Testimony
of Donna A. Bucella,
Director, Terrorist Screening Center, FBI
Before The House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and
Homeland Security, and The House Select Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee
On Intelligence and Counterterrorism
March 25, 2004
Terrorist Screening Center Operations and Capabilities
Good afternoon Chairman Coble, Chairman Gibbons, Ranking Members and Members
of both Subcommittees. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the missions
and objectives of the new Terrorist Screening Center (TSC). Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 6 (HSPD-6), issued on September 16, 2003, ordered
the creation of the TSC, directing its operations to begin on December 1,
2003, and we met that goal. The TSC was created to ensure that government
investigators, screeners, federal agents, and state and local law enforcement
officers have ready access to the information and expertise they need to
respond quickly when a known or suspected terrorist is encountered here in
the United States, at our borders and at our embassies. Today, I will tell
you about our daily operations, including some of our successes, our future
plans, and how we will safeguard civil liberties. I will provide as much
information as I can in this open forum, however, I will be happy to provide
additional, classified details in a closed hearing at your request.
TSC
Operations
The
TSC is a multi-agency Center, including
participants from the FBI, Department
of State, Customs and Border
Protection, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, Secret Service, Coast Guard,
Transportation
Security Administration,
and the Office of Foreign Assets Control.
Other agencies, including the Postal
Service and Drug Enforcement Administration,
have agreed to participate. Our goal
is to consolidate
the Government's approach to terrorism
screening and provide for the appropriate
and lawful use of Terrorist
Information in screening processes.
We will be a diverse Center, manned by
experts to include intelligence analysts
and law enforcement from a wide variety
of agencies,
and to communicate and coordinate efforts
across the full spectrum of federal,
state and local government
agencies. Currently, the TSC is staffed
by approximately 84 employees, including
permanent personnel, temporary
duty assignees, and contractors to
staff our 24/7 operation.Since
December 1, 2003, TSC has been providing
key resources for screeners and law enforcement
personnel. These
include:
(1)
a single coordination point for terrorist
screening data;
(2) a consolidated 24/7 call center
for encounter identification assistance;
(3) access to a coordinated law enforcement
response to federal, state and local
law enforcement;
(4) a formal process for tracking encounters and ensuring
feedback is supplied to the appropriate entities, and
(5)
a process to address the misidentification
issues.
The
TSC's initial capabilities were limited
because of the need to integrate records in a way that
ensured that the data about known and suspected
terrorists
was as accurate as possible. Each
agency
contributing data to the TSC is using its own database.
These databases,
which were created to support the
mission of the individual agencies, are
in many instances their case
management
systems, not terrorist watch lists.
Despite our limited capabilities
in the first week of operation, the
TSC
answered 56 calls, including one in which a local police
department was seeking information
regarding an ongoing investigation.
A suspected terrorist had
traveled over 1,000 miles from his home, and the department's
call alerted the FBI to his activities.
The police department coordinated
their surveillance
with the FBI investigation, resulting in solid intelligence
for both local and federal law enforcement.
Another
call came from a West Coast police
department that was investigating an individual
for a state felony
charge. The TSC determined the
individual was a terrorism suspect in a
federal investigation, and our operational
component at the FBI's Counterterrorism
Division put
the respective investigators together.
The FBI and the local investigator are
now sharing case information,
resulting in a coordinated approach.
Again, we are linking investigations and
coordinating the U.S. Government
approach to screening for suspected
terrorists.
There
are three fundamental types of
inquiries: interior (within the U.S.),
border (at the border/ports points
of entry) and exterior (outside
the border). Interior inquiries will normally
be made by state and local
law enforcement. Border inquiries
are made by Customs and Border Protection
(CBP). Exterior inquiries are
conducted by the State Department.
The
process for making an internal
inquiry is relatively simple. A police
officer checks the National Crime
Information Center (NCIC) database
on a routine traffic stop, and he/she is
requested to call the TSC because
the person stopped has similar
identifying information to a known or suspected
terrorist listed in the NCIC.
When the officer calls TSC,
through the police department's dispatch,
the call center verifies the caller's identity,
takes the information on the
encounter and the circumstances
of the encounter, and checks
his name through the TSC 's database. The
TSC database includes the name, date
of birth and other identifying
information for a known or suspected terrorist.
The call center quickly researches
the underlying information,
including classified, sensitive information.
We make a determination as to whether
the encounter is the same person
as the one in our database. After notifying
the officer of a positive,
negative or inconclusive result,
we help coordinate operational support
as to how the person should be
handled. For example, the officer
may be advised -- in appropriate and lawfully
authorized circumstances
-- to arrest, detain or question
the individual. Simultaneously, we contact
our operational component at the FBI's
Counterterrorism
Division known as CT Watch.
CT Watch provides for the local Joint Terrorism
Task Force (JTTF) to respond.
In some cases, officers provide
valuable intelligence from a simple car
stop, and in other cases, JTTF agents
will respond to assist. Two
cases serve to demonstrate the process:
In
one case, local police arrested
a suspected terrorist associate on a state
criminal violation.
