604 Lowe Drive
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2322
|
|
604 Lowe Drive Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2322
|
*RED THRUST STAR
July 1992
 |
STAFF Commander, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment....................COL Patrick LamarBrigade S-2..........................................................................MAJ James P. Kump Editor-in-Chief......................................................................Mr. Allen E. Curtis Managing Editor................................................................SPC Evelyn G. Jewell |
|---|
RED THRUST STAR is published for the U.S. Forces Command OPFOR Training Program by S-2, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Irwin, CA 92310-5031. The purpose of the RED THRUST STAR is to publish timely, authoritative information on OPFOR training to increase the knowledge and understanding of OPFOR training throughout the Armed Forces. Articles published reflect views of the authors and should not be interpreted as official opinion of the Department of the Army, or of any branch, command, or agency of the Army. Material may be reprinted, provided credit is given to RED THRUST STAR and to the author(s), except where copyright is indicated. Articles, photographs, and new items of interest on all facets of OPFOR training are solicited. Direct communication is authorized to : Editor, RED THRUST STAR, c/o S-2, 177th Armored Brigade, Fort Irwin, CA 92310-5031, tel. (619) 386-5289/5207, or DSN 470-5289/5207. Subscriptions are available to battalion size or larger units, as well as to training and readiness staffs, from the same address. Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. RED THRUST STAR is published quarterly.
This medium is approved for the official dissemination of OPFOR related material.
By Order of the Secretary of the Army:
GORDON R. SULLIVAN
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
Official
THOMAS F. SIKORA
Brigadier General, U.S. ARMY
The Adjutant General
Distribution: Special
Greetings Comrades
by Colonel Patrick Lamar
The Non-Linear Nature of Future War:
A Soviet/Commonwealth View
Foreign Military Studies Office
U.S. Army Combined Arms Command
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Modern Defensive Tactics of a Russian Motorized Rifle Division
by Mr. Charles R. Patrick
U.S. Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center
Washington, DC
Defense in Built-up Areas
by Mr. Charles J. Dick
Soviet Studies Research Center
Camberley, UK
NTC OPFOR Techniques:
The Motorized Rifle Battalion's Reconnaissance Platoon
by 1LT Steven F. Kuni
Executive Officer, Company B. 1-63 Armor
Certain Aspects of Army Counteroffensive Operations
(From the Experience of the Second World War)
by Colonel V.F. Yashin, Candidate of Historical Sciences, Assistant Professor
and Lieutentant-Colonel V.I. Kuznetsov, Candidate of Historical Sciences
Department of Operational Art, Frunze General Staff Academy
Moscow, Russia
Book Reviews
by Allen E. Curits
Editor, Red Thrust Star
Greetings Comrades
by Colonel Patrick Lamar
I am pleased to have the opportunity to address you in this column for the first time, having assumed command of the 177th Amored Brigade earlier this month from Colonel Patrick O'Neal. As I look back over the last two years of the bulletin's publication I believe it has done a good job of documenting developments in our understanding of the threat, and in the refinement of the opposing force (OPFOR) portrayal at the National Training Center (NTC).
An area I believe we have not been able to address as adequately is the state of OPFOR training outside the NTC. With very few exceptions, the editors have not received articles from the other combat training centers, or from active or reserve component units with successful opposing force training programs. When the NTC picked up the Red Thrust mission in 1988, it was not intended that the Star become a "house organ," but it has done so. I would encourage any of our readers to submit articles on their OPFOR programs to help reverse this trend.
Having completed my first rotation in command of the OPFOR 60th Motorized Rifle Division. I can assure you that the OPFOR portrayal at the NTC will continue to be robust and challenging to rotational units. Over the previous two rotations, the OPFOR tested prototypes of the OPFOR Surrogate Vehicle (OSV). Based on an M113A3 chassis, and fitted with a stripped-down M2 Bradley turret maechanism, the OSV is designed to replicate the BMP-2 infantry fighing vehicle. Field testing during the rotations shows it to be a highly accurate replication, and to have a significant increase in fighting capability over the M551 Sheridan-based BMP-1. The program to refine and produce the OSV is funded, and will result in the complete re-equipping of the 32d Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment with OSV BMP-2s over the next few years. Concurrently, programs to upgrade the MILES systems and to provide OPFOR air defense simulators are also resourced and will result in a far more challenging training battlefield.
The OPFOR will also continue to refine its execution of Krasnovian doctrine, and will use the pages of this publication to keep the training audience informed of such developments. In this issue of the bulletin, there are articles that mirror our thoughts on different aspects of this problem. The first article, from the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) at Fort Leavenworth outlines the development of Soviet and Commonwealth military thought on the non-linear nature of future war. It is a synopsis of presentations the FMSO staff has made during past threat workshops at the NTC. The subject of further developments to former Soviet military doctrine is one that we must keep in mind for future revisions of Krasnovian doctrine.
The next article from Mr. Charles Patrick of the Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center, addresses such developments in the context of contempoary Russian defensive tactics. His analysis lays out the basic frame work of a division defense; he and other contributors will expand on this in greater detail in future issues. Mr. Patrick has a number of other tactically-orientated articles in the pipeline to us, and we look forward to publishing them.
A long-standing contributor to both the bulliten and the NTC's threat workshops is Mr. Charles Dick, director of the army's Soviet Studies Research Center. He presented his review of modern Soviet tactics for defending in built-up areas at last fall's workshop. This should be useful for units conducting MOUT training.
One of the NTC OPFOR company executive officers, 1LT Kuni, explains in his article how the OPFOR motorized rifle battalion reconnaissance platoon accomplishes its mission. This subunit is a relatively new addition to the Krasnovian OPFOR structure, and I'm sure rotational units will be very interested in 1LT Koni's exposition.
Perhaps the most significant article in this issue is the last one. Mr. Curtis, the bulletin's editor, had the chance to go to Russia this summer to visit a number of locations connected with Russian military history. Among the Russian officers he met were military history professors from the Frunze general staff academy, who volunteered to give us articles on historical topics that relate to current military doctrine. The first such article begins in this issue and will conclude in the next. I am very pleased to be able to include the analytical work of professional Russian army officers in our publication.
In the past, the bulletin has made a pratice of saying farewell to individuals that have executed the Red Thrust program as they move on to new endeavors. This summer at the National Training Center, we are changing out a number of key personnel. One of these is LTC Steve Swanson, who has been the brigade S-2, the NTC threat manger, and Red Thrust OIC for the last year. I want to thank him for an outstanding job in manging the many efforts to upgrade the OPFOR portrayal and keep you informed of them, and wish him well in his next assignment with the XVIII Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg.
The Non-Linear Nature of Future War:
A Soviet/Commonwealth View
Foreign Military Studies Office
U.S. Army Combined Arms Command
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
The views expressed here are those of the Foreign Military Studies Office. They should not necessarily be construed as validated threat doctrine.
Introduction
For years prior to the recent revolutionary political events in the Soviet Union and Commonwealth, Soviet military theorists have been preoccupied with the new technological revolution in weaponry and its likely impact on the nature of future war. By the mid-1980s, Soviet military theorists reached the conclusion that future war would be non-linear (ochagovyy-fragmented in nature), and they began to reorganize their forces accordingly.
Despite the subsequent revolutionary political events, and the severe disruption of military thought and force structure caused by those events, Commonwealth (Russian) theorists have not abandoned their belief that future war will be non-linear. Fueled by their analysis of the Gulf War, these theorists are articulating an increasingly refined view of non-linear war and are, in part at least, structuring their forces within that context. As the United States Army articulates its future combat doctrine in FM 100-5 and other documents, it should understand our former enemy's concept of the nature of future war.
The recent and ongoing debate among Soviet and Commonwealth military analysts over the nature of contemporary and future war has been of epic proportions. The debate has been fueled by intense Soviet study of the nature of recent wars, in particular the Gulf War, and has been affected by the stormy political, economic, and social turbulence which has engulfed the former Soviet Union. One of the most controversial questions the debate has addressed is the relative utility of the offense and the defense in modern combat.
