

Luce in his own peculiar pidgin by some psychological freak infected almost all our journalism, including other magazines, and much of our radio prattle. Whereas 25 years ago newspaper reporters and rewrite hands took pride in the composition of pear-shaped periods and flights of imagery about fires and funerals, the new mode is just as resolutely harsh.

In fact, in those days, when Mencken and Nathan were shooting spitballs at dignity itself, most rewrite men secretly read Mercury and Mencken's original cliches, a little more artful than Nathan's, could be combed out of everything to the left of the goiters and electric belts.

Nothing as horrible as Drew Pearson's jerked-Englised paraphrase of Timestyle would have got past any copy desk and the depth of the decline may be gauged by the fact that this phenomenon may claim, with what truth I do not presume to know, that his merchandise appears in several hundred American dailies.

The name of Percy Hammond will mean nothing even to many Americans who were reading papers in the 'twenties and the 'teens. For some reason he limited himself to the stage and actors and pretty much to impromptus such as reviews done in a feverish hurry. His Sunday specials were longer and finer wrought but his daily standard was a high degree of beauty. Percy also, like Mencken, used what he himself called out-of-town words, but always with marvelous grace and there was hardly a time that any other word would have quite sufficed.

I chanced to call on him at the Algonquin with the Grantland Rices one evening not long after he was left desolate by the death of his wife. He was sopping wet and there was a whole bowl of cigarette butts on the bed table. His son, John, was staring out the window, helpless for Percy was actually thru with life.

He plainly had pneumonia and when I made some stupid remark about his getting well and writing more beautiful copy he said, "I don't want to get well and I don't want to write another word." They put him in a hospital and he died in a couple of days. I heard he wrote hard, which is true of most successful hands altho Broun just played the typewriter like a professor in a honky-tonk and out came limpid literature, much of it good satire and whimsy.

No speech of Churchill's ever will be mistaken for any of Roosevelt's factory-made banalities because Churchill takes pride in his skill and kept himself inimitable. His voice and diction enforced his language, even tho he does suffer from a mushy imperfection of speech, but he has had no rival in our day. But leave us never forget that he sent the Black and Tans to Ireland.

[Copyright, 1953, King Features Syndicate, Inc.]



**Federal Bureau of Investigation  
United States Department of Justice  
San Francisco 2, California  
January 25, 1954**

- Mr. Tolson
- Mr. Ladd
- Mr. Nichols
- Mr. Belmont
- Mr. Clegg
- Mr. Glavin
- Mr. Harbo
- Mr. Rosen
- Mr. Tracy
- Mr. Mohr
- Mr. Trotter
- Mr. Winterrowd
- Tele. Room
- Mr. Holloman
- Miss Gandy

IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO  
FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_

PERSONAL

Mr. John Edgar Hoover  
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

<sup>0</sup>  
WINSTON CHURCHILL

*W. J. ...*

While in Monterey, California, last week, I visited [redacted] who is the [redacted] the Del Monte Properties and is [redacted] the famous inventor.

[redacted] recounted that he had had a visit the previous evening with Mr. Winthrop Aldrich, United States Ambassador to England, who has been visiting friends and relatives here in California.

The observations of Aldrich have probably come to the Bureau's attention from other sources, but for whatever worth or interest it may have, Aldrich is reported to have informed some of his close friends in strictest confidence that the recent illness of Prime Minister Churchill was a most serious and harrowing one. The illness was in the nature of a stroke that temporarily paralyzed one of the Prime Minister's arms and made it difficult for him to speak. However, Aldrich has advised that he has made an almost miraculous recovery. At the time it was thought the Prime Minister would have to resign, but it is now Aldrich's belief that the Prime Minister has recovered so completely, he will neither resign nor retire, but will carry on, and, as he has put it in his own words, if he has anything to say about it, would prefer to "die in harness."

The Prime Minister's health, according to Mr. Aldrich, was of very special concern also because of the fact that the heir to the leadership of the Conservative Party, Mr. Anthony Eden, was also then very seriously ill. Mr. Aldrich told his friends that Mr. EDEN has also made a very astounding recovery and is regaining good health rapidly. Aldrich pointed out that the seriousness of the illness of both of these men had to be kept as closely guarded a secret as possible in the British Isles, in order that the Laborites would not attempt to overturn the present government, which has a slim voting majority.

Mr. Aldrich is also supposed to have told his audience that England has made very substantial progress under the leadership of the Conservatives, and is in a much strengthened financial position over its position a year or two ago.

