Testimony
of James F. Jarboe, Special Agent in Charge, Tampa Division,
FBI
Before
the U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee on National
Security, Veterans Affairs and International Relations
August 5, 2002
"Homeland
Security: Facilitating and Securing Seaports"
Good
afternoon Chairman Shays, and members of the subcommittee.
I am pleased to have the opportunity to appear before you
to discuss seaport security. Ever present in everyone's mind
are the threats of terrorist violence against US interests
"anywhere in the world" that have been issued by international
terrorist Usama bin Laden, his organization Al-Qaeda, and
sympathetic groups. The FBI and other components of the US
Intelligence Community, as well as foreign intelligence services,
are currently tracking a large volume of threats emanating
from these sources. The Al-Qaeda network continually refines
its operational capabilities by experimenting with variations
on suicide bombing techniques to inflict mass casualties,
including vehicle bombings against embassies, maritime attacks
against naval vessels, and hijacking of commercial airliners.
These attacks and capabilities illustrate the range of threats
posed by extremists affiliated with international terrorist
organizations like Al-Qaeda.
Intelligence
bulletins have been issued in relation to the potential of
a broad range of attack scenarios including acts involving
weapons of mass destruction, plots to attack bridges and financial
institutions and fuel refineries, plots to use small aircraft
for suicide attacks, and possible interest in crop dusting
capabilities, commercial drivers licenses with hazardous material
endorsements, and an offensive SCUBA diver capability.
Domestic
extremist groups continue to pose a threat. In fact, domestic
terrorists have committed the majority of terrorist attacks
in the United States. Between 1980 and 2000, the FBI recorded
335 incidents or suspected incidents of terrorism in this
country. Of these, 247 were attributed to domestic terrorists,
while 88 were determined to be international in nature. The
domestic terrorist threat is divided into three general categories--left-wing,
right-wing, and special interest (or single issue). Right-wing
terrorism activity in Central Florida is diffuse and uncoordinated,
thanks in part to the arrest of Donald Beauregard, the leader
of the Southeastern States Alliance, by the FBI Joint Terrorism
Task Force. Beauregard was involved in a conspiracy to commit
acts of terror that included raids of National Guard Armories
for the purpose of stealing weapons to further use in attempts
to disable energy facilities, communication centers and law
enforcement offices. Environmental extremists and anarchists
could pose a threat to port security. Further, terrorists
have an increasingly sophisticated array of weapons and capabilities
available to them. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-- explosive,
chemical, biological, or radiological in nature--represent
a real-world threat to ports. Information regarding these
types of weapons is disseminated through such means as the
World Wide Web.
The Tampa
Division of the FBI encompasses 18 central Florida counties
from the Gulf of Mexico to the Atlantic coast. Central Florida
is a focal point for travelers and tourists within the State
of Florida offering a complete range of transportation systems
including major seaports. Central Florida encompasses several
theme parks and beaches along Florida's central coast on both
the Atlantic and Gulf coasts. Since Walt Disney World in Orlando
is the number one tourist destination in the country, it impacts
the total population of the entire region. Additionally, there
were more than 40 million visitors in Orange County in 2000
and more than 15.7 million in the Tampa Bay area. The Tampa
Bay area is a secondary focal point for travelers within the
State of Florida offering a wide variety of tourist attractions
and numerous large-capacity venues hosting international,
professional, and collegiate sporting events. In addition,
the associated supporting transportation systems have their
own set of particular security concerns.
There
are six commercial international airports within Central Florida
located in Melbourne, Orlando, Tampa, St. Petersburg, Sarasota
and Fort Myers. There is one non-international commercial
airport in Naples. There are six major railway stations located
in Orlando, Tampa, St. Petersburg, Sarasota, Fort Myers and
Naples. The numerous rail lines traversing Central Florida
predominantly carry freight versus passengers. The four seaports
include the facilities at Tampa, Manatee, and Saint Petersburg
on the Gulf and Port Canaveral on the Atlantic seaboard. The
Port of Tampa is the largest seaport in Florida and the tenth
largest in the nation. The consequence of the varied transportation
networks within Florida is high volume truck, rail, and maritime
traffic, an increased mobility of transient population, the
flow of international commodities, and a parallel increase
in being susceptible to criminal enterprise.
