Testimony of Michael A. Vatis, Director, National Infrastructure
Protection Center, FBI
Before the
Senate Armed Service Committee, Subcommittee on Emerging
Threats and Capabilities
March 1, 2000
"The National Infrastructure
Protection Center"
Introduction
Mr. Chairman, Senator Bingaman,
and Members of the Subcommittee: Thank you for inviting me
back to discuss the threats to our critical infrastructures
and the NIPC's approach to meeting those challenges. Last
year I testified about the role of the National Infrastructure
Protection Center (NIPC) under Presidential Decision Directive-63
(PDD-63), and impediments to critical infrastructure protection.
Much has happened since then to demonstrate the problem in
very vivid terms, including the spread of major computer viruses,
a major international intrusion into government computer networks,
and denial-of-service attacks against some of the most popular
e-commerce websites. Today I will focus on the nature of the
national security and criminal threats we face in cyberspace,
the progress we have made with our interagency partners
particularly the Department of Defense -- in meeting those
threats, and the continuing challenges we face in addressing
national security threats in cyberspace.
The NIPC
Let me begin with a brief recap
of the mission and structure of the NIPC. The NIPC is an interagency
Center located at the FBI. Created in 1998, the NIPC serves
as the focal point for the government's efforts to warn of
and respond to cyber attacks, particularly those that are
directed at our nation's "critical infrastructures."
These infrastructures include telecommunications and information,
energy, banking and finance, transportation, government operations,
and emergency services. In Presidential Decision Directive
(PDD) 63, the President directed that the NIPC serve as a
"national critical infrastructure threat assessment,
warning, vulnerability, and law enforcement investigation
and response entity." The PDD further states that the
mission of the NIPC "will include providing timely warnings
of intentional threats, comprehensive analyses and law enforcement
investigation and response."
To accomplish its goals, the
NIPC is organized into three sections:
- The Computer Investigations
and Operations Section (CIOS) is the operational response
arm of the Center. It supports and, where necessary, coordinates
computer investigations conducted by FBI field offices throughout
the country, provides expert technical assistance to network
investigations, and provides a cyber emergency response
capability to coordinate the response to a national-level
cyber incident.
- The Analysis and Warning
Section (AWS) serves as the "indications and warning"
arm of the NIPC. It provides tactical analytical support
during a cyber incident, and also develops strategic analyses
of threats for dissemination to both government and private
sector entities so that they can take appropriate steps
to protect themselves.. Through its 24/7 watch and warning
operation, it maintains a real-time situational awareness
by reviewing numerous governmental and "open"
sources of information and by maintaining communications
with partner entities in the government and private sector.
Through its efforts, the AWS strives to acquire indications
of a possible attack, assess the information, and issue
appropriate warnings to government and private sector partners
as quickly as possible
- The Training, Outreach and
Strategy Section (TOSS) coordinates the vital training of
cyber investigators in the FBI field offices, other federal
agencies, and state and local law enforcement. It also coordinates
outreach to private industry and government agencies to
build the partnerships that are key to both our investigative
and our warning missions. In addition, this section manages
our efforts to catalogue information about individual "key
assets" across the country which, if successfully attacked,
could have significant repercussions on our economy or national
security. Finally, the TOSS handles the development of strategy
and policy in conjunction with other agencies and the Congress.
Beyond the NIPC at FBI Headquarters,
we have also created a cyber crime investigative program in
all FBI Field Offices called the National Infrastructure Protection
and Computer Intrusion (NIPCI) Program. This program, managed
by the NIPC, consists of special agents in each FBI Field
Office who are responsible for investigating computer intrusions,
viruses, or denial of service attacks, for implementing our
key asset initiative, and for conducting critical liaison
activities with private industry. They are also developing
cyber crime task forces in partnership with state and local
law enforcement entities within their jurisdiction to leverage
the limited resources in this area.
The Broad Spectrum of Threats
Over the past several years we have seen a wide range of cyber
threats ranging from defacement of websites by juveniles to
sophisticated intrusions that we suspect may be sponsored
by foreign powers, and everything in between. Some of these
are obviously more significant than others. The theft of national
security information from a government agency or the interruption
of electrical power to a major metropolitan area would have
greater consequences for national security, public safety,
and the economy than the defacement of a web-site. But even
the less serious categories have real consequences and, ultimately,
can undermine confidence in e-commerce and violate privacy
or property rights. A web site hack that shuts down an e-commerce
site can have disastrous consequences for a business. An intrusion
that results in the theft of credit card numbers from an online
vendor can result in significant financial loss and, more
broadly, reduce consumers' willingness to engage in e-commerce.
Because of these implications, it is critical that we have
in place the programs and resources to investigate and, ultimately,
to deter these sorts of crimes. In addition, because it is
often difficult to determine whether an intrusion or denial
of service attack, for instance, is the work of an individual
with criminal motives or foreign nation state, we must treat
each case as potentially serious until we gather sufficient
information to determine the nature, purpose, scope, and perpetrator
of the attack.