This debate has as an analog the great theoretical debates of the 1920s, which endorsed offensiveness and charted the general course of Soviet military thought for the ensuing 60 years.1 Like its earlier counterpart, it is likely that the outcome of the ongoing debate will have significant and lasting impact on the form and nature of post-Soviet military science, military art, and force structure. Therefore, it is important to understand the nature and potential implications of the debate as the U.S. Army formulates its future military doctrine.
Long-term Soviet preoccupation with offensiveness in military-art culminated in the 1970s with their virtual fixation on all aspects of "deep battle" and "deep operations" as personified by their concept of the theater-strategic offensive. Although this concept, together with intense interest in operational and tactical maneuver, persisted well into the 1980s, it is now clear that Soviet theorists throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s were, in fact, paying increased attention to defensive questions at all levels of war.2 Soviet concern over new developments in combat weaponry and military technology prompted that reaction, although their "gut" response was still to postulate new offensive methods to meet those new-challenges.
For example, the experiences of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War demonstrated the increased lethality of antitank systems (ATGMs) and the increased vulnerability of the Soviets primary offensive weapon, the tank. Later in the 1970s, the Soviets realized the potential impact of Western wartime use of tactical nuclear weaponry on the feasibility and viability of Soviet offensive concepts. Still later, in the early 1980s, the Soviets noted with concern the potential impact on the nature of combat of more active and offensive Western operational and tactical concepts, including AirLand Battle and Follow-on-Forces Attack (FOFA).
Finally, in the mid-1980s, the Soviets realized the potentially devastating effects of newly emerging, and largely Western, high-precision weaponry on their offensive-oriented concepts.
The Soviet response to these challenges was consistent. First, they recognized the existence and implications of each challenge. Then, they concentrated on developing forces and operational and tactical concepts which could theoretically cope with each challenge, but in a typically Soviet offensive context. Thus, the Soviets improved armor protection on their tanks and increased the strength and combined-arms mix in their forces during the mid-1970s, developed new operational maneuver concepts in the late 1970s, expanded their reliance on operational maneuver in the early 1980s, developed imaginative new concepts for conducting tactical maneuver in the mid-1980s, and postulated new concepts and forces for the conduct of non-linear war in the mid- and late 1980s. All of these measures were an attempt to treat new doctrinal and technological challenges within a traditionally offensive context.
The driving force in this dialectical process of change was Soviet realization that new technological developments in weaponry posed distinct and increasingly fundamental challenges to that long-term Soviet faith in the offense. Therefore, it was only prudent to continue to devote some attention to defensive questions. As this process unfolded, it now appears that these challenges were also imperceptibly undermining the confidence of Soviet military analysts that the, by now, largely politically-based fixation on the offense was, in fact, feasible in modern war.
By the close of 1985, a date which the Soviet tactical specialist Lieutenant General V.K. Reznichenko identified as the end of an old and the beginning of a new period of military development. Soviet military analysts were facing a military dilemma, accompanted by vexing and persistent economic problems.3 The apparent quickening pace of combat resulting from enhanced force mobility and the burgeoning lethality and accuracy of new high-precision weaponry called into question long-held assumptions regarding future ground combat and promised to unleash yet another expensive chapter in the global arms race. Moreover, there were increasing doubts among the Soviet mililary and political leadership whether they could keep up with the West in what had become a race to develop and master accelerating technological change. Soviet attempts to do so seemed to threaten the continued economic viability of the Soviet state. The Soviets still adhered to the general concept of the theater-strategtc operation, and Soviet theoretical writings still expressed an all-abiding faith in the offensive as the best guarantor of victory in future war. There were, however, some major problems to be addressed.
The first was the appearance of high-precision weapons (vysokotochnyye oruzhiye), the more lethal and sophisticated descendants of older ATGMs of the 1970s, in the arsenal of Western states and on the prospecutve battlefield. The new weapons exploited miniaturization and computer technology, fields in which the Soviets woefully lagged behind the West. The increased range of these weapons and their unprecedented accuracy made possible long-range stand-off fires against military targets. When incorporated into a system and combined with equally sophisticated larget acquisition means, they posed a significant problem to attacker and defender alike. As a result, older concepts of operational maneuver and, in particular, mass and concentration, had to be reassessed. Forces which massed too early and lingered in assembly and concentration areas courted disaster.5 The traditional ways of preparing for and conducting a penetration operation were clearly obsolete, and new methods had to be found to propel forces through enemy tactical defenses into the operational depths and to protect them while they were operating in the enemy's operational rear.
Compounding the adverse effects this technological revolution was having on traditional Soviet offensive concepts was Western development of new tactical and operational maneuver concepts. The U.S. concept of AirLand Battle and the NATO concept of FOFA sought to capitalize on the new weaponry by conducting deep battle and operations in order to strike enemy forces through the depth of their formation. These concepts placed Soviet second echelons, operational maneuver groups (OMGs), and rear area facilities in increased jeopardy. In short, the new weaponry and imaginative Western force employment concepts forced the Soviets to abandon, or at least seriously alter, traditional concepts of echelonment and traditional concepts for conducting operational maneuver.
Much earlier, in the first half of the 1970s, the Soviets had developed the concept of anti-nuclear maneuver (protivoyadernyy manevr) to deal with the growing threat to operating forces posed by early generations of battlefield nuclear weapons. Their maneuver specialist, F.D. Sverdlov, who participated in the discusstons and formulation of anti-nuclear in maneuver, defined it as the organized shifting of subunits with the aim of withdrawing them out from under the possible blows of enemy nuclear means, to protect their survival and subsequent freedom of action to strike a blow on the enemy. Therefore, anti-nuclear maneuver is also one of the forms of maneuver.6
The defensive aspect of this maneuver was complemented by offensive measures "to rapidly disperse subunits or change the direction of their offensive, and to conduct other measures related to defense against weapons of mass destruction."7
The subsequent work of Sverdlov and other Soviet military theorists throughout the 1970s led them to conclude that the most effective manner in which to conduct anti-nuclear maneuver was through expanded reliance upon more flexible operational and tactical maneuver. They ultimately developed twin concepts for the employment of operational maneuver by OMGs and tactical maneuver by forward detachments, which reached full articulation by 1980.8 By the mid-1980s, the Soviets had generalized both concepts and applied them throughout all military theory and to force structure as well. These theoretical and practical changes were also reinforced by Soviet military experiences in Afghanistan.
During the late 1970s, faced with the increased threat posed to forces by enemy tactical and theater nuclear weapons, Soviet military theorists also recommeded employment of shallower strategic and operational echelonment, in essence a single echelon of fronts, each with the preponderance of its armies also formd in single echelon. the OMG concept posited a solution to the problem of the increased vulnerability of second echclons to nuclear attack by replacing these cumbersome second echelon forces with more dynamic, flexible, and rapidly moving exploitation forces, in the form of more numerous OMGs. Use of these groups would impart a non-linear nature to combat at the operational level of war.
The Soviet solution to the dilemma of countering the new high-precision weaponry of the 1980s involved their wholesale abandonment of linear concepts of warfare at the tactical level as well. Among the new non-linear concepts which Soviet military theorists advanced for combat at the tactical level were the adoption of new forms of tactical echelonment, the formation and employment of tailored combined-arms forces down to the lowest tactical levels (regiment and battalion), the increased conduct of independent actions by tactical subunits (such as raids), and increased combat employment of air assault forces.
