



CURRENT INTELLIGENCE VEEKLY SUMMARY

13 November 1958


TEE VEEK IN BRIEF

PART I

OF INNEDIATE INTEREST

USSR THREATENS WESTERN POSITION IN BERLIN Page 1

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PART I

OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST

VERR THREATENS WESTERN POSITION IN BERLIN

Ehrushchev's threats on 10 November to "revise" the international status of Berlin presage a period of mounting tension in Germany. During this period the USSR will probably take a series of steps to transfer to the East German regime soviet authority in Berlin derived from quadripartite agreements. A new juridical basis for the presence of Seviet troops in East Germany would be established.

Ehrushehev declared that
the Western powers, by violating
the "Potsdam Agreement"—notably
by sanctioning the remilitarisation of West Germany—had forfeited their right to remain
in West Berlin, and he indicated
that the USSR would hand over
its remaining functions to
East Germany. He further declared that any attack on East
Germany would be considered an
attack on the USSR itself. He
gave so indication, however, of
how or when the USSR planned to
hand over its functions. Soviet
Foreign Himister Gromyko en 11
Hovember said this would not
happen immediately but would
not be long delayed. Further,
a Soviet Foreign Himistry official informed American Ambas—
sador Thompson that German problems should be dealt with on a
step-by-step basis.

The Soviet actions would

The Soviet actions would be designed to enhance East German sovereignty, thus underliming the Soviet contention that there are two Germanies and, by invoking the threat of a blockade, to force the West to deal with the Ulbricht regime. A broader purpose may be to fur-

ther increase world tension with a "western Quency" in order to strengthen bloc unity against the common enemy and to block West Gorman attempts to establish normal relations with the East European countries, particularly Poland. Further, the



move is designed to underout forthcoming West German proposals regarding a four-power conference on German reunification.

Moscow's move at this time will strengthen the hand of the Ulbricht regime against popular unrest stemming from the sudden




OF THMEDIATE INTEREST

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change in over-all policy from a "hard line" to one of concessions to certain elements of the populace. As a result of concessions to physicians, industrial workers were considering work slowdowns to pressure the regime into improving their own conditions.

Moreover, the flow of refugees to the West, although somewhat reduced, has continued. During October, more than 19,000 East Germans, including many intellectuals and technicians, fled to the West, approximately 75 percent through West Berlin. A sealing off of West Berlin would thus greatly diminish refugee losses.

In a press conference on 18 Movember, East German Premier Grotewohl, Feferring to the pagability of a withdrawal of Soviet troops from Germany, estated that he understood Ehruskohev's speech raised such a possibility, "naturally" on the premise that the other powers took the same steps. This suggests that East German officials may depart for Moscow in the mear future to negotiate a new agreement along these lines, perhaps after the forthcoming elections of 16 Movember, as reported by a fairly reliable source.

Moscow might transfer its membership in the Berlin Air



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Safety Center to the East Germans, thus confronting the Vest with a situation in which it would be required either to deal with East German efficials or fly without guarantees of safety. Ecover, the East Germans are not now believed to be in a position to exert effective control of flights in the corridor and they apparently do not possess the trained personnel to take over all the Soviet positions at this time.

West German efficials be-lieve that Ehrushchev's speech is aimed at testing the firmness of the Western resolve to Fe-main in Berlin and at exerting pressure on German public opin-ion to accept direct political talks with East Germany. French and British foreign affairs officials have strongly rejected any unilateral abrogation of the Potsdam Agreement, and the West German press chief on 13 Movember hinted that Bonn might consider severing its relations

with Moscow if the USSE abrogated the four-power status of Serlin.

Increased harassment of
West Berlin and Allied and Vest
Germa access to it is now likeiy. Various measures to inhibit traffic on the lifeline
to Berlin could be taken by
the USER or Hast Germany, and
the East Germans could nove to
seel off West Berlin by imposing border restrictions and
halting municipal transport.
Although West Berlin municipal
officials report that there
is no indication of public disquiet in the city, they feel
that acceptance of East German
control over highway access to
Berlin would be an "intolerable
situation." British officials
in Berlin, however, warn of
the danger of a "self-imposed"
blocked if the Western powers
refuse to accept East German
control over access to Berlin.

