navy diver Robert Stehem, a passenger
on the flight, was murdered by the hijackers. Elements of
Hizballah were also responsible for the kidnaping and detention
of United States hostages in Lebanon throughout the 1980's.
The activities of American cells of Hizballah, Hamas, and
Al Gama' Al Islamiyya generally revolve around fund-raising
and low-level intelligence gathering. In addition, there are
still significant numbers of Iranian students attending United
States universities and technical institutions. A significant
number of these students are hardcore members of the pro-Iranian
student organization known as the Anjoman Islamie, which is
comprised almost exclusively of fanatical, anti-American,
Iranian Shiite Muslims. The Iranian Government relies heavily
upon these students studying in the United States for low-level
intelligence and technical expertise. However, the Anjoman
Islamie also represents a significant resource base upon which
the government of Iran can draw to maintain the capability
to mount operations against the United States, if it so decides.
The third category of international terrorist threat stems
from loosely affiliated extremists, characterized by rogue
terrorists such as Ramzi Ahmed Yousef and international terrorist
financier Usama bin Laden. These loosely affiliated extremists
may pose the most urgent threat to the United States because
these individuals bring together groups on an ad hoc, temporary
basis. By not being encumbered with the demands associated
with maintaining a rigid, organizational infrastructure, these
individuals are more difficult for law enforcement to track
and infiltrate. Individuals such as Ramzi Yousef and Usama
bin Laden have also demonstrated an ability to exploit mobility
and technology to avoid detection and to conduct terrorist
acts. Fortunately, in 1995, we were able to capture Yousef
and return him to the United States to stand trial for the
February 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center and the conspiracy
to attack American aircraft overseas. Yousef was convicted
in two trials and sentenced to life imprisonment.
The FBI believes that the threat posed by international terrorists
in each of these categories will continue for the foreseeable
future. As attention remains focused on Usama bin Laden in
the aftermath of the East African bombings, I believe it is
important to remember that rogue terrorists such as bin Laden
represent just one type of threat that the United States faces.
It is imperative that we maintain our capabilities to counter
the broad range of international terrorist threats that confront
the United States.
For many of us in this room, the threat of international terrorism
was literally brought home by the World Trade Center bombing
in February 1993. Although the plotters failed in their attempt
to topple one of the twin towers into the other, an outcome
that would have produced thousands of casualties, they succeeded
in causing millions of dollars worth of damage in a blast
that killed 6 persons and injured more than 1,000. After his
capture in 1995, Ramzi Yousef, the convicted mastermind behind
the New York City bombing and other terrorist acts, conceded
to investigators that a lack of funding forced his group's
hand in plotting the destruction of the World Trade Center.
Running short of money, the plotters could not assemble a
bomb as large as they had originally intended. The timing
of the attack was also rushed by a lack of finances. Incredibly,
the plotters' desire to recoup the deposit fee on the rental
truck used to transport the bomb helped lead investigators
to them. As horrible as that act was, it could very well have
been much more devastating.
We are fortunate that in the nearly six years since the World
Trade Center bombing, no significant act of foreign-directed
terrorism has occurred on American soil. At the same time,
however, we have witnessed a pattern of terrorist attacks
that are either directed at United States interests or initiated
in response to United States Government policies and actions.
Among these acts are:
-
the 1993
murders of two Central Intelligence Agency employees and
the wounding of several others by Mir Amal Kasi in Langley,
Virginia;
-
the March
1995 attack against three employees of the United States
consulate in Karachi, Pakistan, which resulted in the
deaths of two Americans;
-
the July
1995 hostage taking of four western tourists, including
an American, by terrorists in Kashmiri, India;
-
the plot
by Shayk Omar Abdel Rahman and his followers to bomb several
New York City landmarks, including the United Nations
building, the Holland and Lincoln Tunnels, and federal
buildings;
-
the November
1995 bombing of a Saudi Arabian National Guard building
in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, which resulted in the deaths
of five United States citizens assigned to the United
States military training mission to Saudi Arabia;
-
the June
1996 bombing at the Al-Khobar Towers, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia,
which resulted in the deaths of 19 United States servicemen
and the injury of 240 other military personnel and dependents;
-
a plot led
by Ramzi Yousef to destroy numerous United States air
carriers in a simultaneous operation;
-
a plot, also
led by Ramzi Yousef, to kidnap and kill United States
diplomats and foreign officials in Pakistan;
-
the November
1997 ambush and massacre of foreign tourists in Luxor,
Egypt, which appears to have been undertaken to pressure
the United States Government to release Shayk Rahman from
federal prison;
-
the November
1997 murder of four United States businessmen and their
driver in Karachi, Pakistan, believed to be in retaliation
against the FBI's capture and rendition of Mir Amal Kasi;
-
the kidnaping
of seven Americans during 1998 in Colombia by terrorists
groups, bringing to 92 the total number of United States
citizens reported kidnaped in that country between 1980
and 1998, of which 12 Americans have died in captivity;
and
-
the December
1998 kidnaping of a group of western tourists, including
two Americans, by terrorists in Yemen, during which four
hostages were killed and one American hostage wounded
when Yemeni security forces attempted a rescue operation.
As these examples illustrate,
the threat of terrorism is real both at home and abroad. Usama
bin Laden readily acknowledges trying to obtain chemical and
biological weapons for use in his jihad, or holy war, against
the United States. We also know that domestic terrorist groups
have also expressed interest in chemical and biological agents.
The willingness of terrorists to carry out more large-scale
incidents designed for maximum destruction places a larger
proportion of our population at risk. Today, Americans engaged
in activities as routine as working in an office building,
commuting to and from work, or visiting museums and historical
sites in foreign lands, can become random victims in a deadly
game acted out by international terrorists. America's democratic
tradition and global presence make United States citizens
and interests targets for opportunists who are willing to
shed the blood of innocents for their causes.
