Thank you Chairman Kean, Vice Chair Hamilton and members
of the Commission for the opportunity to address you
this afternoon. You have been given an extremely important
mission: to help America understand what happened on
September 11th and to help us learn from that experience
to improve our ability to prevent future acts of terrorism.
The FBI recognizes the importance of your work, and
my colleagues and I have made every effort to be responsive
to your requests. I have appreciated your critique
and feedback on the efforts we are making to improve
the FBI. I look forward to receiving your recommendations
on how we can continue to improve.
Let me take a moment before addressing the specifics
of the FBI's reform efforts to reflect on the loss
we suffered on September 11, 2001. I wish to acknowledge
the pain and anguish of the friends and families of
those we lost that day, and I want to assure you that
we in the FBI are committed to doing everything in
our power to ensure that America never suffers such
a loss again.
Like so many in this country, the FBI lost colleagues
that day. John O'Neill was a retired counterterrorism
investigator who had just started a new job as head
of security for the World Trade Center. Lenny Hatton
was a Special Agent assigned to the New York Field
Office. Lenny was driving to work when he saw the towers
ablaze, rushed to the scene and helped to evacuate
the buildings. He was last seen helping one person
out the door and then heading back upstairs to help
another.
It is the memory of the thousands like John and Lenny
who died that day that inspires the men and women of
the FBI and fuels our resolve to defeat terrorism.
The terrorist threat of today presents complex challenges.
Today's terrorists operate seamlessly across borders
and continents, aided by sophisticated communications
technologies; they finance their operations with elaborate
funding schemes; and they patiently and methodically
plan and prepare their attacks.
To meet and defeat this threat, the FBI must have
several critical capabilities:
First, we must be intelligence-driven. To defeat the terrorists, we must be
able to develop intelligence about their plans and use that intelligence to
disrupt those plans.
We must be global. We must continue our efforts to develop our overseas operations,
our partnerships with foreign services and our knowledge and expertise about
foreign cultures and our terrorist adversaries overseas.
We must have networked information technology systems. We need the capacity
to manage and share our information effectively.
Finally, we must remain accountable under the Constitution
and the rule of law. We must respect civil liberties
as we seek to protect the American people.
This is the vision the FBI has been striving towards
each day since September 11th. It is also the vision
that guided Director Freeh and the Bureau throughout
the last decade. Director Freeh and his colleagues
took a number of important steps to build a preventive
capacity within the Bureau. With their complex investigations
of various terrorist plots and attacks, they developed
extensive intelligence and an expertise about international
terrorism that is the foundation of our efforts today.
With their doubling of Legal Attache offices around
the world, they developed the overseas network and
relationships that are so critical to the war against
international terrorism.
Prior to September 11, 2001, however, various walls
existed that prevented the realization of that vision.
Legal walls -- real and perceived -- prevented the
integration of intelligence and criminal tools in terrorism
investigations. Cultural walls -- real and perceived
-- continued to hamper coordination between the FBI,
the CIA and other members of the Intelligence Community.
Operational walls -- real and perceived -- between
the FBI and our partners in state and local law enforcement
continued to be a challenge. Since the September 11th
attacks, we and our partners have been breaking down
each of these walls.
The legal walls between intelligence and law enforcement
operations that handicapped us before 9/11 have been
eliminated. The PATRIOT Act, the Attorney General's
intelligence sharing procedures and the opinion from
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review
tore down the legal impediments to coordination and
information-sharing between criminal investigators
and intelligence agents. We can now fully coordinate
operations within the Bureau and with the Intelligence
Community. We can also deploy the full range of investigative
tools -- both criminal processes like search warrants
and grand jury subpoenas and intelligence authorities
like FISA wiretap warrants -- to identify, investigate
and neutralize terrorist threats. With these changes,
we in the Bureau can finally take full operational
advantage of our dual role as both a law enforcement
and an intelligence agency.
We are eliminating the wall that historically stood
between us and the CIA. The FBI and the CIA started
exchanging senior personnel in 1996, and we have worked
hard to build on that effort. Today, we and the CIA
are integrated at virtually every level of our operations.
From my daily meetings with George Tenet and with CIA
officials at my twice daily threat briefings, to our
joint efforts in transnational investigations, to our
coordinated threat analysis at the Terrorist Threat
Integration Center, we and the CIA have enhanced our
interaction at every level. This integration will be
further enhanced later this year when our Counterterrorism
Division co-locates with the CIA's Counter Terrorist
Center and the Terrorist Threat Integration Center
at a new facility in Virginia.
We have also worked hard to break down the walls that
have, at times, hampered coordination with our 750,000
partners in state and local law enforcement. We have
more than doubled the number of Joint Terrorism Task
Forces (JTTFs) since 9/11. We have processed thousands
of security clearances to permit law enforcement officers
to share freely in our investigative information. We
have created and refined new information sharing systems
that electronically link us with our domestic partners.
