Testimony of J. T. Caruso, Deputy Assistant Director, Counterterrorism
Division, FBI
Before
the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism
and Government Information
November 6, 2001
"Bioterrorism"
Good
morning Madame Chairwoman, Senator Kyl and members of the
Subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before
you today to discuss the law enforcement response to Bioterrorism.
The Bioterrorism threat has risen to a new level. The Federal
Government, in partnership with state and local law enforcement
agencies, has over recent years taken the threat concerning
the intentional release of a biological agent seriously. However,
until recently, neither the federal government nor state and
local responders have been required to utilize their assets
to coordinate a response to an actual release of anthrax.
The intentional introduction of bacillus anthracis into the
infrastructure of American lives has resulted in significant
alarm concerning our health and safety. Today, I would like
to comment on the manner in which the law enforcement community
responds to a suspected act of terrorism involving biological
agents, and reinforce the cooperative effort that is in place
between the federal government and the myriad of first responders
who provide guidance, assistance and expertise.
The response to a potential bioterrorist threat can be broken
down into two different scenarios: overt and covert releases.
The distinction between the two involves the manner in which
the biological threat agent is introduced into the community
and the nature of the response. Regardless of whether a biological
release is overt or covert, the primary mission of law enforcement
and the public health community is saving lives.
An overt scenario involves the announced release of an agent,
often with some type of articulated threat. An example of
this would be the receipt of a letter containing a powder
and a note indicating that the recipient has been exposed
to anthrax. This type of situation would prompt an immediate
law enforcement response, to include local police, fire and
emergency medical service (EMS) personnel. Each FBI field
office is staffed with a Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
Coordinator whose responsibilities include liaison with first
responders in the community. Due to this established relationship
with first responders, the local FBI WMD Coordinator would
be notified and dispatched to the scene. The articulated threat
involving a biological agent and the authority given to the
FBI by statute and Presidential Decision Directives 39 and
62, directs the FBI to investigate these matters. The response
protocol would involve securing the crime scene and initiating
the FBI's interagency threat assessment process.
The FBI's Counterterrorism Division at FBI Headquarters, coordinates
this threat assessment which determines the credibility of
the threat received, the immediate concerns involving health
and safety of the responding personnel, and the requisite
level of response warranted by the federal government. These
directives are based upon the detailed information received
from the on-scene personnel and input from the necessary federal
agencies with an interest in the particular incident. In a
biological event, representatives from Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC), Department of Health and Human
Services (DHHS), United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)
and Food and Drug Administration (FDA) are the key agencies
called upon to assist FBI personnel in assessing the particular
threat. Based upon the assessment, a determination is made
as to the level of response necessary to adequately address
the particular threat, which could range from a full federal
response if the threat is deemed credible, to collection of
the material in an effort to rule out the presence of any
biological material if the threat is deemed not credible.
The method of collecting suspect material is established by
protocols set forth by the FBI's Hazardous Material Response
Unit (HMRU). These protocols, recognized and followed by state
and local Hazmat teams, are necessary to ensure that sufficient
evidentiary samples are collected, screened and over-packed
according to scientific safety guidelines for transportation
to the appropriate testing facility. More than 85 state health
laboratories perform this analysis on behalf of CDC and belong
to a coordinated collection of facilities known as the Laboratory
Response Network (LRN). Once the testing has been completed,
results are provided to the FBI for dissemination in the appropriate
manner. The results of the analysis are then disseminated
to the exposed person or persons, local first responders and
to the local public health department. Additionally, results
will be forwarded to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) in Atlanta, GA.
