Testimony of Assistant Director Kathleen McChesney, Training
Division, FBI
Before the United
States House of Representatives, Committee on Government
Reform
November 13, 2001
"Communication with the Law Enforcement Community"
Good morning Mr. Chairman and
members of the Committee. I have served in the FBI as a Special
Agent since 1978, after having spent seven years as a police
officer and detective with King County Police in Seattle,
Washington. After joining the FBI, I investigated cases in
San Francisco and Oakland, California, and served as a Supervisory
Special Agent at FBI Headquarters and in Los Angeles, California.
I was the Assistant Special Agent in Charge of the FBI's Detroit
field office and the Associate Special Agent in Charge of
the FBI's Los Angeles field office. In September, 1996, I
was assigned as the Special Agent in Charge of the FBI's Portland
field office and served as the Special Agent in Charge of
the FBI's Chicago field office from March 1999, until October
2001. While still in Chicago, I oversaw Chicago's investigative
efforts in the investigation of terrorist acts at the World
Trade Towers and the Pentagon. I am currently assigned as
an Assistant Director in Charge of the Training Division at
the FBI Academy. I am a member of the International Association
of Chiefs of Police, the International Association of Women
Police and a former member of the Illinois Association of
Chiefs of Police, the Illinois Sheriff's Association, the
Oregon Sheriff's Association, and the Oregon Police Chief's
Association. For the past thirty years, as a police officer
or, as an FBI agent, I have worked closely as a partner, with
hundreds of law enforcement officers throughout the United
States.
With me today is Mr. David G.
Walchak, Deputy Assistant Director (DAD) in the Criminal Justice
Information Services Division, or CJIS. Prior to commencing
his Bureau employment, he served as a police training supervisor
for the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension; Director
of the Maine Municipal Association; Director of the Maine
Criminal Justice Academy; Chief of Police in Concord, New
Hampshire, having served there for more than 22 years; and
on other numerous law enforcement-related boards and committees.
He is also past president of the International Association
of Chiefs of Police and a graduate of the FBI National Academy.
In the 15 months immediately prior to his appointment to the
FBI, he worked in the Community Oriented Policing Services
(COPS) office at the U.S. Department of Justice.
DAD Walchak has strong ties
to the law enforcement community throughout this country.
These prior experiences have and continue to serve him well
in performing his current responsibilities. His primary responsibility
is to strengthen the partnership between the FBI and local,
state, other federal, and international law enforcement entities
by enhancing communication, interaction, and information sharing
capabilities.
Also joining me today is Special
Agent in Charge (SAC) Lynne Hunt of our Baltimore field division.
SAC Hunt obtained her law degree in 1978 and entered on duty
with the FBI in June 1979. She has worked and supervised a
variety of cases in her assignments at our Chicago, Phoenix,
and Washington, D.C. field divisions, as well as at FBI Headquarters.
In 1996, Ms. Hunt was appointed as the Assistant Special Agent
in Charge in Baltimore. She then returned to FBI Headquarters
in 1998 as the Chief of the Financial Crimes Section. In June
2000, Lynne was appointed as the SAC of the Baltimore division.
Under her direction, the Baltimore
field division has played an instrumental role in the investigations
surrounding the tragic events of September 11 and the anthrax
attacks. Through their efforts, the FBI has determined that
seven of the 19 hijackers stayed in Maryland prior to their
terrorist attacks. Maryland is also the location for several
federal mail facilities which have been found to be contaminated
with anthrax. It has been determined that mail received at
these facilities first passed through the contaminated Brentwood
facility. Therefore, it is possible that the contamination
of these federal mail facilities can be traced back to the
Brentwood site. In addition, several U.S. postal workers from
the Brentwood facility have developed anthrax. Many of these
individuals live in Maryland and have been interviewed by
the FBI in connection with this ongoing investigation.
I am keenly aware of the concerns
of law enforcement officers regarding their need for information
to help them do their jobs safely, efficiently and completely.
Recently, FBI Director Robert S. Mueller asked me to assist
him in making improvements in the way that the FBI coordinates
investigations with, and communicates information to, our
law enforcement partners at the state and local levels. The
manner in which I intend to do that is to solicit the guidance
and input of the law enforcement community, as the FBI has
in the past through successful endeavors such as interagency
terrorism working groups, joint terrorism task forces, NCIC
and IAFIS. Our future communicative efforts will include a
shared web based terrorism database and bulletin board. We
will also continue existing efforts to communicate information
through Law Enforcement Online (LEO), conference calls, citizen
academies, and meetings between FBI Special Agents in Charge
(SACs) and their state and local counterparts. Furthermore
the FBI will continue to honor requests by members of congress
to participate in town hall meetings.