The following are some of the categories of cyber threats
that we confront today.
Insiders. The disgruntled insider (a current or former employee
of a company) is a principal source of computer crimes for
many companies. Insiders' knowledge of the target companies'
network often allows them to gain unrestricted access to cause
damage to the system or to steal proprietary data. The 1999
Computer Security Institute/FBI report notes that 55% of respondents
reported malicious activity by insiders.
Hackers. Hackers (or "crackers") are also a common threat.
They sometimes crack into networks simply for the thrill of
the challenge or for bragging rights in the hacker community.
Recently, however, we have seen more cases of hacking for
illicit financial gain or other malicious purposes. While
remote cracking once required a fair amount of skill or computer
knowledge, hackers can now download attack scripts and protocols
from the World Wide Web and launch them against victim sites.
Thus while attack tools have become more sophisticated, they
have also become easier to use. The distributed denial-of-service
(DDOS) attacks earlier this month are only the most recent
illustration of the economic disruption that can be caused
by tools now readily available on the Internet.
We have also seen a rise recently
in politically motivated attacks on web pages or email servers,
which some have dubbed "hacktivism. In these incidents,
groups and individuals overload e-mail servers or deface web
sites to send a political message. While these attacks generally
have not altered operating systems or networks, they have
disrupted services, caused monetary loss, and denied the public
access to websites containing valuable information, thereby
infringing on others' rights to disseminate and receive information.
Virus Transmitters. Virus transmitters are posing an increasingly
serious threat to networks and systems worldwide. Last year
saw the proliferation of several destructive computer viruses
or "worms," including the Melissa Macro Virus, the
Explore.Zip worm, and the CIH (Chernobyl) Virus. The NIPC
frequently sends out warnings or advisories regarding particularly
dangerous viruses, which can allow potential victims to take
protective steps and minimize the destructive consequences
of a virus.
The Melissa Macro Virus was
a good example of our two-fold response -- encompassing both
warning and investigation -- to a virus spreading in the networks.
The NIPC sent out warnings as soon as it had solid information
on the virus and its effects; these warnings helped alert
the public and reduce the potential destructive impact of
the virus. On the investigative side, the NIPC acted as a
central point of contact for the field offices who worked
leads on the case. A tip received by the New Jersey State
Police from America Online, and their follow-up investigation
with the FBI's Newark Division, led to the April 1, 1999 arrest
of David L. Smith. Mr. Smith pleaded guilty to one count of
violating 18 U.S.C. § 1030 in Federal Court, and to four
state felony counts. As part of his guilty plea, Smith stipulated
to affecting one million computer systems and causing $80
million in damage. Smith is awaiting sentencing.
Criminal Groups. We are also seeing the increased use of cyber
intrusions by criminal groups who attack systems for purposes
of monetary gain. In September, 1999, two members of a group
dubbed the "Phonemasters" were sentenced after their
conviction for theft and possession of unauthorized access
devices (18 USC § 1029) and unauthorized access to a
federal interest computer (18 USC § 1030). The "Phonemasters"
were an international group of criminals who penetrated the
computer systems of MCI, Sprint, AT&T, Equifax, and even
the National Crime Information Center. Under judicially approved
electronic surveillance orders, the FBI's Dallas Division
made use of new data intercept technology to monitor the calling
activity and modem pulses of one of the suspects, Calvin Cantrell.
Mr. Cantrell downloaded thousands of Sprint calling card numbers,
which he sold to a Canadian individual, who passed them on
to someone in Ohio. These numbers made their way to an individual
in Switzerland and eventually ended up in the hands of organized
crime groups in Italy. Cantrell was sentenced to two years
as a result of his guilty plea, while one of his associates,
Cory Lindsay, was sentenced to 41 months.
The Phonemasters' methods included
"dumpster diving" to gather old phone books and
technical manuals for systems. They used this information
to trick employees into giving up their logon and password
information. The group then used this information to break
into victim systems. It is important to remember that often
"cyber crimes" are facilitated by old fashioned
guile, such as calling employees and tricking them into giving
up passwords. Good cyber security practices must therefore
address personnel security and "social engineering"
in addition to instituting electronic security measures.
Unfortunately, cyberspace provides
new tools not only for criminals, but for national security
threats as well. These include terrorists, foreign intelligence
agencies, and foreign militaries. Director of Central Intelligence
George Tenet testified in February 2000, before the Senate
Armed Services Committee, that many of the tools and weapons
that can be used for information warfare purposes are "available
on the open market at relatively little cost." The DCI
went on to note that the critical threat of IW lies in its
potential as a "force multiplier" for an adversary
of the United States.
