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Press Room
Congressional Statements

Testimony of Donald M. Kerr, Assistant Director, Laboratory Division, FBI
Before the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts
Regarding FBI Laboratory Support in TWA 800
May 10, 1999

"FBI Laboratory Support in TWA 800"

Statement of Lewis Schiliro

Good Afternoon, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you this afternoon to address the role of the FBI Laboratory in the investigation of TWA 800.

As you may know, I did not become Assistant Director of the FBI's Laboratory Division until October 1997, more than a year after the explosion of TWA flight 800 off the Long Island shore. I am familiar with the performance of Laboratory personnel in that investigation, however, and am happy to answer any questions you may have in that regard. Before discussing the details of the Laboratory involvement in that investigation, I would first like to provide a brief overview of current Laboratory operations.

I. Current Overview of the FBI Laboratory

First, and foremost, the FBI Laboratory is stronger, more efficient, and better organized than it has ever been before. This is due in part to the important role of oversight, including that provided by this Committee, in ensuring the effective performance of all components within the Laboratory. Perhaps the most significant achievement during my tenure as Assistant Director has been the formal accreditation of the Laboratory by the American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors/Laboratory Accreditation Board (ASCLD/LAB).

Even before it became an official recommendation by the Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General (OIG), accreditation by ASCLD/LAB was among the top priorities of Director Freeh. During the past several years, the Laboratory has undergone numerous internal and external reviews, enhanced its quality assurance system, and modified its policies, practices and procedures in preparation for accreditation. The FBI Laboratory includes eight disciplines for which accreditation is available through ASCLD/LAB. Those disciplines -- Controlled Substances, DNA, Serology, Firearms/Toolmarks, Latent Prints, Questioned Documents, Toxicology, and Trace Evidence -- were all fully accredited by ASCLD/LAB on September 11, 1998.

Two of the scientific disciplines that I believe are of particular interest to the Committee -- explosives examinations and metallurgy -- are not accreditable by ASCLD/LAB. With regard to explosives examinations, however, the chief of the FBI's Materials and Devices Unit, Dr. Tom Jourdan, has been tirelessly pursuing a program to provide for accreditation of explosives and hazardous devices examinations. Toward that end, Dr. Jourdan has examined protocols and policies of forensic laboratories worldwide and engaged in the exchange of information with France, England, Ireland, Israel, and Australia. As a result of these efforts, Dr. Jourdan hopes to present ASCLD/LAB with an accreditation program for explosives and hazardous devices at its annual meeting this September.

As for metallurgy, it is not presently an accreditable discipline under ASCLD/LAB for several reasons. First, forensic metallurgy is a narrow field of science with a very limited number of qualified experts. Second, metallurgical examinations are varied and often require a number of novel examination approaches. Since examination protocols must necessarily be general in their application, ASCLD/LAB has not developed a program for certifying the metallurgical examination procedures.

Although only eight of the Laboratory's disciplines were subject to, and approved for, ASCLD/LAB accreditation, all of the other disciplines throughout the Laboratory, including explosives and metallurgy, are held to similar standards.

A. Restructuring of the Laboratory Division

In February, 1997, the FBI Laboratory sought approval from the U.S. Department of Justice and the Office of Personnel Management to establish four senior-level scientists positions in the following disciplines: biological sciences, chemical sciences, physical/materials sciences, and computer/information sciences. Due in large part to the exemption from Title V hiring restrictions granted by the Congress, the Laboratory was able to select individuals who possess exceptional qualifications for these positions.

In addition, the Engineering Sections at the Engineering Research Facility at Quantico, Virginia have recently been assimilated into Laboratory operations. This restructuring will be particularly beneficial following the relocation of the FBI Laboratory to its new facility in Quantico. Construction is currently underway with a target relocation date of 2001.

B. Expansion and Upgrading of Programs

During the past several years, the nation has witnessed several major catastrophic events which have required the immediate deployment of Laboratory personnel. The explosion aboard TWA 800, as well as the bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City, highlighted the critical need for immediate assistance of scientific experts and evidence technicians at such mass disaster scenes. As a result, the FBI Laboratory established five Rapid Deployment Teams (RDTs) to respond to future crises.

Each of the teams includes Laboratory examiners and technicians, as well as a senior-level Laboratory manager who serves as Team Leader and liaison with the on-scene commander. Although the teams are configured primarily to address bombing and hazardous materials incidents, personnel from any discipline may be assigned depending on the type of event requiring their assistance.