WMW:ebn

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
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Director, FBI, from SAC, San Francisco

1-25-54

Aldrich is also supposed to have been very optimistic about the economic outlook for the immediate future of this country. On the international outlook, Aldrich is reported to have advised his listeners that there was less chance of war with Russia today than there has been in the recent past, and that Russia was completely afraid of the might of this country.

Yours sincerely,



WILLIAM M. WHELAN  
Special Agent in Charge

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT *WHS*

DATE: March 15, 1954

FROM : MR. V. P. KEAY *PKA*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER WINSTON CHURCHILL

- Tolson —
- Ladd —
- Belmont —
- Clegg —
- Glavin —
- Harbo —
- Rosen —
- Tracy —
- Gearty —
- Mohr —
- Winterrowd —
- Tele. Ro —
- Holloman —
- Sizoo —
- Miss Gandy —



ACTION:

None. For your information.

*refer to another copy*

*GRE*

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*3*  
MAR 26 1954

# Resignation From 2 Posts Is Accepted By Queen

Sir Winston Plans  
- Sicilian Vacation;  
British Election  
Likely on May 26

By Frazer Wighton  
Reuters

LONDON, April 5.—Sir Winston Churchill tonight resigned as Prime Minister—a reluctant surrender to his 80 years.

The elderly statesman, in a polka-dot bow tie, old-fashioned frock coat and zip-fastened shoes stood before 28-year-old Queen Elizabeth II in a room at Buckingham Palace and asked to be relieved of his burdensome office.

Moist-eyed crowds outside shouted "good old Winnie" and the British Broadcasting Corporation broke into a children's hour program for a special announcement of Churchill's retirement.

But there were no newspapers to blaze banner lines about the man who has probably made more headlines for them than any other in this century. A strike of 600 maintenance workers has hushed London's presses for the last 12 days.

The young sovereign, under whose great-great-grandmother, Queen Victoria, Churchill began his 55-year career of public service as a cavalry officer, sadly accepted his resignation in a 40-minute audience.

Churchill officially recommended that she appoint Foreign Secretary Sir Anthony Eden as his successor. She is expected to summon the 57-year-old Eden to the palace Wednesday and ask him to serve as her new Prime Minister.

Eden is expected to call a general election soon to secure national approval of his succession. Forecasts now claim the election will be May 26.

A one-sentence palace announcement told the resignation story. It said: "the Right Honorable Sir Winston Churchill had an audience of the Queen this evening and tendered his resignation as Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury, which Her Majesty was graciously pleased to accept."

As the reports spread, crowds turned toward 10 Downing Street, home of English Prime  
See CHURCHILL, Pg. 17, Col. 1

- Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Boardman \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Parsons \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Sizoo \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Holloman \_\_\_\_\_
- Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

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*Reagan*

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- Wash. Post and Times Herald \_\_\_\_\_
- Wash. News \_\_\_\_\_
- Wash. Star \_\_\_\_\_
- N. Y. Herald Tribune \_\_\_\_\_
- N. Y. Mirror \_\_\_\_\_
- Date: APR 6 1955

274  
APR 12 1955

# Eyes Misty With Tears, Churchill Bows Out at 80

**CHURCHILL—Fr. Pg. 1**

Ministers since 1735, and toward Buckingham Palace.

Churchill appeared at the door of Number 10 at 4:23 p. m. He stood beaming, cigar in hand, and doffed his top hat to the crowds before stepping into his limousine for the short ride to the palace. He carried his favorite gold-topped cane.

He was leaning back and still smoking his cigar when his car drove past saluting sentries into the palace courtyard. An equerry conducted him immediately to the Queen's apartments.

The late afternoon sun shone in through the tall windows as he bent his bulky figure and kissed her hand. Then, in rounded sentences, he spoke of his age and his desire that the leadership of the government should pass to a younger man.

Just as formally, though she well knew the answer in advance, Elizabeth asked Churchill to recommend a successor and he named Eden.

The momentous occasion—from his departure to his return to Downing Street—took only an hour.

The United Press reported Churchill returned to No. 10 Downing street and stood, old and mute, with tears brimming in his eyes as he received the cheers of a throng which

pressed about him to bid him farewell.]

In theory the Queen then pondered the advice Churchill gave her about his successor.

## Stays in Parliament

Officials made it clear tonight Churchill intends to continue as a member of Parliament, representing his constituency of Woodford, near London. They discouraged the suggestion he might accept some non-departmental post in Eden's new government.