As recently as 1987, the older concept of anti-nuclear maneuver still served as a cornerstone for modern Soviet operational and tactical techniques designed to preempt, preclude, or inhibit enemy resort to nuclear warfare. Only by 1987 the same concept also provided the nucleus for the Soviet theoretical combat response to the threat of high-precision weaponry. As articulated in 1987 by V. G. Rezoichenko:
the continuous conduct of battle at a high tempo creates unfavorable conditions for enemy use of weapons of mass destruction high-precision weapons now included. He cannot determine targets for nuclear strikes precisely and, besides, will be forced to shift his nuclear delivery means often.9
By the mid-1980s, Soviet analysts had concluded that high-precision weapons essentially posed the same sort of threat to attacking forces as had tactical nuclear weapons. In addition, these new weapons promised a capability of more flexible engagement if attacking forces before such forces made actual contact with the enemy. The Soviets tentatively decided that even greater emphasis on operational and tactical maneuver was also a partial remedy to countering enemy use of high-precision weaponry.10 To capitalize fully on the effects of expanded maneuver, the Soviets also believed that they had to reduce planning time and execute command and control more precisely. This required increased emphasis on the use of cybernetic tools, including automation of command and expanded reliance on tactical and operational calculations (nomograms, etc.).
Within this new paradigm for non-linear warfare, the Soviets also realized that advantage accrued to that force which could quickly close with the enemy, thus potentially rendering the enemy's high-precision weapons less effective. This judgment, in turn, increased the operational and tactical significance of first echelons. Thus, by 1987, in the tactical realm, Soviet writers were able to argue that there arises the problem of defining the optimal structure for the first and second echelons at the tactical level. With the enemy using high-precision weapons, the role of the first echelon has to grow. It must be capable of achieving a mission without the second echelon or reserve.11
This judgment paralleled a similar Soviet judgment about echelonment at the operational level, which they had made several years ago. In the Soviet view, operational and tactical combat now embraced "simultaneously, the entire depth of the combat formations of both contending sides."12 As a result, combat missions were no longer solely described in linear fashion by the seizure of lines (rubezh). The new approach, according to Rezoichenko in the 1987 edition of Taktika, was, "to determine them not by line, as it was done before, but rather by important area (objective), the seizure of which will secure the undermining of the tactical stability of the enemy defense.13
Remnichenko and others suggested that tactical missions required the seizure of objectives, whose loss would fragment the enemy's forward defense and render it untenable, along multiple axes throughout the depth of the enemy's defense. At the tactical level, specifically designated and tailored maneuver forces (usually forward detachments) had earlier performed this function, while tailored operational maneuver forces did the same at the operational level.14 In the future, theorists argued, all tactical units and subunits were likely to operate in this fashion.
This description of operational and tactical combat in future war significantly altered traditional Soviet concepts of echelonment, not only by reducing the number of ground echelons, but also by supplementing the ground echelon with a vertical (air assault) echelon, which added greater depth to battle. According to Reznichenko:
One can propose that, under the influence of modern weapons and the great saturation of ground foices with aviation means, the combat formation of forces on the of offensive is destined to consist of two echelons-a ground echelon, whose mission will be to complete the penetration of the enemy defense and develop the success into the depths, and an air echelon created to envelop defending forces from the air and strike blows against his rear area15
A 1988 article rounded out these vivid descriptions of non-linear combat by adding, "Modern combined arms battle is fought throughout the entire depth of the enemy combat formation, both on the side's contact line (FLOT) and in the depth, on the ground and in the air."16 As a consequence, the fragmented nature of battle would result in "mutual wedging overlap of units and subunits, which will have to operate independently for a long time."17 In essence, what emerged by 1988 was a Soviet concept of land-air battle juxtaposed against the U.S. concept of AirLand battle, equally applicable to offensive and defensive operations.
New Soviet concepts for waging non-linear war portended greater Soviet task organization of forces and the fielding of combined-arms forces at even lower levels (e.g. brigades and battalions). This program had already been in progress for several years as the Soviets experimented with and then fielded corps-type operational maneuver formations, first within the Soviet Union and then in the forward groups of forces.
Sharp changes, however, were about to occur, which halted in its tracks this natural evolution in miiitary theory and force structure. These chances forced Soviet military theorists to shift the emphasis of their intellectual work from seeking ways to make the offense more effective to emphasizing defesive themes, which they hitherto had begun considering, but only within an offensive context. Now the context also became defensive.
In all likelihood, these changes were prompted more by the worsening Soviet economic and political situation than by military necessity. Nevertheless, during 1986 Soviet theorists began addressing a growing number of defensive themes, among the most important of which were:
Subsequently, from 1989 through early 1991, as Soviet theorists became preoccupied with defense in Soviet miiitary thought, an even wider range of defensive topics became the subject of extensive and intense analysis, all within a non-linear context. Among the most prominent topics which Soviet analysts examined were:
In essence, the Soviets, in accordance with political and economic realities and their desire to display defensiveness, largely shelved their attempts to restructure their armed forces to meet the offensive requirements of what they perceived as non-linear war; they temporarily abandoned their attempts to create forces which could conduct tactical and operational maneuver on the modern fragmented battlefield and survive (the corps, brigade, and combined-arms battalion structure). This reaction, however, was a political one, which in no way altered Soviet military-theoretical judgments that future war would be non-linear, whether or not the Soviet posture was defensive or offensive.
Given the sharp and revolutionary political, economic, and social changes now underway in the former Soviet Union, the ongoing reevaluatoin of internal and external threats, and new views on the nature of fufure war, it is likely that future military theorists in the Soviet successor states will, while addressing defensive topics, also incorporate into their study elements from their deffensive military analysis, which dominated their attention through 1985 and persisted in some forums well into 1987. This synthesis of old and new should prompt Russian and, perhaps, other military theorists to analyze at least the following topics (some, for obvious political reasons, in closed forums):
Most important, the debate is providing interesting insights into how military theorists view the nature of future combat in light of technological changes and analysis of combat in the Gulf war. At the least, Gulf War experiences underscored the tremendous impact of high-precision weapons on combat and raise the question of whether current operational and tactical maneuver concepts were still viable.
Today, the driving force in the assessments of Commonwealth analysts is the twin belief that today "arms and military technology are the most mobile element of armed struggle", and traditional military formations can no longer cope with that reality.19 Modern combat of a non-linear nature, in the view of these theorists, will be marked by the following characteristics:
This type of combat environment personifies the new revolution in military affairs, and it will place immense new demands on organizations and staffs. To some degree this new revolution replicates circumstances of the late 1950s, when military theorists had to cope with the challenge of nuclear weaponry during the last technological "revolution in military affairs."21 At the least, coping with the consequences of this new technological revolution will require a fundamental reevaluation of all components of military organizations, a process which is already underway.
References
Modern Defensive Tactics of a Russian Motorized Rifle Division
by Mr. Charles R. Patrick
U.S. Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center
Washington, DC
The views expressed here are those of the author. They should not be construed as validated threat doctrine.
"Whatever you do, you must drive the enemy together, as if tying a line of fishes, and when they are seen to be piled up, cut them down strongly without giving them room to move."
Shinmen Musashi
Second Year of Shoho (1645)
Introduction
The Russians clearly began to modify their tactics many years before the official announcement of a new defensive doctrine. Although the debate continues, this article will examine modifications to their defensive tactics if forced to conduct military operations today.
Establishing the Tactical Defensive
Three important factors must be addressed concerning the establishment of a Russian motorized rifle division (MRD) defensive combat formation. First, the current combat formation of a Russian MRD will only be slightly modified from that presented in Figure 1. Based on recent Russian statements, the security zone and main defensive zone should have both greater width and depth than previously. However, even with increased maneuver operations, the subunits and units must be able to mutually support each other with direct fire. The need for supporting fire and the terrain where the defense is established will determine the width and depth of the tactical defense at the subunit, unit, and large unit level.
Second, a Russian MRD does not defend its sector with only its organic equipment and manpower. Former Soviet doctrine dictates that a divisions parent army and parent fronts can, and will, attach additional units and subunits to the MRD for the duration of the defensive battle. This philosophy suggests that the structure of a deployed MRD in the defense may resemble that depicted in Figure 2.
Other units and subunits directly subordinate to army and front will also be operating within the MRDs defensive sector. These units have the mission of conducting the operational portion of its parent army's defensive plan, and could include army or front level air defense, antitank, artillery, and engineer forces. Any enemy force penetrating the divisional sector may face significantly larger combat forces than they would find in a wartime MRD.