The FBI's Evidence Response Team Program has continued to expand and Evidence Response Teams have been deployed around the world to major bombing crime scenes, most recently in East Africa. There are presently over 100 teams located in the various FBI Field Offices. Approximately 700 Agent ERT members have received post-blast bombing crime scene training.

In February, 1997, the Explosives Unit of the FBI Laboratory was restructured, separating the Bomb Data Center (BDC) from the unit and merging the remainder of the unit with most functions of the Materials Analysis Unit to form the Materials and Devices Unit (MDU). The Chief of the MDU, Dr. Tom Jourdan, holds a Master's Degrees in Synthetic Organic Chemistry and Nuclear Chemistry, a Ph.D. in Chemistry, and has completed the U.S. Navy's Explosive Ordnance School, Basic Demolition Course.

Under Dr. Jourdan's leadership, the MDU has increased its personnel resources and technical capabilities. The MDU has four broad areas of responsibility: examinations of evidence associated with bombing matters, elemental analyses, scanning electron microscopy, and metallurgical/materials science examinations.

The bombing matters examinations involve the identification and intended function of recovered bomb components, as well as direct field support in bombing crime scenes. During the last couple of years, the following individuals have been added to the staff of the MDU:

FOUR BOMB COMPONENT AND RECONSTRUCTION EXAMINERS WHO HAVE RECENTLY JOINED THE MDU:

  • John K. Underbakke -
    B.S. in Criminal Justice.
    Over 12 years of explosives training and experience in the military.
    Chief of the Army EOD Training Department and the Hazardous Devices School.
    Experience as field Evidence Response Team member.
  • Rex A. Stockham -
    B.S. in Chemistry.
    Formerly worked as a Physical Science Technician in the MDU prior to going to Agent's Training.
  • Michael W. Hughes -
    B.S. in Chemistry.
    Formerly worked as a Physical Science Technician in the MDU prior to going to Agent's Training.
  • John W. McSwain -
    B.S. in Accounting.
    Special Agent Bomb Technician (SABT) for over 5 years.
    Extensive experience in major bombing matters to include OKBOMB, SOURGAS, and East Africa Embassy Bombings.
  • Mark Withworth -
    B.S. in Aeronautical Engineering
    SABT for four years.
    Extensive experience in bombing matters, to include a number of international bombing scenes
  • METALLURGISTS:
  • Dr. Mike Smith -
    Senior FBI metallurgist who is presently receiving cross- training as an explosives device examiner.
  • Eric Jensen -
    M.S. in Physics

In addition to its present staff, two applicants have been selected to join the MDU and are currently in a background investigation phase. One individual has a Ph.D. in Inorganic Chemistry and postdoctoral work in the areas of energetic materials, as well as analytical chemistry. This individual directs research and development for the testing of energetic materials and has conducted contract research for a number of domestic and international agencies. He brings with him significant hands-on experience with explosives. The other applicant has an M.S. degree in Physics. He is also a research scientist who has directed operations and research programs which involve the field testing of improvised explosives. In addition, he has managed the mathematical modeling of these energetic materials.

The staffing concept of the MDU has been to meld together individuals who possess extensive experience in hands-on, post- blast bombing crime scene search and component recognition/ reconstruction with scientists who possess strong explosives backgrounds and academic credentials that complement and support the collection and examination processes, as well as research and development activities. It should be noted that in any major bombing investigation, the Laboratory employs an interdisciplinary team approach in which the MDU examiners work with colleagues from the Chemistry Unit and other forensic units of the Laboratory, as well as field crime scene search and bomb technician personnel.

In furtherance of its training mission, the MDU has centralized the FBI's post-blast investigations training and staffed it with the SABT instructors who also conduct the forensic bomb device examinations and reconstructions.

As a separate unit, the BDC has expanded and upgraded a number of its programs. SABTs have received expanded training and now, upon request, can assist as well as provide training to state and local bomb squads. The BDC provides program management and oversight to the Hazardous Devices School (HDS), at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, which is the only source of certification for public safety bomb technicians. It also recently hosted a National Bomb Squad Commanders' Conference which was attended by over 130 participants. In addition, the BDC has been actively involved in a variety of research and development projects seeking to increase the technical capabilities of public safety bomb squads to safely detect, diagnose, and defeat bombs, with an emphasis on chemical and biological devices and large vehicle bombs. As part of its mission, the BDC provides planning and operational assistance to public safety bomb squads during special events, such as the recent NATO 50th Anniversary Summit in Washington, D.C.