After
TSC assisted in the positive
identities match, the CT Watch,
contacted the FBI case agent,
who immediately went to the local detention
facility to talk
with the
individual. During that interview,
the individual agreed to cooperate
with the FBI. Another case
illustrates the intersection between local
law enforcement,
homeland security
and counterterrorism investigations.
Local police arrested
an individual and while conducting
the "search
incident to arrest," discovered significant
evidence of terrorist activities. The TSC
confirmed the individual's
identity and our operational component, the
CT Watch, notified the case agent. Intelligence
gained from the
local arrest has significantly affected a
long term counterterrorism case, confirming
the
value
of bringing
local law enforcement into the war on terrorism.
In
addition to serving local
law enforcement, the TSC receives a high
volume of calls from Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) inspectors
who are stationed on the
Nation's borders. A typical
CBP call involves incoming passengers on
international flights. A CBP inspector
will query a list of names
and may receive several possible suspected
terrorist hits from IBIS and NCIC.
The CBP inspector will
go through their National Targeting Center
(NTC), where the record will be analyzed,
then
passed to TSC. Our process
is the same as it would be for a law enforcement
call, that is, to examine
the underlying record which
often contains all source sensitive and
highly classified information on a 24/7
basis, and determine whether
the individual is identical
to the person in the Terrorist
Screening Center Database. The TSC then
appropriately passes any derogatory information
on the subject, and CBP
makes a determination on whether
the individual will be
allowed into the United States.
Our
consular officers are
our first line of defense in keeping known
and suspected terrorists
out of our Homeland
by denying visas to these
individuals. In this regard, State Department
assignees at
the TSC
are continuing
the work previously done
by the TIPOFF Office. Since December 1,
2003, when the TSC came
into operation,
State Department assignees
and their staff at the TSC have reviewed
over 54,000 security
advisory
opinions,
which are cables from
U.S. Embassies and Consulates around the
globe, to determine
if the visa
applicants described
in these cables were "true hits " with
records contained in the database. Eighty of those "hits" resulted
in true matches. As an example in December, a member
of a terrorist organization applied for a visa at a
U.S. consulate overseas. Consular officials denied
the visa based on the TSC 's review of the information
and confirmation that the individual was a "true
hit," i.e. matched the record at the
TSC. The same process applied to a senior
member
of a proscribed
terrorist organization based overseas. His
visa was also denied.
In
addition, 53 visas
have been revoked, as a result of the State
Department's careful comparison of new
records
entered into the terrorist
database with visas that had been previously
issued.
Finally,
since December 1,
2003, agreements between the State Department
and several allies are
now implemented
at
the TSC, resulting
in over 125 possible "true
hits" of known
and suspected terrorists
at the borders of
those nations. During
January, an
individual
known to the U.S.
government as an
affiliate of a terrorist
organization
attempted to
board a flight
to enter one
of these nations.
The individual's
identity was one
of several thousand
consolidated
from various
U.S.
agencies and passed
to this nation.
According to protocols
contained in our
agreement,
State Department
assignees
at the TSC worked
with their counterparts
in our allied nation,
and the individual
was removed
from
the flight
despite holding valid
travel documents.
According
to a 16 September
2003 Memorandum
of
Understanding between
Secretary
Powell, Secretary
Ridge, Attorney
General Ashcroft,
and DCI Tenet,
the Terrorist
Threat Integration Center's (TTIC) identities
database will serve
as
the
single source for the TSC's terrorist
database, excluding purely
domestic terrorism.
Currently TTIC,
which assembles and analyzes
information from
a wide range of sources to identify potential
terrorists, provides
the
TSC with the
vast majority of
its
information about
known or
suspected international
terrorists.
The
FBI provides
the TSC with information about purely domestic
terrorism that is, information
that has been determined
to have no link to foreign intelligence,
counterintelligence,
or international
terrorism. The TSC consolidates this identifying
information and makes
it accessible for
queries from federal, state,
and local agencies
for screening purposes.
When
a nomination
is received at the TSC from TTIC or the
FBI, it is
reviewed
by assignees
to the TSC from participating agencies,
who, in
consultation with
their assigning
member agencies,
determine how an encounter with this
individual will be handled.
The system
is tailored to provide different
feedback depending on where the encounter
takes place.
For example,
an FBI representative who reviews a record
may
determine
that an individual
is subject to a criminal warrant
and needs to be arrested
by state and
local law enforcement, while the Transportation
Security Administration
(TSA) representative
may decide
that the
individual is not appropriate to
board an
aircraft. This
tailoring ensures that specific guidance
is provided
to federal,
state, and
local agencies based on their legal authority.
TSC Capabilities
The
TSC has
approached the challenge
to consolidate terrorists
watch lists
by implementing a "phased in" approach.
We
implemented
phase one from September 16, 2003 to December
1, 2003,
on the day the TSC achieved initial operating
capability.