On his return from the Palace tonight, Churchill met all his senior ministers in the cabinet room of 10 Downing Street to say goodbye. He will send a personal letter of farewell to the junior members of his government.

He will go to Chartwell, his country home in Kent, Wednesday evening staying there until he leaves for a vacation in Sicily next Tuesday.

Churchill has been Prime Minister for a total of eight years, seven months and 25 days—including five years as the nation's leader in World War II.

Friends say Churchill felt capable of carrying on the administration of government for some time to come. But he agreed to retire, they said, so the Conservatives could fight the election without uncertainty about his future health or

his personal plans marring their chances of victory.

[Even before Churchill resigned, the New York Daily News Service reported, the Laborites began needling the Conservatives in Commons. "Can we be told," asked Laborite M. P. Emrys, "if the government is going to be allowed to bury Caesar in the House of Lords, or is he going to be allowed to come back here to worry Anthony?"

[This was reference to speculation that Churchill might be named to the House of Lords. Actually, he has declined the peerage.]

It was understood Churchill also was persuaded by his wife, doctors and close friends to cast off his burdens. If his body is physically tired, his mind at least is still spry—as he has shown by quick-witted replies in recent parliamentary debates.

The statesman leaves office with his greatest ambition unfulfilled—to meet Russia's leaders in a bid to bring permanent peace to the world. Political quarters predict that from behind the scenes he will still go on working on this dream—even though he would no longer represent Britain at a top-level conference.

Churchill's resignation automatically involved that of his government. When his successor announces the new administration, it is probable that most of the ministers who served Churchill will retain their posts.

## Choice of Foreign Secretary

One decision before Eden is the choice of a successor as Foreign Secretary. Harold Macmillan, 61, until now Defense Minister, is favored. Another possibility is Selwyn Lloyd, 50, Supply Minister and an Eden protege, who was formerly Eden's deputy at the Foreign Office.

No matter who is chosen, there will be little change in British foreign policy as mapped out by Eden during his last 3½ years in office.

In the last year Eden has been credited with numerous successes in the international arena. It was partly due to his negotiating skill that war ended in Indochina. He settled the bitter feud between Britain and Egypt over the British army bases in the Suez canal.

After France had rejected the European Defense Community treaty, he found a new way through the Paris and London agreements to bring a rearmed Germany into Western defense.

A crowd of 1000, mainly homeward-bound office workers, swirled around No. 10 Downing Street this evening—and burst into a roar of cheering when the retiring Prime Minister emerged for a private visit.

## Dozens of burly policemen

had to hold back the crowd, which surged forward to greet Churchill and slowed his black limousine to a crawl. The spectators were still there when Churchill, dressed in the same costume he wore to the palace, returned an hour later. They sang and cheered as he gave the famous V-sign and chanted "We want Winnie" until he reappeared later at an opened window and gave the sign 11 times.

By then, Churchill had changed from formal attire and was wearing one of the one-piece "siren suits" he became fond of during World War II.

Late tonight, a crowd of 200 still waited outside his residence singing "For He's a Jolly Good Fellow" and calling hopefully "Come on, Winnie."

Mr. Tolson ✓  
 Mr. Boardman ✓  
 Mr. Nichols ✓  
 Mr. Belmont ✓  
 Mr. Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Parsons \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Sizoo \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

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 DATE 9/11/81 BY SP5 RJS/ML

(CHURCHILL)

LONDON--SIR WINSTON SPENCER CHURCHILL, WHO FOUGHT AND DEFEATED EVERY ENEMY SAVE THE UNYIELDING TOLL OF TIME, PRESENTED HIS RESIGNATION AS PRIME MINISTER OF GREAT BRITAIN TO THE QUEEN TODAY.

HIS SUCCESSOR AS PRIME MINISTER WILL BE SIR ANTHONY EDEN.

THESE FACTS WERE LEARNED UNOFFICIALLY, TWO HOURS BEFORE A 6:30 P.M. (1:30 P.M. EST) FORMAL ANNOUNCEMENT FROM NO. 10 DOWNING STREET MAKES IT OFFICIAL THAT CHURCHILL HAS QUIT.

THE MAGNIFICENT OLD MAN, WEIGHTED BY THE 80 YEARS OF A LIFE THAT HELPED MOULD AN EMPIRE AND FASHION THE SHAPE OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION, DROVE ALONE ON HIS LAST OFFICIAL TRIP TO BUCKINGHAM PALACE.

FOR CHURCHILL IT WAS THE WINTER OF A LIFETIME OF ACHIEVEMENT SELDOM MATCHED, AND EXCEEDED BY FEW.

