Testimony of Ray P. Churay, Assistant Special Agent in Charge,
Phoenix Division, FBI
Before
the House
Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on Government
Efficiency,
Financial Management and Intergovernmental Relations, Phoenix,
AZ
March 22, 2002
"Terrorism
Preparedness"
Good
morning Chairman Horn, Members of the Subcommittee and distinguished
Members of the Arizona Delegation. I value the opportunity
to appear before you and discuss terrorism preparedness, including
threats posed by attacks involving biological, chemical or
nuclear agents, as well as measures being taken by the FBI
and our law enforcement partners to address these threats.
Introduction
The mission
of the FBI's counterterrorism program is to detect, deter,
prevent, and swiftly respond to terrorist actions that threaten
U.S. interests at home or abroad, and to coordinate those
efforts with local, state, federal, and foreign entities as
appropriate. The counterterrorism responsibilities of the
FBI include the investigation of domestic and international
terrorism. As events during the past several years demonstrate,
both domestic and international terrorist organizations represent
threats within the borders of the US
The
Phoenix Division of the FBI
The Phoenix
Division of the FBI encompasses the entire Federal Judicial
District of Arizona. The Division has investigative responsibilities
in 15 counties with an approximate population of six million.
The headquarters office for the Division is located in Phoenix
with satellite offices, or Resident Agencies (RAs), in Tucson,
Lake Havasu, Flagstaff, Sierra Vista, Pinetop, Yuma, and Gallup,
New Mexico. The Division personnel resource staffing level
for Special Agents is 217 and the professional support complement
is 126.
Joint
Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs)
Cooperation
among law enforcement agencies at all levels represents an
important component of a comprehensive response to terrorism.
This cooperation assumes its most tangible operational form
in the joint terrorism task forces (JTTFs) that are established
in 44 cities across the nation. These task forces are particularly
suited to responding to terrorism because they combine the
national and international investigative resources of the
FBI with the street-level expertise of local law enforcement
agencies. This Agent-to-Officer cooperation has proven highly
successful in preventing several potential terrorist attacks.
JTTFs
are coordinated with the newly created Anti-Terrorism Task
Forces located in the offices of US Attorneys throughout the
country. This coordination is crucial, to avoid duplication
of effort and enhance the exchange of information and overall
counterterrrorism objectives.
The Phoenix
Division has a JTTF which includes members of the United States
Attorney's Office, the FBI, the INS, the IRS-CID, the US Postal
Service, the ATF, the Secret Service, the US Customs Service,
the Arizona Department of Public Safety, the Phoenix Police
Department, and the Maricopa County Attorney's Office. The
Department of Defense, Defense Intelligence Agency will have
a representative on the Phoenix JTTF in the very near future.
The Phoenix JTTF covers both international and domestic terrorism
matters. The JTTF is also responsible for Weapons of Mass
Destruction (WMD) matters, and Special Events. The Phoenix
JTTF exemplifies the axiom that the ability of agencies to
share intelligence and pool investigative resources is key
to preventing terrorist acts.
Phoenix JTTF Activities
FBI Special
Agents assigned to the Phoenix JTTF meet with their federal,
state and local counterparts in designated alternating locations
for training, discussion of investigations, and to share intelligence.
For example, members of the JTTF meet with the Arizona Emergency
Response Commission, an entity that has access to chemical
reporting and tracking within private industries. This program
(AZSERC) provides the FBI with a CD that contains information
on chemical storage in general, and a secure Internet program
that tracks current chemical stockpiling in particular.
The Phoenix
JTTF also benefits from a productive working relationship
with the Arizona Department of Health Services (ADHS). The
state bioterrorism lab, an entity of the ADHS, is the only
lab in the state certified to conduct evidence identification
in regards to bioterrorism. This lab tested more than 1,100
samples during the national anthrax investigation. This department
also tracks hospital cases in order to identify any spikes
in and/or unexplained illnesses.