The development of the Internet
and our dependence on information technology poses one of
the most difficult challenges to our national security and
defense planners since the advent of the airplane forced planners
to worry about controlling not just the battlefield, but the
airspace over the battlefield. The cyber revolution has permeated
virtually every facet of the U.S. military and our broader
society. Foreign militaries and intelligence services alike
have been quick to embrace cyber tools. The cyber environment
offers opportunities for easy concealment and anonymity, and
transborder attacks at light.
Three major categories of threat
actors pose a national security challenge to the United States
in cyberspace.
Terrorists. Terrorists groups are increasingly using new
information technology and the Internet to formulate plans,
raise funds, spread propaganda, and to communicate securely.
In his statement on the worldwide threat in 2000, Director
of Central Intelligence George Tenet testified that terrorists
groups, "including Hizbollah, HAMAS, the Abu Nidal organization,
and Bin Laden's al Qa'ida organization are using computerized
files, e-mail, and encryption to support their operations."
In one example, convicted terrorist Ramzi Yousef, the mastermind
of the World Trade Center bombing, stored detailed plans to
destroy United States airliners on encrypted files on his
laptop computer. While we have not yet seen these groups employ
cyber tools as a weapon to use against critical infrastructures,
their reliance on information technology and acquisition of
computer expertise are clear warning signs. Moreover, we have
seen other terrorist groups, such as the Internet Black Tigers
(who are reportedly affiliated with the Tamil Tigers), engage
in attacks on foreign government web-sites and email servers.
"Cyber terrorism" by which I mean the use
of cyber tools to shut down critical national infrastructures
(such as energy, transportation, or government operations)
for the purpose of coercing or intimidating a government or
civilian population is thus a very real, though still
largely potential, threat.
Foreign intelligence services. Not surprisingly, foreign intelligence services
have adapted to using cyber tools as part of their espionage
tradecraft. Even as far back as 1986, before the worldwide
surge in Internet use, the KGB employed West German hackers
to access Department of Defense systems in the well-known
"Cuckoo's Egg" case. While I cannot go into specifics
about more recent developments in an open hearing, it should
not surprise anyone to hear that foreign intelligence services
increasingly view computer intrusions as a useful tool for
acquiring sensitive U.S. government and private sector information.
Information Warfare. The prospect of "information warfare"
by foreign militaries against our critical infrastructures
is perhaps the greatest potential cyber threat to our national
security. We know that several foreign nations are developing
information warfare doctrine, programs, and capabilities for
use against the United States or other nations. Knowing that
they cannot match our military might with conventional or
"kinetic" weapons, nations see cyber attacks on
our critical infrastructures or military operations as a way
to hit what they perceive as America's Achilles heel
our growing dependence on information technology in government
and commercial operations. For example, two Chinese military
officers recently published a book that called for the use
of unconventional measures, including the propagation of computer
viruses, to counterbalance the military power of the United
States. And a Russian official has also commented that an
attack on a national infrastructure could, "by virtue
of its catastrophic consequences, completely overlap with
the use of [weapons] of mass destruction."
Distributed Denial of Service
Tools
The recent distributed denial
of service (DDOS) attacks on e-commerce sites have garnered
a tremendous amount of interest in the public and in the Congress.
Because we are actively investigating these attacks, I cannot
provide a detailed briefing on the status of our efforts.
However, I can provide an overview of our activities to deal
with the DDOS threat beginning last year and of our investigative
efforts over the last three weeks. These attacks illustrate
the growing availability of destructive, yet easy-to-use,
exploits that are widely available on the Internet.
In the fall of last year, the
NIPC began receiving reports about a new set of "exploits"
or attack tools collectively called distributed denial of
service (or DDOS) tools. DDOS variants include tools known
as "Trinoo," "Tribal Flood Net" (TFN),
"TFN2K," and "Stacheldraht" (German for
"barbed wire"). These tools essentially work as
follows: hackers gain unauthorized access to a computer system(s)
and place software code on it that renders that system a "master"
(or a "handler"). The hackers also intrude into
other networks and place malicious code which makes those
systems into agents (also known as "zombies" or
"daemons" or "slaves"). Each Master is
capable of controlling multiple agents. In both cases, the
network owners normally are not aware that dangerous tools
have been placed and reside on their systems, thus becoming
third-party victims to the intended crime.
The "Masters" are
activated either remotely or by internal programming (such
as a command to begin an attack at a prescribed time) and
are used to send information to the agents, activating their
DDOS ability. The agents then generate numerous requests to
connect with the attack's ultimate target(s), typically using
a fictitious or "spoofed" IP (Internet Protocol)
address, thus providing a falsified identity as to the source
of the request. The agents act in unison to generate a high
volume of traffic from several sources. This type of attack
is referred to as a SYN flood, as the SYN is the initial effort
by the sending computer to make a connection with the destination
computer. Due to the volume of SYN requests the destination
computer becomes overwhelmed in its efforts to acknowledge
and complete a transaction with the sending computers, degrading
or denying its ability to complete service with legitimate
customers hence the term "Denial of Service".