Presidential Decision Directive
(PDD) 39 mandates that the FBI coordinate the efforts of law
enforcement agencies to ensure a coordinated and vigorous
response to terrorist acts. PDD-62 reaffirms the FBI as the
lead federal agency in both preventing terrorist attacks and
investigating those attacks when they occur within the United
States, in international waters (not involving the flag vessel
of a foreign country), or against U.S. persons and establishments
overseas.
In order to adequately respond
to the potential terrorist threat, the FBI and other members
of the law enforcement community coordinate many terrorist-related
matters via established Counterterrorism Working Groups, Joint
Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) and Regional Terrorism Task
Forces (RTTFs).
The FBI has had Terrorism Task
Forces in place for over 20 years. The first formal JTTF was
established in New York City, in 1980. Because of the significant
threat of terrorism in the United States the FBI mandated
that all field offices establish an Interagency Counterterorism
Working Group and/or JTTF. The JTTF concept has proven to
be the most successful way to address terrorism investigations
through an interagency approach involving the law enforcement
and public safety community. These task forces broaden interagency
liaison and communications, eliminating a duplication of effort
and combines federal, state, and local law enforcement resources
in the fight against terrorism.
The counterterrorism successes
achieved, thus far, by the JTTFs are due, in part, to the
promotion of an atmosphere of enhanced coordination or "immediate
transparency" between the FBI and other law enforcement
members. The presence of FBI and other investigators representing
various local, state, and federal agencies on these task forces
both encourages and ensures the timely and continued sharing
of valuable intelligence-related information between the participating
agencies. All JTTF members are required to have top secret
clearances affording them access to information which is developed
throughout the course of an investigation.
There are currently 36 JTTFs
in operation, which reflects an increase of 25 task forces
since 1996, to which more than 620 FBI special agents are
assigned, and approximately 584 full-time and part-time officers
from other federal, state, and local agencies are assigned.
Full-time federal participants in the JTTF program include
the Immigration and Naturalization Service; U.S. Secret Service;
Naval Criminal Investigative Service; U.S. Marshals Service;
U.S. Customs Service; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms;
U.S. Border Patrol; U.S. Department of State/Diplomatic Security
Service; Postal Inspection Service; Internal Revenue Service;
Department of Interior's Bureau of Land Management; Air Force
Office of Special Investigations; U.S. Park Police; Federal
Protective Service; Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration;
and the Defense Criminal Investigative Service.
In addition to the JTTFs, the
RTTF initiative serves as a viable means of accomplishing
the benefits associated with information sharing and training
for law enforcement officials in a particular region. FBI
special agents assigned to counterterrorism matters meet with
their federal, state, and local counterparts in the region
on a semiannual basis for training, discussion of investigations,
and to share intelligence. The design of this non-traditional
terrorism task force provides the necessary mechanism and
structure to direct counterterrorism resources toward localized
terrorism problems within the united states. There are currently
six RTTFS in existence: the inland northwest RTTF, the south
central RTTF, the southeastern RTTF, and the northeast border
RTTF, the deep south RTTF, and the southwest RTTF. The FBI's
JTTFs and RTTFs also coordinate with the anti-terrorism task
force recently created by the Attorney General working together
the ATTF, JTTF, and RTTFs ensure all relevant agencies' coordination
and information sharing is efficient and comprehensive.
Through the FBI's command center,
known as the Strategic Information and Operations Center,
or SIOC, the FBI is coordinating every aspect of the investigation
into the terrorist attacks of September 11. The SIOC is the
nerve center for the cooperation and coordination of this
investigation by and between FBI headquarters, our 56 field
offices, and 32 other government agencies present in the command
center.
The SIOC currently operates
with more than 500 personnel representing these 32 different
agencies and their components. Criminal division lawyers from
the Department of Justice are also working in SIOC both to
facilitate obtaining warrants and to continuously evaluate
evidence.
The FBI recognizes that each
agency represented in SIOC plays a critical role in this investigation.
We are all working side by side in the command center setting
investigative leads, responding to inquiries, and tracking
the hijackers' activities and contacts prior to September
11th. We have enlisted the professional assistance of our
state and local law enforcement partners across the nation
in two ways: first, through our 35 joint terrorism task forces
and regional task forces where federal, state, and local law
enforcement agencies partner together on terrorism matters;
and, second, through the electronic dissemination of threat
warnings and law enforcement intelligence to police agencies
across the nation. In this way, we reach approximately 18,000
law enforcement agencies instantly.