A covert release of a biological agent invokes a different
type of response, driven by the public health community. By
its nature, a covert introduction is not accompanied by any
articulated or known threat. The presence of the disease is
discovered through the presentation of unusual signs and/or
symptoms in individuals reporting to local hospitals or physician
clinics. In this situation, there is initially no crime scene
for law enforcement personnel to respond to. The criminal
act may not be revealed until days have elapsed, following
the agent identification and preliminary results obtained
from the epidemiological inquiry conducted by the public health
sector. Contrary to an overt act where law enforcement makes
the necessary notification to public health, in a covert release,
notification to law enforcement is made by the public health
sector. The early notification of law enforcement in this
process encourages the sharing of information between criminal
and epidemiological investigators. Once an indication of a
criminal act utilizing a biological agent is suspected, the
FBI assumes primary authority in conducting the criminal investigation,
while public health maintains responsibility for the health
and welfare of the citizens. At the local level, involving
the FBI WMD Coordinator and the state or local public health
department, and at the national level between FBI Headquarters
and the CDC, effective coordination has been accomplished
to address the requisite roles and responsibilities of each
agency.
The response to an actual threat or one that is later determined
to be not credible, or a hoax, is indistinguishable. This
includes deployment of a Hazmat team, thorough examination
of the potentially contaminated area (in situations where
a telephonic reporting is received) and the disruption of
the normal operations of the affected entity. Additionally,
the individuals potentially exposed to the WMD may experience
extreme anxiety/fear due to the reported release. Potential
victims may have to be decontaminated or transported to a
medical facility. The first responders must treat each incident
as a real event until scientific analysis proves that the
material is not a biological agent. To both the responding
entities and the potentially exposed victims, the presence
of a powder threatening the presence of anthrax is not a "hoax",
or something to be taken lightly. The individuals perpetrating
such an activity must be held accountable for their actions.
In 1999, the FBI testified before the House Energy and Commerce
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, discussing the
need for improved Federal statutes which address the threatened
use and possession of biological agents. During this testimony,
it was reported that in 1998, the FBI opened 181 cases related
to WMD events, of which 112 were biological in nature. The
number of cases has increased since then, with 267 in 1999,
and 257 in 2000. (threatened biological releases accounted
for 187 and 115 respectively)
Prior to the events of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent
release of anthrax along the East Coast, the number of cases
initiated for 2001 was 100, of which 67 were biological. A
large percentage of these cases involved the threatened release
of anthrax, necessitating a law enforcement response. The
combined terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon,
the subsequent publicity afforded to a handful anthrax threats,
and the tragic death of four persons, have resulted in a dramatic
increase in calls for help from the public. The law enforcement
communities and first responder communities (fire, police
and emergency medical services) have responded. Since mid-September,
the FBI has responded to approximately 7,089 suspicious anthrax
letters, 950 incidents involving other WMD matters (bomb threats,
etc.), and an estimated 29,331 telephonic calls from the public
about suspicious packages. Resources available by law enforcement
in responding to the alleged threats and public health laboratories
in testing suspicious material for the presence of biological
agents are strained and stretched to capacity.
As part of the USA PATRIOT ACT which the President signed
into law on October 26, 2001, Congress recently approved a
modification to Title 18, USC, Section 175 which criminalizes
the possession of certain biological material except for medical
or clinical purposes, or bona fide research. Prior to this
modification, the government had the burden of proof that
specific possession of a biological agent was for illegal
purposes or evil intent. This created a significant burden
on the law enforcement community to provide sufficient proof
that the biological agent was intended to be used as a weapon.
Congress' modification recently provided will be of significant
benefit in addressing the need to apprehend and prosecute
those individuals who are capable of and intent upon creating
a biological weapon to harm and terrorize the American people.
It will allow for early apprehension of the responsible party
and the prevention of any release of the biological material.
Under the direction of AG Ashcroft and FBI Director Mueller,
the federal government is now prosecuting non-credible threats,
or hoaxes, within the full extent of the law. In fact, 11
indictments or complaints have been issued by United States
Attorney's Offices throughout the country, threatening the
release of anthrax. Utilizing the statutory guidelines which
became effective November 1, 2001, these individuals face
a possible five year mandatory minimum incarceration.
As the FBI strives to meet new challenges, we will continue
to stress coordination with state and local law enforcement
agencies and emergency responders through Joint Terrorism
Task Forces (JTTFs), Regional Terrorism Task Forces (RTTFs)
and WMD Coordinators.
This concludes my prepared remarks. I would like to respond
to any questions of the Subcommittee.
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