These attacks are especially damaging when they are coordinated
from multiple sites hence the term Distributed Denial
of Service.
An analogy would be if someone
launched an automated program to have hundreds of phone calls
placed to the Capitol switchboard at the same time. All of
the good efforts of the staff would be overcome. Many callers
would receive busy signals due to the high volume of telephone
traffic.
In November and December, the
NIPC received reports that universities and others were detecting
the presence of hundreds of agents on their networks. The
number of agents detected clearly could have been only a small
subset of the total number of agents actually deployed. In
addition, we were concerned that some malicious actors might
choose to launch a DDOS attack around New Year's Eve in order
to cause disruption and gain notoriety due to the great deal
of attention that was being payed to the Y2K rollover. Accordingly,
we decided to issue a series of alerts in December to government
agencies, industry, and the public about the DDOS threat.
Moreover, in late December,
we determined that a detection tool that we had developed
for investigative purposes might also be used by network operators
to detect the presence of DDOS agents or masters on their
operating systems, and thus would enable them to remove an
agent or master and prevent the network from being unwittingly
utilized in a DDOS attack. Moreover, at that time there was,
to our knowledge, no similar detection tool available commercially.
We therefore decided to take the unusual step of releasing
the tool to the Department of Defense, other government agencies,
and to the public in an effort to reduce the level of the
threat. We made the first variant of our software available
on the NIPC web site on December 30, 1999. To maximize the
public awareness of this tool, we announced its availability
in an FBI press release that same date. Since the first posting
of the tool, we have posted three updated versions that have
perfected the software and made it applicable to different
operating systems.
The public has downloaded these
tools tens of thousands of times from the web site, and has
responded by reporting many installations of the DDOS software,
thereby preventing their networks from being used in attacks
and leading to the opening of criminal investigations both
before and after the widely publicized attacks of the last
few weeks. Our work with private companies has been so well
received that the trade group SANS awarded their yearly Security
Technology Leadership Award to members of the NIPC's Special
Technologies Applications Unit.
Recently, we received reports
that a new variation of DDOS tools was being found on Windows
operating systems. One victim entity provided us with the
object code to the tool found on its network. On February
18 we made the binaries available to anti-virus companies
(through an industry association) and the Computer Emergency
Response Team (CERT) at Carnegie Mellon University for analysis
and so that commercial vendors could create or adjust their
products to detect the new DDOS variant. Given the attention
that DDOS tools have received in recent weeks, there are now
numerous detection and security products to address this threat,
so we determined that we could be most helpful by giving them
the necessary code rather than deploying a detection tool
ourselves.
Unfortunately, the warnings
that we and others in the security community had issued about
DDOS tools last year, while alerting many potential victims
and reducing the threat, did not eliminate the threat. Quite
frequently, even when a threat is known and patches or detection
tools are available, network operators either remain unaware
of the problem or fail to take necessary protective steps.
In addition, in the cyber equivalent of an arms race, exploits
evolve as hackers design variations to evade or overcome detection
software and filters. Even security-conscious companies that
put in place all available security measures therefore are
not invulnerable. And, particularly with DDOS tools, one organization
might be the victim of a successful attack despite its best
efforts, because another organization failed to take steps
to keep itself from being made the unwitting participant in
an attack.
On February 7, 2000, the NIPC
received reports that Yahoo had experienced a denial of service
attack. In a display of the close cooperative relationship
that we have developed with the private sector, in the days
that followed, several other companies (including Cable News
Network, eBay, Amazon.com, Buy.com, and ZDNET), also reported
denial of service outages to the NIPC or FBI field offices.
These companies cooperated with us by providing critical logs
and other information. Still, the challenges to apprehending
the suspects are substantial. In many cases, the attackers
used "spoofed" IP addresses, meaning that the address
that appeared on the target's log was not the true address
of the system that sent the messages. In addition, many victims
do not keep complete network logs.
The resources required in an
investigation of this type are substantial. Companies have
been victimized or used as "hop sites" in numerous
places across the country, meaning that we must deploy special
agents nationwide to work leads. We currently have seven FBI
field offices with cases opened and all the remaining offices
are supporting the offices that have opened cases. Agents
from these offices are following up literally hundreds of
leads. The NIPC is coordinating the nationwide investigative
effort, performing technical analysis of logs from victims
sites and Internet Service Providers (ISPs), and providing
all-source analytical assistance to field offices. Moreover,
parts of the evidentiary trail have led overseas, requiring
us to work with our foreign counterparts in several countries
through our Legal Attaches (Legats) in U.S. embassies.