On September 1, 2001, the FBI
established a web based terrorism database to provide a communicative
network for law enforcement components located in Utah, Idaho,
Montana, and Washington states to share terrorism information
in anticipation of the 2002 Winter Olympic Games. The success
of the FBI's counterterrorism program rests in its ability
to share investigative and intelligence information with law
enforcement nationwide. The system being utilized by the inland
northwest RTTF is the Regional Information Sharing System
(RISS).
RISS is an innovative network,
similar to Law Enforcement Online (LEO), funded by the Department
of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance. RISS has six regional
networks which link federal, state, and local law enforcement
agencies from neighboring states into a regional collaborative
network. The regional network servicing the inland northwest
RTTF is called the Rocky Mountain Information Network (RMIN).
RMIN is headquartered in Phoenix, Arizona, and covers Arizona,
Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, Wyoming,
and Canada. The other five established regions of the United
States, can be accessed by RMIN users through RISS. Future
efforts will involve establishing a web based bulletin board
for all task forces nationwide. This will allow each task
force to publish terrorism information relevant to their territory.
The system is still in the developmental stage.
The FBI's strategic plan for
the JTTF program is to ensure that each of the FBI's 56 field
offices either has a JTTF and/or coverage through an RTTF.
The creation of these new JTTFs will result in an expanded
level of interaction and cooperation between the FBI and the
law enforcement and public safety community throughout the
nation, enhancing the flow of information between the participating
agencies. Additionally, field offices will have an enhanced
capacity to engage in more focused, integrated approaches
to combating terrorism.
Proposed FY 2002 expansion includes
establishing JTTFs in eight field offices. Proposals are currently
being drafted for establishing JTTFs in Baltimore, Honolulu,
Milwaukee, Norfolk, Omaha, St. Louis, Kansas City, and Little
Rock.
The FBI is faced with a formidable
task that experience has shown is best achieved through the
utilization of the vast resources and personnel dedicated
to task forces. Moreover, given the persistent and growing
threat posed by international terrorists, the U.S. Government's
counterterrorism interests will best be served by the continued
and, as appropriate, enhanced presence of other law enforcement
and intelligence entities, on these task forces.
I now want to comment on how
deeply committed the FBI is to working with all levels of
law enforcement to ensure the safety and security of our nation,
now and in the future. On October 24, 2001, in his remarks
before the United States Conference of Mayors, and again on
October 29, before the International Association of Chiefs
of Police (IACP) conference in Toronto, Canada, Director Mueller
spoke of this commitment. A copy of Director Mueller's remarks
to the IACP is attached at the conclusion of my prepared statement.
Speaking specifically on the FBI's response in regard to the
terrorist attacks of September 11th, Director Mueller mentioned
that the FBI established a Terrorist Prevention Task Force
at FBI Headquarters made up of representatives of a dozen
different agencies. Its goal is to identify and stop future
terrorist acts with proactive investigations and to predict
and prevent future scenarios. Prior to September 11th, the
FBI was, and continues to work with our colleagues at the
local, state, and federal levels to evaluate security at critical
public events and to protect critical infrastructures like
water and transportation systems. Our work in these areas
has been supported at every turn by law enforcement and public
safety agencies from across the nation. One of Director Mueller's
highest priorities is to improve our working relationship
with our law enforcement partners around the world. He stated
that he is convinced that no one institution is strong enough
to tackle the challenge of terrorism alone. No one agency
or entity at any level, whether it be federal, state, or local,
has the resources to do it alone. We must work together. Law
enforcement, quite simply, is only as good as its relationships.
Director Mueller has reached
out to key law enforcement leaders throughout the United States
and asked them to educate him on their issues and concerns.
He held a series of meetings with representatives of the International
Association of Chiefs of Police, the Major City Chiefs and
the National Sheriff's Association. The Director and the Attorney
General have sat across the table from the Philadelphia Police
Commissioner, John Timoney, and the Baltimore Police Commissioner,
Edward Norris, and the Mayor of Gary, Indiana, Scott King,
and other key state and local law enforcement officials. The
meetings were candid, open and productive and led to new initiatives.
One initiative is to explore the feasibility of creating a
permanent advisory board comprised of state and local law
enforcement executives to address current and future issues
that impact on our essential working relationships. A first
meeting is scheduled for November 16th, 2001. During this
meeting it is anticipated that short term solutions for information
sharing will be discussed.