Responding to the Threat of International Terrorism
The United States has developed a strong response to international
terrorism. Legislation and Executive Orders enacted over the
past 15 years have strengthened the ability of the United
States Government to protect its citizens through five affirmative
ways: diplomacy, sanctions, covert operations, military options,
and law enforcement actions. For this, the Congress and the
Executive Branch deserve the gratitude of the American people.
We cannot accurately gauge how many potential strikes our
government's strong stand against terrorism has discouraged.
We can, however, measure with considerable satisfaction the
success we have had in preventing plots detected in the planning
stages and our successes in investigating, locating, apprehending,
and prosecuting individuals who have carried out terrorist
activities. I would like to highlight two aspects of this
response, renditions and fund raising, that demonstrate the
commitment of the United States Government to combating terrorism.
During the past decade, the United States has successfully
obtained custody of 13 suspected international terrorists
from foreign countries to stand trial in the United States
for acts or planned acts of terrorism against our citizens.
Based on its policy of treating terrorists as criminals and
applying the rule of law against them, the United States is
one of the most visible and effective forces in identifying,
locating, and apprehending terrorists on American soil and
overseas. The majority of terrorist renditions have been accomplished
with the cooperation of the foreign government in which the
terrorist suspect was located. Among the individuals recently
returned to the United States by this process have been Mir
Amal Kasi, who shot and killed two Central Intelligence Agency
employees in Langley, Virginia, in 1993, and who was rendered
from Afghanistan to the United States in 1997, and Tsutomo
Shirosaki, a Japanese Red Army member, who was rendered to
the United States in 1996, more than 10 years after firing
rockets at the United States Diplomatic Compound in Jakarta,
Indonesia. Every time the United States obtains custody of
a terrorist for trial, we send a clear message to terrorists
everywhere that no matter how long it takes, no matter the
difficulty, we will find you and you will be held accountable
for your actions.
During Fiscal Year 1998, FBI investigative actions prevented
10 planned terrorist acts. Nine acts were prevented with the
arrest of six members of an Illinois-based white supremacist
group who were planning to target the Southern Poverty Law
Center and its founder, Morris Dees; the Simon Weisenthal
Center; and the New York City office of the Anti- Defamation
League of B'nai B'rith. This group had also discussed robbing
an armored car using a LAW rocket; poisoning the water supply
of East St. Louis, Illinois; and committing several murders,
including a homosexual man, a black female attorney, a member
of another white supremacist group who had made derogatory
comments about the Aryan Nations, and a former member of their
own group. The arrest of Byron Bazarte in August 1998 prevented
the bombing of an unspecified target in Washington, D.C.
Using the authorities provided under Section 302 of the Anti-Terrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, the Secretary of
State, in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary
of the Treasury, has designated 30 groups as foreign terrorist
organizations. This designation allows the United States Government
to take actions to block the transfer of funds in the United
States in which these organizations have an interest. The
FBI provided information concerning various organizations
to the Department of State to assist it in compiling the list
of foreign terrorist organizations. Consistent with provisions
of the Act, the FBI did not make recommendations concerning
which groups should be designated as foreign terrorist organizations.
In July 1998, the FBI arrested Mawzi Mustapha Assi, a procurement
agent for a foreign terrorist organization, in Dearborn, Michigan,
in July 1998, on criminal charges relating to providing material
support to a foreign terrorist organization, export of materials
on the munitions control list, and other export violations.
The FBI and the United States Customs Service seized $124,000
worth of sensitive night vision and navigational devices.
Assi became a fugitive after the Government's unsuccessful
attempts to detain him prior to trial.
We believe these provisions provide law enforcement with a
potentially powerful tool to disrupt the ability of terrorist
organizations to fund their destructive activities. Investigations
into the financial operations of clandestine organizations
on the shadowy fringes of international politics can be particularly
complex, time consuming, and labor intensive. Organizations
have demonstrated an ability to reinvent themselves with new
names in an effort to thwart law enforcement efforts. As with
measures of this type, its most powerful impact may be from
its deterrent effect. As investigators and prosecutors build
successful cases and precedents to enforce anti-fund raising
activities, targeted groups may decide that fund raising in
the United States is too difficult and risky.
The Domestic Terrorism Threat
Domestic terrorist groups are those which are based and which
operate entirely within the United States, or its territories,
and whose activities are directed at elements of the United
States Government or its civilian population. Domestic terrorist
groups represent interests that span the full political spectrum,
as well as social issues and concerns. FBI investigations
of domestic terrorist groups or individuals are not predicated
upon social or political beliefs; rather, they are based upon
planned or actual criminal activity. The current domestic
terrorist threat primarily comes from right-wing extremist
groups, Puerto Rican extremist groups, and special interest
extremists.
Right-wing Extremist Groups. The threat from right-wing
extremist groups includes militias, white-separatist groups,
and anti-government groups. All right-wing extremist groups
tend to encourage massing weapons, ammunition and supplies
in preparation for a confrontation with federal law enforcement,
as well as local law enforcement who are often perceived as
agents for the State/Federal government.
The goal of the militia movement is to defend and protect
the United States Constitution from those who want to take
away the rights of Americans. The militia movement believes
that the United States Constitution gives Americans the right
to live their lives without government interference. The FBI
is not concerned with every single aspect of the militia movement
since many militia members are law-abiding citizens who do
not pose a threat of violence. The FBI focuses on radical
elements of the militia movement capable and willing to
commit violence against government, law enforcement, civilian,
military and international targets (U.N., visiting foreign
military personnel). Not every state in the union has a militia
problem. Militia activity varies from states with almost no
militia activity (Hawaii, Connecticut) to states with thousands
of active militia members (Michigan, Texas).
The American militia movement has grown over the last decade.
Factors contributing to growth include:
-
GUNS- The right to bear arms is an issue which almost all
militia members agree and most militia members believe
a conspiracy exists to take away their guns. The national
system of instant background checks for all gun buyers,
mandated by the 1993 Brady Act and which actually was
implemented on November 30, 1998, has further angered
many militia groups. These militia members see this
new law as another example of how the government is
conspiring to take away their guns. The banning of semiautomatic
assault weapons has also angered many militia members
.