While the crime may be high
tech, investigating it involves a substantial amount of traditional
investigative work as well as highly technical work. Interviews
of network operators and confidential sources can provide
very useful information, which leads to still more interviews
and leads to follow-up. And victim sites and ISPs provide
an enormous amount of log information that needs to be processed
and analyzed by human analysts.
Despite these challenges, I
am optimistic that the hard work of our agents, analysts,
and computer scientists; the excellent cooperation and collaboration
we have with private industry and universities; and the teamwork
we are engaged in with foreign partners will in the end prove
successful.
Interagency Cooperation
The broad spectrum of cyber
threats described earlier, ranging from hacking to foreign
espionage and information warfare, requires not just new technologies
and skills on the part of investigators, but new organizational
constructs as well. In most cyber attacks, the identity, location,
and objective of the perpetrator are not immediately apparent.
Nor is the scope of his attack -- i.e., whether an intrusion
is isolated or part of a broader pattern affecting numerous
targets. This means it is often impossible to determine at
the outset if an intrusion is an act of cyber vandalism, organized
crime, domestic or foreign terrorism, economic or traditional
espionage, or some form of strategic military attack. The
only way to determine the source, nature, and scope of the
incident is to gather information from the victim sites and
intermediate sites such as ISPs and telecommunications carriers.
Under our constitutional system, such information typically
can be gathered only pursuant to criminal investigative authorities.
This is why the NIPC is part of the FBI, allowing us to utilize
the FBI's legal authorities to gather and retain information
and to act on it, consistent with constitutional and statutory
requirements.
But the dimension and varied
nature of the threats also means that this is an issue that
concerns not just the FBI and law enforcement agencies, but
also the Department of Defense, the Intelligence Community,
and civilian agencies with infrastructure-focused responsibility
such as the Departments of Energy and Transportation. It also
is a matter that greatly affects state and local law enforcement.
This is why the NIPC is an interagency center, with representatives
detailed to the FBI from numerous federal agencies and representation
from state and local law enforcement as well. These representatives
operate under the direction and authority of the FBI, but
bring with them expertise and skills from their respective
home agencies that enable better coordination and cooperation
among all relevant agencies, consistent with applicable laws.
Let me stress in particular
the very close working relationship that we have established
with the Department of Defense. Since the NIPC's founding
in February 1998 -- due in considerable part to the leadership
of Deputy Secretary of Defense Hamre and Assistant Secretary
of Defense Art Money -- DoD has been our close partner and
consistent supporter. The Deputy Director of the NIPC is a
civilian detailee from the Office of the Secretary of Defense;
the Assistant Section Chief of our Computer Investigations
and Operations Section is a civilian law enforcement official
form the Air Force Office of Special Investigations; the Chief
of our Watch and Warning Unit is a detailee from the U.S.
Army; and our Military Liaison is a detailee from the U.S.
Navy. In addition, we have program managers, watchstanders,
investigators, and analysts detailed from several other DoD
components including the National Security Agency, the Defense
Criminal Intelligence Service, the Air Intelligence Agency,
and the Naval Criminal Intelligence Service. We are currently
working with the Department's leadership to bolster and solidify
DoD's participation in the NIPC.
The DoD relationship is so important
to us for several reasons. First, DoD is all too often a target
for cyber attacks, and DoD's presence in the Center ensures
that we can work closely with DoD investigative components
in responding to such attacks. Second, if a major cyber attack
should occur, the NIPC and FBI would be responsible for gathering
information within the U.S., pursuant to the FBI's criminal
investigative or foreign counterintelligence authorities.
Only with such information would it be possible for us collectively
to determine whether we were seeing a state-sponsored attack,
in which case the National Command Authority might determine
that a military or some other offensive response were appropriate,
or a criminal attack warranting a law enforcement response.
Third, DoD, through its investigative and its intelligence
components, often has critical information that is invaluable
to our ability to perform the NIPC's indications and warning
mission. Combining DoD's information with other information
(from open sources, industry sources, FBI investigations,
or intelligence sources) allows us to see the fullest possible
picture of ongoing activity or threats and to make a collective
judgment about what we are seeing.
In addition to the DoD detailees
who work with at the Center, the NIPC works very closely with
DoD through our liaison with Major General John Campbell and
the Joint Task Force - Computer Network Defense (JTF-CND).
NIPC investigators stay in close contact with their JTF-CND
counterparts, providing mutual assistance on intrusion cases
into DoD systems, as well as other matters. NIPC alerts, warnings
and advisories are coordinated with the JTF-CND. We expect
that this relationship will continue and grow to include a
close working relationship with U.S. Space Command now that
it has been assigned the Computer Network Defense mission.
Two recent cases illustrate
the depth and breadth of our inter-agency cooperation, particularly
with DoD.
Solar Sunrise. The "Solar Sunrise" case is another
example of close teamwork with other agencies. In 1998, computer
intrusions into U.S. military computer systems occurred during
the Iraq weapons inspection crisis. Hackers exploited known
vulnerabilities in Sun Solaris operating systems. Some of
the intrusions appeared to be coming from the Middle East.