BUT TIME AND AGE CAME TOGETHER AT 4:30 P.M. (11:30 A.M. EST) ON THIS WARM AND TRANQUIL DAY IN SPRING TO BRING HIS STEWARDSHIP TO AN END.

HE QUIT QUIETLY AND WITH SADNESS AT THE END OF A FINAL 24 HOURS AS PRIME MINISTER THAT WERE FILLED WITH DEEP EMOTION AND RICH AFFECTION.

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58 APR 12 1955

WASHINGTON CITY NEWS SERVICE

- Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Boardman \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Parsons \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Sizoo \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Holloman \_\_\_\_\_
- Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

ADD CHURCHLL, LONDON

SIR WINSTON CHURCHILL, THE GRAND OLD MAN OF EMPIRE, OFFICIALLY  
RESIGNED AS PRIME MINISTER OF GREAT BRITAIN.

4/5--EG1235P



- Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Boardman \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Parsons \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Sizoo \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Holloman \_\_\_\_\_
- Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

WADD CHURCHILL LONDON  
 TEARS GLISTENED IN HIS EYES AS HE PRESENTED HIS RESIGNATION TO THE  
 QUEEN.

SIR ANTHONY EDEN WILL BE HIS SUCCESSOR.  
 CHURCHILL, WHO BATTLED AND DEFEATED EVERY ENEMY SAVE THE RELENT-  
 LESS PASSAGE OF TIME, PRESENTED HIS RESIGNATION TO QUEEN ELIZABETH II  
 AT BUCKINGHAM PALACE.

THEN HE WENT HOME TO DOWNING STREET AND STOOD FOR A TIME, OLD AND  
 MUTE, HIS FINGERS RAISED IN THE "V" FOR VICTORY SIGN AND TEARS  
 STANDING BRIGHT IN HIS EYES, WHILE FROM BUCKINGHAM PALACE THE ANNOUNCE-  
 MENT CAME OFFICIALLY THAT HE HAD QUIT.

THE PALACE ANNOUNCEMENT SAID:  
 "THE RIGHT HONORABLE SIR WINSTON CHURCHILL HAD AN AUDIENCE OF THE  
 QUEEN THIS EVENING AND TENDERED HIS RESIGNATION AS PRIME MINISTER AND  
 FIRST LORD OF THE TREASURY WHICH HER MAJESTY WAS GRACIOUSLY PREPARED  
 TO ACCEPT."

4/5--RH1242P

DO-6

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

|              |                                     |
|--------------|-------------------------------------|
| Mr. Tolson   | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| Mr. Nichols  | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| Mr. Boardman | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| Mr. Belmont  | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| Mr. Mohr     | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| Mr. Parsons  | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| Mr. Rosen    | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| Mr. Tamm     | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| Mr. Trotter  | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| Mr. Jones    | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| Mr. Nease    | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| Tele. Room   | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| Mr. Holloman | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| Miss Holmes  | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| Miss Gandy   | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |

Attached book "Proceedings of the  
Presentation of the Williamsburg Award  
to Sir Winston S. Churchill" was  
sent to the Director from Colonial  
Williamsburg, P. O. Box 516,  
Williamsburg, Virginia.

*Winston Churchill* *2-1*

The Trustees of Colonial Williamsburg take  
pleasure in sending you the Proceedings of the  
Presentation of the Williamsburg Award to  
the Rt. Hon. Sir Winston S. Churchill at  
Drapers' Hall, London, December 7, 1955.

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July 24, 1957

*esa*

EX-116

Mr. Kenneth Chorley  
Room 5125  
30 Rockefeller Plaza  
Rockefeller Center  
New York 20, New York

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62-65596-27  
Dear Kenneth:

Thank you so much for sending me a copy of the Proceedings of the Presentation of the Williamsburg Award to Sir Winston S. Churchill in London on December 7, 1955. This is truly an outstanding resume of what must indeed have been a memorable event, and I am most grateful for your generous consideration.

With kind personal regards,

Sincerely,  
*[Signature]*  
J. Edgar Hoover

MAILED 5  
JUL 24 1957  
COMM-FBI

NOTE: Mr. Chorley is President of the Trustees of Colonial Williamsburg.