-
STATE
LAWS- Militias resent
state laws forbidding them to gather together to fire
weapons. Sixteen states have laws which prohibit
all militia groups and 17 states have laws which
prohibit all paramilitary training.
-
MISTRUST
OF FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT-
is frequently mentioned in militia literature and overall
militia mythology. FBI and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco
and Firearms (ATF) actions, such as Ruby Ridge, the
Branch Davidians, and the Freeman standoff, are cited,
and thus are hated and distrusted by many militia members.
-
TAXES- Militia members believe that they pay too many taxes
and that those tax dollars are wasted by a huge, uncaring
and inefficient bureaucracy in Washington, D.C. Since
the Internal Revenue Service collects federal taxes,
it is widely hated by militia members.
-
THE
UNITED NATIONS - is perceived
as an organization bent on taking over the world and
destroying American democracy and establishing "the
New World Order." The New World Order theory holds
that, one day, the United Nations will lead a military
coup against the nations of the world to form a one-world
government. United Nations troops, consisting of foreign
armies, will commence a military takeover of America.
The United Nations will mainly use foreign troops on
American soil because foreigners will have fewer reservations
about killing American citizens. Captured United States
military bases will be used to help conquer the rest
of the world.
Most of the militia movement
has no racial overtones and does not espouse bigotry; there
are some black and Jewish militia members. However, the pseudo-religion
of Christian Identity, as well as other hate philosophies,
have begun to creep into the militia movement. This scenario
is currently being played out in the Michigan Militia, arguably
the largest militia group in America. Lynn Van Huizen, leader
of the Michigan Militia Corps, is currently trying to oust
Christian Identity factions from his group. Christian Identity
is a belief system that provides both a religious base for
racism and anti-Semitism, and an ideological rationale for
violence against minorities. This pattern of racist elements
seeping into the militia movement is a disturbing trend, as
it will only strengthen the radical elements of the militias.
Many white supremacist groups adhere to the Christian Identity
belief system, which holds that the world is on the verge
of a final apocalyptic struggle between God/Christ and Satan
(The Battle of Armageddon) in which Aryans (European Caucasians)
must fight Satan's heirs: Jews, nonwhites and their establishment
allies (i.e., the Federal Government). The Christian Identity
belief system (also known as Kingdom Identity) provides a
religious base for racism and anti-Semitism, and an ideological
rationale for violence against minorities and their white
allies. Christian Identity teaches that the white race is
the chosen race of God, whites are the "true Israelites"
and Jews are the Children of Satan. Adherents believe that
Jews have increasingly gained control of the United States
Federal Government and are attempting to enslave the white
population by enacting laws subjugating the white people,
such as affirmative action, pro-choice, and anti-gun statutes.
To prepare for Armageddon, many Identity adherents engage
in survivalist and paramilitary training, storing foodstuffs
and supplies, and caching weapons and ammunition. As the next
millennium approaches, Identity's more extreme members may
take action to prepare for Armageddon, including armed robbery
to finance the upcoming battle, destroying government property
and infrastructure, and targeting Jews and nonwhites.
Due to Christian Identity adherents' widespread propaganda
efforts and Identity's racist/anti-Semitic/anti-government
appeal, there are a number of churches and diverse organizations
throughout the United States that embrace the doctrines of
Identity. Identity beliefs are also increasingly found in
the rhetoric of all types of right-wing extremist groups,
including, but not limited to, militias, survivalist communes,
the Ku Klux Klan, neo-Nazis, skinheads, tax protesters, and
common law courts. Thus, with the approaching millennium,
there is a greater potential for members from such Identity
influenced groups to engage in violent activities as well.
As the next millennium approaches, violent and illegal acts
may increase, due to Christian Identity's belief that the
world is on the verge of a final apocalyptic struggle (aka
The Battle of Armageddon) between God/Christ and Satan. Identity
members believe that this entails Aryans (European Caucasians)
fighting Satan's heirs (Jews, non-whites, and their establishment
allies). To prepare, Identity adherents engage in survivalist
and paramilitary training. As the year 2000 approaches, more
extreme members may take action to prepare for or bring about
"Armageddon," including armed robbery to finance
the upcoming battle, destroying government property and targeting
Jews and non-whites.
Other Anti-Government Groups. The other right-wing
anti-government groups include Freemen, "sovereign"
citizens, and common law courts. The Freemen and sovereign
citizens believe they have the right to renounce their citizenship,
after which they do not have to comply with any laws or rules
and the federal government would have no influence over them.
In addition, some, like the Freemen, believe they have the
right to issue their own money which is called "certified
comptroller warrants."
Some members of the right-wing have formed their own system
of laws to enforce and follow (called common law courts) to
replace the existing court system. The common law courts have
no basis in jurisprudence, but participants claim legitimacy
based on the laws of the Old Testament, English common law,
the Magna Carta and commercial law. Some common law courts
have issued arrest warrants, but as of yet, there are no reports
that any of these arrests have been accomplished.
Puerto Rican Extremist Groups. A resurgence in Puerto
Rican extremism has occurred in the past six months. A nearly
decade-long hiatus in terrorist activity ended on March 31,
1998, with the detonation of an incendiary device at the "Superaquaduct"
construction project in Arecibo, Puerto Rico. On June 9, 1998,
a bomb exploded outside a branch of Banco Popular in
Rio Piedras, Puerto Rico. The EPB-Macheteros publicly claimed
responsibility for both attacks, citing environmental concerns
and opposition to the privatization of the Puerto Rico Telephone
Company.
Puerto Rican extremism remains a concern to the FBI. Traditionally,
the Puerto Rican Terrorists have targeted United States establishments
and interests in an effort to gain Puerto Rican independence.
