Statement of FBI Director Louis
J. Freeh
On the Arrest of FBI Special Agent Robert Philip Hanssen
Sunday night the FBI arrested
Robert Philip Hanssen who has been charged with committing espionage.
Hanssen is a Special Agent of the FBI with a long career in counterintelligence.
The investigation that led to
these charges is the direct result of the longstanding FBI/CIA
efforts, ongoing since the Aldrich Ames case, to identify additional
foreign penetrations of the United States Intelligence Community.
The investigation of Hanssen was conducted by the FBI in partnership
with the CIA, the Department of State, and, of course, the Justice
Department.
The complaint alleges that Hanssen
conspired to and did commit espionage for Russia and the former
Soviet Union. The actions alleged date back as far as 1985 and,
with the possible exception of several years in the 1990s, continued
until his arrest on Sunday. He was arrested while in the process
of using a "dead drop" to clandestinely provide numerous
classified documents to his Russian handler.
It is alleged that Hanssen provided
to the former Soviet Union and subsequently to Russia substantial
volumes of highly classified information that he acquired during
the course of his job responsibilities in counterintelligence.
In return, he received large sums of money and other remuneration.
The complaint alleges that he received over $600,000.
The full extent of the damage
done is yet unknown because no accurate damage assessment could
be conducted without jeopardizing the investigation. We believe
it was exceptionally grave.
The criminal conduct alleged
represents the most traitorous actions imaginable against a country
governed by the Rule of Law. As difficult as this moment is for
the FBI and for the country, I am immensely proud of the men
and women who conducted this investigation. Their actions represent
counterintelligence at its very best and under the most difficult
and sensitive of circumstances. Literally, Hanssen's colleagues
and coworkers at the FBI conducted this investigation and did
so quietly, securely and without hesitation. Much of what these
men and women did remains undisclosed but their success and that
of their CIA counterparts represents unparalleled expertise and
dedication to both principle and mission.
The complaint alleges that Hanssen,
using the code name "Ramon," engaged in espionage by
providing highly classified information to the KGB and its successor
agency, the SVR, using encrypted communications, dead drops,
and other clandestine techniques. The information he is alleged
to have provided compromised numerous human sources, technical
operations, counterintelligence techniques, sources and methods,
and investigations, including the Felix Bloch investigation.
The affidavit alleges that Hanssen
voluntarily became an agent of the KGB in 1985 while assigned
to the intelligence division at the FBI field office in New York
City as supervisor of a foreign counterintelligence squad. Hanssen
allegedly began spying for the Soviets in 1985 when, in his first
letter to the KGB, he volunteered information that compromised
several sensitive techniques. He also independently disclosed
the identity of two KGB officials who, first compromised by Aldrich
Ames, had been recruited by the U.S. Government to serve as "agents
in place" at the Soviet Embassy in Washington. When these
two KGB officials returned to Moscow, they were tried and convicted
on espionage charges and executed.
Hanssen subsequently was assigned
to a variety of national security posts that legitimately provided
him access to classified information relating to the former Soviet
Union and Russia. As a result of these assignments within the
FBI, Hanssen gained access to some of the most sensitive and
highly classified information in the United States Government.
To be very clear on this issue, at no time was he authorized
to communicate information to agents of the KGB/SVR. Nor can
there be any doubt that he was keenly aware of the gravity of
his traitorous actions. He later wrote to his KGB handler, speaking
about the severity with which U.S. laws punishes his alleged
actions, and acknowledging "...I know far better than most
what minefields are laid and the risks."
Hanssen was detailed to the Office
of Foreign Missions at the Department of State from 1995 to 2000.
The complaint, however, does not allege any compromises by him
at the State Department. In one letter to his Russian handlers,
Hanssen complains about lost opportunities to alert them that
the FBI had discovered the microphone hidden at the State Department,
known then by the FBI but apparently not by Hanssen as being
monitored by a Russian intelligence officer. In this assignment,
however, Hanssen did continue to have access to sensitive FBI
information as he remained assigned to the FBI's National Security
Division and routinely dealt with sensitive and classified matters.
For many years, the CIA and FBI
have been aggressively engaged in a sustained analytical effort
to identify foreign penetrations of the Intelligence Community.
That effort is complemented by substantial FBI proactive investigation
of foreign service intelligence officers here and by the critical
work done by the CIA. Because of these coordinated efforts, the
FBI was able to secure original Russian documentation of an American
spy who appeared to the FBI to be Hanssen -- a premise that was
soon to be confirmed when Hanssen was identified by the FBI as
having clandestinely communicated with Russian intelligence officers.
