Statement
of Robert S. Mueller, III
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Before the United States Senate Committee
on Governmental Affairs
September
8, 2004
Introduction
Good
morning, Madam Chairman, Senator Lieberman and
Members of the Committee. I appreciate the opportunity
to be here today to provide the FBI's views on
intelligence reform. I would also like to express
my gratitude for the efforts of so many inside
and outside of government, particularly the 9/11
Commission and this Committee, who have worked
to ensure that our national intelligence capability
is postured for success against the adversaries
of the 21st Century. That overarching objective
must drive all efforts for reform.
Model
for Reform
To
understand our views on intelligence community
reform, it is important to understand first how
we in the FBI believe intelligence should be managed
and how it should be produced. We believe that
the management of intelligence should be centralized,
but that its production should be distributed.
For the FBI, that means that the Office of Intelligence
provides guidance to ensure that we focus intelligence
collection and production on intelligence priorities
and on filling gaps between what we know and what
we do not know. This centralized management overlays
our headquarters divisions and our field offices,
which remain responsible for intelligence collection,
operations, analysis and reporting. The result
of this approach is that intelligence and operations
are integrated -- with the users of intelligence,
not the producers, judging its value. These principles
have guided the development of our intelligence
program at the FBI.
The
FBI's Office of Intelligence manages intelligence
production based on requirements, apportions resources
based on threats, and sets standards for intelligence
cadre training, source development and validation,
and collection tasking. The actual production of
intelligence occurs within our 56 field offices,
400 resident agencies, our four operational headquarters
divisions, and perhaps most importantly, by our
800,000 partners in state, local and tribal law
enforcement. The Office of Intelligence continually
monitors performance through imbedded intelligence
elements in the field and headquarters and adjusts
tasking and resources based on nationally directed
intelligence requirements. The authorities and
responsibilities of our Office of Intelligence
allow it to carry out two broad areas of responsibilities:
management of the FBI intelligence component; and
direction to it to ensure that its activities are
in keeping with the priorities established by the
President and the needs of the users of intelligence.
Turning
to the proposals for intelligence reform, widespread
agreement exists as to the creation of a National
Intelligence Director as the manager of intelligence
production across the 15 Intelligence Community
components. The NID, however, should not be directly
responsible for the conduct of operations. The
role of the NID should, instead, be to ensure that
appropriate activities and operations are conducted
by the constituent elements of the Intelligence
Community.
Given
the model above, we believe that the NID should
have a mechanism by which the principals of the
National Security Council and the Homeland Security
Council and the Directors of the CIA, FBI and other
relevant Departments and agencies, are charged
with ensuring the responsiveness to the direction
of the NID and managing implementation of that
direction. These individuals represent in large
measure the users of intelligence and will bring
to the NID the views of the users as they set priorities
and evaluate intelligence community performance.
In reality, the principals would delegate that
responsibility to a subordinate -- in our case,
the FBI's Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence.
Core Principles to Guide Intelligence Reform
Madam
Chairman, the model I have outlined incorporates
three core principles for intelligence reform that
we think this Committee should consider as it seeks
to enact legislation. These three principles are:
(1)
providing analysts transparency into sourcing,
(2) understanding the value of operational chain of command, and
(3) protecting civil liberties.
Providing
Analysts Transparency into Sourcing
Turning
to the first principle, we believe it is important
that analysts be provided transparency into intelligence
sources. Just as Agents need to question the background,
motivation and access of their sources, analysts
must also examine the credibility of sources who
provide intelligence information. FBI analysts
do not blindly receive source information then
develop intelligence reports and threat assessments
based on that information. Instead, our analysts
have transparency to our sources and the result
is a high quality intelligence product.
Historically,
individual FBI Agents would collect information,
analyze that information in the context of their
particular case, and then use that analysis to
guide their investigation. But the FBI, as an institution,
had not elevated that analytical process above
the individual case or investigation to an overall
effort to analyze intelligence and strategically
direct intelligence collection against threats
across all of our programs. Today, we have done
so and, I believe, done so successfully. Not only
does the FBI remain among the best collectors of
information in the world, we now have the enhanced
capacity to exploit that information for its intelligence
value. Ensuring that our analysts, not just our
Agents, have access to information about our sources
plays an important role in the development of thorough
and reliable intelligence products.
In the ongoing debate regarding intelligence reform, some have suggested
that a new entity composed of analysts be created, as well as a separate
entity for the intelligence collectors. We believe that creating such "stovepipes" would
be a step backward in the progress we have made since 9/11. Our success has
been enhanced by co-locating our analysts with those who must act on the
intelligence. The physical and logistical proximity of the analysts to the
collectors results in increased transparency for the analysts which, in turn,
results in better analysis.