During Phase One, the TSC had the ability
to: (1)
make the names and identifying information
of terrorists,
known to or suspected by the U.S. Government,
accessible
to federal, state and local law enforcement;
(2) have
a system for properly reviewing whether
a known or suspected terrorist should be
included in
or deleted
from additional screening processes; (3)
administer
a process to ensure that persons, who may
share
a name with a known or suspected terrorist,
are not unduly inconvenienced in U.S. Government
screening
processes;
and, (4) implement a system to adjust or
delete
outdated or incorrect information to prevent
problems
arising from misidentifications.
Phase
two
occurred from December 1, 2003 to March
1, 2004 in the development of the Terrorist
Screening Database
(TSDB).
The TSDB is an unclassified law enforcement
sensitive
database, containing identifying information
of
known or suspected terrorists. The TSDB
allows the consolidation of disparate information,
currently held
by
multiple agencies and used in different
ways, to be brought together for a single
purpose -- to help
identify
and detain potential terrorists to prevent
future
terrorist attacks.
We
are
currently in phase
three
which concludes
before
the
end of this
year.
The TSC will
create
a
more dynamic
database
and
use a single,
integrated
system
for
ensuring known or
suspected
terrorists'
identities
are
promptly incorporated
into
all appropriate
screening
processes.
The
terrorist screening
database
will
eventually
allow
private sector
entities,
such
as operators
of
critical infrastructure
facilities
or
organizers of large
events,
to
submit a list
of
persons associated
with
those events
to
the U.S. Government
to
be screened for any
nexus
to terrorism.
In
addition, the TSC
will
begin to implement
mechanisms
for
sharing terrorist
screening
information
with
additional cooperating
countries
and
to obtain
such
information from these
countries.
The
Department of State
is
currently working
on
this issue.
Because
our mission cuts across
traditional boundaries
between law enforcement,
national security,
and homeland defense,
we have begun an
aggressive outreach
program. Our outreach
must include members
of the intelligence
community, federal
law enforcement, non-law
enforcement/non-intelligence related
government agencies,
critical infrastructures,
and most importantly,
officers from the
Nation's 18,000
law enforcement agencies.
We not only train
our law enforcement
and government agency
partners; viewing
outreach as a two-way
process, we also
seek feedback and innovative
ideas from them.
Safeguarding Civil Liberties
We
recognize that
with all
of these
capabilities also
comes the
responsibility to
ensure that
we continue
to protect
our civil
liberties.
The
TSC has absolutely no authority to conduct
intelligence collection or other operations.
In fact, the TSC does not collect information
at all it
only receives information collected by other
entities
with preexisting
authority to do so, each with their own policies
and procedures to protect privacy rights
and civil liberties.
The handling and use of information, including
U.S. person information, is governed by the
same statutory,
regulatory, and constitutional requirements
as if the information was not to be included
in
a TSC-managed
database.
The
TSC's primary mission
is to ensure that the
identities data that
is already known to
the U.S. Government
is held in one
location where it
can be queried
by those who need
it, including federal
security screeners
and state and local
law enforcement officers.
The structures
which are in place
also ensure
that information about U.S.
persons
that has been determined
to be purely
domestic terrorism
information with no
link to foreign
intelligence, counterintelligence,
or international
terrorism does not
go through the Terrorist
Threat
Integration Center,
but instead is placed
directly into the
TSC by the
FBI. The Attorney
General has also
been directed to implement
procedures
and safeguards with respect
to information
about U.S. persons,
in coordination with the
Secretary
of State,
the Secretary of Homeland
Security,
and the Director
of Central Intelligence.
We
are also committed
to addressing the issues
and inconveniences
arising from
the misidentification of
persons
under previous watch-listing
practices.
Procedures are in
place to review
and promptly adjust
or delete erroneous
or outdated domestic
terrorism information.
The TSC works closely
with TTIC regarding
any international terrorism
information
errors, as only
TTIC can make
changes to the
records it provides
to the TSC. In
addition, we are
currently in the
process of creating
a dedicated staff specifically
to address
the misidentification process
for the
TSC.
Conclusion
The
creation of
the Terrorist
Screening Center
marks a
significant step
forward in
protecting America's
communities and
families by
detecting, disrupting,
or preempting
terrorist threats.
The TSC
is already
contributing to
nationwide efforts
to keep
terrorists out
of the
U.S. and
locate those
who may
already be
in the
country. For
this unclassified
hearing, I
have given
you only
a few
of our
successes. We
have screened
over 2,000
calls since
our inception,
and the
numbers continue
to rise.
State and
local law
enforcement officers
are now
assisting in
the identification
of known
or suspected
terrorists here
in the
U.S., have
provided invaluable
intelligence for
pending investigation,
and are
now integral
in the
efforts of
combating terrorism
in the
U.S. I
appreciate the
Joint Subcommittee's
interest in
the TSC's
activities and
I will
be happy
to answer
any questions
you may
have.