The Hazardous Materials Response Unit (HMRU), which was formed in 1986, has expanded its programs to counteract the threat of terrorism involving nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. The HMRU has provided on-scene field support and special event support on an ever-increasing basis. It has provided training and equipment to FBI agents so that they can respond to criminal acts involving the use of hazardous materials.

As a result of its emphasis on nuclear and mitochondrial DNA programs, the FBI Laboratory has personal identification capabilities that can materially assist in the identification of remains. Such capabilities are available to support the identify of victims of mass disasters, such as bombings and air crashes and complement the capabilities of the FBI Disaster Squad.

 

C. Partnerships

The FBI Laboratory is committed to and has long promoted interaction with other Laboratories on specific cases and in technical working groups examining broader issues. The Laboratory has established working partnerships with other forensic laboratories, including the New York State Police, the Texas Department of Public Safety, the Illinois State Police, and the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension. These partnerships provide for bilateral exchanges in areas of quality assurance, audits, and training, resulting in stronger forensic programs for all.

The Laboratory has also been instrumental in the formation and technical leadership of numerous scientific working groups within the forensic community. The purpose of the scientific working groups is to develop and standardize protocols and analytical practices in disciplines such as materials analysis; friction ridge analysis, study and technology; imaging technologies; digital evidence, bombing and arson matters. Many FBI Laboratory examiners serve in leadership roles in these groups as they seek to bring together national and international experts to develop procedures, protocols, training and accreditation guidelines.

Similar arrangements have been developed between the FBI Laboratory and members of the Federal scientific community. Through partnerships with the Department of Energy, the Department of Defense, and the Environmental Protection Agency, the FBI has been able to share information and enhance forensic applications, the transfer of technology, research and development, and specialized training.

The FBI Laboratory's involvement in the TWA-800 investigation was an outstanding example of good quality assurance practice. The same procedures that are routinely utilized to ensure the integrity of evidence and guard against contamination in the FBI Laboratory were employed during the examinations at the Calverton Hangar, where the aircraft examination and reconstruction efforts took place. The FBI Laboratory assumed responsibility for preparing the hangar, and utilized examiners from the Chemistry Unit for analysis of control swabbings taken from the walls and interior portions of the hangar. The Laboratory arranged for a hazardous material contractor to cover the hangar floor with protective material to guard against contamination.

During and since the TWA-800 investigation the FBI Laboratory has been acquiring the most modern laboratory equipment and instrumentation to support forensic analyses, particularly those relating to bombings and weapons of mass destruction matters. In addition, Mobile Modular Laboratories have been configured for deployment to support on-site forensic analyses and examinations in a wide spectrum of environments.

As part of its research and development mission, the Laboratory has targeted critical areas which will enhance its support of major crime investigations. These efforts presently involve 16 internal research and development activities, as well as 30 counterterrorism research projects that have been outsourced to DOE national laboratories, private sector vendors and academic institutions. These initiatives focus on:

  1. Field Portable Explosives Detection Technology
  2. Forensic Evidence Analysis and Crime Scene Technology
  3. Information Infrastructure Technology
  4. Specialized and Examiner Training
  5. Victim and Terrorist Identification
  6. Remote, Render-safe Technology, Detection of Explosives and Neutralization Techniques
  7. Hazardous Materials Response
  8. Computer Analysis Response Team (CART)
  9. Latent Print Automation

II. Laboratory Support of TWA-800 Investigation

The FBI Laboratory responded quickly to the TWA 800 disaster on July 17, 1996. That evening, the Evidence Response Team (ERT) from the Newark Division of the FBI arrived at the scene. The following morning, three examiners from the Materials and Devices Unit at FBI Headquarters arrived in Calverton and were joined later that morning by three examiners from the Chemistry Unit.

The first week following the crash was devoted to the recovery of bodies. This was the first priority of all personnel who arrived at the scene. As a result, the only debris recovered was that which contained bodies and that which was floating and washed up on the beach.

During the course of the investigation, approximately 5,000 hours of on-site support was provided by Laboratory examiners. Laboratory support was maintained by teams who were rotated in and out during the investigation. Over a million pieces of debris were recovered. Explosive residue chemists conducted an exhaustive survey of wreckage that entailed over 9,000 swabbings and examinations. Tens of thousands of pieces of debris were visually inspected by bomb technicians, with 116 subsequently submitted to the Laboratory for further analysis.

