

EXTERNAL and **INTERNAL FACTORS:** FROM DRIVERS TO OPERATIONAL IMPACTS

Given the scope of its investigative and intelligence responsibilities, the FBI is subject to numerous influences, both external and internal, that affect its ability to achieve the goals and objectives laid out in the Strategic Plan. This section describes the seven most important factors, or global "drivers," that can alter the threat environment, affect forecasting, and interfere with the FBI's ability to meet its goals and objectives. This section also describes the potential impact of those drivers on FBI programs and processes, and provides actions the FBI can take to reduce or ameliorate their impact.

Underlying Global Driver	Results	Possible Shocks	Implications for United States National Security	Operational Impacts for FBI	Org'l and Recruiting Consequences
Global demographic changes	90 percent of population growth in developing countries Aging populations in richer countries Declining population in Russia, South Africa, Japan, other countries Increasing urbanization	Pandemic affecting particular regions or much of globe Less dramatic shocks would hollow out United States partners	Legal and illegal streams of immigrants to United States cover potential terrorists or criminals Rise in xenophobic rightwing groups Immigrants engage United States in politics and conflicts back home Age distributions create "youth bulges" in Africa and Middle East, including Saudi Arabia Refugee streams create instability in poorer recipient countries	Need to penetrate immigrant communities Further dispersion of targets More operations abroad Need for non-"terrorism"- associated agents to respond	Enhanced need for recruiting among immigrants More need for a wider variety of linguists
In particular for United States	Aging plus immigration produces "dumb-bell" age distribution		Increase in crime Easier for terrorists and criminals to hide in urban areas Non-English speaking criminals make investigations more difficult	Rapid turn-over creates opportunity to reshape FBI culture But also reduces corporate memory More criminal targets as well	

Underlying Global Driver	Results	Possible Shocks	Implications for United States National Security	Operational Impacts for FBI	Org'l and Recruiting Consequences
Communi- cations revolution	Universal wireless connectivity Uneven across globe, some countries left out Microsoft "monoculture" dominates Packet-switched communications dominate Increasingly "digital" western society	Major outbreak of disease would disrupt communications Attacks, other shocks could bring down parts of networks	Terrorists, militias, criminals communicate with ease Encryption ubiquitous if not infallible Operations very difficult in "unconnected" countries given dependence on commercial networks Many-to-one, many-to-many communications reinforce communities, from militias to pedophiles Increasing dependence on COTS and public networks (e.g., VPNs over public networks) Data flows means information on Americans available "abroad"	Increased efficiency of operations Constrains FISA operations – need to enter or get close to end-nodes in the Net Easier FBI peer-to- peer communications; supervisory agents have less opportunity for oversight Pervasive media makes reaching out to the public, e.g., to identify criminals, more possible Identity theft makes it harder to identify people, including perpetrators Intercepts are primarily on packet-switched or wireless networks Conduct Operation Continuity Planning for FBI digital networks, to include options for total network failure	Increased need for technical expertise throughout organization requires change in culture

Underlying Global Driver	Results	Possible Shocks	Implications for United States National Security	Operational Impacts for FBI	Org'l and Recruiting Consequences
Global economic changes	Distance, weight continue to mat- ter less and less in international commerce Prospects for global prosperity good Asia biggest win- ner But uneven across countries and within them Increased speed, ease of transna- tional financial flows Energy resources underscore importance of Persian Gulf, Russia, Caspian region, coastal Africa, for instance	Major oil crisis Japan, Europe falter on labor shortages China and/or India falter on economic restructuring Debt crisis among LDCs	With demographics, unem- ployed "youth bulges" of males offer recruits for terrorism Population growth plus economic failure risks "failed states" as humanitar- ian problems and terrorist havens "Bads" – weapons, includ- ing WMD, drugs – move as easily as goods Global economy, plus thick migration abet organized crime Easier for criminal and ter- rorist groups to transfer currency globally	Terrorism and organized crime converge More operations abroad, more need to train for foreign operations Outsourcing abroad raises questions about security of information technology Greater need to coordi- nate countermeasures with other countries, international financial organizations	Need for close cooperation between CTD and CID
In particular, for United States	Widening cleav- ages between "red" and "blue" states With outsourc- ing, United States becomes depen- dent, loses know- how in crucial areas	Sustained downturn in United States economy Rising budget defi- cits lead to down- ward pressure on budgets	Gaps plus communication abet rise of radical groups		Continuing dif- ficulty recruiting highly-paid tech- nical and other talent