Third, Russian divisional commanders do not establish a defensive combat formation without considering possible enemy courses of action. The MRDs defense will be based upon established former Soviet principles of tactics and standards of activity (norms).
These principles and norms govern the Russian correlation-of-forces analysis and their perception of how their enemy will fight. The Russians have analyzed how they expect a NATO style heavy armored force to conduct conventional combat operations. Based on this analysis, a Russian army-level commander would expect an armor-heavy opponent, conducting a major breakthrough operation, to attack his forward divisions defensive sector with corps consisting of three heavy divisions. This force may attack in three echelons with a mechanized infantry division of five tank battalions and five mechanized infantry battalions conducting the breaching operation. The second-echelon heavy division would conduct the breakthrough battle while the third-echelon heavy division would exploit the breakthrough into the operational depth of the defense. The army commander will establish his army's defensive combat formation and provide guidance and additional
units to his forward-deployed divisions, a process that strengthens the MRDs defense against this anticipated threat.
Fighting the Tatical Defensive Battle
Basis of the Defense
During the initial period of war but prior to the outbreak of hostilities, the MRD will be tasked to establish a defense out of contact with enemy forces. In this situation, the MRD commander can expect to have up to several weeks to construct extensive countermobility obstacles and primary and secondary fighting positions. In addition, he will develop a detailed fire support plan for division-, reegiment-,
and battalion-level artillery and mortars. Upon receiving his mission from the army commander, the division commander creates a divisional combat formation designed to allow his unit to fight a defensive battle to its best advantage in its assigned sector.
Engaging Enemy Forces Outside the Security Zone
Once hostilities begin, the Russians will employ reconnaissance strike complexes to engage enemy forces at the farthest distance possible from the forward edge of the security zone. The intent is to attrit the enemy as much as possible before they make contact with friendly forces. These strikes will be conducted by fixed-wing aviation and artillery assets drawn from the front and the army artillery group (AAG). Some front- and army-level surface-to-surface missiles, multiple rocket launchers, and artillery are capable of delivering several types of improved conventional munitions (ICMs) containing either scatterable antipersonnel and antiarmor mines or antipersonnel cluster munitions. These ICMs will be concentrated on enemy assembly areas, attack points, routes of march, and avenues of approach. In addition, some AAG artillery assets are capable of delivering semiactive laser-guided projectiles (SLPs).
As enemy formations advance closer to the forward edge of the security zone, the Russians will engage enemy units with reconnaissance fire complexes (RFCs). Fires will be conducted by the divisional artillery group (DAG), regimental artillery groups (RAGs), and long-range battalion-level mortars. Some DAG artillery assets are also capable of delivering scatterable antipersonnel and antiarmor mines. These munitions would likewise be concentrated on enemy attack points, routes of march, and avenues of approach. In addition, some BAG and RAG artillery assets are capable of delivering SLPs.
Once the advance elements of the enemy formations close with the forward edge of the security zone, they will be engaged by direct fire from rotary wing assets of the army attack helicopter regiment, tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and dedicated antitank weapons.
Engaging Enemy Forces Inside the Security Zone
Under this type of threat environment, the size of Russian forward detachments operating within the security zone could be as large as a full regiment. This force, working in conjunction with engineer, air defense, and antitank units, would engage attacking enemy forces with a combination of direct and indirect fire systems. These fires are designed to slow down, disrupt, and channel enemy forces into preselected fire sacks or kill zones that have already been registered by antitank and artillery units. Intelligence received during the battle in the security zone is also used to determine the strength and direction of the enemy attack.
As enemy units enter the security zone, they will begin to encounter engineer-emplaced obstacles designed to delay and disrupt their advance. These engineer works will consist of explosive and nonexplosive obstacles, covered by direct and/or indirect fire assets. In addition, the subunits of the forward detachment and other units defending within the security zone will be maneuvering in and between fixed centers of resistance. These centers of resistance are specially constructed field fortifications containing a number of company- and platoon-level strongpoints and alternate fighting positions. Proper utilization of these resistance points will enable the forward detachment to defend in either a 360-degree arc or to withdraw through a series of fortified lines. These fortified lines are different that the old positional defensive lines used in prior Soviet tactical doctrine.
The battle in the security zone should allow the division to adequately prepare to meet the enemy attack as it reaches the forward edge of the main defensive zone. The question of whether the forward detachment can withdraw intact and conduct a battle handover will be entirely dependent upon its success in the security zone battle.
Engaging Enemy Forces Inside the Main Defensive Zone
Units defending within the main defensive zone will be deployed in a manner that exploits both the terrain and weapons to their best advantage. This defense will be primarily based on standard tactical doctrine, but will emphasize maneuver by units and by fire, alternate fortified lines, field fortifications, and camouflage and deception.
As the enemy units begin to breach the forward edge of the main defensive zone, they will encounter an obstacle zone consisting of a series of obstacle complexes throughout the width and depth of the main defensive zone. These complexes will be constructed to exploit terrain and man-made features (towns, villages, highways, rail lines) to better integrate the obstacle plan. These complexes will consist of both explosive and nonexplosive obstacles and will be covered by direct and pre-registered indirect fire assets.
As enemy units advance deeper into the divisions defensive combat formation, the obstacle and fire plan will force these units into preplanned fire sacks. Defending tank, infantry, artillery, and engineer subunits wilt redeploy during the battle to secondary fighting positions to establish tank ambushes.
Combat Results
The motorized rifle division's tactical defensive can produce one of three results:
Conclusion
Despite a current on defensive doctrine, the primacy of the offensive , at the tactical and operational level, is still recognized as essential to achieve victory upon the modern battlefield. The successful defensive battles of history enabled the defender to transition over to the offense and decisively defeat the opponent-a military maxim of history not lost by the Russians.
Defense in Built-up Areas
by Mr. Charles J. Dick
Soviet Studies Research Center
Camberley, UK
The views expressed here are those of the author. They should not necessarily be construed as validated threat doctrine.
Background1
Prior to the Great Patrotic War (WWII), large cities were not expected to be objects of defense (save for naval bases), despite the lessons of Madrid and Polish cities. Accordingly, only the tactical aspects of combat in cities were dealt with in sections of manuals. After all, the Red Army intended to go over to the offensive immediately once hostilities started. When forced to adopt the strategic defensive in 1941 the need to defend cities, whether because they were important administrative or industrial centers or transportation hubs, quickly became apparent. The Soviet Union paid dearly for the army's neglect of the operational aspects of city defense.
In a directive of 14 October 1942, the Supreme High Command tackled the fundamentals of city defense. All built-up areas (BUAs) were to be adapted for defense, regardess of their distance from the line of contact. In doing so, the follwing instructions were given:
In recent years, the experience of defending cities during the Great Patronic War has been forgotten. The subject is, for instance, ignored in the 1984 History of Military Art and the Military Encyclopedic Dictionary, and, indeed, in exercises. With the radical change in the [former-ed.] Soviet Union's strategic situation and a possible genuine shift to a defensive military strategy, there may well be a revival of interest in the defense of cities, particularly as "unremitting attention is devoted to these issues in numerous NATO exercises when working out aspects of American and alliance concepts for AirLand battle."2
Operational-tactical Aspects3
It is the prerogative of the Supreme High Command to determine whether a city should be defended. It is a political, and not a purely military decision, given the inevitable destruction of the infrastructure, not to mention the effects on hundreds of thousands of lives. It does not, however, follow that the decision to prepare an urban area for defense can be put off until orders are received from the Supreme High Command. Plans must be worked out beforehand so that implementation can start as soon as orders are received. Much time is needed to prepare a city for defense (i.e., up to two weeks), and hasty preparation is usually ineffectual: the 247-day siege of Sevastopol shows what can be accomplished with prior preparation.
In planning the defense of a city, measures to hold satellite towns, individual industrial sites, airfields and railway stations must be included. Nor can preparation be only against ground attack. Massive aerial bombardment must be expected, and a comprehensive air defense plan will be needed to meet it.