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Boardman \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Parsons \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Trotter \_\_\_\_\_
- Nease \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holloman \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : A. H. Belmont *ab*

DATE April 5, 1961

FROM : S. B. Donahoe *SD*

SUBJECT: WINSTON CHURCHILL <sup>①</sup>

|               |       |
|---------------|-------|
| Tolson        | _____ |
| Parsons       | _____ |
| DeLoach       | _____ |
| Mohr          | _____ |
| Bishop        | _____ |
| Casper        | _____ |
| Callahan      | _____ |
| Conrad        | _____ |
| DeLoach       | _____ |
| Evans         | _____ |
| Malone        | _____ |
| Rosen         | _____ |
| Tavel         | _____ |
| Trotter       | _____ |
| W.C. Sullivan | _____ |
| Tele. Room    | _____ |
| Ingram        | _____ |
| Gandy         | _____ |

As a matter of information ASAC R. J. Baker of the Miami Office mentioned to me today that the Miami Office has received information Winston Churchill, former Prime Minister of England, will arrive Palm Beach, Florida, on the evening of April 6 or the morning of April 7, 1961.

Churchill is aboard the yacht "Christina" which is owned by Aristotle Onassis, international shipping magnate.

**ACTION:**

For information.

- SBD:dmd *dmd* *STEMS*  
 (5)  
 1 - Mr. Parsons  
 1 - Mr. Belmont  
 1 - Mr. Donahoe  
 1 - Mr. A.R. Jones

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- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_
- Casper \_\_\_\_\_
- Callahan \_\_\_\_\_
- Conrad \_\_\_\_\_
- Felt \_\_\_\_\_
- Gale \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_
- Tavel \_\_\_\_\_
- Trotter \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holmes \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

### The Washington Merry-Go-Round

# Churchill's White House Visits

By Drew Pearson

Among Franklin D. Roosevelt's intimates, Winston Churchill is best remembered for clomping down the second-floor hall of the White House, his slippers flapping, his crimson silk komono, with gold dragons embroidered on it, half draped around his rotund, naked tummy.



Pearson

There was no Blair House in those days, and the Prime Minister of Britain, on his frequent trips to confer with President Roosevelt, was invited to be a White House guest. He kept such unholy hours, sleeping until 3 in the afternoon and staying up until 3 a.m., that the Chiefs of Staff eventually complained about it.

They pointed out that Winston would wait until after midnight, when they weren't around, to argue FDR into important war decisions. After midnight, the President, following a long, hard day, was weary while Churchill, after sleeping all day, was full of vigor and eloquence.

To one of these late night sessions was credited FDR's original agreement to bow to Winston and transfer Gen. George Marshall to Europe.

Reaction by the Chiefs of Staff, and later the public, was so critical that the decision was reversed.

### Churchill Factions

Among Roosevelt intimates, there were two schools regarding the doughty and crusty Prime Minister, and their opinions about him were just as vigorous as his about them. One school was led by Mrs. Roosevelt.

Mrs. Roosevelt's difference with Winston was not over the way he turned her house-keeping topsy-turvy by keeping the servants up all night, out over the independence of India and other British colonies.

U.S. military and diplomatic leaders supported Mrs. Roosevelt, though for somewhat different reasons. Sumner Welles, longtime Under Secretary of State, and Ambassador William Phillips, a former Under Secretary, had argued that if the Indian people were given a pledge of independence they would enter the war with enthusiasm and supply the manpower for the Burma front, thereby saving American lives.

But Churchill said no. And he would pound the table indignantly, insist that no one knew how to handle India except the British, and shout "blood will flow" if there was American interference.

The defeat of the pro-

Churchill faction among FDR's advisers was Harry Hopkins, who worshipped the old man. With him, Churchill could do no wrong.

### Seed of the Empire

At times the argument among Roosevelt advisers was bitter, especially over Churchill's opposition to the second front across the English Channel. This reached a crisis at Casablanca in 1943, when the U.S. General Staff argued that the way to win the war in a hurry was by a direct attack on Germany across the Channel. Churchill was opposed, finally stipulated that if such a second front was undertaken the troop ratio would have to be 70 per cent American to 30 per cent British.

"We cannot squander the seed of the Empire," he said, referring to expected loss of manpower.

However, it would have taken one year to transport enough American troops to England to carry out this ratio, and Gen. Albert Wedemeyer, Chief of War Plans, argued that the British, with a sizable army already in England, could participate on a 50-50 basis. In this case the second front could be started in the summer of 1943.