The Port
of Tampa is centrally located in downtown Tampa within 10
miles of MacDill Air Force Base. The Port of Tampa is the
busiest port in Florida in terms of raw tonnage and stores
approximately 50% of the extremely hazardous chemicals in
the State of Florida. Of major significance is that the Port
of Tampa is non-contiguous property, encompassing more than
2,500 acres of land. Generally, the port represents an appealing
target of opportunity for would be terrorists. The port is
immense, accessible from land, sea and air. The port is adjacent
to a large population of civilians and vital regional and
national infrastructure, including power facilities, water
facilities, and Headquarters of United States Central Command
and United States Special Operations Command at MacDill Air
Force Base. The port contains such hazards as liquid propane
gas, anhydrous ammonia, and chloride.
Central
Florida also has some of the richest phosphate deposits in
the world. The western counties are dependent on this phosphate-based
industry. Fifty percent of the Florida's hazardous materials
are stored within Hillsborough County and 25% within Polk
County. Major storage of extremely hazardous substances (EHSs)
and other chemicals are located in this industrialized area
and are vulnerable to accidental, malicious, and acts-of-nature
releases. In 1993, the United States EPA conducted chemical
audits of the three anhydrous ammonia terminals located on
Tampa Bay - CF Industries, located on Hooker's Point, Farmland
Hydro, L.P. and IMC-Agrico, both located on Port Sutton Road
on Port Sutton Channel. The audit revealed that the three
terminals represent nearly 92.5 percent of Hillsborough County's
total amount of anhydrous ammonia (NH3) inventories.
Individually,
each of the three ammonia terminals pose a risk to the surrounding
community and the effect of three facilities, in close proximity
with such massive quantities, pose even greater risk. A 1998
survey showed that these three facilities had outstanding
safety records. Safety standards have undergone continual
improvement with each passing year.
In addition,
many hazardous materials shipments originate in the Port of
Tampa and move through Hillsborough County and beyond. A large
volume of hazardous material travels through the area via
railroads, highways, waterways, and pipelines on a daily basis.
In particular, ammonia is transported by tank truck, rail
car, and pipeline to fertilizer plants in Polk County. Chlorine
is primarily transported by tank trucks and barges to waste
water treatment plants. Residents throughout the county are
vulnerable to the release- intentional or accidental, of transported
hazardous materials.
South
Florida, in particular, is ideally located to serve as the
US gateway to and from the Americas. The nearness of the US
Gulf Coast to Latin America makes it an obvious entry point
for maritime traffic. Most of the cargo headed to ports in
the Gulf originates from source and transit nations in Latin
America, especially Mexico, Venezuela and Colombia. In addition,
an extensive network of rail and truck lines allow for fast
and efficient delivery of all types of goods, both legitimate
and illegitimate, to markets throughout the US and Canada.
The coast
of the Gulf of Mexico has hundreds of miles of relatively
open shoreline that separate the major ports -- Houston, Texas;
New Orleans, Louisiana; and Tampa, Florida. While these major
ports have a major presence of law enforcement and security,
the open shoreline and smaller ports leaves the Florida coast
open to a variety of criminal activity.
The high
volume of maritime traffic in the large ports, both commercial
and noncommercial, provide ample cover for the movement of
illicit goods. Eleven of the top 15 ports in trade volume
in the United States and 6 of the top 10 ports in volume of
foreign trade are located on the Gulf of Mexico. It is a concern
that terrorist organizations could take advantage of well-established,
well-known criminal patterns to further their own objectives,
such as concealing money laundering operations, transport
and distribution of explosives and/or hazardous materials,
or illegal entry into the United States. Specifically, bulk
and containerized cargo freighters, fishing vessels, recreational
boats and tugs, and cruise ships, all of which operate from
Florida coasts, each provide unique potential for exploitation
by terrorists as well as other criminal organizations.
