Testimony of Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, FBI
Before
the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs
June 27, 2002
"Homeland Security"
Thank
you Chairman Lieberman, Senator Thompson and members of the
Committee for having me here today. The urgency with which
this Committee is addressing the critically important issue
of homeland security is appreciated by all of us engaged in
the war against terrorism.
September
11th has transformed the executive branch, including the FBI.
Understanding this basic fact is essential to evaluating how
the FBI fits into the President's proposal to establish a
Department of Homeland Security and what we will provide to
ensure this new department gets from the FBI what it needs
to succeed. That is our obligation. Or put more bluntly, the
FBI will provide Homeland Security the access, the participation,
and the intelligence in whatever form and quantity are necessary
for this new department to achieve its mission of improving
and building domestic preparedness against terrorism in America.
Let me
back up a little bit. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11 we
began taking a hard look at ourselves to see how we could
make a more collaborative, flexible and agile FBI. Even before
9/11, we knew we had to fix our antiquated information infrastructure
and unbridle our Agents from overly burdensome bureaucracy.
Much
has changed since then and much more is in the offing. And
while I would be glad to discuss the details of what we are
about, our most basic change complements the homeland security
proposal in very fundamental ways.
Simply put, our focus is now one of prevention. This simple
notion reflects itself in new priorities, different resource
deployments, a different structure, different hiring and training,
different business practices, and a substantially different
information architecture.
More
importantly, it is reflected in how we collect, analyze and
share information.
So, for
example, in the aftermath of the attacks of 9/11, more than
half, or 6,000 of our 11,000 plus Agents were working on identifying
the individual attackers, their international sponsors and,
along with other agencies, taking steps to prevent the next
attack. Today, 9 and ½ months later, the number of
FBI Agents committed to counter-terrorism is approximately
2,000, or double the amount of our pre-9/11 commitment. But
regardless of what that permanent number ultimately may be,
what is important is that we will apply to prevention whatever
level of resources, the entire agency if need be, necessary
to address the threats at hand and we will do so in the context
of the multi-agency effort repeatedly tested in our strategic
operations center approach to counter-terrorism and information
sharing.
In addition
to committing manpower, 9/11 has triggered a wide-range of
organizational and operational changes within the Bureau.
Three I would like to note are the expansion of the Joint
Terrorism Task Forces throughout the country, the creation
of a National Joint Terrorism Task Force in Washington, D.C.,
and the substantial increases in our analytical capacity.
All three are designed to promote better information sharing.
The Joint Terrorism Task Forces are chaired in 56 regions
of the country by the FBI, and include members of other federal
agencies such as INS, Customs, CIA and BATF as well as state
and local law enforcement. Homeland Security will be included
as well. The importance of these task forces is that they
have transformed a federal counter-terrorism effort into a
national effort and provide for very effective, real time
information sharing. While there are 11,000 FBI Agents, there
are 650,000 state and local law enforcement officials. Working
with our federal law enforcement partners and our colleagues
at the state and local level in task forces not only substantially
increases the resources and scope of the effort to prevent
terrorist attacks but also substantially enhances the collection
and sharing of information, fundamental to effective intelligence
support.
The national
complement to these local or regional task forces is the National
Joint Terrorism Task Force. The National Joint Terrorism Task
Force brings a needed national perspective and focus to the
local task forces. The national task force consists of both
the FBI and other agency detailees - - and it will include
the new department - - and operates out of the FBI's Strategic
Information Operations Center. The task force will complement
both the FBI's and the new department's analytical efforts
and the inclusion of other agencies allows for the real time
sharing of information with all the participating agencies.
On the
analytical side, pre-9/11 our analytical numbers were woefully
inadequate. The effect not only was inadequate operational
support but also our ability to "finish" and timely
disseminate intelligence was impeded. Thanks to considerable
help from George Tenet -- he loaned us 25 experienced analysts
and an experienced senior analyst to head up our new Office
of Intelligence -- and the substantial resources Congress
is providing, our ability to identify, analyze, "finish"
and share intelligence is becoming much improved. This will
very directly help Homeland Security and the CIA but, equally
important, it will give us the actionable intelligence we
need to support our own investigations.
Of equal importance to the FBI putting its own operational
house in order is our relationship with the CIA. This relationship
has a long history, and is the subject of much contemporary
comment, most of it critical. But for those commentators,
I would counsel caution. The relationship has changed, and
is still changing, all for the better.
Even
before 9/11 it was much better than it was five years ago.
Since 9/11 it is better still, although our challenge is to
continually improve, particularly in regard to information
sharing. The most important single factor is that both George
Tenet and I jointly brief the President every morning on pending
terrorist threats against America. The positive consequences
of this new relationship are found in FBI Agents working at
Langley and CIA officers at FBI Headquarters. Moreover, the
daily threat matrix is the joint product of the two agencies
and seven days a week, we exchange briefing material, all
to ensure we are working off a common knowledge base. Additionally,
CIA officers have joined us on our Joint Terrorism Task Forces
and the National Joint Terrorism Task Force and our Legal
Attaches overseas work very closely with both the CIA and
the Department of State.
