Testimony of Section Chief Timothy D. Bereznay, FBI
Before the House
International Relations Committee
May 11, 2000
"State Department Security Issues"
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman,
and Members of the Committee, I am pleased to appear before
you today to discuss State Department security issues of concern
to this Committee. I will be as forthcoming as possible, given
the sensitive and classified nature of aspects of the information
requested by the Committee.
Concerning the missing State
Department laptop computer, I want to ensure the Committee
that the FBI's investigation of the missing computer is being
afforded the highest FBI priority. As you are aware, I am
prohibited from discussing the matter further as it is the
subject of a pending criminal investigation.
The Committee has asked that
I comment on the sufficiency of State Department security
procedures in connection with the bugging of the 7th floor
conference room by the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service.
The FBI was asked by State Department in late August 1999,
to conduct an environmental technical survey, in other words
a review of neighboring properties to determine whether a
hostile intelligence service might have acquired such property.
This survey was specifically requested in connection with
pending renovations at the Department. We were also pleased
to have our Washington Field Office work with the Office of
Diplomatic Security in 1998 to survey access to State Department
by Russian intelligence officers. Beyond these narrow surveys,
conducted with or at the request of State Department, the
FBI was not called upon to review physical security procedures
at the Department. Those matters were, however, addressed
by the Office of the Inspector General in its September 1999,
report.
The FBI believes the State Department
acted swiftly during August 1999, to limit the number of unescorted
foreign nationals visiting State Department following the
discovery of the listening device in the seventh floor State
Department conference room. On August 23, 1999, the State
Department implemented policy that requires all foreign nationals
to be escorted within the building at all times. As noted
by the Committee, there is an exception for foreign media
correspondents issued unique but permanent badges that allow
unescorted entry, without passing through metal detectors.
There is reportedly an understanding
the media is not to go above the second floor, where the press
office is located. This exception affords unescorted access
to the State Department by a number of known foreign service
intelligence officers. The FBI does not customarily provide
other agencies, to include the State Department, with lists
of intelligence officer identities, to protect both sensitive
cases and sources, unless there is specific reason or if asked.
If asked, the FBI would be willing to identify to the State
Department permanent media badge holders identified as hostile
intelligence officers so that their access could be restricted
or their visits monitored.
Historically, hostile intelligence
services have utilized media cover for intelligence activities
in the United States. However, because intelligence officers
under media cover do not have diplomatic immunity, they normally
perform in-depth but overt intelligence collection. Clandestine
handling of agents or other covert activity is usually assigned
to intelligence officers under diplomatic cover. In addition
to overt intelligence collection, intelligence officers under
correspondent cover have been engaged in active measures campaigns
designed to support their national interests and to influence
United States policy makers. Active measures campaigns take
the form of oral persuasions or the dissemination of written
information favorable to their national policy--both of which
are facilitated by intelligence officers under media cover.
Hostile intelligence services use active measures as an inexpensive
and relatively low-risk way to advance their international
positions.
Over the last fifteen years,
no foreign intelligence service officer under media cover
has been declared persona non grata for engaging in espionage
activities. This is attributed, as I previously noted, to
the fact that these officers are not accredited diplomatic
immunity, and thus normally do not engage in clandestine agent-handling
activities subject to interdiction.
With respect to your inquiry
regarding the use of laptop computers, the FBI uses only specified
laptop computers that carry appropriate safeguards for classified
data, to include both use of passwords and encryption. These
laptops are maintained by automation personnel and are available
for short period loans to FBI employees. The laptop computers
are periodically examined and the stored information purged;
when they are turned in by one employee, and before being
loaned to another individual, the hard drive is purged and
reprogrammed. The laptop computers are also subjected to an
audit and forensic checks to ensure they have not been compromised.
The FBI views the protection
of classified information in a computer environment as a problem
that is not unique to the State Department. It is a security
issue that will continue to present problems to all members
of the Intelligence Community.
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