Another issue that arose was
that of sharing information. In that regard, the Director
encouraged the law enforcement leaders to participate in the
Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) which exist in 36 cities
or to become part of counterterrorism working groups, and
he tasked FBI Special Agents in Charge with initiating task
forces in cities where they do not currently exist.
It is also apparent that much
more needs to be done in terms of training. Hundreds of thousands
of law enforcement officers throughout the country can provide
valuable information about criminal activity and offenders.
The FBI is in the process of preparing training materials
that can be disseminated to these officers so that we use
the force-multiplier effect in identifying wrongdoers. Similarly,
it is important to educate officers on how the FBI obtains
information regarding potential terrorist acts, how it is
evaluated, and the laws which regulate its use and transmission.
While there are areas for improvement,
I would be remiss if I did not advise the committee of our
long-term provision of critical information services to state
and local law enforcement. Our Criminal Justice Information
Services Division, or CJIS, has worked with the criminal justice
community for many years under a shared management concept
in the management and operation of the FBI's three national
criminal justice information systems: (1) the Integrated Automated
Fingerprint Identification System or IAFIS, (2) the National
Crime Information Center or NCIC, and (3) Law Enforcement
Online or LEO. Under this shared management concept, representatives
from local, state, and federal law enforcement from across
the nation and the FBI are partners and stakeholders. Through
this mechanism, all levels of criminal justice participate
in decisions regarding the policy, technical, and procedural
aspects of the systems. Participation in all three systems
is voluntary, yet over 100,000 criminal justice agencies contribute
to and/or have access to the information maintained at CJIS.
Electronic connection is achieved through a nationwide network
operated and funded by the FBI, emanating from Clarksburg,
West Virginia. The CJIS division maintains a single point
of contact in each state and federal agency. Access for local
agencies, to the point of contact in each state, is provided
through state operated and funded networks.
At this time, I want to provide
the committee with an overview of these systems and the partnership
we have with law enforcement in operating these systems. The
IAFIS is the national fingerprint and criminal history record
repository and is accessible by all criminal justice agencies
24 hours a day, seven days per week, 365 days a year. The
IAFIS relies upon information submitted by local, state, and
federal criminal justice agencies. These same agencies also
have access to the repository to retrieve data. All information
entered into the system is fingerprint-based. Information
retrieved is very reliable because fingerprint comparison
insures a positive identification. Fingerprint submission
for criminal identifications are typically completed in less
than two hours and non-criminal, or applicant fingerprints
are processed in less than 24 hours.
To illustrate IAFIS usage, the
FBI received more than 15.4 million fingerprint submissions
during fiscal year 2001. This equates to approximately 1.3
million receipts per month and reflects a six percent increase
in receipts from fiscal year 2000. In addition, we add approximately
5,000 to 7,000 new entries daily for offenders who were not
previously included in the data file.
A much faster, but far less
accurate, means of access to the criminal history repository
provides for retrieval by name, date of birth, social security
number, and other demographic identifiers. The Interstate
Identification Index, or Triple I, as this name-based system
is known, provides a response within seconds to inquiries
from remote users.
Fingerprints can still be submitted
in hard copy and are converted to electronic form by CJIS.
Electronic fingerprint submissions are, however, much more
efficient; and, at this time 57 percent of the average daily
submissions (40,000) are in electronic form. Failure of agencies
to convert to electronic form is virtually always due to lack
of funds to procure the needed equipment or personnel shortages
preventing proper staffing of the electronic capture operation.
Once an agency converts to electronic fingerprint submissions
the benefits are many. Not only is the transmission faster,
electronically sent in seconds rather than days through the
mail, but the process of taking the prints is faster. Prints
taken manually must be done three times, one copy for local
files, one for the state repository, and one for the national
repository. Taken once electronically, additional copies may
be sent easily. Also, the faster a print reaches the FBI,
the sooner it is available to the rest of the nation, extending
the benefit of one agency submitting electronically to all
agencies.
One example of the value of
electronic access to Triple I information is its use in a
pilot project with the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) at John F. Kennedy (JFK) International Airport in New
York City and at the Newark, New Jersey, International Airport.
The INS requested Triple I access to identify criminal alien
passengers on the airlines' advance passenger manifest with
the intent to prosecute all who violated the Immigration and
Naturalization Act. As this is deemed an appropriate criminal
justice function, the INS started utilizing this capability
in late 1999.