Understanding
the Value of the Operational Chain of Command
The
second core principle to consider in reforming
the intelligence community is the value of the
operational chain of command. The 9/11 Commission
report recommended the establishment of a national
counterterrorism center as the logical next step
to further enhance the cooperation between intelligence,
national security, and law enforcement agencies
that was begun by the Terrorist Threat Integration
Center (TTIC). As you know, the President recently
issued an Executive Order establishing the National
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). Among the provisions
of the Executive Order is the directive that the
NCTC assign strategic operational responsibilities
to lead agencies for counterterrorism activities
that are consistent with the law. The Executive
Order also explicitly states: "The Center
shall not direct the execution of operations." This
directive, which comports with the recommendation
of the 9/11 Commission, recognizes the importance
of leaving operational control in the hands of
the agencies.
At
least one of the pending legislative proposals
for intelligence reform would transfer the Counterterrorism
and Counterintelligence Divisions out of the FBI
and into a new entity. We believe that such a proposal
fails to recognize the fact that most of the FBI's
investigative work is accomplished by its 56 field
offices and 400 satellite offices located throughout
the country. An interdependent relationship exists
between the FBI's Headquarters Divisions and our
geographically dispersed field offices both in
terms of operational coordination of investigations
and the routine exchange of personnel. This interdependent
relationship and chain of command between the field
offices and headquarters divisions cannot be disrupted
and remain effective.
The
FBI's components, particularly the Counterterrorism
and Counterintelligence Divisions, are not distinct
and severable entities. Rather, they are fluid
combinations of a variety of personnel. They include
long-term professional employees, such as analysts,
who spend decades developing a subject area expertise;
mid-career field agents serving two or three years
tours of duty to expand or hone their counterterrorism
or counterintelligence experience before returning
to management positions in field offices; and senior
FBI executives who have proven themselves in leadership
roles in the field or other headquarters components.
If
the operational divisions are removed from FBI
Headquarters, as some have proposed, a large portion
of the FBI's counterterrorism and counterintelligence
program will remain within the FBI, in the form
of counterterrorism and counterintelligence squads
and task forces in field offices, as well as designated
counterterrorism and counterintelligence agents
in our satellite offices. Separating our counterterrorism
and counterintelligence leaders from the information
collectors and investigators would result in less
effective coordination and a less safe America.
In
addition, it is important to understand that the
FBI's intelligence capabilities are enterprise-wide.
Intelligence is integrated into all of the Bureau's
investigations, not just counterterrorism and counterintelligence.
Some of the reform proposals that would carve out
sectors of the FBI fail to take into account that
our counterterrorism and counterintelligence efforts
benefit enormously from the intelligence garnered
through our criminal investigations, our cyber
crime efforts, the work of the FBI Laboratory,
and our other programs. Altering the operational
chain of command for any FBI program would impair
the integration of intelligence that has proven
effective in our national security efforts.
Protecting
Civil Liberties
The
third and, perhaps most important core principle,
is the need to protect civil liberties. As former
DCI George Tenet stated in a hearing earlier this
year, the way the CIA conducts operations overseas
is very different than the way the FBI conducts
operations with our own citizens at home. Concentrating
domestic and international counterterrorism operations
in one organization represents a serious risk to
American civil liberties. It is difficult to expect
an agent trained in conducting operations overseas
to fully appreciate the necessary legal constraints
placed on operations conducted within the United
States.
Let
me turn to the words of the Commission's report,
which stated, "The FBI does need to be able
to direct its thousands of agents and other employees
to collect intelligence in America's cities and
towns–interviewing informants, conducting
surveillance and searches, tracking individuals,
working collaboratively with local authorities,
and doing so with meticulous attention to detail
and compliance with the law. The FBI's job in the
streets of the United States would thus be a domestic
equivalent, operating under the U.S. Constitution
and quite different laws and rules, to the job
of the CIA's operations officers abroad."
The
legal limitations, the oversight mechanisms and
self-regulatory practices of the Bureau effectively
ensure that our operations are carried out within
Constitutional and statutory parameters. A number
of outside entities, including the Government Accountability
Office and the Department of Justice Office of
Inspector General, have studied our operations
since 9/11 and have found that we have conducted
them with full regard for civil liberties. Moreover,
just last month the President issued an Executive
Order creating the President's Board on Safeguarding
Americans' Civil Liberties, which will be launched
this month. Such a board was recommended by the
9/11 Commission and will include FBI participation.
Update
on FBI Intelligence Initiatives
Recognizing
the "significant progress" the FBI has
made in the past three years, the 9/11 Commission
recommended that counterterrorism intelligence collection
in the United States remain with the Bureau. We are
proud of that progress, about which I have testified
on numerous occasions since 9/11. Today, I would
like to conclude by giving you a brief update on
some of our most recent efforts:
• We
are moving forward with the creation of an FBI
Directorate of Intelligence – a "service-within-a-service" – as
recommended by the Commission and some Members
of Congress.
