Remarks by John E. Mclaughlin
Vice Chairman for Estimates, National Intelligence Council
Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
4 December 1996
Senator Specter and other Members of the Committee, I propose to summarize
very briefly for you the statement we have submitted for the record.
Serious issues are on the table today. Clearly, the subject of the
Estimate in question -- our vulnerability to missile attack - - is of
supreme importance to our country. But it is also not inconsequential
that the findings of this Estimate have come under sharp attack, along
with the professional integrity of those who prepared it. I intend to
address all of these by focusing on three areas: what this Estimate
actually says, the process by which it was produced, and then I would
like to respond to some of the criticism it has received. By way of
preface, I would say that after a year of criticism, we still regard
this Estimate as a sound intelligence product -- one that reports clearly
the results of analytic work in response to the questions of those who
requested it.
What the Estimate Says . . .
What is this Estimate about? It seeks to gauge the threat to North
America, including Canada and all 50 of our states, from emerging missile
forces in the world. Because Russia and China are extensively covered
in other intelligence studies, this Estimate was not designed to deal
in detail with their missile forces, other than to note two things:
first, that unauthorized launch of Chinese or Russian missiles remains
a remote possibility and, second, that we would become more concerned
in the event of a severe internal crisis in either country. And as with
all National Intelligence Estimates, this one sought to project events
over a certain period of time, in this case 15 years.
What does the Estimate conclude?
- First, among the countries potentially hostile to the US, North
Korea has the most advanced ballistic missile program. We have identified
a missile in development that we call the Taepo Dong 2 that may become
capable of reaching Alaska and the western-most portion of the 2,000
km long Hawaiian Island chain.
- Second, no country other than the declared nuclear powers will develop
or otherwise acquire ballistic missiles capable of reaching the contiguous
48 states (CONUS) or Canada by 2010. North Korea is the only potentially
hostile country capable of developing a ballistic missile threat to
any part of the US by 2010.
- Third, we are confident that we would detect and identify flight
testing of any country’s developmental ICBM at least five years before
deployment, and probably detect other additional indicators years
before flight testing.
- Fourth, while the factor of foreign assistance introduces some uncertainty
into our predictions of developmental timelines, our assessments include
the range of reasonable possibilities. We expect no country that currently
has ICBMs will sell them, partly out of concern that the missile might
be turned against them.
- Fifth, we also noted that in the next 15 years countries may obtain
land-attack cruise missiles to support of regional military goals.
Adapting these relatively short-range missiles to launch from ships
would be easier and less detectable than an ICBM development program,
but we judged this an unlikely course.
Finally, the fact that we project out 15 years does not mean that
we can safely dismiss this subject until well into the next century.
This is one of the highest priorities of the Intelligence Community.
Our analytic work will continue; we will monitor developments, pursue
collection, and bring to the attention of the President and the Congress
new information and analysis on this important subject.
How was the Estimate Produced?
National Intelligence Estimates are unique in many ways. First, they
represent the views of the entire Intelligence Community, not just a
single agency or analyst. Eight separate agencies contributed in various
ways to producing this Estimate. Each Estimate is discussed and approved
at a meeting of the most senior leaders of the Intelligence Community.
Second, Estimates strive to ensure the presentation of all viewpoints.
We do not impose consensus; in fact, we are charged by the Director
of Central Intelligence with bringing out and sharpening differences
on key issues. Such disagreements are recorded in the text. This Estimate
was no exception, although the differences among experts were not great.
Third, Estimates are also unique in that they focus more consistently
on future trends than most intelligence analysis and, in doing so, they
strive to reduce the uncertainties for our policymakers on the most
contentious issues facing them.
Now, analysts preparing Estimates have to wrestle with a number of
difficult conceptual dilemmas, and how we deal with these often affects
the reception an Estimate gets, as has been the case with this one,
I believe. We struggle constantly, for example, to balance the harried
policymaker’s demand for brevity against our temptation to lay out all
the evidence to support our often controversial judgments. When we conclude
we should lay out the evidence, we must balance this against the risk
of unauthorized disclosure. At the same time, we must balance the reader’s
desire for clarity in judgment against the need to note the uncertainties,
gaps, qualifiers, and alternative outcomes. When we go too far in the
latter direction, it leads to charges that we are waffling. In the case
of the present Estimate, we may have leaned too far toward brevity.
No one has accused us, though, of waffling. Indeed, while some have
criticized the Estimate for too little emphasis on uncertainties, others
have praised it for not obfuscating or seeking refuge in the "lowest
common denominator" view. All of which has contributed to the controversy.
Which leads me to my final point about Estimates. When I was a very
junior analyst some years ago, the country’s most senior practitioner
of Estimates responded to my query about the purpose of the business
by noting simply that it was above all to (quote) "raise the level of
debate about the future" (unquote). His point was that controversy about
Estimates is not necessarily bad, that intelligence Estimates (because
they deal with the future) must never be portrayed as the last word
or "revealed wisdom," and that policymakers and intelligence analysts
ultimately benefit from the very thorough airing of the issue. And it
is in that spirit that we come here today, Mr. Chairman.
Regarding Criticism . . .
In closing, I will not take time to go through every critical comment
about the estimate, but I would like to give you our perspective on
three of the more sweeping charges we have heard over the last year.
By far the most serious is that the conclusions of the Estimate were
politically influenced, that we in essence took orders from someone
in the political arena rather than living up to the most basic tenet
of our profession, that is to "call it as we see it." This is the most
serious charge that you can level at an intelligence officer, and I
cannot let the occasion pass without rejecting it in the strongest terms.
I state categorically that there was no attempt by Administration officials
to shape or modify the judgments in the Estimate at any time. Like it
or not, it is purely the work of highly professional, independent, and
dedicated intelligence analysts. And I believe their judgments were
and remain very sound.
A second and presumably related criticism is that we have reversed
assessments of recent years without sufficient justification, that irrespective
of the evidence, we have dropped earlier warnings in favor of a more
benign scenario. This, too, is unfounded. Yes, some projections of missile
developments were extended by a few years, but this was in response
to new information that I could detail in another setting. Moreover,
the thrust of the judgment in this Estimate is consistent with government
assessments published in 1993 and later, including one published by
the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization in July 1995. I also note
that the GAO review of the Estimate concluded it is not inconsistent
with the two NIEs published in 1993.
And finally, there is the criticism that the Estimate did not address
threats to all of the United States, particularly Hawaii and Alaska.
This has always puzzled us, because the second key judgment of the Estimate
clearly describes the potential threat to Alaska and Hawaii. With regard
to most of the matters in the Estimate, however, the threat to Alaska
and Hawaii is not greater than for the rest of the US and therefore
is not spelled out separately.
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to make these points, and
my colleague and I will welcome your questions. With me today is, Dr.
David Osias, the National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs
and Nuclear-Proliferation, who oversaw production of this Estimate.
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