Madam Chairwoman and members of the Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to discuss with you the FBI's critical role in support of domestic preparedness. As the witnesses who have come before me have testified, this is an extraordinarily complex issue but one vital to the safety of our citizens and those sworn to protect them.

We share the concerns of the Committee. There must be cohesive coordination at all levels and the efficient application of scarce resources and training in a manner that adequately prepares our first responders, whatever size community they protect, to deal with both the crisis and consequence of a major terrorist incident.

Right now we are fortunate. The probability of a catastrophic attack such as a nuclear event remains low, but the consequence of one could be unimaginably severe. To the FBI, this translates into the luxury of our country being able to adequately prepare, but it also vividly highlights the magnitude and breadth of preparation required.

In response to these very concerns, in the fall of 1998, the Attorney General met with various representatives of the state and local preparedness community, those emergency and public service employees appropriately known as the "stakeholders." Just as you have, Madam Chairwoman, we listened to the concerns of the first responder community about the very real need for coordination of federal preparedness programs and for information about these programs. Like you have heard, the stakeholders recommended that a single office be established to coordinate the often confusing myriad of federal assistance and training programs available to state and local domestic preparedness personnel.

The response came quickly. The Attorney General, along with relevant agencies and components like the FBI, in December developed the first ever "Five Year Interagency Counterterrorism and Technology Crime Plan," thus the long-term plan was put in place.

More relevant to your hearing today, the Attorney General instructed that the FBI, in coordination with the Department of Justice, establish the National Domestic Preparedness Office, or NDPO. NDPO has, as its mission, to be a "one-stop shop" for information about domestic preparedness programs and, more importantly, a coordinating office for preparedness programs. All of this, including the broad but firm commitment to standing up NDPO as the coordinating office as the stakeholders requested, is being done in the context of the President's clear guidance in PDD 62, the controlling authority within the Executive Branch.

Congress authorized NDPO approximately six (6) months ago, and we anticipate the first reprogrammed funding of $1.4 million to be approved in the very near future. We worked with both Congress and other agencies to develop a "blue print" that carefully lays out NDPO's central role and its goal of integrating and streamlining government assistance. That blueprint was approved by Congress in December, 1999. These actions, particularly the funding by Congress, are, of course, vital to the ultimate success of this endeavor and we are appreciative of the attention being given to the resource needs of NDPO.

The FBI in late 1998 began its initial preparation in anticipation of a fully functional NDPO. For example, we began assigning staff and space within FBIHQ, as well as initiated garnering the interagency support and agreements critical to the mission's success. A robust information sharing system has been designed and established that facilitates collection and dissemination of information from, to, and among the federal, state and local first responder community. A widely distributed newsletter has been put in place as an effective means to comprehensively share ideas and experiences across the community, and NDPO has issued special bulletins to alert the emergency response community to trends or threats that pertain to domestic preparedness.

NDPO also has effectively capitalized on the burgeoning advantages of the Internet by establishing a "common communications link," an Internet-based, community-wide system that is gathering 100 new users every month. NDPO's web site helps support this common information exchange mechanism.

The information sharing/outreach functional area also coordinated input from the federal, state, and local emergency responder community to develop the "on-scene commander's guide. " The "on-scene commander's guide" is a crisis and consequence management tool designed to assist commanders in the field in assessing options during the first two hours of an incident involving a potential biological or chemical agent. The national interagency civil military institute in San Luis Obispo graciously provided the NDPO with funding to print the "on-scene commander's guide." This product has been enthusiastically received by its target audience. In fact, the NDPO has received requests for thousands of additional guides.