The timing, nature, and apparent source of some of the attacks
raised concerns in the Pentagon and elsewhere that this could
be a concerted effort by Iraq to interfere with U.S. troop
deployments. NIPC coordinated a multi-agency investigation
which included the FBI, the Air Force Office of Special Investigations,
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Department
of Justice, the Defense Information Systems Agency, the National
Security Agency, and the Central Intelligence Agency. Within
several days, the investigation determined that the intrusions
were not the work of Iraq, but of several teenagers in the
U.S. and Israel. Two juveniles in California pleaded guilty
to the intrusions, and several Israelis still await trial.
The leader of the Israeli group, Ehud Tenenbaum, has been
indicted and is currently scheduled for trial in Israel in
April. In addition to proving the necessity and value of close
interagency coordination by the NIPC in this type of investigation,
Solar Sunrise also demonstrated why it is necessary to gather
information from victims and other sites within the U.S. pursuant
to applicable legal authorities before making conclusions
about the likely identity of the attacker and determining
what response to take.
Moonlight Maze. More recently, we observed a series
of intrusions into numerous Department of Defense and other
federal government computer networks and private sector entities.
Investigation last year determined that the intrusions appear
to have originated in Russia. The intruder successfully accessed
U.S. Government networks and took large amounts of unclassified
but sensitive information, including defense technical research
information. The NIPC coordinated a multi-agency investigation,
working closely with FBI field offices, the Department of
Defense, and the Intelligence Community. While I cannot go
into more detail about this case here, it demonstrates the
very real threat we face in the cyber realm, and the need
for good teamwork and coordination among government agencies
responsible for responding to the threat.
Private Sector Cooperation
Our success in battling cyber
crime also depends on close cooperation with private industry.
This is the case for several reasons. First, most of the victims
of cyber crimes are private companies. Therefore, successful
investigation and prosecution of cyber crimes depends on private
victims reporting incidents to law enforcement and cooperating
with the investigators. Contrary to press statements by companies
offering security services that private companies won't share
information with law enforcement, private companies have reported
incidents and threats to the NIPC or FBI field offices. The
number of victims who have voluntarily reported DDOS attacks
to us over the last few weeks is ample proof of this. While
there are undoubtedly companies that would prefer not to report
a crime because of fear of public embarrassment over a security
lapse, the situation has improved markedly. Companies increasingly
realize that deterrence of crime depends on effective law
enforcement, and that the long-term interests of industry
depend on establishing a good working relationship with government
to prevent and investigate crime.
Testimony two weeks ago before
the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee for Commerce, State,
and Justice by Robert Chesnut, Associate General Counsel for
E-bay, illustrates this point:
Prior to last week's attacks,
eBay had established a close working relationship with the
computer crimes squad within the Northern California office
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI").
E-Bay has long recognized that the best way to combat cyber
crime, whether it's fraud or hacking, is by working cooperatively
with law enforcement. Therefore, last year we established
procedures for notifying the FBI in the event of such an attack
on our web site. As result of this preparation, we were able
to contact the FBI computer intrusion squad during the attack
and provide them with information that we expect will assist
in their investigation. In the aftermath of the attack, eBay
has also been able to provide the FBI with additional leads
that have come to our attention.
Second, the network administrator
at a victim company or ISP is critical to the success of an
investigation. Only that administrator knows the unique configuration
of her system, and she typically must work with an investigator
to find critical transactional data that will yield evidence
of a criminal's activity.
Third, the private sector has
the technical expertise that is often critical to resolving
an investigation. It would be impossible for us to retain
experts in every possible operating system or network configuration,
so private sector assistance is critical. In addition, many
investigations require the development of unique technical
tools to deal with novel problems. Private sector assistance
has been critical there as well.
To encourage private sector
cooperation, we have engaged in a concerted outreach effort
to private industry, providing threat briefings, issuing analyses
and threat warnings, and speaking at industry conferences.
In another example of cooperation, the Attorney General and
the Information Technology Association of America announced
a set of initiatives last year as part of a "Cybercitizens
Partnership" between the government and the information
technology (IT) industry. One initiative involves providing
IT industry representatives to serve in the NIPC to enhance
our technical expertise and our understanding of the information
and communications infrastructure.
We have several other initiatives
devoted to private sector outreach that bear mentioning here.
The first is called "InfraGard." This is an initiative
that we have developed in concert with private companies and
academia to encourage information-sharing about cyber intrusions,
exploited vulnerabilities, and physical infrastructure threats.