It is important to note that the FBI Laboratory's on-site support was provided despite numerous other demands on its resources. Several examiners and evidence technicians were reassigned to New York from the ongoing investigation of the Kobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia. Others reported to New York from Atlanta where the Olympic Games were underway. Approximately one week after the TWA-800 crash, the bombing of Centennial Park in Atlanta occurred.

One of the major issues which arose during the recovery phase, was the storage of the quickly accumulating evidence. An FBI Agent from the Long Island Resident Agency arranged for the use of an empty Grumman/U.S. Navy hangar for evidence storage and ultimately for reconstruction of the aircraft. The FBI and ATF then provided mobile equipment for use in analyzing evidence at the site, while the U.S. Navy engaged a private contractor to map out the location of the debris on the ocean floor.

Security in and around the testing areas of the hangar was tight. Only designated laboratory personnel were allowed access and no weapons or ammunition were allowed inside the hangar. Personnel from the FBI's Chemistry Unit manned the testing area of the hangar from July 18, 1996, the day after the crash, until November 8, 1996. Throughout that time, all ships and vehicles used to transport evidence were swabbed to ensure that no pre- existing residues were present. In addition, over 9000 swabs and vacuum samples were collected and tested, including all recovered seats and floorboards and over 500 swabs were taken of the center fuel cell alone.

Over 60 Laboratory Division employees from the Evidence Response Team, Materials and Devices, Bomb Data Center, Chemistry, Trace Evidence, Latent Fingerprint and Special Photographic units worked on the case back in Washington, providing many additional thousands of hours of support.

On August 23, 1996, we announced that scientific analysis conducted by federal examiners had found microscopic explosive traces of unknown origin relating to flight 800. We also advised, however, that based upon all of the scientific and forensic evidence analyzed up to that time, we could not conclude that the flight had crashed as a result of an explosive device.

Shortly thereafter, on August 30, 1996, we announced that additional microscopic explosive traces of unknown origin had been found. We again reiterated that we still could not conclude that the aircraft was brought down by an explosive device.

These announcements came after extensive discussions among senior level scientists and the on-scene commanders. The Laboratory personnel noted that the finding of explosives residue without the corresponding blast damage could not yet be explained and cautioned against jumping to false conclusions.

The New York Office management carefully weighed the information provided by the Laboratory and, together with Director Freeh, decided to issue the above announcements. These events portray a careful, deliberative process in which scientific findings were given proper consideration and, ultimately, an appropriate public release of the information was made.

During the initial months, continued scientific testing continued to confirm that there was evidence of explosives residue with no evidence of bomb blast or missile effects. It was not until September 1996, that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) announced that in June 1996, the Boeing 747 known as TWA flight 800 had been used in a Bomb Dog training exercise. Although this announcement solved the anomaly of the bomb residue, it did not solve the mystery of the cause of the explosion.

The Laboratory's finding and reporting of these residues constituted the consummate double blind test. Through the practice of good science and protocol, the Laboratory confidently reported its findings at a time when there was no explanation for the presence of such residues.

A number of metallurgists from a number of different organizations worked on, or were consulted about, the TWA-800 crash. These metallurgists worked well together and were in agreement with the Laboratory explosives examiners that there was no indicia of blast effects or missile strike.

III. Lessons Learned

Earlier this year, an after-action meeting was held at Calverton to discuss the events surrounding the investigation of TWA flight 800 and to identify optimal practices for a future major aircraft downing investigation. The agencies attending the meeting were as follows: the FBI, the National Transportation Safety Board, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, the Federal Aviation Administration, the Department of Defense-Office of Special Technology, Defense Intelligence Agency - Missile and Space Intelligence Center, Naval Air Warfare Center, Air Force Research Laboratory, and the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. I would like to note that all attendees expressed satisfaction with the meeting and found it to be very constructive and productive. There was no sign of hostility, nor disagreement, among the participants.

At this meeting the need for a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the FBI and the NTSB was recognized. This MOU would set forth each agency's role and responsibilities and define the interaction that should occur between the two agencies during the investigation of a transportation disaster.

The FBI and the NTSB also agreed to pursue cross-training of personnel in order to provide investigators with a better understanding of each agency's mission and responsibilities. As a result, the FBI's Evidence Response Teams will participate in NTSB Crash Investigation Courses and NTSB investigators will attend FBI ERT training. This cross-training will commence next month.

In closing, I would like to say that in the TWA-800 investigation and the more recent East Africa bombings, the FBI has demonstrated its ability to address major challenges wherever they may occur. The lessons learned have enhanced our capabilities and identified optimal practices that will help the FBI Laboratory to meet the challenges of the future.