I have spent a few moments on the FBI's post-9/11 operational
characteristics and our relationship with the CIA for a purpose.
The experience of the executive branch since 9/11 has only
served to cement in my mind the need for a new Department
of Homeland Security. Although the FBI and CIA are operating
at higher levels of operational efficiency and connectivity,
there still remains a need for an agency that is committed
to improving, and in some cases, building from scratch, a
defensive infrastructure for America. As a domestic law enforcement
agency with its top priority the prevention of terrorist attacks,
the FBI has, I believe, done an excellent job of responding
to emerging threats. But there is much to be done beyond our
purview. America's borders, transportation systems, manufacturing
base, cities, residential communities, and financial institutions,
to just name a few, would all benefit from a systematic upgrade
in their defensive posture against not just conventional attacks,
but chemical, radiological and biological attacks. Beyond
law enforcement and intelligence gathering, such a structural
upgrade requires an ongoing regulatory effort that must also
have the capacity to react to new risks from a determined
and opportunistic enemy. It must rally and incorporate the
combined efforts of the private sector and the general public
as well. This is a massive undertaking, which, when coupled
with border security, is well beyond the capacity of the FBI.
Given
the daunting challenge facing Homeland Security, the question
naturally arises as to what intelligence capability the new
department requires. The FBI's view on this matter is quite
simple: Whatever it needs to properly do its job. The President's
formulation in his proposal strikes me as proper. The new
department as a matter of course will get all FBI "finished"
intelligence analysis, and such "raw" intelligence
as the president thinks it needs. But experience also tells
me that the participation of Homeland Security on joint task
forces, the national task force, and with us at FBI Headquarters,
like our colleagues from the CIA do, will prove to be as valuable
as anything else we do.
It also
is worth stressing that the new department's mission is to
provide America with a defensive backbone against terrorist
attack. As such, it should be aware of the manifold nature
of the threats it faces, but it should not lose sight of its
preventive and anticipatory function by duplicating the efforts
of the FBI and CIA that have thousands of agents, intelligence
officers and analysts relentlessly investigating the items
on the daily threat matrix.
That is why I think this proposal complements the reorganization
we are implementing at the FBI and vice versa. As part of
a changing culture, a senior CIA official participates in
my daily case and threat briefings and, as I mentioned, CIA
officials and analysts are throughout our counter-terrorism
structure. The reverse is likewise true. This is so to ensure
the CIA sees what we see and to ensure it gets acted upon.
I would expect Homeland Security to be equally integrated,
equally participatory.
Discussions
of the FBI's relationship with Homeland Security have also
raised the issue of whether the counter-terrorism division
of the FBI should be transferred to the new department. My
view is no. As a practical matter, such a move at this critical
moment would disrupt our ongoing battle against terrorism.
Al Qaeda is active both abroad and at home. In fact, given
the mobility of the enemy, and its ongoing effort to recruit
American citizens to its ranks, such distinctions are beginning
to blur. The FBI's counter-terrorism team, intertwined with
and supported by the rest of the FBI, and in concert with
our colleagues in the CIA, has a substantial number of open
and ongoing counter-terrorism cases.
And because
I believe that these practical considerations at the moment
should override other rationale for such a transfer, I will
list certain substantial concerns about such a move.
Moving
the FBI into the new Department would detract from the focus
of both the new Department and the FBI itself. The FBI, while
actively engaged in counter-terrorism duties, also has significant
non-counter-terrorism law enforcement responsibilities. These
responsibilities are best met through the clear operational
management provided under the current system and best overseen
by the Department of Justice. And while the FBI's counter-terrorism
duties are focused on the prevention of terrorist acts, these
duties also have a strong criminal law enforcement component
that is critical to both prevention and prosecution, and that
also are best served as currently organized.
The increased analytical capability of the FBI will enhance
the new Department's analytical abilities as a separate entity.
The FBI's analysis, informed by the distinct capabilities
of the FBI, has a focus on information with a nexus to law
enforcement. The new Department, as a customer of the FBI,
will be able to draw on this information, as well as information
from other agencies that will provide their own focus. This
is one area where redundancy can be valuable because of distinctly
different perspectives.
The FBI
has established close working relationships with state, local
and foreign law enforcement, and Department of Justice prosecutors,
through its day-to-day work on a variety of crime prevention
and prosecution matters. These relationships are critical
to the FBI's counter-terrorism efforts, its other crime prevention
efforts and to information collection across the Nation, and
would be disrupted by moving the FBI to the new Department.
In sum,
while the fear is that this new department will not get the
information it needs, I believe we are doing that which will
ensure that it does, and in ways that reflect the practical
realities of information collection and law enforcement. Old
rivalries and outdated equities went by the wayside on 9/11.
I believe what we are doing will work, reflects the most practical
arrangement and I have every expectation that the President
and Congress will monitor this closely to ensure that it does.
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