A vital component of InfraGard is the ability of industry
to provide information on intrusions to the local FBI field
office using secure e-mail communications in both a "sanitized"
and detailed format. The local FBI field offices can, if appropriate,
use the detailed version to initiate an investigation; while
NIPC Headquarters can analyze that information in conjunction
with other information we obtain to determine if the intrusion
is part of a broader attack on numerous sites. The NIPC can
simultaneously use the sanitized version to inform other members
of the intrusion without compromising the confidentiality
of the reporting company. The key to this system is that whether,
and what, to report is entirely up to the reporting company.
A secure web site also contains a variety of analytic and
warning products that we make available to the InfraGard community.
The success of InfraGard is premised on the notion that sharing
is a two-way street: the NIPC will provide threat information
that companies can use to protect their systems, while companies
will provide incident information that can be used to initiate
an investigation and to warn other companies.
Our Key Asset Initiative (KAI)
is focused more specifically on the owners and operators of
critical components of each of the infrastructure sectors.
It facilitates response to threats and incidents by building
liaison and communication links with the owners and operators
of individual companies and enabling contingency planning.
The KAI began in the 1980s and focused on physical vulnerabilities
to terrorism. Under the NIPC, the KAI has been reinvigorated
and expanded to focus on cyber vulnerabilities as well. The
KAI currently involves determining which assets are key within
the jurisdiction of each FBI Field Office and obtaining 24-hour
points of contact at each asset in cases of emergency. Eventually,
if future resources permit, the initiative will include the
development of contingency plans to respond to attacks on
each asset, exercises to test response plans, and modeling
to determine the effects of an attack on particular assets.
FBI field offices are responsible for developing a list of
the assets within their respective jurisdictions, while the
NIPC maintains the national database. The KAI is being developed
in coordination with DOD and other agencies. Currently the
database has about 2400 entries. This represents 2400 contacts
with key private sector nodes made by the NIPC and FBI field
offices.
A third initiative is a pilot
program we have begun with the North American Electrical Reliability
Council (NERC). Under the pilot program, electric utility
companies and other power entities transmit cyber incident
reports in near real time to the NIPC. These reports are analyzed
and assessed to determine whether an NIPC warning, alert,
or advisory is warranted. Electric power participants in the
pilot program have stated that the information and analysis
provided by the NIPC back to the power companies fully justify
their participation in the program. It is our expectation
that the Electrical Power Indications and Warning System will
provide a full-fledged model for the other critical infrastructures.
Much has been said over the last few years about the importance
of information sharing. Since our founding, the NIPC has been
actively engaged in building concrete mechanisms and initiatives
to make this sharing a reality, and we have built up a track
record of actually sharing useful information. These efforts
belie the notions that private industry won't share with law
enforcement in this area, or that the government won't provide
meaningful threat data to industry. As companies continue
to gain experience in dealing with the NIPC and FBI field
offices, as we continue to provide them with important and
useful threat information, and as companies recognize that
cyber crime requires a joint effort by industry and government
together, we will continue to make real progress in this area.
Meeting the Growing Cyber
Threat
As Internet use continues to
soar, the number of cyber attacks is also increasing exponentially.
Our case load reflects this growth. In FY 1998, we opened
547 computer intrusion cases; in FY 1999, that number jumped
to 1154. Similarly, the number of pending cases increased
from 206 at the end of FY 1997, to 601 at the end of FY 1998,
to 834 at the end of FY 99, and to over 900 currently. These
statistics include only computer intrusion cases, and do not
account for computer facilitated crimes such as Internet fraud,
child pornography, or e-mail extortion efforts. In these cases,
the NIPC and NIPCI squads often provide technical assistance
to traditional investigative programs responsible for these
categories of crime.
We can clearly expect these
upward trends to continue, and for the threats to become more
serious. While insiders, hackers, and criminal groups make
up much of our case load at the moment, we can anticipate
a growing number of national security cases in the near future.
To meet this challenge, we must ensure that we have adequate
resources, including both personnel and equipment, both at
the NIPC and in FBI field offices. We currently have 193 agents
nationwide dedicated to investigating computer intrusion and
virus cases. In order to maximize investigative resources
the FBI has taken the approach of creating regional squads
in 16 field offices that have sufficient size to work complex
intrusion cases and to assist those field offices without
a NIPCI squad. In those field offices without squads, the
FBI is building a baseline capability by having one or two
agents to work NIPC matters, i.e. computer intrusions (criminal
and national security), viruses, InfraGard, state and local
liaison, etc.
At the NIPC, we currently have
101 personnel on board, including 82 FBI employees and 19
detailees from other government agencies. This cadre of investigators,
computer scientists, and analysts perform the numerous and
complex tasks outlined above, and provide critical coordination
and support to field office investigations. As the crime problem
grows, we need to make sure that we keep pace by bringing
on board additional personnel, including from other agencies
and the private sector.