Another
example of information sharing between the Phoenix JTTF and
other state and local agencies, is the liaison with the Metropolitan
Medical Response System. The cities of Phoenix, Mesa, and
Tucson are members of this program which is federally funded
by the US Department of Justice (DOJ). This program integrates
the communication and planning aspects of fire, police, and
emergency medical response. This program has received praise
from the DOJ. There are other programs with which the Phoenix
JTTF has liaison, including the Arizona Homeland Defense,
and the Arizona Department of Emergency and Military Affairs.
JTTF preparedness includes field and table top exercises which
test the ability and response capabilities of agencies who
would participate in responding to a disaster involving biological,
chemical, or nuclear attack. The Phoenix JTTF has participated
in exercises held in Phoenix, Mesa, the Palo Verde Nuclear
Power Plant, Lake Havasu City, and Maricopa County.
The JTTF
also handles "special events." The Phoenix Division
has covered several high profile special events, including
the 2002 World Series, the Fiesta Bowl, and Phoenix International
Speedway NASCAR events. These events were attended by tens
of thousands of fans and had national exposure. All FBI field
offices were queried for information related to possible criminal
activities directed against the events or participants. The
Phoenix JTTF worked closely with state and local entities
to ensure that these events were safe and secure for the public.
The Phoenix
JTTF is responsible for numerous ongoing investigations. A
recent example is an eco-terrorism investigation that involved
an individual who identified himself as the Coalition to Save
the Preserves. The perpetrator set fires to luxury homes under
construction at or near the mountain preserves in the Phoenix
Metropolitan area, in an effort to stop urban sprawl. Months
of hard work resulted in the arrest of the responsible party.
This individual pled guilty, was sentenced to 18 years in
prison and was ordered to pay approximately four million dollars
in restitution. In addition to the permanent JTTF member agencies,
the Phoenix Fire Department, the Scottsdale Police Department,
and the Rural Metro Fire Department also participated to bring
this matter to a successful conclusion.
Steps
Taken After September 11, 2001
In addition
to continuing all of the activities detailed earlier, in light
of the events of September 11, 2001, the Phoenix JTTF is implementing
several changes. The JTTF is in the process of adding six
additional state and local agency members. The JTTF is also
expanding to the Flagstaff and Tucson Resident Agencies to
better facilitate the coverage of terrorism related issues
in outlying areas of the state. These satellites of the Phoenix
JTTF will include representatives of the FBI, as well as representatives
of state and local agencies. Training will be provided to
new members to facilitate bringing new local agencies "up
to speed" on JTTF matters.
The Phoenix
JTTF has within its territory the Palo Verde nuclear power
facility. Palo Verde is the world's largest producer of nuclear
energy. The most recent joint "tabletop" exercise
hosted by the Phoenix JTTF, was conducted at the Palo Verde
Nuclear Power Plant. These exercises involved numerous federal,
state, and local agencies and included more than 300 participants.
Although this exercise took place before September 11, 2001,
the Phoenix JTTF has been in constant contact with Palo Verde
concerning aircraft flying close to Palo Verde and other security
related issues since September 11, 2001. The security of Palo
Verde is a top priority with the Phoenix JTTF.
Other
key logistical assets, such as lakes, dams, and facilities
owned and operated by the Salt River Project (SRP), are monitored
via cooperation and liaison with various agencies. For example,
after September 11, 2001, the SRP and the Phoenix JTTF had
a meeting to discuss the infrastructure and security of SRP's
water facilities, and steps that needed to be taken to ensure
the integrity of Arizona's water supply. SRP briefed the JTTF
on new security measures that were implemented in light of
the events of September 11, 2001.
National
Infrastructure Protection Center
Because
of its relevance to the topic of this hearing, specifically
the threat to nuclear and chemical facilities, I would like
to briefly discuss the National Infrastructure Protection
Center (NIPC), which was created in 1998. The NIPC represents
a joint government and private sector partnership that includes
representatives from the relevant agencies of federal, state
and local government. The NIPC's mission is to serve as the
US government's focal point for threat assessment, warning,
investigation and response to threats or attacks against our
critical infrastructures, both domestic and international.