On December 13, 1998, Puerto Ricans voted in a non-binding
referendum concerning Puerto Rico's political status. Voters
were given the opportunity to vote for independence, continued
commonwealth status, statehood, free association, or none
of the above. Independence garnered precious little support
in the referendum, receiving a mere 2.5% of the vote, according
to media reports. Despite the lack of popular support for
independence, militant independence activists continue to
pursue independence through illegal means. Recently, July
25, 1998 marked the 100-year anniversary of the United States
invasion of Puerto Rico during the Spanish-American War. In
addition, several convicted Puerto Rican terrorists remain
incarcerated within the federal prison system, and militant
pro-independence activists continue to lobby for their release.
The militant independentistas may engage in violence
as a response to the prisoners' continued incarceration, or
as a symbolic commemoration of over 100 years of American
control over the island.
Special Interest Extremists. Special interest or single
issue extremists advocate violence and/or criminal activity
with the goal of effecting change in policy vis a vis one
specific aspect of society. The most recognizable single issue
terrorists at the present time are those involved in the violent
animal rights, anti-abortion, and environmental protection
movements. Each of these issues evoke strong emotions within
society at large, and violent aberrants continue to tarnish
the legitimate public debate on each issue.
The FBI continues to vigorously investigate various bombings
of abortion clinics and incidents of violence targeting abortion
providers across the country. The January 1998 bombing of
an abortion clinic in Birmingham, Alabama, has resulted in
a significant allocation of FBI manpower and resources to
the investigation of the bombing. The recent assassination
of Dr. Barnett Slepian in Buffalo, New York, serves as an
acute reminder of the very real threat posed by anti-abortion
extremists.
Animal rights extremists continue to pose significant challenges
for law enforcement as well. Various arsons and other incidents
of property destruction have been claimed by the Animal Liberation
Front (ALF) and the Earth Liberation Front (ELF). For example,
on October 19, 1998, the Vail Ski Resort suffered a series
of arson attacks that damaged or destroyed eight separate
structures and resulted in approximately $12 million in property
damage. In a communique issued to various news agencies in
Colorado, ELF claimed responsibility for the arsons in retaliation
for the resort's plans to expand its ski areas. The group
claimed that the proposed expansion would destroy the last
remaining habitat in Colorado for the lynx.
Although the frequency of terrorist incidents within the United
States has decreased in number, the potential for destruction
has increased as terrorists have turned toward large improvised
explosive devices to inflict maximum damage. The ease with
which people can obtain the recipes for manufacturing explosives
and developing chemical and biological weapons facilitates
the potential of a major incident. As technology and materials
become more accessible, the possibility of misuse and subsequent
fatalities increases. One has only to look at the bombing
of the Murrah Federal Building, in Oklahoma City, to see the
devastating potential for a terrorist act. Prior to April
19, 1995, no one would have believed that Americans would
commit such a tragic act against other Americans. But they
did, and the potential for another such incident continues.
Looking Forward
If there was ever any doubt about the level of commitment
and determination that drives rogue terrorists to strike their
perceived enemies, convicted terrorist Ramzi Yousef provided
a glimpse into the mind set of these individuals. When sentenced
to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, Yousef
boasted of his destructive exploits saying, "Yes, I am
a terrorist and proud of it."
Today's terrorists have learned from the successes and mistakes
of terrorists who went before them. The terrorists of tomorrow
will learn from the successes and mistakes of the Ramzi Yousef,
Usama bin Laden, and others. Tomorrow's terrorists will have
an even more dizzying array of deadly weapons and technologies,
including chemical and biological agents and computer networks,
available to them for committing their insidious acts. We
cannot lull ourselves into a false sense of security based
on the capabilities that exist today and the successes we
have achieved. Rather, we must continue to improve upon our
existing readiness and develop the capabilities, technologies,
and techniques that will be required to keep pace with acts
of terrorism in the future.
The FBI has developed its Strategic Plan for 1998 - 2003 to
guide us as we deal with the challenges and changing crime
problems that face this organization. Under this plan, we
have identified as our highest priority foreign intelligence,
terrorist, and criminal activities that directly threaten
the national or economic security of the United States. Two
of the strategic goals set for this priority area are especially
relevant to the problems we are discussing today:
· Prevent, disrupt,
and defeat terrorist operations before they occur; and
· Deter the unlawful exploitation of emerging technologies
by foreign powers, terrorists, and criminal elements.
Our goal is to move beyond just responding to acts of terrorism,
whether these terrorist acts be bombings here in the United
States or in foreign countries or cyber attacks against the
national information infrastructure. We recognize that to
be successful in the future, the FBI must become more proactive
in dealing with these complex threats and problems.
I would like to discuss several areas that I believe are especially
important to our national response to the problem posed by
terrorism. In doing so, I would like to highlight some of
the programs and investments the Subcommittee has supported
in prior years and our requests for the 2000 budget. For 2000,
the FBI is requesting increases totaling $9,000,000 for our
Counterterrorism initiative and 207 positions (60 agents)
and $36,742,000 for our Technology and Cyber Crimes initiative.
Rapid Deployment. The United States Government's response
to the bombings in East Africa demonstrated the firm and unequivocal
commitment to responding to acts of terrorism wherever they
may occur. Terrorists must know that if they act against the
United States, the FBI will pursue them relentlessly and for
as long as it takes to bring them before the bar of justice.
Earlier, I described the scope of the deployment of FBI personnel
to East Africa. Based on that experience, in the aftermath
of the near simultaneous bombings in Tanzania and Kenya, I
directed the establishment of five FBI Rapid Deployment Teams
to provide a capability of responding to multiple incidents.
With the funding you provided in the Omnibus Consolidated
Appropriations and Emergency Supplemental Act of 1999, we
are establishing teams in New York City, Washington, D.C.
(2), Miami, and Los Angeles. Since the establishment of these
teams, there have been three instances where teams have been
placed on full alert due to the receipt of intelligence information
indicating a potential terrorist act.