Churchill was quite irked at Wedemeyer. However, he won his point. The cross-Channel operation was delayed for a year and a half, and the long,

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- The Washington Post and Times Herald \_\_\_\_\_
- The Washington Daily News \_\_\_\_\_
- The Evening Star \_\_\_\_\_
- New York Herald Tribune \_\_\_\_\_
- New York Journal-American \_\_\_\_\_
- New York Daily News \_\_\_\_\_
- New York Post \_\_\_\_\_
- The New York Times \_\_\_\_\_
- The Baltimore Sun \_\_\_\_\_
- The Worker \_\_\_\_\_
- The New Leader \_\_\_\_\_
- The Wall Street Journal \_\_\_\_\_
- The National Observer \_\_\_\_\_
- People's World \_\_\_\_\_
- Date \_\_\_\_\_

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costly campaign up the boot of Italy began.

Another hot argument took place among Roosevelt advisers—later among Truman advisers—over Greece.

At Casablanca, Churchill got a commitment that the Mediterranean Operation be under British jurisdiction, that all American personnel travel on British planes, all telegrams be sent over British wireless, all American labels be scratched off lend-lease goods and replaced with labels reading "Britain Delivers."

American officials resented this bitterly. And the resentment rose to a crescendo when Churchill sent the British Army into Athens with telegraphic instructions to Gen. Ronald Scobie—"Treat Athens like a conquered city."

It was the shooting down of Greek women and children by Gen. Scobie on the streets of Athens at the end of the war which led to a Communist-inspired civil war and the Truman Doctrine which replaced British rule with an American Protectorate for Greece.

There was great admiration for the Old Bulldog's indomitable determination to defend the British Empire at all costs in those war days, but there was also a lot of feeling that the war could have been won a little quicker if the Old Bulldog hadn't been quite so indomitable.

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- Tele Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holmes \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

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esa

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

# Churchill Foresaw Divided Berlin

By Drew Pearson

The secret telegrams sent by Winston Churchill to President Roosevelt just a few days before FDR died give fascinating revelations regarding the No. 1 political headache remaining in Western Europe: Berlin.



If the Allies, especially the American commanders headed by Eisenhower, had followed Churchill's stern, almost peremptory, warnings, the United States would not now be maintaining troops in Berlin 15 years after the war, nor would we have had to operate a vast airlift to save Berlin, or almost go to war with Russia over Berlin in the summer of 1961.

American military strategists have complained, with some justice, that Churchill's stubbornness against a cross-channel front and his reluctance to let Field Marshal Montgomery close the pincers on the German army, after the Normandy invasion, prolonged the war. However, the secret wartime telegrams show that on political strategy regarding Berlin, the old British war horse was as right as rain.

Churchill first began to

worry about Berlin on March 28, 1945, as the Russian army raced west through Poland and as the American army raced north from the Rhine. Noting that Gen. Eisenhower had sent a telegram direct to Stalin regarding Berlin "without previously mentioning the subject either to Air Chief Marshal Tedder or to the combined Chiefs of Staff," Churchill sent a telegraphic warning to Ike. It read:

"We all thought that this went beyond the limits of negotiation with the Soviets by the Supreme Commander in Europe."

What had alarmed Churchill was Eisenhower's plan to shift the American army's drive away from Berlin to Leipzig and Dresden.

### Churchill Worries

Three days later, Churchill became more alarmed. On March 31, he sent Eisenhower another telegram.

"If we deliberately leave Berlin to them (the Russians)," he warned, "even if it should be in our grasp, the double event may strengthen their conviction, already apparent, that they have done everything. Further, I do not consider myself that Berlin has yet lost its military significance and certainly not its political significance."

Not content with this stiff warning to Eisenhower, Churchill followed it up next day, April 1, with a telegram direct to President Roosevelt. He said he had no desire to lower the prestige of Gen. Eisenhower in his relations with the Russians. But, he continued:

"All we sought was a little time to consider the far-reaching changes desired by Gen. Eisenhower in the plans that had been concerted by the combined Chiefs of Staff at Yalta and had received your and my formal approval.

"The British Chiefs of Staff were naturally concerned at a procedure which apparently left the fortunes of the British army, which, though only a third of yours, still amounts to over a million men, to be settled without the slightest reference to British authority. They also do not understand from Gen. Eisenhower's message (to Stalin) what was actually intended..."

Churchill then complained to Roosevelt in some detail regarding Eisenhower's change in plans.