Large
bulk and containerized cargo pose a smuggling risk in the
major ports of the Eastern and Gulf coasts. Most container
traffic along the Gulf Coast consists of perishable goods
like fruits and vegetables. Although Tampa and Port Manatee's
container traffic is considerably less than the ports of Houston,
New Orleans and Gulfport, Mississippi, Tampa is ranked fifth
among Gulf ports receiving significant quantities of non-liquid
bulk imports. Non-liquid bulk imports into the Port of Tampa
are led by shipments of sand and gravel from Mexico, Canada
and the Bahamas; sulfur from Mexico and Chile; and cement
and concrete from Colombia, Venezuela and Europe.
The fishing
industry represents a major presence along Florida's coastline.
Fishing vessels at the numerous fishing ports of all sizes
constitute a secondary risk in the region. The Gulf of Mexico
is home to one of the largest fishing fleets in the United
States. Moreover, the region contains 5 of the top 10 U. S.
fishing ports in terms of total catch. More than 18,000 commercially
documented fishing vessels operate from numerous bayous inlets,
rivers and bays along the Gulf Coast. Many of these vessels
travel back and forth throughout the Gulf between fishing
ports, large and small, following the seasonal migrations
of fish as permitted by fishing regulations. The transient
nature of the industry and the abundance of vessels provide
ample occasion for boats engaged in smuggling activity to
blend in, either transporting drugs (or explosives), directly
from overseas or participating in transfers offshore.
Recreational
boating and tugs and barges operating near the border are
additional risks. Although there are over 750,000 private
vessels registered in the state of Florida, these small private
vessels generally receive less law enforcement attention.
The numerous recreational vessels and sailboats travel freely
along the southern Gulf Coast of Florida. Foreign tugs usually
transfer barges to local tugs, giving the impression that
a barge entering a Gulf port is local.
The primary
home of the cruise ship industry in the United States is South
Florida. Port Canaveral is among the nation's top five cruise
ports in terms of revenue and on the Gulf Coast. Vessels depart
from Port Canaveral and the Port of Tampa for destinations
throughout the Caribbean and Central and South America.
To address
the concerns expressed above, the law enforcement community
together with private industry and multi-disciplinary agencies
such as fire/rescue, HAZMAT operations, and Florida Emergency
Management has made concerted efforts in educating, training,
practicing, and preparing for contingency scenarios. Through
combined actions of a host of agencies preventive measures
have been carefully considered and implemented. Not the least
of these has been the development of several anti-terrorism
task forces and specifically focused working groups and intelligence
exchange forums. Participants in the working groups have been
carefully selected by each represented agency for their subject
matter knowledge and experience, and jurisdictional roles.
The Tampa
FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force is not a recent development
but was formed in the mid-90s. Over the past several years,
they have developed an aggressive outreach program comprised
of four distinctive components of the terrorism preparedness
program. It is important to note that the FBI Joint Terrorism
Task Force and Special Agent/WMD coordinators in the Tampa
Division are experienced and knowledgeable focal points for
all terrorism and WMD investigative matters. In addition to
contingency plan development (1), the program includes training
seminars (2), tabletop and field exercises (3), and threat
assessments (4). From January 1999 through September 2000,
Tampa Division has provided terrorism training for many first
responders from all safety and law enforcement disciplines.
Agents have conducted approximately 60 WMD and terrorism presentations
and participated in 17 tabletop and full-field exercises.
Furthermore, threat assessments have been researched and prepared
for 12 special counter-terrorism preparedness events, such
as the NHL Hockey All-Star Game at the Tampa Ice Palace (near
the Port); Super Bowl XXXV including the Gasparilla Pirate's
Parade/Super Bowl Sunday pre-game events along Bayshore Boulevard;
the USS LASSEN ship commissioning ceremony, and US Central
Command and US Special Operations Command change of command
ceremonies at the Marriott Waterside.