Underlying Global Driver	Results	Possible Shocks	Implications for United States National Security	Operational Impacts for FBI	Org'l and Recruiting Consequences
Rising belief in non- material – religion, tribe, ethnicity – "us" vs. "them"	Also fuels pool of potential terrorists Rise of new radi- cals from cults, to "new left" to anti-globalization forces Reaction to domi- nance of global culture identified as "American"	Fundamentalists take-over in major state, like Saudi Arabia	Feeds terrorism and state failure United States focus of hatred in much of the world, especially Muslim world Increased pressure on Muslim allies not to coop- erate	Continued dispersion of targets Need to work abroad, but increasing danger to agents abroad	
In particular, for the United States	New cults, militias at home Increased divi- sions in United States including intensified parti- sanship	Divisions and discontents in United States much greater than expected More links between militias and "legitimate" society Militias "used" by more capable foes like Al Qaeda	Ethnic-based crime on the increase – for instance, staged accidents Crime embedded in cul- ture that does not see it as "criminal" Increased ethnic and geo- graphic basis for drug use, e.g. Meth in rural areas	Harder to penetrate many ethnic groups, especially new ones Issues of reliability within a much more varied work- force FBI actions perhaps focal- point in global battle to try to rein in "rogue" super- power	Increasing difficulty recruiting Arabs and other Muslims, also at home

Underlying Global Driver	Results	Possible Shocks	Implications for United States National Security	Operational Impacts for FBI	Org'l and Recruiting Consequences
New revolutions in technology	Biotechnology permits genomic profiling, biomedical engineering, genetic modification Materials technology permits customized, "smart," sensor- rich products Nanotechnology changes the way everything is designed and made High-tech dominance of United States corporations Biotech, especially, will provide opportunities for the rich, and so be divisive across and within societies	Major accidents delay technology around the world Biotech becomes a source of conflict with United States allies Dramatic new lethalities emerge United States turns out to be not such a clear leader in some technol's	Proliferation of weapons, including mass destruction, easier Possible new "weapons" from biotechnology, other sciences Widening technological gap between United States and rest of world Potential to enumerate and uniquely identify individuals in a society	DNA, blood, genetic analysis advanced New sensors aid tracking bad items and people, but deception also facilitated "Tagging" property or items also permits targeting of agents Agents and informants abroad denied the use of multiple identities Increase in espionage and cyber crimes directed against United States corporations Improved sensors and new testing raises civil liberties concerns	Again, need to recruit and raise stature of technical talent throughout organization
Revolution in security technology and practice	Network manages precision strikes from afar, linked to an array of sensors Soldiers as sensors as much as shooters United States in class by itself Sensors and procedures for policing and contingency operations improve but more slowly	Major potential opponent leapfrogs United States, in concepts of operation if not technology Conspicuous United States vulnerability appears	Would-be United States foes driven to asymmetric attacks, seeking vulnerabilities, including at home Limited foreign capabilities limit number and depth of United States partnerships Perception of "hemorrhaging" in contingency operations leaves administration vulnerable in public opinion	Again, increased operations abroad, especially in "policing" operations Rise in espionage against United States government and defense contractors Need to be able to operate after attack against the FBI (including WMD), especially HQ Risk of political pressure for solutions quicker than technology will permit	

Underlying Global Driver	Results	Possible Shocks	Implications for United States National Security	Operational Impacts for FBI	Org'l and Recruiting Consequences
Changing role of state and law	Global economy, technology empower non- state actors, from terrorists, to corporations, to NGOs Role of state, including United States, becomes that of coalition- builder International law continues to shift from states as subjects to people	Continued dra- matic terrorism creates new national security state Ungoverned, "gray areas" of globe increase dramati- cally Possible efforts, esp. religiously motivated, to end-run United States law	With technology, asymmet- ric threats, including WMD More and more states can- not police selves United States intervention, even armed, more accept- able, hence more likely But as "rights" of individu- als extended, international scrutiny of United States actions increases	Need to cooperate with a wide variety of states and non-states FBI perhaps subject of special scrutiny, abroad and at home	Need for forms of coop- eration beyond cases and task forces Need to rethink security procedures in dealing with many more "out- siders"