"Gen. Eisenhower, in his estimate of the enemy's resistance, to which I attach the greatest importance, now wishes to shift the axis somewhat to the southward and strike through Leipzig, even perhaps as far south as Dresden. He withdraws the

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- The Washington Post and Times Herald
- The Washington Daily News \_\_\_\_\_
- The Evening Star \_\_\_\_\_
- New York Herald Tribune \_\_\_\_\_
- New York Journal-American \_\_\_\_\_
- New York Daily News \_\_\_\_\_
- New York Post \_\_\_\_\_
- The New York Times \_\_\_\_\_
- The Baltimore Sun \_\_\_\_\_
- The Worker \_\_\_\_\_
- The New Leader \_\_\_\_\_
- The Wall Street Journal \_\_\_\_\_
- The National Observer \_\_\_\_\_
- People's World \_\_\_\_\_
- Date \_\_\_\_\_

JAN 28 1965

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File R/M



9th Army from the northern group of armies . . .

"I say quite frankly that Berlin remains of high strategic importance. Nothing will exert a psychological effect of despair upon all the German forces equal to that of the fall of Berlin . . .

#### **A Divided Berlin**

"I further consider that from a political standpoint we should march as far into Germany as possible," Churchill wired Roosevelt, "and that should Berlin be within our grasp, we should certainly take it."

When Churchill did not get an answer to his April 1 telegram from FDR, he shot off another wire to Roosevelt, April 5:

"I still think it was a pity that Eisenhower's telegram was sent to Stalin without anything being said to our Chiefs of Staff or to our Deputy Air Chief Marshal Tedder or to our Commander in Chief, Field Marshal Montgomery," Churchill complained.

Seven days later, Roosevelt was dead. Fourteen days later, the American Army reached Potsdam, the suburbs of Berlin, then withdrew to the River Elbe, in conformity with Eisenhower's previous commitment to Stalin.

After that, Berlin became a divided city.

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 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

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**The Washington Merry-Go-Round**

**De Gaulle Was Churchill's 'Cross'**

By Drew Pearson

No two men were more at odds during World War II than Charles de Gaulle and Winston Churchill. De Gaulle had been brought to England by Churchill in the last hours before the Nazis closed in on France, and there were times when the stubborn Englishman wished that he had left the stubborn Frenchman sitting on the pier in Bordeaux.



Churchill not only agreed with Secretary of State Cordell Hull when he referred to de Gaulle's "so-called" Free French, but was indignant with de Gaulle when, at Casablanca, President Roosevelt and Churchill tried to persuade de Gaulle to have his photo taken with Gen. Henri Giraud, of the French in North Africa. Despite pressure from both Mr. Roosevelt and Churchill, de Gaulle refused.

It was after this that Churchill, referring to the symbol of the Free French, remarked, "The Cross of Lorraine is the hardest cross I have to bear."

Despite this background of antagonism, President de Gaulle issued one of the most moving tributes to the man who once ridiculed him—Winston Churchill.

**LBJ and de Gaulle**

In Washington during recent months, relations have been improving between the United States and de Gaulle. This results, in part, from the patient policy of President Johnson.

"Some of the State Department boys want me to issue statements answering President de Gaulle," Mr. Johnson told a friend the other day. "But I just lean back from the plate and let those fast balls go by."

Diplomatic insiders say this better atmosphere between Washington and Paris should make possible a conference between de Gaulle and Mr. Johnson. The President of the United States has a lot of admiration for the President of France, recognizes that he has done great things for his country.

So Mr. Johnson, a patient and persuasive negotiator, would like to sit down with President de Gaulle on some early occasion and see whether they can revive the 180

years of friendship between the United States and France.

**HHH's Office**

Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey has been given a joshing runaround by his old Senate colleagues over the fact that he cannot find a choice working office on Capitol Hill. However, he has a real working office about 100 feet from Mr. Johnson's in the Executive Office Building and is proud of it.

His pride results from the fact that the office was once occupied by Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt in World War I. And Humphrey has dug up one of the last portraits of Mr. Roosevelt, painted in 1945 shortly before he died, to hang on his wall.

"Muriel helped me fix the place up," he said with pride. "She picked these curtains and had 'em put some covers over those old-fashioned radiators. I picked out this beige carpet, a color that won't show the tracks."

The Vice President is being kept busy trucking back and forth between the Senate and the White House, and he is actually getting over his old habit of being late.

The knobs on Humphrey's door are worth \$250 each. They carry the Navy seal on one side of the door, the Army seal on the other, emblems of the fact that the Executive Office used to

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- The Washington Post and Times Herald *Bill*
- The Washington Daily News \_\_\_\_\_
- The Evening Star \_\_\_\_\_
- New York Herald Tribune \_\_\_\_\_
- New York Journal-American \_\_\_\_\_
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- New York Post \_\_\_\_\_
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- The New Leader \_\_\_\_\_
- The Wall Street Journal \_\_\_\_\_
- The National Observer \_\_\_\_\_
- People's World \_\_\_\_\_
- Date \_\_\_\_\_

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house the State, War and  
Navy Departments.

