Testimony
of Robert M. Burnham, Chief, Domestic Terrorism Section,
FBI
Before
the United States House of Representatives, Subcommittee
on Oversight and Investigations
May 20, 1999
"Threat of Bioterrorism in America"
Good morning Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee,
my name is Robert M. Burnham, and I am the Chief of the
Domestic Terrorism Section at FBI Headquarters. My current
responsibilities include national oversight and management
of the Domestic Terrorism Operations, Weapons of Mass
Destruction and Special Events Management Programs for
the FBI. Thank you for this opportunity to speak to you
this morning about the Threat of Bioterrorism in America.
I am here primarily to discuss the law enforcement concerns
regarding existing federal statutes, particularly as they
pertain to the threatened use and possession of biological
agents. We believe that these existing statutes have significant
gaps, which the President will propose to fill when he
submits his Crime Bill to Congress.
Our response
to these threats is constantly evolving and over the last
several years our knowledge and experience in this area have
expanded tremendously. The large number of cases we have addressed
over the last three years has highlighted certain vulnerabilities
in the current legislation which could significantly hamper
future investigations.
Weapon
of Mass Destruction (WMD) type cases, primarily those cases
dealing with the threatened use or procurement of chemical
and biological materials with intent to harm, have steadily
increased. In 1996, 37 cases were opened by the FBI. In 1997,
there were 74 cases opened, of which 22 were related to biological
agents. By 1998, the FBI opened 181 cases, 112 of which were
biological in nature. In 1999 there have been 123 WMD cases,
100 of which have been biological. In 1998 and 1999 combined,
over three-quarters of the cases opened have threatened a
biological release, and the biological agent most often cited
in 1998 and 1999 has been anthrax.
Of concern
is the fact that under existing federal statutes, there is
no prohibition on any individual possessing any biological
agents regardless of their lethality or whether the individual
has a legitimate use for the agents. A brief discussion of
several cases will serve to highlight these concerns.
The case
involving Larry Wayne Harris has garnered national attention
based upon his interest in biological weapons agents. In 1995,
Harris ordered three vials of Yersinia pestis from a culture
company. Yersinia pestis is the causal agent for bubonic plague.
After the vials were sent, Harris called to inquire about
them and the company from which he ordered the vials became
suspicious. After consulting with the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention(CDC), law enforcement was contacted
and the vials were recovered from the glove compartment of
Harris's vehicle. Although Harris claimed to be a microbiologist
who was writing a training manual for the Aryan Nations, he
certainly did not have a facility or the training necessary
to properly handle the material. However, he had broken no
law in possessing the agent, or in maintaining it in his glove
compartment. In fact he was ultimately charged under the Fraud
by Wire statute for fraudulently using a laboratory registration
number when ordering the agent. A misdemeanor would exist
today for such conduct under CDC transfer regulations.
An individual
by the name of Thomas Leahy came to the attention of the FBI
in 1997 when he was arrested for shooting his stepson in the
face. In the basement of Leahy's home was a makeshift laboratory
where field tests indicated that he had produced ricin. Leahy
was initially indicted for possession of the biological agent
ricin for use as a weapon in violation of Title 18, Section
175, the Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Statute (BWAT).
After further laboratory analysis it was also determined that
he had attempted to grow botulism and had produced nicotine
sulfate which he mixed with DMSO, a solvent, and placed in
a spray bottle. As the case progressed it became apparent
that proving Leahy intended to use the ricin as a weapon would
be difficult. It was only after a superseding indictment for
the weaponization of the nicotine sulfate that Leahy agreed
to plead guilty to a violation of the BWAT Statute. Until
evidence developed regarding weaponization of the nitrate
sulfate, there was no clear basis for successful prosecution.