The enemy will always try to seize a city by surprise, form the march, before a proper defense can be organized. Continuous reconnaissance will be required to determine the enemy's concept well in advance. In this context, raiding actions by small, mobile detachments on the approaches are of exceptional importance in revealing the enemy grouping and plans and in hampering the swift advance of his forward detachments, forcing the main body to deploy prematurely. Reserves which can deploy rapiply onto threatened axes as revealed by reconnaissance play an especially important role.
The need for high density of fire in strongpoints and centers of resistance in the first defensive position, coupled with the complexity of organizing counterattacks and the severe limitations on using the weapons of the second echelon in the first position, suggest the desirability of deploying in a single echelon in the tactical zone. Reserves should, however, be deployed in two to three areas. This arrangement will facilitate the establishment of a perimeter defense and reduce the time for preparing counterattacks. The Great Patriotic War only saw the adoption of a two-echelon deployment on the axis of the enemy main attack.
Features of Urban Combat4
Urban combat has several distinctive features which make it combat in special conditions:
Principles of Tactical Combat
The special nature of combat in cities imposes its own unique tactical principles.
Whenever possible, the enemy should be repulsed on the approaches to the BUA. A perimeter defense will be able to exploit to the full the protective features of the terrain and, at the same time, exploit to the full the long-range weaponry of the defender. This assumes a particular importance from the fact that the enemy will usually try to seize a BUA from the march, rapidly penetrating weak sectors to seize vital ground within the city and thus paralyzing the defese. The difficulty of conducting the defensive maneuver to meet a surprise and speedy thrust or thrusts make it important to stop the enemy on the perimeter so that he must organize a storm of the city-a time consuming business.
Combat in cities is conducted primarily by subunits. Therefore, all battalions, companies and even platoons must be organized as all-arms subunits capable of operating as tactically independent entities. Thus, tanks are not used in mass, but are parceled out to bolster motorized rifle subunits. Similarly, up to half or somtimes even more of the available artillery will be devoted to subunits to act in the direct fire role. Similarly, antitank units, flamethrower, smoke-generating, and engineer elements will not operate en masse but will be divided amongst motorized rifle
subunits. It is worth noting the advantage accruing to the Soiviets in combat in cities from the possession of antitank guns, sights on self-propelled artillery which allow for direct fire, a large smoke-generating capacity and a plethora of flame equipment (both manpack and tank-mounted).
The defense in a BUA should be so organized as to canalize the attack into fire sacks where the enemy can be destroyed by fire and surprise counterattacks.
The intervals between strongpoints and centers of resistance must be covered by obstacles (in turn, covered by fire) and ambushes to prevent enemy infiltration and bypassing.
All strongpoints and centers of resistance must be organized for all-round defense and sufficiently supplied to fight on from encirclement. No withdrawals will be permitted except on the express order of the senior commander.
Time defense must be active. A rigid, unyielding defense of strongpoints is necessary to slow and canalize the enemy, but the soul of the defense is the counterattack. Unlike combat in "normal" terrain, a counterattack is executed without delay, before the enemy has time to consolidate his gains and reap the defensive advantages of houses prepared for defense.
The enemy will probably attempt to attack the defenders from the rear and seize vital ground (i.e., river or canal crossings, dominating features, large open areas like parks or gardens) by heliborne desants or the infitration of forward or bypassing detachments. Strong air defenses and anti-desant reserve are needed to preclude this option.
Considerable engineer preparation is necessary to enhance the natural defensive properties of BUAs and to create obstacles to the widespread use of amor or infiltration by infantry.
To ensure reliable command and control, command at all levels will be positioned well forward, exercising their function from command and observation posts even at divisional level. Extensive use will be made of well-buried land lines of radio (with numerous relay stations) and, when these inevitably fail, of runners and dispatch riders. Much emphasis is, however, placed on personal observation of the battlefield by commanders and on their personal contact with subordinates.
Deployment of Subunits and Their Conduct of the Battle5
A motorized rifle battalion will hold a center of resistance. This, in turn, will compromise a series of company and platoon strongpoints, organized for all-round defense. The frontage and depth of centers of resistance and strongpoints will depend on the strength of the enemy and own forces, the layout of the sector defended, and the mission of the defending subunit (i.e., whether it is on a main or secondary axis, whether it is acting in the first or second echelon). Figure 1 illustrates a typical center of resistance on a main axis.6
A platoon strongpoint will comprise one or two sturdy buildings, with basements or semi-basements. These are usually located at crossroads, on street corners, or overlooking a bridge or open ground such as parks and squares. The aim is to maximize fields of fire and to provide multi-tiered layers of fire where fields of fire are necessarily short.
A company strongpoint will comprise one large, four- to five- story
building or one to two blocks or groups of buildings. Thus, its frontage will vary from 200-600 meters, with a depth of 200-400 meters. Platoon positions will be mutually supporting.
A battalion center of resistance will consist of two to three strongpoints, in one or two echelons according to the importance of the axis. These will be mutually supporting, with obstacles and ambushes in the gaps between them. The frontage will vary accordingly terrain and echeloning.
The platoon and company strongpoints, the basic building blocks of defense, are worth examining in more detail:
maskirovka purposes. The rubble will provide material for barricades and for shelters. Houses not prepared for the defense should be boobytrapped or mined, whether or not they are demolished.
Tactical examples of defensive combat in cities are few and far between in modern training literature. Indeed, the theme is generally neglected in all the standard works. There is, however, one detailed description of an exercise on the theme, "the motorized rifle platoon in defense of a city," and this will repay examination.9
Figure 5 shows the problem set to the students. The enemy had broken through eighty kilometers to the south and was expected in the vicinity of Skobeltsino in five to six hours with his leading elements and seven to eight hours with his main body. The 5th Motorized Rifle Company, with an attached battery, and engineer and flamethrower squad, was tasked with creaing a strongpoint to prevent any enemy breakthrough in the direction of Blindazhnaya Hill-Dal'niy Woods.
The company commander's decision was to defend in a single
echelon, with the main effort being placed on denying the main road through Skobeltsino by both holding pair of two-story buildings on his right.
The first motorized rifle platoon, the subject of the exercise, was reinforced with an artillery platoon, a tank, and two pairs of flamethrowers. It was given the mission of defending the pair of two-story buildings aforementioned, preventing any penetration down the main road. Its zones of fire were: on the right, corner of right hand building to reference point 1; on the left, from the lone tree to reference point 2; an addititional fire sector on the right was to mound 2.5. Two sectors of concentrated small arms fire were designated: number 1, from the pile of rocks to the lone tree; number 2, from the girder to rock 2.1. The BMPs were given a sector from the lone tree to the girder. The right flank would be supported by BMP, grenade launcher and machine gun fires. The defense was to be set up by 0940, the fire system by 1000 and the engineer work finished by 1300.
The platoon commander appreciated that he had adequate limit to prepare his defense, a strong time given his resources. He also thought that the enemy would likely try to outflank him to his right, so he concentrated his force on the right hand house, preparing fire positions westwards. The approaches were open, with good fields of fire, but the ruins to the right could offer cover, so a machine gun on the second floor of the right hand building was told off to cover them.
The platoon commander issued orders as follows:
between the platoon and Figurnaya Hill. Zones of fire: on the right, from right hand corner of building to lone tree; on the left, from left hand corner to rock 2.1; additional fire sector on the right, to mound 2.5. Concentrated fire sectors: number 1, front pile of rocks to the left 30 meters; number 2, from girder 30 meters to the left. The right flank would be supported by BMP and grenade launcher fire.
The battle developed as follows:
The exercise prompts some comments.
was made of cellars; there was considerable engineer preparation: the defense was mobile and flexible; effort was concentrated on separating the attacking tanks and infantry.
Comment on Soviet Concepts for Defense in BUA
Most of the Soviet concepts for defense in BUA seem to be sound. However, three may be queried.
The Soviets derived considerable benefit from their plethora of flame weapons and their preparedness to use artillery in the direct fire role. Their possession of antitank guns and preparedness to use large numbers of tanks in BUAs would also confer an advantage.