To facilitate
its ability to investigate and respond to attacks, the FBI
has created a National Infrastructure and Computer Intrusion
Program (NIPCIP). Under this program, managed by the NIPC
at FBI Headquarters, NIPCIP investigative teams have been
established in each of the FBI's 56 field divisions, including
the Phoenix division. The field NIPCIP investigators conduct
computer intrusion investigations, respond to threats, and
collect information on "key assets" within each
sector.
Through a 24-hour watch and other initiatives, the NIPC has
developed processes to ensure that it receives information
in real-time or near-real-time from relevant sources, including
the US intelligence community, FBI criminal investigations,
other federal agencies, the private sector, emerging intrusion
detection systems, and open sources. This information is quickly
evaluated to determine if a broad-scale attack is imminent
or underway.
The National
Infrastructure and Computer Intrusion Program also has a role
in preventing terrorist acts. The focus of NIPC's "Key
Asset Initiative" includes asset identification and protection,
improving cyber and physical security, and enhancing ongoing
coordination with other federal, state and local government
entities, to ensure their involvement in the protection of
critical infrastructures. Assets include the major electrical,
communications, and water facilities; transportation hubs;
energy plants and other infrastructure which are instrumental
in supporting societal activities and which, if attacked,
would represent a major loss or disruption to Arizona and
US communities. Computer intrusions financially impact the
business community and computer systems may be used to gain
illegal entry into governmental or military agencies. Computer
terrorists may conduct clandestine communications via computers
located in educational institutions or elsewhere without the
knowledge of the computer system's sponsor.
InfraGard
Program
InfraGard
is an information sharing and analysis alliance between government
and the private sector that provides formal and informal channels
for the exchange of information about infrastructure threats
and vulnerabilities. The FBI started the alliance as a pilot
project in 1996. Today, all 56 field divisions of the FBI
have initiated InfraGard chapters, with hundreds of private
companies participating across the nation. The Phoenix Division
InfraGard Program incorporates business, governmental, and
military communities into a system similar to a Neighborhood
Watch. They conduct regular meetings to discuss awareness
of computer issues and operate a self warning system.
Threat
Warning Systems
Because
warning is critical to the prevention of terrorist acts, the
FBI also has expanded the National Threat Warning System (NTWS)
first implemented in 1989. The system now reaches all aspects
of the law enforcement and intelligence communities. Currently,
sixty federal agencies and their subcomponents receive information
via secure teletype through this system. The messages also
are transmitted to all 56 FBI field offices and 44 legal attaches.
If threat information requires nationwide unclassified dissemination
to all federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies,
the FBI transmits messages via NLETS. In addition, the FBI
disseminates threat information to security managers of thousands
of US commercial interests through the Awareness of National
Security Issues and Response (ANSIR) program. If warranted,
the expanded NTWS also enables the FBI to communicate threat
information directly to the American people.
On January
16, 2002, the FBI disseminated an advisory via the National
Law Enforcement Telecommunications Systems (NLETS) regarding
possible attempts by terrorists to use US municipal and state
web sites to obtain information on local energy infrastructures,
water reservoirs, dams, highly enriched uranium storage sites,
and nuclear and gas facilities. Although the FBI possesses
no specific threat information, these types of activities
on the part of terrorists pose serious challenges to our national
security. Since the terrorist attack of September 11, the
FBI has disseminated 37 warnings via the NTWS. The FBI also
has issued more than 40 "be on the lookout" (BOLO)
alerts via the NLETS system. BOLO alerts provide the names
of individuals who are of investigative interest to the FBI.
Bioterrorism
and Weapons of Mass Destruction
The FBI
Counterterrorism Division's Weapons of Mass Destruction Countermeasures
Unit (WMDCU) plans and conducts Weapons of Mass Destruction
(WMD) exercises which address the specific needs and objectives
of state and local emergency responders. State and local emergency
management officials may request this assistance through their
respective FBI WMD Coordinators who forward the request to
WMDCU. Every FBI Field Division, including the Phoenix Division,
has a WMD Coordinator. WMDCU fully integrates state and local
planning officials into the exercise planning process to ensure
their requirements are specifically met. WMDCU also co-chairs
the Interagency Board (IAB) for Equipment Standardization
and Interoperability. The IAB consists of more than 48 separate
local, state and federal organizations. The IAB is responsible
for the creation of the Standardized Equipment List and is
recognized as the leading authority in the area of WMD response
equipment.