In another
case in 1995, an individual by the name of Thomas Lavy entered
into Canada from Alaska on his way to North Carolina. Lavy
was stopped by Canadian Customs officials who discovered in
his vehicle several guns, $98,000.00 in cash and white supremacist
literature. Also discovered was a container of white powder
which Lavy readily identified as ricin. The Canadians took
the powder, and released Lavy. Sometime later, the FBI was
advised of the incident by Canadian authorities and in the
interest of public safety an investigation was initiated.
Lavy was subsequently arrested and a search of his home conducted.
Lavy was in possession of a large quantity of castor beans,
from which ricin is derived, but stated that he had not produced
more ricin. Lavy committed suicide while in a detention facility
awaiting adjudication. He had perpetrated no clear threat;
the mere possession of the ricin was not itself a violation
of federal law.
In 1995,
four members of the Patriots Council, an extremist group with
anti-government and anti-tax ideals that advocated the overthrow
of the U.S. Government, were arrested for plotting to kill
a U.S. Marshal with ricin. They had produced the ricin in
a home laboratory and planned to mix the ricin with DMSO,
a solvent, which they would then smear on the door handles
of the Marshal's vehicle. The plan was thwarted, however,
and the four men were convicted. The FBI was able to discover
and prove their plan to use the ricin as a weapon. Again had
the subjects threat to murder the Marshal with ricin not been
discovered, the outcome of the case may have been different.
If possession of this biological agent without a legitimate
purpose were illegal, individuals acting in instances such
as this could be thwarted prior to the development of proof
of the intended or actual use of the agent as a weapon. Merely
possessing this biological agent, without intent to use it
as a weapon, would not have constituted any crime under existing
federal law.
As you
are all aware, there has been a rash of threats around the
country involving anthrax. These threats have affected businesses,
schools, hospitals, and even court houses. The cost of the
response to these threats is significant. For example, Los
Angeles estimated that the cost to respond to the onslaught
of threats they received around the New Year in 1999 was one
and a half million dollars. Fortunately, the redirection of
these emergency response assets did not have an adverse effect
on the Los Angeles area's ability to respond to other crises.
The arrest of two individuals involved in making threats in
California was well publicized, and as a result of those arrests
there was an immediate drop in the number of threats received
throughout California. However the frequency of these threats
still has the potential to desensitize people to the possibility
of an actual attack and is of concern.
I could
cite numerous other examples where time and resources were
expended in response to these threats. I believe this aptly
illustrates why passage of effective legislation addressing
threat and false reporting of information regarding biological
agents is imperative as a deterrent to the massive outlay
of money and resources needed to respond to these bogus threats.
To date, most of these cases have involved specific communicated
threats to use a biological agent. Fortunately, we have not
as yet had a major incident involving the actual release of
a biological agent such as anthrax. Several cases have involved
vague or veiled threats stating only that anthrax had been
released. In addition, others have involved callers who have
merely advised in an apparent non-threatening manner that
anthrax had been released in the building. The net effect
has been highly disruptive for the responding community. Under
existing legislation regarding biological weapons, there must
be a threat to use these agents as a weapon to be considered
a violation. The individuals who have caused these mass disruptions
could potentially evade prosecution by claiming they had not
communicated a threat to use the biological agent as a weapon.
This issue has already been raised by the courts. We believe
that a provision criminalizing false reporting requirement
would remedy weaknesses in current law.
As I
have stated previously, the interest in biological agents
and weapons continues to grow. Intelligence has indicated
that terrorist groups, both foreign and domestic, have demonstrated
an interest in acquiring biological materials and knowledge.
In addition, literature containing recipes and modes of dissemination
are available through "how to" literature and over
the Internet. Whether the cases involve mere threats or actual
possession of biological material, the disruption and potential
damage to the public is potentially devastating. New legislation
is needed to adequately support the agents and prosecutors
who work to protect the public from those who would misuse
biological agents as a weapon, and those who capitalize on
the fear and panic that can be derived from the mere threat
of a biological attack. The President's proposed Crime Bill
will address these needs.
Thank
you for you consideration today, and I will answer any questions
you may have.
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