We readily recognize that improvements are needed in working
with our partners at the Department of Defense so that necessary
airlift support for future deployments can be staged in a
more timely and organized manner. Again, your interest and
assistance in the improving the capability of the Department
of Defense to provide aviation support to the FBI is greatly
appreciated and will help us place advance teams on scene
faster. As directed by Congress, we are also working to develop
a memorandum of understanding with the Department of Defense
to address the full scope of airlift support and related services
that are required by the FBI.
Intelligence Collection, Analysis, and Dissemination.
The collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence
regarding terrorist activities and threats are critical to
the success of FBI efforts to prevent incidents and in the
investigation of acts that do occur. Within the FBI, we have
several programs and initiatives to do this.
With the Subcommittee's support, the FBI established the Counterterrorism
Center at FBI Headquarters in 1995. The FBI Counterterrorism
Center encompasses the operations of the FBI's International
Terrorism Operations Section and Domestic Terrorism Operations
Section. Just this week the Diplomatic Security Service joined
nineteen other federal agencies assigning personnel to the
FBI Counterterrorism Center. Other agencies in the Center
include: the Air Force Office of Special Investigations, the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, the Federal Bureau
of Prisons, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence
Agency, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Defense,
the Department of Energy, the Department of Transportation,
the Environmental Protection Agency, the Federal Aviation
Administration, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Internal Revenue
Service, the National Security Agency, the Naval Criminal
Investigative Service, the United States Customs Service,
the United States Marshals Service, and the United States
Secret Service. The proposed National Domestic Preparedness
Office would also become a partner with the Counterterrorism
Center to ensure domestic preparedness programs and activities
can benefit from counterterrorism operational experiences
and reflect the most up-to-date threat information for making
decisions on training and equipment grants.
Providing intelligence and threat information to our State
and local partners is accomplished through the Counterterrorism
Center and the National Infrastructure Protection Center.
Depending upon the nature of the information, we use one or
more of several avenues for dissemination. The FBI has expanded
the Terrorist Threat Warning System, first implemented in
1989, to reach all aspects of the law enforcement and intelligence
communities. Nationwide dissemination of unclassified information
is achieved through the National Law Enforcement Telecommunications
System (NLETS). In addition, the FBI transmits threat information
to security managers of thousands of United States commercial
interests around the country through the Awareness of National
Security Issues and Response (ANSIR) program. The National
Infrastructure Protection Center also uses NLETS and ANSIR
to reach State and local law enforcement and others regarding
cyber and infrastructure-related threats and information.
The Center has developed the InfraGard program which facilitates
the sharing of information about computer intrusions and research
related to infrastructure protection among network participants.
The proposed National Domestic Preparedness Office anticipates
providing special bulletins and related information on weapons
of mass destruction issues to a much broader base of State
and local agencies, consisting of law enforcement, fire fighter,
emergency medical services, public health, and emergency management,
through the Law Enforcement On-Line intranet, a website accessible
through the Internet, newsletters, and a toll- free assistance
number.
Another mechanism for promoting coordination during an incident
is the FBI's new Strategic Information and Operations Center,
which was dedicated this past November. Congress provided
funding for this project beginning in 1995. The new Strategic
Information and Operations Center allows us to handle multiple
incidents simultaneously. It also provides us with greatly
enhanced communications capabilities between FBI Headquarters
and field offices, as well as between the FBI and other federal
agencies. Our coordination of operational efforts in East
Africa were hampered, somewhat, by the physical and technical
limitations of the old center.
The FBI and the Central Intelligence Agency have taken several
steps to improve cooperation between agencies, including the
exchange of deputies, exchange of personnel assigned to each
agency's counterterrorism center, joint meetings, and joint
operational and analytical initiatives.
At the field operational level, the FBI sponsors 18 Joint
Terrorism Task Forces in major cities to maximize interagency
cooperation and coordination among federal, State, and local
law enforcement. Currently, 327 full-time and part-time federal,
State, and local law enforcement personnel participate on
these task forces, in addition to FBI personnel. Federal law
enforcement participants include the Immigration and Naturalization
Service, the United States Secret Service, the Naval Criminal
Investigative Service, Central Intelligence Agency, Federal
Protective Service, United States Marshals Service, United
States Customs Service, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms, the United States Border Patrol, the United States
Department of State, the Postal Inspection Service, and the
Internal Revenue Service. All task force participants are
provided appropriate security clearances that are necessary
for their involvement in task force operations and investigations.
Joint Terrorism Task Forces have played a critical role in
many significant terrorism investigations. The FBI recently
expanded this concept to include Regional Terrorism Task Forces.
Regional task forces, of which two are now in existence, are
designed to meet the needs of communities where a terrorism
problem exists across a broader regional geographic area,
but the situation does not warrant a full-time task force.
Regional task forces meet on regular intervals to share information
they have collected and determine if there is a nexus for
that information to any ongoing investigation. The 5-Year
Interagency Counterterrorism and Technology Crime Plan supports
further expansion of FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces where
warranted by assessments of activity.
One of our most effective means of obtaining information is
the use of court- authorized electronic surveillance. Communication,
either written or conversations with accomplices, is central
to any collaborative effort -- including terrorist conspiracies.
The capability to lawfully intercept communications between
criminals, terrorists, and foreign intelligence agents, has
been instrumental in our past successes. These capabilities
help the FBI, as well as law enforcement in our States and
cities, to prevent acts and to save lives. This Subcommittee
has been supportive our efforts to ensure that law enforcement
does not lose its capabilities to lawfully intercept communications
in the growing digital telecommunications environment. I hope
that you will be able to support our request in the 2000 budget
for $15,000,000 to support reimbursements to telecommunications
carriers for costs incurred in complying with the Communications
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA).
