Testimony of James F. Jarboe, Section Chief, Counterterrorism
Division, Domestic Terrorism Section, FBI
Before the
House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Crime
November 7, 2001
"Law Enforcement Response to Bioterrorism"
Good morning Mr. Chairman and
members of the Subcommittee. I appreciate the
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the law
enforcement response to bioterrorism.
The Bioterrorism threat has
risen to a new level. The federal government, in partnership
with state and local law enforcement agencies, has always
taken the threat concerning intentional release of a biological
agent seriously. However, neither the federal government nor
state and local responders have been required to utilize their
assets to coordinate a response to an actual release of anthrax.
The intentional introduction of bacillus anthracis into the
infrastructure of American lives has resulted in significant
panic and alarm concerning our health and safety. Today, I
would like to comment on the manner in which the law enforcement
community responds to a suspected act of terrorism involving
biological agents, and reinforce the cooperative effort that
is in place between the federal government and the myriad
of first responders who provide guidance, assistance and expertise.
The response to a potential
bioterrorist threat can be broken down into two different
scenarios: overt and covert releases. The distinction between
the two involves the manner in which the biological threat
agent is introduced into the community and the nature of the
response. Regardless of whether a biological release is overt
or covert, the primary mission of law enforcement and the
public health community is saving lives.
An overt scenario involves the
announced release of an agent, often with some type of articulated
threat. An example of this would be the receipt of a letter
containing a powder and a note indicating that the recipient
has been exposed to anthrax. This type of situation would
prompt an immediate law enforcement response, to include local
police, fire and emergency medical service (EMS) personnel.
Each FBI field office is staffed with a Weapons of Mass Destruction
(WMD) Coordinator whose responsibilities include liaison with
first responders in the community. Due to this established
relationship with first responders, the local FBI WMD Coordinator
would be notified and dispatched to the scene. The FBI investigates
these articulated threats involving a biological agent. The
response protocol would involve securing the crime scene and
initiating the FBI's interagency threat assessment process.
The FBI's Counterterrorism Division at FBI Headquarters, coordinates
this threat assessment which determines the credibility of
the threat received, the immediate concerns involving health
and safety of the responding personnel, and the requisite
level of response warranted by the federal government. The
FBI obtains detailed information from the on-scene personnel
and input from the necessary federal agencies with responsibility
in the particular incident. In a biological event, representatives
from Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Department
of Health and Human Services (DHHS), United States Department
of Agriculture (USDA) and Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
are the key agencies called upon to assist FBI personnel in
assessing the particular threat. Based upon the assessment,
a determination is made as to the level of response necessary
to adequately address the particular threat, which could range
from a full federal response if the threat is deemed credible,
to collection of the material in an effort to rule out the
presence of any biological material if the threat is deemed
not credible.
The method of collecting suspect
material is established by protocols set forth by the FBI's
Hazardous Material Response Unit (HMRU). These protocols,
recognized and followed by state and local Hazmat teams, are
necessary to ensure that sufficient evidentiary samples are
collected, screened and over-packed according to scientific
safety guidelines for transportation to the appropriate testing
facility. Over 85 State Health Laboratories perform this analysis
on behalf of CDC and belong to a coordinated collection of
facilities known as the Laboratory Response Network (LRN).
Once the testing has been completed, results are provided
to the FBI for dissemination in the appropriate manner. The
results of the analysis are then disseminated to the exposed
person or persons, local first responders and to the local
public health department. Additionally, results will be forwarded
to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in
Atlanta, GA.
A covert release of a biological
agent invokes a different type of response, driven by the
public health community. By its nature, a covert introduction
is not accompanied by any articulated or known threat. The
presence of the disease is discovered through the presentation
of unusual signs and/or symptoms in individuals reporting
to local hospitals or physician clinics. In this situation,
there is initially no crime scene for law enforcement personnel
to respond. The criminal act may not be revealed until days
have elapsed, following the agent identification and preliminary
results obtained from the epidemiological inquiry conducted
by the public health sector. Contrary to an overt act where
law enforcement makes the necessary notification to public
health, in a covert release, notification to law enforcement
is made by the public health sector. The early notification
of law enforcement in this process encourages the sharing
of information between criminal and epidemiological investigators.
Once an indication of a criminal act utilizing a biological
agent is suspected, the FBI assumes primary authority in conducting
the criminal investigation, while public health maintains
responsibility for the health and welfare of the citizens.
At the local level, involving the FBI WMD Coordinator and
the State or local public health department, and at the national
level between FBI Headquarters and the CDC, an effective coordination
has been accomplished to address the requisite roles and responsibilities
of each agency.
The response to an actual
threat or one that is later determined to be not credible,
or a hoax, is indistinguishable.
This includes deployment of a Hazmat team, thorough examination
of the potentially contaminated area (including situations
where a telephonic reporting is received) and the disruption
of the normal operations of the affected entity. Additionally,
the individuals potentially exposed to the WMD may experience
extreme anxiety/fear due to the reported release. Potential
victims may have to be decontaminated or transported to a
medical facility. The first responders must treat each
incident as a real event until scientific analysis proves
that the material is not a biological agent. To both the
responding entities and the potentially exposed victims, the
presence of a powder threatening the presence of "anthrax"
is not a hoax, or something to be taken lightly. The individuals
perpetrating such an activity must be held accountable for
their actions.
In 1999, the FBI testified before
the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations, discussing the need for improved Federal statutes
which address the threatened use and possession of biological
agents. During this testimony, it was reported that in 1998,
the FBI opened 181 cases related to WMD events, of which 112
were biological in nature. The number of cases has increased
since then, with 267 in 1999, and 257 in 2000. (threatened
biological releases accounted for 187 and 115 respectively.)
Prior to the events of September
11, 2001 the number of cases initiated for 2001 was 100, of
which 67 were biological, and a large percentage of these
cases involved the threatened release of anthrax, necessitating
a law enforcement response. However, the combined terrorist
attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, the subsequent
publicity afforded to a handful of anthrax threats, and the
tragic death of four persons, have resulted in a dramatic
increase in calls for help from the public. Since mid-September,
the FBI has responded to over 7,000 suspicious anthrax letters,
950 incidents involving other WMD matters, and an estimated
29,000 telephone calls from the public about suspicious packages.
In that same time frame, the FBI has initiated 305 new anthrax
related investigations which exceeds and virtually doubles
the normal annual average of all WMD cases. Resources available
by law enforcement in responding to the alleged threats and
public health laboratories in testing suspicious material
for the presence of biological agents are limited.
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