The bioterrorism
threat has risen to a new level. The federal government, in
partnership with state and local law enforcement agencies,
has always taken threats concerning the intentional release
of biological agents seriously. However, until recently, neither
the federal government nor state and local responders have
been required to utilize their assets to coordinate a response
to an actual release of anthrax. The intentional introduction
of anthrax into our infrastructure has resulted in significant
alarm concerning our health and safety. I would like to comment
on the manner in which the law enforcement community responds
to a suspected act of terrorism involving biological agents,
and reinforce the cooperative effort that is in place between
the federal government and the myriad of first responders
who provide guidance, assistance and expertise.
The response
to a potential bioterrorism threat can be broken down into
two different scenarios: overt and covert releases. The distinction
between the two involves the manner in which the biological
threat agent is introduced into the community and the nature
of the response. Regardless of whether a biological release
is overt or covert, the primary mission of law enforcement
and the public health community is saving lives.
An overt
scenario involves the announced release of an agent, often
with some type of articulated threat. An example of this would
be the receipt of a letter containing a powder and a note
indicating that the recipient has been exposed to anthrax.
This type of situation would prompt an immediate law enforcement
response, to include local police, fire and emergency medical
service (EMS) personnel. As noted earlier, each FBI field
office is staffed with a WMD Coordinator whose responsibilities
include liaison with first responders in the community. Due
to this established relationship with first responders, the
local FBI WMD Coordinator would be notified and dispatched
to the scene.
Depending
upon the magnitude of the threat, the response protocol could
involve initiating the FBI's interagency threat assessment
process. The FBI's WMD Operations Unit of the Counterterrorism
Division at FBI Headquarters, coordinates this threat assessment
with the FBI Laboratory's Hazardous Materials Response Unit
(HMRU) to determine the credibility of the threat received,
the immediate concerns involving health and safety of the
responding personnel, and the requisite level of response
warranted by the federal government. The FBI obtains detailed
information from the on-scene personnel and input from the
necessary federal agencies with responsibility in the particular
incident. In a biological event, the Department of Health
and Human Services (DHHS), including Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC), and Food and Drug Administration (FDA),
as well as the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)
are the key agencies called upon to assist FBI personnel in
assessing the particular threat. Based upon the assessment,
a determination is made as to the level of response necessary
to adequately address the particular threat, which could range
from a full federal response if the threat is deemed credible,
to collection of the material in an effort to rule out the
presence of any biological material if the threat is deemed
not credible. (In the event of a chemical, nuclear or radiological
threat, a similar threat assessment would occur.)
The FBI
Headquarters Counterterrorism Division interaction with each
FBI field office and their WMD coordinators, along with other
internal and external agencies, has improved the threat assessment
process, allowing federal, state, and local agencies to scale
back and provide a more measured response. In many cases,
the situation is handled with minimal publicity, therefore
limiting the impact of the terrorist objective. The process
has been effective in saving the federal government, and the
state and local communities, time and money, and has allayed
the fears of victims in rapid fashion on numerous occasions.
A covert
release of a biological agent invokes a different type of
response, driven by the public health community. By its nature,
a covert introduction is not accompanied by any articulated
or known threat. The presence of the disease is discovered
through the presentation of unusual signs and/or symptoms
in individuals reporting to local hospitals or physician clinics.