Technology Development and Exploitation. Developing
and exploiting technology for law enforcement and counterterrorism
applications are a key to maintaining our edge in the war
against terrorists. This Subcommittee recognized the value
of research and development when you set out your instructions
and expectations for the 5-Year Interagency Counterterrorism
and Technology Crime Plan. In 1998, you provided the FBI with
$10,500,000 from the Attorney General's Counterterrorism Fund
for directed research and development projects. With that
1998 funding, as well as other funding appropriated for the
FBI Laboratory's Advanced Render Safe and Hazardous Materials
Response Programs, we took the following actions:
-
Entered
into an agreement with the Department of Energy to improve
access by the forensic community to America's national
laboratories by seeking to leverage resources in five
areas: research, development, test, and evaluation;
technology transfer; specialized training; specialized
forensic analytical support; and hazardous materials
response.
-
Initiated
17 projects under the Department of Energy agreement,
as well as awarded contracts for 11 other projects with
commercial and academic entities, in the areas of explosives
detection, forensic evidence analysis and crime scene
technology, information infrastructure technology, and
specialized training.
-
Began the
process to establish separate agreements with the Savannah
River Site and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.
-
Continued
our agreements with the United States Army Edgewood
Arsenal, Engineering Development and Education Center,
Naval Medical Research Center, United States Naval Medical
Center, and have begun the process of establishing other
agreements with other key components of the Department
of Defense.
-
Entered
into an agreement with the Southwest Surety Institute
at New Mexico State University to establish forensic
training that complements FBI forensic curriculum requirements
and which supports counterterrorism related operational
and support services.
-
Upgraded
and enhanced the Automated Computer Examination System
(ACES), an automated forensic search capability for
computer evidence, and enhanced technical support of
crime scene evidence collection and execution of court-authorized
electronic surveillance on computer networks.
I am pleased
that the FBI has been added to the Technical Support Working
Group (TSWG) Executive Committee. The Technical Support
Working Group is an interagency group that coordinates federal
research and development programs. The Department of State
and Department of Defense provide leadership to the group.
The FBI has used the Technical Support Working Group to
leverage its funding by joining with other agencies in co-sponsoring
projects. The FBI encourages support for existing, proven
interagency efforts like the Technical Support Working Group
to help us meet the challenges posed by new and emerging
technology.
Without continued, sustained investments, at both the agency
and interagency levels, in the development and application
of new technologies for law enforcement, we will fall behind
in meeting our goals of preventing terrorism. Unfortunately,
law enforcement is not alone in seeking to use new technology
to improve its capabilities.
Shortly after the World Trade Center bombing, Ramzi Yousef
made his way to Pakistan. Eventually, he and several associates
moved on to the Philippines and rented a unit at the Dona
Jasefa apartment complex. That apartment served as a safehouse
and improvised bomb factory. On December 11, 1994, Yousef
placed a small explosive on a Philippines airliner en route
to Tokyo via Cebu. A Japanese businessman was killed when
the device exploded under his seat. Investigation determined
that Yousef and his associates had used the device to test
a new bomb design and that Yousef planned to place more
powerful devices on United States airliners.
While mixing chemicals at the apartment on January 7, 1995,
a fire broke out, forcing Yousef and two co-conspirators
to flee into the street. Concerned that he had left his
laptop computer in the apartment, Yousef sent one of his
associates back into the apartment to retrieve it. Responding
Philippine police arrested the associate and were able to
recover the computer -- which contained encrypted files
-- intact.
We were fortunate in that Yousef was careless in protecting
his computer password. Consequently, we were able to decrypt
his files. These files contained the details of Yousef's
plot to destroy numerous United States airliners using a
timing device made from an altered watch. After simultaneously
planting the devices on United States airliners, the five
participants in the plot were to return to either Pakistan
or Qatar.
Had that fire not broken out or had we not been able to
access those computer files, Yousef and his co-conspirators
might have carried out the simultaneous bombings of 11 United
States airliners, with potentially thousands of victims.
Terrorists, both abroad and at home, are using technology
to protect their operations from being discovered and thwart
the efforts of law enforcement to detect, prevent, and investigate
such acts. Convicted spy Aldrich Ames was told by his Russian
handlers to encrypt his computer files. International drug
traffickers also are using encryption to avoid detection
by law enforcement.
Most encryption products manufactured today for use by the
general public are non-recoverable. This means they do not
include features that provide for timely law enforcement
access to the plain text of encrypted communications and
computer files that are lawfully seized. Law enforcement
remains in unanimous agreement that the continued widespread
availability and increasing use of strong, non-recoverable
encryption products will soon nullify our effective use
of court authorized electronic surveillance and the execution
of lawful search and seizure warrants. The loss of these
capabilities will devastate our capabilities for fighting
crime, preventing acts of terrorism, and protecting the
national security. Recently, discussions with industry have
indicated a willingness to work with law enforcement in
meeting our concerns and assisting in developing a law enforcement
counterencryption capability. I strongly urge the Congress
to adopt a balanced public policy on encryption, one that
carefully balances the legitimate needs of law enforcement
to protect our Nation's citizens and preserve the national
security with the needs of individuals.
The demand for accessing, examining, and analyzing computers
and computer storage media for evidentiary purposes is becoming
increasingly critical to our ability to investigate terrorism,
child pornography, computer-facilitated crimes, and other
cases. In the past, the Subcommittee has supported FBI efforts
to establish a data forensics capability through our Computer
Analysis Response Teams. There is a need to further expand
this capability to address a growing workload. Indeed, our
limited capability has created a backlog that impacts on
both investigations and prosecutions. For 2000, the FBI
is requesting 20 positions and $13,835,000 for our cryptanalysis
and network data interception programs and 79 positions
and $9,861,000 to expand our Computer Analysis Response
Team capabilities.