And, we have brought on an experienced police chief
from North Carolina to serve as our State and Local
Law Enforcement Coordinator.
This coordination has been the hallmark of our operations
since September 11th. A good example is the case involving
the Lackawanna terrorist cell in upstate New York.
Every one of our partners played a significant role
in that case -- from the police officers who helped
to identify, investigate and surveil the cell members,
to the diplomatic and Intelligence Community personnel
who handled the investigations and liaison overseas,
to the federal agents and prosecutors who conducted
the grand jury investigation leading to the arrests
and indictment.
Removing these walls has been part of a comprehensive
plan to strengthen the ability of the FBI to predict
and prevent terrorism. We developed this plan immediately
after the September 11th attacks. With the participation
and strong support of the Attorney General and the
Department of Justice, we have been steadily and methodically
implementing it ever since.
This plan encompasses many areas of organizational
change -- from re-engineering business practices to
overhauling our information technology systems. Since
you have a detailed description of the plan in the
written report we submitted on Monday, I will not repeat
it here today. If I may, however, I would like to take
a moment to highlight several of the fundamental steps
we have taken since 9/11.
1. Prioritization
Our first step was to establish the priorities to
meet our post-9/11 mission. Starting that morning,
protecting the United States from another terrorist
attack became our overriding priority. We formalized
that with a new set of priorities that direct the actions
of every FBI program and office. Every FBI manager
understands that he or she must devote whatever resources
are necessary to address the terrorism priority, and
that no terrorism lead can go unaddressed.
2. Mobilization
The next step was to mobilize our resources to implement
these new priorities. Starting soon after the attacks,
we shifted substantial manpower and resources to the
counterterrorism mission. We also established a number
of operational units that give us new or improved counterterrorism
capabilities -- such as the 24/7 Counterterrorism Watch
Center, the Document Exploitation Unit, and the new
Terrorism Financing Operation Section.
3. Centralization
We then centralized coordination of our counterterrorism
program. Unlike before, when investigations were managed
primarily by individual field offices, the Counterterrorism
Division at Headquarters now has the authority and
the responsibility to direct and coordinate counterterrorism
investigations throughout the country. This fundamental
change has improved our ability to coordinate our operations
here and abroad, and it has clearly established accountability
at Headquarters for the development and success of
our Counterterrorism Program.
4. Coordination
As I noted earlier, another critical element of our
plan since September 11th has been the increased coordination
with our law enforcement and intelligence partners.
We understand that we cannot defeat terrorism alone,
and we are working hard to enhance coordination and
information sharing with all of our partners, including
the Department of Homeland Security which plays a central
role in the protection of our nation's borders and
infrastructure. This coordination is critical to every
area of our operations.
As you pointed out in your second staff statement,
this coordination is particularly critical when we
face a transnational threat from Al Qaeda or another
terrorist group that operates internationally. In that
situation, we need to be completely aligned with the
CIA, with foreign services, and with other agencies
that have operations or information relating to that
transnational threat.
We have learned much about how we and other agencies
coordinated the investigation of Khalid al Mihdhar
and Nawaf al Hazmi in 2000 and 2001. As your staff
statement explained, our efforts to investigate and
locate al Mihdhar and al Hazmi were complicated because
some felt that they could not coordinate or share certain
information with others.
Because of our improved coordination since 9/11, I
believe that that investigation would proceed differently
if it were to occur today.
• Because we coordinate much more closely and regularly
with the CIA and NSA, we would likely be aware of
-- and involved in -- the search for the two men
much earlier in the process.
• Because the legal wall between intelligence and law
enforcement operations has been eliminated, FBI and
CIA personnel would be able to share all information
about these two men and their possible travel to
the United States.
• Because the CIA now briefs me and my top executives
each morning and CIA and DHS officials attend my
twice-daily threat briefings, information about the
threat posed by these two men could quickly reach
-- and get the attention of -- the highest levels
of the FBI, and the government.
5. Intelligence Integration
The last crucial element of our transformation has
been to develop our strategic analytic capacity, while
at the same time integrating intelligence processes
into all of our investigative operations. We needed
to dramatically expand our ability to convert our investigative
information into strategic intelligence that could
guide our operations. Initially we concentrated our
efforts on the 9/11 investigation and the Counterterrorism
Division. We then developed step-by-step from there.
Our first step was to deploy 25 CIA analyst detailees to the Counterterrorism
Division, along with dozens of FBI analysts from other divisions, to improve
our ability to analyze the masses of data generated in our post-9/11 investigations.
We then established a formal analyst training program and started to develop
the permanent analyst position and career track within the Counterterrorism
Division.
The next step of this effort was to establish an
official Intelligence program to manage the intelligence
process throughout the Bureau. To oversee this effort,
I appointed Maureen Baginski -- a 25-year analyst and
executive from the NSA -- to serve as the Bureau's
first Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence.