Soviet Training Standards
"Actions at platoon to battalion level are the foundation of urban combat." The responsibilities of junior commanders "increases significantly" in BUA, and they have to be able to display "initiative in extreme and stressful situations", finding "non-standard solutions" to the many, complex problems of urban combat.10 There is ample evidence that the subunit commanders of today are ill prepared to meet the demands of combat defense in BUA:
The Soviet Army did little training for combat in BUA. It was not practiced in officer schools. Facilities for it were generally lacking. When they did exist, they were, for the most part, for the exercise of individuals or sections at the most, some units have set up training grounds, but these tend to be poor affairs. Figure 6 shows one such. It consists of two real and several notional buildings, and an obstacle course. In the exercise description which accompanied the diagram, the enemy's four company-sized storm groups were represented by six soldiers "of no particular speciality" under the command of the political deputy! It was said to be difficult to convince a soldier, seeing in front of him a comrade with a smoke generator, that an assault group was attacking him.
Soiviet motorized riflemen tended to have low levels of individual skills (there being little requirement four them in the traditional Soviet concept of tactics). Thus, training in the urban combat center in Figure 6 revealed the following deficiencies and brought about a recognition of the need for the following new SOPs:11
Morale in the Soviet Army was collectively generated. The sense of strength deriving from being part of a massive, unstoppable machine was important to the soldier, as indeed was his fear of summary punishiment by his officer if he did not perform bravely. The fragmented, small subunit actions characteristic of BUA, combined with a driving, rather than a leading command-style on the part of officers, would probably have lead to poor subunit performance.
References
NTC OPFOR Techniques:
The Motorized Rifle Battalions Reconnaissance Platoon
by 1LT Steven F. Kuni
Executive Officer, Company B, 1-63 Armor
In this article, I intend to show how I organize and fight a reconnaissance platoon in an OPFOR motorized rifle battalion (MRB) at the NTC. I will cover the past and present organization of MRB combat reconnaissance patrols (CRPs), the troop leading procedures I follow before a mission, and the conduct of reconnaissance missions.
Organization
In the past, the OPFOR regiment had considerable latitude in the composition of CRPs. As you know, an OPFOR reinforced MRB at NTC is composed of the assets of a U.S. mechanized infantry company (providing the BMPs) and a U.S. tank company (providing the reinforcing tanks). A favored CRP structure was one BRDM scout car (usually the mechanized infantry company executive officer), two BMPs, and a T-72 tank (the tank company executive officer).
Against a modernized rotational unit, I found the most effective formation involved letting the BRDM have free rein, relying on stealth and speed for advance reporting. I placed the BMPs forward, depending on them to find and fix the enemy. Slightly to the rear in the tank, I retained the freedom to maneuver to react to what the BMPs might find. This worked especially well in dealing with a Bradley-pure scout screen. Facing a counter-reconnaissance screen that included M1s, the best technique was to isolate one vehicle at a time, surround and overwhelm it. Another CRP leader, on the other hand, preferred to lead in his tank with the BMPs trailing.
Our current OPFOR doctrine does not normally permit the employment of tanks in less than platoon strength, so we no longer reinforce our CRPs with individual tanks. Also, our OPFOR model calls for a ten-tank company, rather than the old thirteen-tank structure, and adds a three-BMP reconnaissance platoon to each MRB. To accommodate these organizational changes, 1-63 Armor converted three T-72s from each of its compames into BMPs, to provide a reconnaissance platoon for each MRB. Each tank platoon converted one vehicle, and retains control over that BMP for the purposes of manning, maintenance, and training.
In the field, the tank company executive officer commands the three BMPs as a platoon during missions. Afterward, he relinquishes control of the BMPs back to their parent platoons. This sometimes presents problems, as the administrative mission requirements of the individual platoons do not always match the tactical needs of the OPFOR reconnaissance platoon. But any problems are usually resolved through common sense, good communications, and a "mission first" attitude.
Mission
In the offense, the mission of the platoon is normally to clear the main route of advance. As the BMP is no match for a Bradley one-to-one on open ground, I attempt to bypass and hand the screen off to follow-on tanks. If this is impossible, the platoon goes to ground, suppresses, and talks follow-on elements into the enemy. In meeting battles or forward detachment missions, we often make aggressive use of speed to secure a key piece of terrain. If successful, we call fires and report the advance of the enemy. We then talk the forward security element into a hasty defensive position from which to kill the advancing enemy. In the defense, the platoon will normally act as a night screen. Sometimes widely dispersed, the platoon pulls off at dawn and allows tanks and BMPs of the line platoons to screen during the day. Division and regimental reconnaissance will also be forward of the platoon at night. A battle handover line between the battalion and higher assets is normally established. Closer coordination between these elements is an area that needs improvement.
Troop Leading Procedures
Receive mission- I require my vehicle commanders and my gunner to attend the MRB order, normally given the afternoon before an operation. This ensures that more than one set of ears receives all critical information. If I am unable to issue a complete order, at least the basic information is in the hands of the executors.
Issue a warning order- This is usually done during brief backs following the battalion order. At a minimum, I ensure boresight and CATIES checks are completed, a timeline and priorities of work are given, receive the maintenance status, and dictate the specifics of my intended platoon combat instructions.
Make a tentative plan- I do this during the order. I figure the timeline, and analyze probable enemy courses of action and the effect of terrain on our ability to penetrate, survive and report.
Initiate movement- This is usually already done, as orders are given in a laager that supports deployment for the mission.
Conduct reconnaissance- This is also done during the order from the map as we normally are familiar with the terrain. Occasionally, MRB commanders will take key leaders forward for a detailed reconnaissance and explanaticon of their intent. Because of the incredible time constraints placed upon them, this is not always possible.
Complete the plan- Given that my vehicle commanders were at the MRB order, this is not vital. I feel, however, that giving a platoon order clarifies what I want to my vehicle commanders, insures consistency of effort, and gets the information down to the lowest level. Soildiers will always perform better if they know what they are doing and why they are doing it. They will also require less active control during the conduct of the operation, freeing leaders to concentrate on higher tasks.
Issue order- I require the entire platoon to attend the platoon order. I tailor it to my platoon and its mission; its not just a regurgitation of the MRB tinder. I use the order to teach both Blue force and OPFOR doctrine and tactics. If the mission is a forward detachment, I ask the troopers to compare and contrast an forward detachment to an advance guard mission. If we expect to encounter obstacles, I can cover engineer intent and related graphics. It is a good time to go over American and Soviet principles of reconnaissance. Once I read Roger's Standing Orders and related them to modern mechanized combat. Finally, I clearly articulate the primary mission and priority intelligence requirements. I go over specifically the mission priority and scheme of maneuver. If one or two BMPs are lost, the survivors can still get the commander the information he wants in the absence of guidance.
Inspect, supervise and refine- A benefit of having the vehicle commanders at both orders is the ability to refine the plan as four people heard the commanders intent, not just one. Normally before a mission, I will inspect items I feel are critical to the mission or may not be getting enough attention. If its not inspected, its neglected. Besides, troopers love to show you that they are on top of the ball and prepared. Take the time to let them prove it to you. You can also catch a potentially costly oversight. At this time I will quiz troopers on the operation. I do not expect a colonels knowledge from a loader. I ask simple questions: "What time do we leave tomorrow? When do we switch frequencies? What is the route we'll take? Where do we expect to see first enemy contact? How are his forces arrayed?" This is great feedback. If I am met with a blank stare, either the vehicle commander or I has failed somewhere and we have to get it fixed.
Conduct of Missions
The CRP will normally cross the line of departure (LD) fifteen to thirty minutes ahead of the main body. I make sure to press the MRB commander for enough time to work out front without being too far out of range if I encounter a situation I can't handle myself. I do not allow radio traffic of any sort for any reason when jumping off. Radio checks are done the night prior. Reporting of LDs and subsequent ones are done only when required. Control of the recon platoon is accomplished by signals whenever possible.