As alleged in the complaint,
computer forensic analysis, substantial covert surveillance,
court authorized searches and other sensitive techniques revealed
that Hanssen has routinely accessed FBI records and clandestinely
provided those records and other classified information to Russian
intelligence officers. As alleged, he did so using a variety
of sophisticated means of communication, encryption, and dead
drops.
Further, the complaint alleges
that Hanssen, using his training and experience to protect himself
from discovery by the FBI, never met face-to-face with his Russian
handlers, never revealed to them his true identity or where he
worked, constantly checked FBI records for signs he and the drop
sites he was using were being investigated, refused any foreign
travel to meet with the Russians, and even declined to accept
any "trade craft." Hanssen never displayed outward
signs that he was receiving large amounts of unexplained cash.
He was, after all, a trained counterintelligence specialist.
For these reasons, the FBI learned of his true identity before
the Russians; they are learning of it only now. Even without
knowing who he was or where he worked, Hanssen's value to the
Russians was clear both by the substantial sums of money paid
and the prestigious awards given to their own agents for Hanssen's
operation.
While this arrest represents
a counterintelligence investigative success, the complaint alleges
that Hanssen located and removed undetected from the FBI substantial
quantities of information that he was able to access as a result
of his assignments. None of the internal information or personnel
security measures in place alerted those charged with internal
security to his activities. In short, the trusted insider betrayed
his trust without detection.
While the risk that an employee
of the United States Government will betray his country can never
be eliminated, there must be more that the FBI can do to protect
itself from such an occurrence. I have asked Judge William H.
Webster, and he has graciously agreed, to examine thoroughly
the internal security functions and procedures of the FBI and
recommend improvements. Judge Webster is uniquely qualified as
a former FBI Director, CIA Director and Director of Central Intelligence
to undertake this review. This is particularly timely as we move
to the next generation of automation to support the FBI's information
infrastructure. Judge Webster and anyone he selects to assist
him will have complete access and whatever resources are necessary
to complete this task. He will report directly to the Attorney
General and me and we will share his report with the National
Security Council and Congress. I intend to act swiftly on his
recommendations.
Before concluding, I would like
to take this opportunity to thank Director of Central Intelligence
George Tenet for the cooperation and assistance of his agency
in this investigation. Through our cooperative efforts, the FBI
and CIA were able to learn the true identity of "Ramon"
and the FBI was able to conduct a solid investigation. Our joint
efforts over the last several years and specifically in this
case should give pause to those contemplating betrayal of the
Nation's trust. Without the current unprecedented level of trust
and cooperation between the CIA and FBI, making this case would
not have been possible. Nor would many other intelligence and
counterintelligence accomplishments that routinely but quietly
contribute to the security of this Nation.
Through Attorney General John
Ashcroft, I would like to thank the Department of Justice and
the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Virginia.
The level of support and expertise from Acting Deputy Attorney
General Robert Mueller, Counsel for Intelligence Policy Frances
Fragos Townsend, U.S. Attorney Helen Fahey and Assistant United
States Attorney Randy Bellows is superb. We particularly appreciate
the unhesitating leadership and support of Attorney General Ashcroft
from the moment he took office.
Director Tenet and I have briefed
the intelligence committees of Congress because of the clear
national security implications.
As Director of the FBI, I am
proud of the courageous men and women of the FBI who each day
make enormous sacrifices in serving their country. They have
committed their lives to public service and to upholding the
high standards of the FBI. Since becoming Director over seven
years ago, I have administered the FBI oath to each graduating
class of Special Agents at the FBI Academy. Each time, I share
the pride and sanctity of those words when new agents swear to
"support and defend the Constitution of the United States
against all enemies, foreign and domestic" and to "bear
true faith and allegiance to the same."
Regrettably, I stand here today
both saddened and outraged. An FBI Agent who raised his right
hand and spoke those words over 25 years ago has been charged
today with violating that oath in the most egregious and reprehensible
manner imaginable. The FBI entrusted him with some of the most
sensitive secrets of the United States Government and instead
of being humbled by this honor, Hanssen has allegedly abused
and betrayed that trust. The crimes alleged are an affront not
only to his fellow FBI employees but to the American people,
not to mention the pain and suffering he has brought upon his
family. Our hearts go out to them. I take solace and satisfaction,
however, that the FBI succeeded in this investigation. As an
agency, we lived up to our responsibility, regardless of how
painful it might be.