Thanks to the efforts of Maureen and her colleagues
in the Office of Intelligence, we have made substantial
progress since her appointment last May.
• We
have developed and are in the process of executing
Concepts of Operations governing all aspects
of the intelligence process -- from the identification
of intelligence requirements to the methodology for
intelligence assessment to the drafting and formatting
of intelligence products.
• We have established a Requirements and Collection Management Unit to
identify intelligence gaps and develop collection strategies to fill those gaps.
• We have established Field Intelligence Groups in the field offices, whose
members review investigative information -- not only for use in investigations
in that field office -- but to disseminate it throughout the Bureau and ultimately
to our law enforcement and Intelligence Community partners.
• We are accelerating the hiring and training of analytical personnel,
and developing career paths for analysts that are commensurate with their importance
to the mission of the FBI.
With these changes in place, the Intelligence Program is established and growing.
We are now turning to the last structural step in our effort to build an intelligence
capacity. Just last month, I authorized new procedures governing the recruitment,
training, career paths and evaluation of our Special Agents -- all of which
are focused on developing intelligence expertise among our agent population.
The most far-reaching of these changes will be the
new agent career path, which will guarantee that agents
get experience in intelligence investigations and with
intelligence processes. Under this plan, new agents
will spend an initial period familiarizing themselves
with all aspects of the Bureau, including intelligence
collection and analysis, and then go on to specialize
in counterterrorism, intelligence or another operational
program. A central part of this initiative will be
an Intelligence Officer Certification program that
will be available to both analysts and agents. That
program will be modeled after -- and have the same
training and experience requirements as -- the existing
programs in the Intelligence Community.
Conclusion
Those are some of the highlights of our plan for
organizational reform. To get a sense for the pace
and number of changes since 9/11, I would refer you
to the time-line chart displayed on the easel. This
time-line plots out almost 50 significant new counterterrorism-related
capabilities or components we have established over
the past 31 months. From the founding of the Counterterrorism
Watch Center on 9/11 to the directive establishing
the intelligence career track last month, this time
line shows a steady pace of change and innovation.
Many have asked whether all these changes have succeeded
in turning us into the agency we need to be. These
are valid questions.
To the question of whether the FBI now has a fully-matured
intelligence apparatus in place, the answer is that
we have laid the structural foundation, and are developing
the intelligence personnel and the capacities at a
steady pace.
To the question of whether the FBI and its partners
now enjoy seamless coordination, the answer is that
we are communicating and integrating our operations
like never before.
To the question of whether the FBI is making progress,
the answer is that we clearly are. While we still have
much work to do, the Bureau is moving steadily in the
right direction.
Our efforts over the past 31 months have produced
meaningful and measurable results. Working with our
partners here and abroad, we have disrupted and detained
supporters of Al Qaeda from Lackawanna, New York, to
Portland, Oregon; we have participated in the detention
of much of Al Qaeda's leadership; and we have seized
millions of dollars in terrorist financing.
We have also seen measurable accomplishments within
the FBI. While it is always difficult to quantify the
extent of organizational change, it is worth spending
a minute with the next chart on the easel. Here, we
have plotted a number of measures that reflect, in
one way or another, our evolution into a prevention-based
intelligence agency. As you see, it is a series of
bar graphs showing numerical comparisons between September
11, 2001 and now. Starting on the left, you can see
how we have increased the numbers of agents, analysts
and translators assigned to counterterrorism, as well
as the total personnel assigned to the 84 Joint Terrorism
Task Forces around the country. We have increased the
number of counterterrorism agents from 1344 to 2835;
counterterrorism analysts from 218 to 406; linguists
from 555 to 1204; and JTTF personnel from 912 to 4249.
The first two charts on the bottom line show the increase
in the number of intelligence bulletins and reports
issued since 9/11. We have gone from no intelligence
bulletins in 2001 to 115 since 9/11; and from no intelligence
reports to 2648. Finally, the last two charts show
an increase of 85% in the number of Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act warrants we have obtained and an increase
of 91% in the number of counterterrorism sources we
have developed -- both important measures of our increasing
focus on developing intelligence against our terrorist
adversaries.
Each of these increased measures reflects hard work
and dedication on the part of the men and women of
the FBI. They have embraced and implemented these counterterrorism
and intelligence reforms, while continuing to shoulder
the responsibility to protect America. And, they have
carried out the pressing mandate to prevent further
terrorism, while continuing to work in strict fidelity
to the Constitution and the rule of law.
The men and women of the FBI have served admirably because they believe it
is their duty to protect the citizens of the United States, to secure freedom,
and to preserve justice for all Americans. I want to take this opportunity
to thank them and their families for their sacrifices and for their service
to America.
I look forward to continuing our cooperation with
the Commission, and to reviewing the findings in your
final report.
I would be happy to answer any questions you might
have.