Ideally, my first report is that of enemy contact. I stress to my vehicle commanders the importance of stop, look, and listen often. The trick is to see the ememy first, often by exhaust plume or radio antenna. They also look at me for sometimes detailed hand and arm signals.
On offensive missions, I keep the same two up-one back formation ("vee") used before. The 1st MRB recoinnaissance platoon prefers to fight from column and line formations. We stay on a single axis and, as much as possible, within mutual main gun range. I control the speed of the platoon in the "vee" by forcing them to keep out in front of me. If I want more speed, I simply go faster. The "horns" of the formation know to maintain station forward of me and act accordingly.
We report the location a type of obstacles and the reconnoaissance platoon is specifically tasked to find bypasses whenever possible. I try to emphasize the importance of dismounting to look and listen, especially in wadi fights. From personal experience on both sides, you feel pretty stupid dying on the crest of a hill you didn't have time to look over first.
I stress to my platoon that we are reporters, not fighters. It is our job to move in advance of the battalion and let it know what to expect. We can not go unaided into a battalion defense and live (and a dead scout tells no tales!). Once contact is gained that we cannot reduce or bypass, we must go to ground and allow follow-on forces to come and develop the situation. After the follow-on forces have breached or penetrated and are regaining mass on the far side, the reconnaissance platoon kicks out again. When the battalion has a secongd echelon mission, the reconnaissance platoon follows the lead echelon. We report their progress and situation and guide our battalion through breaches in obstacles. Flank security is normally handled by detached BMPs from the line motorized rifle compaies.
In defenses, the priority is to report. Normally the platoon is widespread on a screen one in unprepared positions. As the enemy advances, it is not the job of the reconaissance platoon to hold the enemy. We may fire a few rounds to force early deployment and slow the enemy, but the most important thing is to pull back before becoming decisively engaged while unsupported. If the mission dictates pulling through the defense, rehearsal of passage of lines is critical. An alternative is pulling back to keyhole positions forward of the defense that are tied into the kill sack.
Whenever possible, reconnaissance BMPs shoould have four-man crews. That gives them another set of eyes and ears for security. One man can dismount and the vehicle is still full-up and able to light. It also makes more crew rest possible on repeated night screen missions. Unlike tank and BMP crews of the line, the reconnaissance platoon fights in virtually every offensive and defensive battle the MRB conducts. Only well seasoned personnel should be assigned to the recon platoon. It is not the place to learn the desert and the procedures of time OPFOR regiment. These skills should first be acquired through service in the line.
Finally, the often hectic pace of OPFOR operations is no excuse for not conducting an after action review (AAR). Five minutes spent in the intermediate laager covering what went right, what went wrong, how to do it better the next time, and a slap on the back, yields more than a formal AAR done later or worse yet, done not at all.
Certain Aspects of Army Counteroffensive Operations
(From the Experience of the Second World War)
by Colonel V.F. Yashin, Candidate of Historical Sciences, Assistant Professor and Lieutenant-Colonel V.I. Kuznetsov, Candidate of Historical Sciences Department of Operational Art, Frunze General Staff Academy Moscow, Russia
Editor's Note: During a visit earlier this month to Russia, I had the pleasure of discussing the OPFOR program and the Red Thrust Star with the director and staff members of the Military History Institute and with instructors from the General Staff Academy (Frunze Academy). Several instructors from the Frunze Academy asked if we would be interested in articles for the bulletin, and Lt. Col. Kuznetsov presented me with the manuscript for this article before my departure.
A version of the article originally was published in the January 1992 Voyennaya mysl' (Military Thought), but without the maps and one of the tables that accompany this version.
The question of the correlation of the defensive and offensive is posed in a new way as a result of altered views on the nature of modern war. In our view, based on the defensive direction of Soviet military doctrine, the counteroffensive (especially in the initial period of war) can be correctly viewed as the basic form of offensive operations. It is not by chance that
|
|
|||||||
| * Table compiled from materials of USSR TsAMO [Ministry of Defense Central Archives], stack 201, list 392, file 7, sheet 239; stack 208, list 2511, file 226, sheets 9, 10, 13; stack 507, file 1, sheets 12, 72. | |||||||
many aspects of this problem have been widely discussed lately in the journal Voyennaya mysl'.1 This article analyzes basic questions of preparing and conducting army counteroffensive operations based on the experience of the Second World War and scientific research data.
The pertinence of the experience of counteroffensive operations, especially at army level, obtained in the years of the Second World War, stems from the fact that these operations were conducted under conditions very similar to those which we consider today. Their preparation was carried out, as a rule, in the course of the final phase of a defensive operation, which necessitated the simultanious solution of questions connected both with the stabilization of the front as well as the implementation of measures for the preparation of the counteroffensive operation. Until the war, questions of the counteroffensive were not widely developed in Soviet military science. However, in the years of the Second World War, the necessary experience was aquired.
The counteroffensive was understood at that time to include those troop operations of strategic or operational-stategic importance, conducted immediately following defensive operations and having the goal of seizing the operational and strategic initiative from the the enemy. As a rule, the counteroffensive was accomplished by a group of fronts, but fronts and armies carried it out in the form of front or army offensive operationas. Such operatios are known today by the term "counteroffensive."
However, it is necessary to point out that within the scope of a strategic counteroffensive, a front counteroffensive operation, or a front counterstrike, not all armies conducted counteroffensive operations, only those which were in immediate contact with the enemy and went over to the offensive without an operational pause, with the aim of crushing enemy groupings, either attacking or going over to the defense in their areas of operations. For example of these, refer to the army counteroffensive operations presented in Table 1.
The preparation of army counteroffensive operations was characterized by a number of features. These resulted from specific conditions of the situation, for which one had to determine tasks for the preparation of troops for going over from the defense to the offensive. The first feature lay in the fact that preparation of an army counteroffensive operation was usually conducted in parallel with the conduct of defensive operations of a complex nature (some formations were forced to withdraw and others to fight in encirclement), in this connection, the organization of command and control became complicated, and there arose additional problems of the moral-psychological character and material-technical support of the upcoming operations.
The second feature was that the attacking enemy usually had the initiative and surpassed the defending army in forces and means, which required bringing in additional units for the counteroffensive. The transition to the counteroffensive often was launched under conditions of relative equality or slight superiority. In a number of cases armies were inferior to the enemy in tanks (9th, 54th, 16th, 50th, and 61st Armies) and in guns and mortars (51st Army). This placed additional demands on the creation of strike groups.
The third and most important feature was the limited time given armies, formations, units, and subunits for immediate preparation for the transition from the defense to the offensive. This often helped conceal the concept of operations from the enemy and helped achieve surprise in going over to the counteroffensive.
Now we must turn specifically to the discussion of the nature of enemy actions at the moment preceding the transition to the counteroffensive. Combat experience indicates that the enemy groupings in the zone of an army counteroffensive typically included from 1.5 to 8 divisions, of which 1-3 were panzer divisions. Their composition would number up to 23,000 personnel, 46-400 tanks and assault guns, and 130-920 guns and mortars.2 Such a grouping allowed the enemy to have the following operational densities: 5-29 kilometers per division and 1-5 tanks and 3-21 artillery weapons per kilometer of frontage.3 This was characteristic of the formation of the enemy defense in the first year of the war, and showed that his grouping depended, as a rule, on its offensive nature, and so the depth of the combat array was only 2-4 kilometers for formations (large units-divisions). In addition, the enemy usually did not have significant corps and army reserves. Reserve army groups were located 200 kilometers or more away. They were committed to the engagement only on the third to fifth day of the operation.
Combat experience shows that in shifting to the defense (at the tactical level) the enemy would take up to two days to consolidate on the line reached. He would establish a defense according to the principle of strongpoints, deploying them at road junctions.
In the following period of war, the nature of the enemy's actions changed. As early as the winter of 1941/42, he began to shift from a defensive system of strongpoints to a mobile defense based on holding scattered centers while simultaneously conducting frequent counterattacks. In addition, the opposing grouping's defensive depth also grew through an increase in corps reserves and the approach of army reserves, contributing to the enemy's delivering strong counterattacks and counterstrikes. This process was completed in the autumn of 1942.