During the past year, members of the state and local emergency response identified potential command and control issues at a weapons of mass destruction site. In response to concerns raised by stakeholders regarding the interface between the FBI's crisis management central control function or Joint Operations Center (JOC) and the Incident Command System, or ICS, utilized by state and local emergency responders, the NDPO coordinated meetings between the federal partners, FEMA's National Fire Academy and the Emergency Management Institute, and state and local agencies to address this issue. These meetings culminated in an exercise held at the National Fire Academy in January 2000. The exercise was successful because it resulted in new recommendations that were specifically helpful in our efforts to integrate federal and state/local resources. The JOC will interface with the ICS at the scene of a WMD incident and evolve into a unified command, without changing existing federal and state/local critical incident management systems. All participants at the exercise concluded that existing federal and state critical incident management systems each had specific purposes and could seamlessly interface at a working incident site.

We share the committee's belief that a national strategy, focused on WMD terrorism domestic preparedness at the state and local level, is needed and it is the responsibility of the federal government to facilitate the development of this strategy. The NDPO, since February, 1999, has facilitated a federal interagency working group which was formed, in part, to address the development of such a strategy. This working group, consisting of representatives from the " big six," has developed a methodology for formulating the national strategy, as well as a framework for the strategy itself. The working group's efforts have not gone beyond this point, however, because of an inability, due to resources, to directly involve representatives from the emergency response disciplines. The NDPO is prepared to facilitate the strategy's development once funds allowing for state and local direct involvement in the process are made available.

Another important development, the standardized equipment list, is a product of the Interagency Board (IAB) for equipment standardization and interoperability, which is co-chaired by the DOD and the FBI, as delegated by the Department of Justice. The IAB is a valuable advisory board to the NDPO, and is comprised of officials from various local, state, and federal government organizations. The IAB effectively hosts an annual process to update the standardized equipment list, the latest iteration of which was just released in April.

Equally important because of the need for standardization of federal training courses, the NDPO has received concurrence from its federal partners for the establishment of a curriculum review panel to ensure that federal training programs appropriately comply with accepted national standards for quality, thus giving local authorities assurance that the training received is of an acceptable level of both content and consistency.

Further, just last week, the Attorney General signed the charter to establish our state and local advisory group. The advisory group will be comprised of state and local first responders, and will offer advice and recommendations to the NDPO based on both state and local preparedness concerns and from a wide range of professional outlooks. Representatives will come from fire/rescue, hazmat, emergency medical and health services, law enforcement, emergency management and state and local governments. This is a particularly vital new development that will substantially increase the voice of local stakeholders.

As the committee has heard, from today's testimony and from us at briefings, standing up NDPO has not been without difficulties. This a first-of-its-kind effort, the magnitude of which has been daunting.

We have learned smaller, less obvious lessons. For example, housing NDPO in FBI Headquarters has proven not to be effective. The security of our building inhibits the easy access to NDPO office space and automation systems by those partners most critical to our success. We are working with Congress to secure common space that not only will facilitate access, but also will give the state and local NDPO participants a closer identity with the endeavor.

There are larger lessons as well. Clearly, the need for formal agreements between federal agencies is critical so that the roles and responsibilities of each are clearly defined and, more importantly, clearly understood by the stakeholders. As you have heard today, as well, the voices of the stakeholders must be better
integrated into the functioning of NDPO. We recognize these problems and are moving to address them through better organization and more responsive leadership.

It is no secret that this is a difficult task. It is both more complex and more expensive than first anticipated. What we all agree on, however, is the importance of the undertaking. Every stakeholder from the small town fireman to the major city police chief, needs to be prepared for the unthinkable.

We believe NDPO can get us there. Any start up of this kind of undertaking will, by its nature, hit rough spots. These are being overcome and, as funding becomes available, the pace will accelerate.

We appreciate this Committee's support and concerns, as well as the support of Congress. The orderly application of available resources is a difficult but reliable process that, with the help of Congress, will succeed.

Finally, I appreciate, as well, the understanding of the Chairwoman that the FBI does not comment on pending legislation. I understand that OMB has concerns about HR4210 that will be forthcoming. These concerns, I understand, focus on potentially duplicative efforts leading to confusion among the stakeholders. In any case, we all appreciate Congress' intense interest in this vital issue.