Our Nation's critical infrastructure -- both cyber and physical
-- present terrorists, hackers, criminals, and foreign agents
with a target for attacks, the consequences of which could
be devastating. Over the past several years, the Congress
has been very supportive of FBI efforts to develop and improve
its capabilities for investigating computer intrusions and
other cyber- crimes. These efforts have included the establishment
of the National Infrastructure Protection Center and the
creation of specially-trained and equipped squads and teams
in FBI field offices. For 2000, we are requesting increases
of $1,656,000 for operations of the National Infrastructure
Protection Center and 108 positions (60 agents) and $11,390,000
for additional field National Infrastructure Protection
and Computer Intrusion squads and teams.
Domestic Readiness. The most potentially devastating
threat facing the United States as we enter the next century
is the terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction (large
conventional explosive, chemical, biological, radiological
or nuclear devices). For terrorists, symbolic targets, critical
infrastructure or major special events make attractive targets.
These acts may result in a significant loss of life, may
cause psychological trauma and will attract a high level
of media exposure.
While the United States holds little credible intelligence
at this time indicating that international or domestic terrorists
are planning to attack United States interests domestically
through the use of weapons of mass destruction, a growing
number (while still small) of `lone offender' and extremist
splinter elements of right-wing groups have been identified
as possessing or attempting to develop/use chemical, biological
or radiological materials. Additionally, religious /apocalyptic
sects which are unaffiliated with far right extremists may
pose an increasing threat. With the coming of the next millennium,
some religious/apocalyptic groups or individuals may turn
to violence as they seek to achieve dramatic effects to
fulfill their prophecies. The possibility of an indigenous
group like Aum Supreme Truth cannot be excluded.
In all likelihood, State and local law enforcement, emergency
management, and public health agencies are going to be the
first to respond to and contend with the aftermath of a
terrorist's large-scale improvised explosive device or the
release of chemical or biological agents. Congress has recognized
the critical importance of State and local agencies in the
national response to and management of such a crisis by
providing assistance through several programs, such as the
Department of Defense Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness
Program and training and equipment grants under the auspices
of the Office of Justice Programs. The FBI strongly supports
efforts to train and equip State and local first responders
whose assistance and expertise will be critical to our investigation
of such terrorist incidents. I would like to describe three
FBI-led initiatives supporting domestic readiness: the proposed
National Domestic Preparedness Office, the Hazardous Devices
School, and the equipping of State and local bomb squads.
During the development of the 5-Year Counterterrorism and
Technology Crime Strategy, State and local stakeholders
recommended that the Attorney General designate a single
federal agency to coordinate the multitude of federal domestic
preparedness activities. In October 1998, the Attorney General
announced her proposal to establish a National Domestic
Preparedness Office that would serve as a single point of
contact for State and local authorities. The Attorney General
delegated responsibility for implementing and managing the
Office to the FBI. After several months of working with
key federal agencies involved in this area, a blueprint
to guide the implementation of the National Domestic Preparedness
Office was prepared and is under review. Among the agencies
we consulted with in developing the blueprint were: the
Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Department of Health
and Human Services, the Department of Defense, the National
Guard Bureau, the Department of Energy, the Environmental
Protection Agency, various components within the Department
of Justice, and State and local authorities. Using this
blueprint as a guide, the Department recently submitted
to the Subcommittee a notification to establish the National
Domestic Preparedness Office.
The mission of the National Domestic Preparedness Office
will be to assist State and local emergency response agencies
(law enforcement, fire, hazardous materials, emergency medical
services, emergency management, and public health) by serving
as a single coordinating office and clearinghouse for federal
efforts to prepare our Nation's communities for the threat
posed by the terrorist use of a weapon of mass destruction.
The Office will be organized around six program areas that
will focus upon specific issues or areas, including: planning,
training, exercises, equipment/research and development,
information and intelligence sharing, and health and medical.
State and local acceptance of the National Domestic Preparedness
Office is critical for its success. Part of the blueprint
for the office is the creation of a State and local advisory
group patterned after our highly successful Criminal Justice
Information Services Advisory Policy Board. The individuals
comprising this group will represent their respective areas
of expertise and serve as a bridge between federal domestic
preparedness program planning and the needs and priorities
of states and local communities. We are also recruiting
experienced individuals from State and local first responder
groups to work in the National Domestic Preparedness Office.
We also plan to solicit State and local agencies for detailees
to the Office.
In our local communities, the work of the National Domestic
Preparedness Office will be facilitated by a network of
56 full-time coordinators, one in each FBI field office.
These local coordinators will serve as the primary point
of contact for State and local emergency first responders.
State and local officials will also be able to contact the
National Domestic Preparedness Office through a toll-free
assistance number, an Internet website, and the Law Enforcement
On-Line intranet.
As we continue building state and local first responder
preparedness and readiness, we must keep in mind that this
undertaking is a long-term and costly commitment that must
be sustained in the future. Equipment provided in 1999 will
need to be upgraded or replaced in the future as newer,
improved technologies become available. New protective equipment
may also be needed to respond to changes in the chemical,
biological, and nuclear threat. Basic training must be available
for State and local employees who will be hired in the future.
Advanced training must be provided to State and local personnel
who have completed basic training to maintain competencies.
The proposed National Domestic Preparedness Office is part
of our long-term commitment to sustaining state and local
first responder readiness. Through this office, we hope
to provide better, more coordinated service and assistance
to State and local communities and reduce duplication among
federal programs.
Another initiative being undertaken by the FBI to improve
State and local readiness capabilities is the expansion
of training and modernization of facilities at the Hazardous
Devices School, located at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama. Through
the Hazardous Devices School, the FBI trains and certifies
federal, state, and local bomb technicians in accordance
with standards developed through the National Bomb Squad
Commanders Advisory Board. The Hazardous Devices School
is the only law enforcement training facility offering certification
for public safety bomb technicians. The 5-Year Interagency
Counterterrorism and Technology Crime Plan recommends increasing
the availability of federal pre-blast and post- blast bomb
technician training for first responders.
With the funding provided by the Congress in 1998, we were
able to train 963 students, an increase of 48 percent over
the previous year. In particular, we provided training to
386 students in a new Weapons of Mass Destruction Bomb Technician
Emergency Actions Course. Beginning this year, the weapons
of mass destruction course is being integrated into the
basic bomb technician course so that all new bomb technicians
receive this training. We will also continue to offer the
separate course to those bomb technicians already certified.