In addition to putting in place
the requisite number of agents, analysts, and computer scientists
in the NIPC and in FBI field offices, we must fill those positions
by recruiting and retaining personnel who have the appropriate
technical, analytical, and investigative skills. This includes
personnel who can read and analyze complex log files, perform
all-source analysis to look for correlations between events
or attack signatures and glean indications of a threat, develop
technical tools to address the constantly changing technological
environment, and conduct complex network investigations. There
is a very tight market for information technology professionals.
The Federal Government needs to be able to recruit the very
best people into its programs. Fortunately, we can offer exciting,
cutting-edge work in this area and can offer agents, analysts,
and computer scientists the opportunities to work on issues
that no one else addresses, and to make a difference to our
national security and public safety. In addition, Congress
provided the FBI with a pilot program that exempts certain
technical personnel from the Title V civil service rules,
which allows us to pay more competitive salaries and recruit
and retain top notch personnel. Unfortunately, this pilot
is scheduled to expire in November unless extended.
Training and continuing education
are also critical, and we have made this a top priority at
the NIPC. In FY 1999, we trained 383 FBI and other-government-agency
students in NIPC sponsored training classes on network investigations
and infrastructure protection. The emphasis for 2000 is on
continuing to train federal personnel while expanding training
opportunities for state and local law enforcement personnel.
During FY 2000, we plan to train approximately 740 personnel
from the FBI, other federal agencies, and state and local
law enforcement.
Developing and deploying the best equipment in support of
the mission is also very important. Not only do investigators
and analysts need the best equipment to conduct investigations
in the rapidly evolving cyber system but the NIPC must be
on the cutting edge of cyber research and development. Conducting
a network intrusion or denial-of-service investigation often
requires analysis of voluminous amounts of data. For example,
one network intrusion case involving an espionage matter currently
being investigated has required the analysis of 17.5 Terabytes
of data. To place this into perspective, the entire collection
of the Library of Congress, if digitized, would comprise only
10 Terabytes. The Yahoo DDOS attack involved approximately
630 Gigabytes of data, which is equivalent to enough printed
pages to fill 630 pickup trucks with paper. Technical analysis
requires high capacity equipment to store, process, analyze,
and display data. Again, as the crime problem grows, we must
ensure that our technical capacity keeps pace. We are also
working closely with other agencies to ensure that we leverage
existing resources to the fullest extent possible.
Challenges in Combating Cyber Intrusions
The burgeoning problem of cyber
intrusions, viruses, and denial of service attacks poses unique
challenges to both the NIPC and the Defense Department. These
challenges require novel solutions, close teamwork among agencies
and with the private sector, and adequate human and technical
resources.
Identifying the Intruder. One major difficulty that distinguishes cyber
threats from physical threats is determining who is attacking
your system, why, how, and from where. This difficulty stems
from the ease with which individuals can hide or disguise
their tracks by manipulating logs and directing their attacks
through networks in many countries before hitting their ultimate
target. The "Solar Sunrise" case illustrates this
point. This will continue to pose a problem as long as the
Internet remains rife with vulnerabilities and allows easy
anonymity and concealment.
Jurisdictional Issues. Another significant challenge we face is intrusions
involving multiple jurisdictions. A typical investigation
involves victim sites in multiple states and often many countries.
This is the case even when the hacker and victim are both
located in the United States. In the United States, we can
subpoena records, engage in judicially approved electronic
surveillance, and execute search warrants on suspects' homes,
seize evidence, and examine it. We can do none of those things
ourselves overseas; rather, we depend on the local authorities
to assist us. In some cases the local police forces simply
do not understand or cannot cope with the technology. In other
cases, these nations simply do not have laws against computer
intrusions and are therefore limited in their ability to help
us. FBI Legal Attaches in 35 embassies abroad provide critical
help in building bridges with local law enforcement to enhance
cooperation on cyber crime and in working leads on investigations.
As the Internet spreads to even more countries, we will see
greater demands placed on the Legats to support computer crime
investigations. The NIPC also has held international computer
crime conferences and offered cyber crime training classes
to foreign law enforcement officials to develop liaison contacts
and bring these officials up to speed on cyber crime issues.
The most difficult situation
will arise, however, in which a foreign country with interests
adverse to our own simply refuses to cooperate. In such a
situation, we could find that an investigation is stymied
unless we find an alternative method of tracing the activity
back to its source.
Conclusion
I want to thank the subcommittee again for giving me the opportunity
to testify here today. The cyber threat is real, multifarious,
and growing. The NIPC is moving aggressively to meet this
challenge by training investigators and analysts to investigate
computer intrusion cases, equipping them with the latest technology,
developing our analytic capabilities and warning mechanisms
to head off or mitigate attacks, and closely cooperating with
the private sector. A close partnership with DoD will remain
vital to our success. We have already made considerable progress
in developing our capabilities to protect public safety and
national security in the Information Age. I look forward to
working with Congress to ensure that we continue to be able
to meet the threat as it evolves and grows. Thank you.
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