Specifically,
in June 99, the State of Florida Division of Emergency Management
hosted a statewide WMD Terrorism Summit through a grant from
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) at which FBI
Special Agents gave presentations on the threat potential
to Central Florida. The purpose of this Summit was to solicit
input from first responders prior to drafting a statewide
terrorism response strategy. This forum was an excellent opportunity
to connect with Federal agency counterparts on both crisis
management and consequence management. Since attending the
Summit, FBI Special Agents have assisted in writing and reviewing
WMD Incident Response Plans for numerous agencies and large
capacity entertainment complexes, ensuring consistent response
and coordination with the FBIHQ WMD Incident Contingency Plan.
Furthermore, the FBI Special Agent/WMD Coordinators have made
specific efforts to establish productive liaison with the
emergency management community at the state and county level
by visiting county Emergency Operations Centers (EOC) and
including the Directors of each in working groups and training
programs. Florida EOCs are pro-active in planning for response
to incidents of the use of WMD by preparing annexes to their
frequently implemented hurricane response plans.
Of particular
note in the exercise arena, in March 2000, the FBI Joint Terrorism
Task Force coordinated a major 17-agency countywide field
exercise involving a terrorist takeover of an anhydrous ammonia
industrial facility at the Port of Tampa. This scenario was
chosen to incorporate a response from sea and air assets as
well as traditional law enforcement and fire rescue/emergency
teams. The exercise was preceded by a one-day seminar for
mid-level crisis managers and supervisors. Evaluations of
the exercise were incorporated in later threat assessments,
contingency plans, and grant requests.
Law enforcement
personnel from throughout the greater Tampa Bay area participate
in several formal terrorism working groups that address both
domestic and international terrorism matters and WMD response
issues. The FBI regularly participates in the State of Florida
Regional Domestic Security Task Force (RDSTF), the Central
Florida Statewide Terrorism Intelligence Networking Group
(STING), the Florida Intelligence Unit (FIU), the Tampa Bay
Area Intelligence Unit (TBAIU), the MacDill Air Force Base
Counter Intelligence/Counter Terrorism Working Group, the
Tampa Bay Harbor Safety Committee, the Tampa Bay Metropolitan
Medical Response System Steering Committee and the Port Security
Working Group. These forums are composed of a broad spectrum
of law enforcement investigators and intelligence analysts,
military intelligence and command personnel, and also include
professionals from the security departments of major private
enterprises such as electric power companies, railways, and
industry representatives when appropriate. The joint approach
to intelligence sharing, investigation and crisis management
has served Central Florida extremely well. Thanks to recent
efforts undertaken by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement,
FBI intelligence analysts now have access to a statewide terrorism
database called THREATNET. The establishment of this database
will be key to coordinating pertinent elements of pending
investigations, for example patterns of activity, vehicle
tags, subject names and aliases, as well as common meeting
areas.
The Tampa
Bay Port Security Working Group, led by the US Coast Guard,
was established in April 2000 as a result of the Interagency
Commission on Crime in US Seaports and has five sub-committees
that report on a bi-monthly basis. The FBI regularly participates
in the Port Security Working Group meetings and heads the
Terrorism Sub-Committee. The FBI's role in these committees
is to provide threat analyses and to disseminate intelligence
that affects safe operation of the port facilities. Somewhat
unique to this forum is the integration of private industry
and Fire/Hazmat chiefs of both City of Tampa and Hillsborough
County as members of the FBI JTTF. Input provided by the emergency
management and fire/safety sectors of our community is essential
to successful preparedness.
The FBI
has encouraged state, county, and local response community
leaders to conduct an appropriate needs and vulnerability
self-assessment to determine which federal domestic training
courses and programs would be of value. The State of Florida
conducted a statewide vulnerability assessment of seaports.
Although this assessment was funded by the State Office of
Drug Control and primarily focused on drug countermeasures,
it also assessed port access, credentialing, and security.
Issues raised through this assessment are being addressed
through the Port Security Working Group. The interagency cooperation
is evident in the daily coordination between management staff,
investigators, and intelligence personnel of each agency on
issues where we have common interests.
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