• We
have established Field Intelligence Groups, or
FIGS, in each FBI field office to integrate analysts,
Agents, linguists, and surveillance personnel
in the field to bring a dedicated team focus
to intelligence operations.
• We
have set unified standards, policies, and training
for intelligence analysts. As part of a new recruiting
program, veteran analysts are attending events
at colleges and universities throughout the country,
and we are offering hiring bonuses to analysts
for the first time in FBI history.
• Since
FY 2002, 264 analysts have graduated from the
College of Analytic Studies' six-week Basic Intelligence
Analyst Course. More than 650 field and headquarters
analysts have attended specialty courses on a
variety of analytical topics. Nearly 1,400 field
and headquarters employees have attended specialized
counterterrorism courses offered in conjunction
with the CIA University, and more than 1,000
New Agent Trainees have received a two-hour instructional
block on intelligence.
• We
are establishing an Intelligence Officer certification
program for Agents, Analysts, Surveillance Specialists
and Language Analysts. We are also in the process
of changing the criteria on which Agents are
evaluated to place more emphasis on intelligence-related
functions. Once established, Intelligence Officer
certification will be a pre-requisite for advancement,
thus ensuring that all FBI senior managers will
be fully trained and experienced intelligence
officers.
• We
are working to incorporate elements of our basic
intelligence training course into the New Agents
Class curriculum. We expect that work to be completed
this month. A key element of this concept is
that agents in New Agents Training and analysts
in the College of Analytic Studies will conduct
joint training exercises in intelligence tradecraft.
The first offerings to contain these joint exercises
are expected in December of this year.
• In
March, we established a career path in which
new Special Agents are initially assigned to
a small field office and exposed to a wide range
of field experiences. After approximately three
years, agents will be transferred to a large
field office where they will specialize in one
of four program areas: Intelligence, Counterterrorism/
Counterintelligence, Cyber, or Criminal, and
will receive advanced training tailored to their
area of specialization. In our Special Agent
hiring, we have changed the list of "critical
skills" we are seeking in candidates to
include intelligence experience and expertise,
foreign languages, and technology.
• Our language specialists are critical to our intelligence cadre as well.
The FBI's approximately 1,200 language specialists are stationed across 52 field
offices and headquarters, and are now connected via secure networks that allow
language specialists in one FBI office to work on projects for any other office.
Since the beginning of FY 2001, the FBI has hired nearly 700 new linguists out
of a pool of 30,000 applicants. In addition, the FBI formed a Language Services
Translation Center to act as a command and control center to coordinate translator
assignments and maximize its capacity to render immediate translation assistance.
• We
have placed reports officers in our Joint Terrorism
Task Forces (JTTFs) to ensure vital information
is flowing to those who need it. Since 9/11,
we have expanded the total number of JTTFs from
34 to 100.
• We
have issued the first-ever FBI requirements and
collection tasking documents. These documents
are fully aligned with the DCI's National Intelligence
Priorities Framework and we have published unclassified
versions for our partners in state, local, and
tribal law enforcement.
• We have created a collection capabilities database that tells us what
sources we can bring to bear on intelligence issues across the FBI.
• And,
this year, we are on course to triple the volume
of intelligence reporting that we disseminate to
the intelligence community.
Conclusion
Madam
Chairman, the FBI's combined mission as an intelligence,
counterterrorism, and law enforcement agency gives
us the singular ability to exploit the connections
between terrorism and criminal activity. Now that
the USA PATRIOT Act has removed the wall between
intelligence and law enforcement investigations,
the FBI has a unique capacity to handle both the
criminal aspects and intelligence gathering opportunities
presented by any terrorism case, giving us a full
range of investigative tools. We are concerned
that some pending proposals would erect new walls
between our law enforcement and intelligence missions.
We also urge Congress to renew all provisions of
the PATRIOT ACT -- because no matter how the organizational
charts on drawn, we will continue to need these
vital tools to prevent acts of terrorism against
the American people.
Over
the past three years, the FBI has made great strides
yet we acknowledge that much work remains to be
done. We have a plan in place to get where we need
to be and we have the hard-working, dedicated men
and women of the FBI to take us there.
Madam Chairman, I want to thank you and the members of this Committee for
your support and advice. I look forward to working with you as you develop
legislation to strengthen our intelligence apparatus and better ensure the
protection of the American people. I welcome any suggestions you have for
improving our counterterrorism efforts and strengthening our nation's security.
Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today. I am happy
to answer any questions you may have.
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