The INS is currently seeking
to expand this program to other international airports. A
series of meetings has been held with the INS, the FBI, and
U.S. Customs Service to plan for the orderly expansion of
this program. The U.S. Customs Service is involved because
it provides the INS with Triple I access through their Treasury
Enforcement Communications System, or TECS. System upgrades
will be required in order to handle the increased volume this
would impose on the TECS. The Customs Service has advised
that it will take approximately nine months to accomplish
its systems upgrade. Thereafter, an incremental transition
to other international airports can begin.
The next system I will address is NCIC. NCIC is a computerized
index of documented criminal justice information, again available
twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, 365 days a year.
The over 40 million records
stored in NCIC are entered by, and available to local, state,
and federal law enforcement agencies which generate approximately
3 million transactions per day, mostly to retrieve information
from the database. Access to the data stored in NCIC is restricted
to duly-authorized criminal justice agencies. In addition
to law enforcement, criminal justice agencies include criminal
courts, prosecuting attorneys, and probation and parole offices.
The NCIC database consists of
information concerning persons of interest to law enforcement
and stolen property. In addition to the criminal history information
available in Triple I, which can be accessed through NCIC,
data includes fugitives, missing persons, individuals on probation
or parole, subjects incarcerated in federal prisons (entered
by the Federal Bureau of Prisons), individuals against whom
restraining orders have been issued, convicted sexual offenders,
deported felons (entered by the INS), and persons who have
threatened high ranking government officials (entered by the
U.S. Secret Service). Stolen property includes virtually anything
with a unique identifying number such as vehicles, boats,
license plates, guns, airplanes, financial instruments, appliances,
and personal items.
In October 1995, the database
was expanded to include a category of individuals who are
members of violent gangs or terrorist organizations. Shortly
after the events of September 11, individuals on the terrorist
watch list were entered into this database, which can be accessed
by law enforcement throughout the United States. When available,
facial images have been appended to these entries.
Law Enforcement Online (LEO)
is the law enforcement, criminal justice, and public safety
information highway of the twenty-first century. It provides
all levels of criminal justice a national focal point for
electronic communication, education, and information sharing.
LEO can be accessed by any approved employee of a duly constituted
local, state, or federal law enforcement, criminal justice,
or public safety agency. It provides a state-of-the-art common
communications link to all levels of these agencies by supporting
broad, immediate dissemination and exchange of information.
Some of the special features of LEO include: a special topics
index, which provides a secure community area for information
related to law enforcement; LEO online special interest groups,
which provides public and private controlled multi-level access
for members of specialized organizations and disciplines in
public safety; news groups, which provides bulletin board
capability between users and posting of topical information;
a multimedia library, which provides an easily accessed multimedia
repository on a broad range of publications, documents, studies,
research, technical bulletins, and reports of interest to
LEO users; distance learning, which provides on-line topical
learning modules; and e-mail capability between users. With
these capabilities, it is easy to see that LEO is an important
tool in equipping officers to counter crimes that involve
a coordinated effort across the United States, such as violent
crime, money laundering, organized crime, and counterterrorism.
In addition to the three FBI
systems I just mentioned, there is another means, already
in place, by which the criminal justice community can share
information. This is the National Law Enforcement Telecommunications
System, or NLETS. NLETS is a computerized, high-speed message
switching system. Its sole purpose is to provide for the interstate
and/or interagency exchange of criminal justice and criminal
justice-related information. A log of all transactions is
kept to provide system statistical reports and management
information.
NLETS is supported by a computer
system located at the Arizona Department of Public Safety
in Phoenix, Arizona. The system can receive, store, and forward
message traffic from and to all its user agencies. Administrative
message traffic on the system includes all types of free form
criminal justice data from one point to one or more points.
NLETS also supports inquiry into state motor vehicle, driver's
license, criminal
history, and other state data bases.
NLETS users are primarily criminal
justice agencies nationwide. Communications service is provided
to the capitol city for each state, the District of Columbia,
Puerto Rico, numerous federal agencies, and the national insurance
crime bureau. The sole international member is the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police.
In closing, I am confident that
the FBI will continue to build stronger, more supportive relationships
with all levels of law enforcement and emergency responders
nationwide. I believe we will get through these difficult
and trying times by supporting each other, by upholding our
values, and by tapping into the deep reservoir of determination,
strength, and courage that exists throughout America.
I thank you for the privilege
of addressing this committee today. DAD Walchak, SAC Hunt
and I are available to answer any questions the committee
may have of us.
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