The increase in the depth of the enemy defense preordained the appearance of the army defensive line, found at a distance of 8-20 kilometers from the forward edge. Such a line, first of all, protecteted his main force from the strike of Soviet troops and secondly, allowed him to organize his defense. Thus called for additional preparation for breaking through or overconmng the defense, as it was, in particular, in the Kursk counteroffensive. In the 13th Army area, from 11-14 July, the enemy brought three panzer divisions to the rear from the forward edge, and in the 6th Guards Army area, from 17 to 19 July, the main forces of a tank and an infantry division were left to provide a strong rear guard.4
With insufficient personnel and equipment by war's end, the enemy began to use a mobile form of defense even more widely. It was based on operations by infantry subunits reinforced by ten to twelve tanks, or purely by panzer groupings, which because of their high mobility would be moved from sectors not under attack. Simultaneously, main forces would be withdrawn to an intermediate line to organize a stiff defense.
Proceeding from the combat capabilities of the army and the nature of the enemy operations, the transition to the counteroffensive in the conditions of the enemy's use of maneuver defense demanded decisive actions and initiative. In a period of preparing the army for the transition, a process was adopted or a plan was defined for the counterattack. Then, having calculated the change in the situation, the army commander assigned combat missions for formations and units and organized coordination, the comprehensive support of combat operations, and political work. Studies showed that under conditions of limited time, an attempt to single out a number of key measures from the entire set of measures was seen in the work of commanding generals and staffs of armies. They included improving the operational situation for the army, establishing strike and other groupings, and ensuring concealment and surprise in going over to the offensive.
The most difficult of these was improving the army's operational situation. It usually was achieved by eliminating an enemy breakthrough or penetration in the army area. In a number of operations it was improved by capturing a favorable line securing the army's transition to the counteroffensive. For those goals army commanders prepared and carried out army counterstnikes. For example, the enemy's penetration in the zone of 5th army (commanded by Lieutenant-General L.A. Govorov) during the counteroffensive at Moscow was successfully eliminated by an army counterthrust.5 The operational situation of 16th Army (commanded by Lieutenant-General K.K. Rokossovskiy) was improved in a similar manner. It should be noted that because of the absence of sufficient forces and means in a number of operations, armies launched counteroffensives from occupied lines. This was the case with the 9th Army at Rostov, the 54th Army at Tikhvin, and the 13th and 6th Guards Armies at Kursk.
Sometimees local offensive operations were conducted to even out the front line or capture a favorable line supporting the army's launching of a counteroffensive. For example, from 24-25 December 1942, the commander of 51st Anmriy, Major-General N.I. Trufanov, organized such an operation on the right flank with the forces of three rifle divisions, and moved to the north bank of the Aksav River (on the eve of the Koitelnikovo offensive operation).6 At the same time, it took necessary steps to stabilize the front line by organizing strongpoints with rifle formations on the army's left flank. The lost position was restored and favorable lines for forces to launch a counteroffensive were captured by the conduct of local attacks by 60th army (commanded by Lieutenant-General I.D. Chernyakhovskiy) in the Zhitomir-Berdichev operation and of 26th Army (Lieutenant-General N.A. Gagen) in the counteroffensive at Balaton.7 In cases where the enemy carried out a deep penetration of the defense in the army zone and moved to its rear line of communication, the front commander's forces would conduct a front counterthrust in which a portion of army forces also usually took part.
For example, in the 50th Army area the enemy used forces of two panzer divisions to deliver a strike on the left flank on 2 December 1941 and rushed to envelop the city of Tula from the northeast (see Figure 1). He succeeded in disrupting communications between front and army staffs and creating a real threat of the city's encirclement.5 The enemy launched an offensive on the right flank on 5 December. Under these conditions the situation was improved by a counterattack of the 258th Rifle Division on the right flank along its forward edge. In the center of the army formation, Shepilovo was liberated on 7 December as a result of the counterattack of the 290th Rifle Division, and by day's end the enemy advance had been halted by stubbornly holding occupied lines and by counterattacks. Sinmultaneously, the penetrated enemy grouping was routed by delivery of a front counterthrust.9 As a result, this allowed Lieutenant-General I.V. Boldin to make the decision to go over to the counteroffensive throughout the army zone.*
Editors Note: This article will conclude in PB-30-92-4, the Octo9ber 1992 issue of the bulletin.
References
Book Reviews
by Allen E. Curtis
Editor, Red Thrust Star
Scott R. McMichael, Stumbling Bear: Soviet military performance in Afghanistan, published in 1991 by Brassey's, London, UK. Order from Brassey's (US) Inc., Front and Brown Streets, Riverside, NJ 08075. ISBN 0 08 040982 2
LTC McMichael is a well establishied military author; many readers will be familiar with his writings in Military Review or his Combat Studies Institute study, A Historical Perspective on Light Infantry. This most recent product summarizes the Soviet Army's experience in Afghanistan in a well-researched, concise study.
The Soviet Union was ill-prepared for military operations against the Afghan mujahedin. Because the possibility of a counter-insurgency war was ideologically unacceptable, the Sooviet army went into Afghanistan with no doctrine for such a war, and with a force structure and tactics unequal to the task.
>After extensive research in Soviet open source writings on the Afghan war, LTC McMichael skillfully lays out the situation, from the initial occupation until the Soiviet's development of counter-insurgency forces and doctrine to meet the unforeseen requirements. He includes a brief terrain analysis of Afghanistan, a concise description of the mujahedin threat, and a brief survey of the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.
The real meat of this study is in the description of the develepment of specialized counter-insurgency forces to suit the tactical environment, and the concurrent development of their tactics. The author details the techniques and tactics produced (or revived from Soviet military history) four this type of warfare, such as special techniques of reconnaissance, the use of outflanking detachments, and the concentration on ambushes. He also includes discussion of Soiviet air tactics and air support of ground operations, and other forms of combat support (artillery, engineer, chemical). Finally, he briefly describes the logistical support peculiar to that war, and addresses issues of leadership and training encountered by the Soviets.
This is a valuable summary of the shift from conventional operations to counter-insurgency operations by the Soviet Army in Afghanistan. Since many Afghan veterans remain in the armies of the Commonwealth of Independent States, it is worth revisiting this experience as a basis for understanding how Commonwealth forces might deal with similar situations in the future, whether within or among themselves, as participants in peacekeeping forces, or in response to some other currently unfoureseen events.
MAJ William H. Burgess III, ed., Inside Spetsnaz: Soviet special operations: a critical analysis, published in 1990 by Presidio Press, 31 Pamaron Way, Novato, CA 94949. Price: $24.95. ISBN 0 89141 339 1
I'm not sure how we overlooked reviewing this book two years ago when it was released. It certainly deserves consideration by all readers of this bulletin for a place on their bookshelves.
MAJ Burgess has coordinated the efforts of a number of specialists in the Soiviet studies community to produce this volume. Its fourteen chapters concentrate on the historical background of Soviet special purposes forces, from almost immediately after the Revolution, throughout the Spanish Civil War and the Great Patriotic War, up to the recent past in Afghanistan. Readers may wish to note that MAJ James Gedhardt, formerly of the Soviet Army Studies Office and contributor to the Red Thrust Star, wrote or co-wrote (with MAJ Burgess) three of the chapters, on Spetsnaz in the Far North, and in the Petsamo-Kirkenses and Manchurian Operations in the Great Patriotic War.
David Isby, author of Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Army, prepared the chapter of Afganistan, and Jim Shortt completes the picture with an assessment of current (1990) Spetnaz organization and capabilities. Mr. Shortt, an international security and counter-terrorism consultant, has offered to provide additional information on Spetsnaz equipment for an upcoming issue of the Star.
The special purpose forces of the defunct Soviet Union are now transitioning to become elements of the armed forces of the Commonwealth and the Baltic states. It would be worth picking up this book and reviewing where they have been, in order to better understand where they may go.