The expansion of training at the Hazardous Devices School
is placing great demands on current facilities. These facilities,
consisting of three aging metal buildings and small test
ranges located an inefficient distance from other facilities,
limit the quantity of personnel trained and the quality
of instruction permissible. Additionally, there is an increasing
demand for basic and advanced courses, as well as speciality
courses that require advanced techniques, that cannot be
met with existing facilities.
For 2000, the FBI is requesting $9,000,000 to construct
a practical problems training course at Redstone Arsenal
as a first step toward improving instructional facilities.
The proposed practical problems training course would be
comprised of a series of mock buildings that would permit
more realistic training scenarios and exercises for students.
State and local bomb technicians may be among the first
emergency responders to encounter a terrorist device, including
devices that may combine the use of explosives and a chemical,
biological, or radiological agent. Recognizing the importance
for providing State and local bomb technicians with a capability
for detecting the presences of such agents, the FBI developed
a multi-year initiative to provide basic equipment and chemical/biological
detection technology to the approximately 630 State and
local bomb technician squads across the Nation. Congress
directed the Attorney General in the 1999 Justice Appropriations
Act to provide $25,000,000 from the Department's Working
Capital Fund to begin this initiative. For 2000, the Department
is requesting $45,000,000 to continue this initiative which
is being managed by the FBI. This request directly supports
the recommendation contained in the 5-Year Interagency Counterterrorism
and Technology Plan to prepare bomb technicians to address
incidents involving a combination of explosives and chemical,
biological, or radiological agents.
International Partnerships and Cooperation. If, as
recent events seem to indicate, terrorists are going to
strike against the United States through its presence and
citizens in foreign countries, then it is in our national
interest to develop and expand "cop-to-cop" relationships
with friendly foreign law enforcement, provide basic counterterrorism
crime scene and related training, and share with them our
forensic and related technologies.
As I indicated earlier, FBI Legal Attaches from Cairo and
Pretoria were the first non-resident United States law enforcement
officials to arrive on the scene of the terrorist bombings
in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi. Both of these individuals
were instrumental in establishing productive relationships
with the host governments and local law enforcement authorities
so that our main body of agents, technicians, and others
could do their jobs once they arrived. Our Legal Attaches
provided critical advice to local authorities on protecting
the crime scenes so that key evidence was not destroyed.
And, as I also noted earlier, our Legal Attache on scene
in Nairobi was instrumental in persuading Kenyan authorities
to turn over to the United States tw>
Transfer interrupted!
>
This Subcommittee has strongly supported my efforts to increase
the number of FBI Legal Attache Offices. I am hopeful that
we can continue to depend upon your support as we complete
the four year expansion strategy that was started in 1996.
Both Tanzanian and Kenyan authorities expressed interest in
receiving training and technical assistance so that they will
not only be better prepared in the event of future acts of
terrorism, but also out of a desire to provide more effective
basic law enforcement services -- modeled after those of American
law enforcement -- to their citizens. Investments in these
types of cooperative programs, such as the Antiterrorism Training
Assistance program of the Department of State and the International
Law Enforcement Academy in Budapest, will help provide foreign
law enforcement with basic knowledge, such as taking the steps
needed to protect terrorism crime scenes until the arrival
of FBI rapid deployment teams and prevent the contamination
or destruction of evidence that could eventually be used in
a United States Court to prosecute an international terrorist.
In support of the Attorney General's leadership efforts within
the G-8 to strengthen international cooperation to combat
terrorism, the FBI is developing the WorldFACTS system, which
will provide G-8 countries with access to four FBI forensic
systems: EXPRESS, which correlates information from bombing
crime scenes and undetonated explosives devices, and provides
a reference base for explosives; comparing and matching firearms
evidence from shooting incidents and seized firearms; searching
and matching latent fingerprints from crime scenes and evidence;
and storing and sharing of terrorist-case related DNA information.
Funding for this effort was provided by the Subcommittee in
1997. In 1998, we successfully completed a test of the telecommunications
line between Italy and the United States. We have shipped
WorldFACTS equipment to Italy in anticipation of the finalization
of operational guidelines between the FBI and Italian authorities.
The FBI also assists the Department of Defense in its counterproliferation
program. The goals of this program are to train and equip
foreign law enforcement personnel to detect, prevent, investigate,
and prosecute incidents involving the illegal trafficking
in weapons of mass destruction and to deter the possible proliferation
and acquisition of weapons of mass destruction in Eastern
Europe, the Baltic States, and the countries of the former
Soviet Union. Under this interagency program, which also involves
the United States Customs Service, the Department of Energy,
the Department of State, the Department of Commerce, and other
agencies, the FBI has provided counter-proliferation training
for government officials from the republics of Kazakhstan,
Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Georgia, and Moldova. Reducing the
opportunity for terrorists to obtain radiological and similar
materials at the source is the first step toward preventing
their use against the United States.
Conclusion
To adequately understand the terrorist threat currently facing
the United States, we must appreciate the unique position
America occupies in the world today. As the sole superpower,
the politics of the United States are viewed with intense
interest by nations around the world . To some individuals
and groups who feel powerless to affect their own destinies
through legal means, the breadth of influence and power wielded
by the United States represents a stunning contrast -- and
an attractive target for their frustrations. Despite our successes
against various terrorist groups and individuals, new groups
and new individuals step onto the scene to take up the cause
against America.
The FBI has developed a broad-based response to many external
threats that confront the United States today. Due to the
strong support of this Subcommittee, we are much better prepared
to address the terrorist threat at home and abroad than we
were six years ago. With the continued support of Congress
and the Executive Branch, and in cooperation with our partners
in the intelligence and law enforcement communities, we will
continue to enhance our ability to protect the American people
from the threat of international terrorism.
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