In this situation, there is initially no crime scene for law
enforcement personnel to investigate. The criminal act may
not be revealed until days have elapsed, following the agent
identification and preliminary results obtained from the epidemiological
inquiry conducted by the public health sector. Contrary to
an overt act where law enforcement makes the necessary notification
to public health, in a covert release, notification to law
enforcement is made by the public health sector. The early
notification of law enforcement in this process encourages
the sharing of information between criminal and epidemiological
investigators. Once an indication of a criminal act utilizing
a biological agent is suspected, the FBI assumes primary authority
in conducting the criminal investigation, while public health
maintains responsibility for the health and welfare of the
citizens. An effective coordination has been accomplished
to address the requisite roles and responsibilities of each
agency at the local level, involving the FBI WMD Coordinator
and the state or local public health department, and at the
national level between FBI Headquarters and the CDC.
A recent
example of a WMD matter in Phoenix was the handling of more
than 1100 reports of possible anthrax contamination. As discussed
above, to address WMD matters, the Phoenix JTTF is in constant
communication with members of the law enforcement, fire, emergency
management, and medical communities. That partnership was
clearly evident in the cooperation that occurred addressing
those perceived threats. Since October 2001, the FBI nationally
has responded to more than 16,000 reports of use or threatened
use of anthrax or other hazardous materials.
To deal
with the Arizona portion of the anthrax crisis, a meeting
was held with appropriate Phoenix response agencies and FBI
personnel, to include the Phoenix Division WMD Coordinator.
A course of action was agreed upon. The law enforcement, fire,
emergency, and medical agencies quickly agreed on the manner
of handling the responses and protocols for handling potential
evidence. The state lab agreed to receive suspect packages
from any fire, police, or emergency agency.
The FBI Laboratory Division is also a key component in dealing
with incidents involving the release of biological, chemical
or nuclear agents. The FBI Laboratory has developed a response
capability to support counterterrorism investigations worldwide.
The FBI's mobile crime laboratory provides the capability
to collect and analyze a range of physical evidence on-scene,
and has been deployed at major crime scenes, including the
World Trade Center bombing, Khobar towers, and the East African
embassy bombings. The mobile crime laboratory contains analytical
instrumentation for rapid screening and triage of explosives
and other trace evidence recovered at crime scenes.
The FBI
Laboratory also provides the capacity to rapidly respond to
criminal acts involving the use of chemical or biological
agents with the mobile, self-contained fly away laboratory
(FAL). The FAL consists of twelve suites of analytical instrumentation
supported by an array of equipment which allows for safe collection
of hazardous materials, sample preparation, storage, and analysis
in a field setting. The major objectives of the mobile crime
laboratory and the FAL are to enhance the safety of deployed
personnel, generate leads through rapid analysis and screening,
and to preserve evidence for further examination at the FBI
laboratory. In addition, the laboratory has developed agreements
with several other federal agencies for rapid and effective
analysis of chemical, biological, and radiological materials.
One partnership, the Laboratory Response Network (LRN), is
supported by the CDC and the Association of Public Health
Laboratories for the Analysis of Biological Agents.
Conclusion
Terrorism
represents a continuing threat to the US and a formidable
challenge to the FBI. In response to this threat, the Phoenix
Division of the FBI has developed, and is expanding, its broad-based
counterterrorism program, which is integrated into the local
and state law enforcement and first responder network. The
Phoenix Division intends to disrupt terrorist activities by
continuing to support and use it's JTTF, and by continually
expanding interagency cooperation. While this approach has
yielded many successes, the dynamic nature of the terrorist
threat demands that our capabilities continually be refined
and adapted to continue to provide the most effective response.
Within
the Phoenix Division, all of the FBI's aforementioned investigative
responsibilities are conducted jointly with other law enforcement
agencies represented on the Phoenix JTTF, and at times, with
additional agencies such as the intelligence community, fire,
emergency response, and medical agencies. It is impossible
for the FBI to conduct investigations and obtain intelligence
without the assistance of all the Arizona federal, state,
and local agencies. Communication and coordination are exceptional
in all areas and the Phoenix Division consistently strives
to maintain and improve that cooperation.
Chairman
Horn, this concludes my prepared remarks. I would like to
express appreciation for this subcommittee's concentration
on the issue of terrorism preparedness and I look forward
to responding to any questions.
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