### Dr. King's Assailant

Jimmy George Robinson, the man who poked the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. the other day at Selma, Ala., is not a Birmingham boy as he told the newspapers, but a Texan who has been operating a bicycle shop on Route 67 outside Garland, Tex., where he has gained local notoriety as a right-wing rabble-rouser.

A year ago, he was arrested for planting a flaming cross on the lawn of Jack Oran of Richardson, Tex., who had spoken to Kiwanis and Rotary groups on the similarities between American right-wingers and the German Nazis.

Robinson was fined \$25 for violating a fire ordinance.

### 'Classified' Maps

Movie maker George Seaton needed a 1944 battle map of France for his World War II spy thriller, "38 Hours," but both the French Embassy and the Pentagon solemnly insisted that the old maps were "classified."

Seaton turned for help to Sen. Thomas H. Kuchel (R-Calif.), who also got nowhere until he threatened to call the Russian Embassy for the maps. Then the Pentagon reluctantly produced them.

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Mrs. John de S. Mosely  
17 Nottingham St.  
London, W. 1  
England

AKA ELIZABETH

|              |       |
|--------------|-------|
| Mr. Tolson   | _____ |
| Mr. DeLoach  | _____ |
| Mr. Mohr     | _____ |
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| Mr. Tavel    | _____ |
| Mr. Trotter  | _____ |
| Tele. Room   | _____ |
| Miss Holmes  | _____ |
| Miss Gandy   | _____ |

14th December, 1966.

Dear Sir,

"The Eightieth Birthday Tribute to Sir Winston Churchill" is a pictorial anthology of his life, specially commissioned by his family to commemorate the occasion. Due to the extensive research involved, the work was not completed until some three months after the event. The original printed sheets only then being of historic importance, were placed in the Archives of Beaulieu Palace, where they have since remained.

After Churchill's death, Lord Montagu of Beaulieu, a kinsman of Sir Winston, decided to release these sheets (3,000 sets in all) and issue them exactly as was originally intended in beautifully handbound leather volumes. Each copy is numbered and individually inscribed with the owner's name. The book contains some 220 pages and 400 photographs with descriptive captions, and includes a forward by Randolph Churchill and a replica of Sir Winston's signature imprinted in gold leaf on the cover. They are now being offered for sale at \$100 per copy.

The profits received by Lord Montagu will be donated on behalf of each subscriber to the Winston Churchill Memorial and Library in Fulton, Missouri. A crested scroll, displaying the names of the owners, will be on permanent display in the Library at Beaulieu Palace and an exact replica will be donated to Fulton.

If you would care to subscribe, please indicate your name (or name of recipient) exactly as you would like it to appear in your book. Remittance should be made payable with order to: The Heritage Collection.

I hope to have the favour of your early reply and thank you in advance for your consideration of this matter.

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EX-108

Yours truly,

JAN 10 1967

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Elizabeth Mosely

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**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION/PRIVACY ACTS SECTION  
COVER SHEET**

**SUBJECT: WINSTON CHURCHILL**

**CROSS REFERENCE**

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES  
AND FIELD OFFICES  
ADVISED BY ROUTING  
SLIP(S) OF

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DATE 10-23-81 Class AND b7c  
Re: [REDACTED]

March 20, 1944

The following information concerning [REDACTED] has been made available by an official of the Ford Motor Company in Detroit, Michigan: b7c

On February 8, 1944, on [REDACTED] who said he lives in Washington, D. C., and described himself as an agricultural economist, personally called at the Ford Motor Company at Detroit for an interview. Upon being interviewed by an official of the Ford Motor Company, [REDACTED] revealed that a [REDACTED] one of the leaders of the Peace Now Movement (a pacifist organization) [REDACTED] Miss Jeanette Rankin, former Congresswoman, had introduced him to the mother of one Tyler Kent, Mrs. Ann H. P. Kent of Washington, D. C. [REDACTED] identified Kent as a young American formerly employed at the American Embassy in London who was convicted in 1940 for espionage by British authorities. [REDACTED] added, however, that he had learned from Mrs. Kent that young Kent had actually been "railroaded" inasmuch as young Kent, through his work at the Embassy, had come into possession of copies of approximately one thousand cablegrams said to have been exchanged between President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill. According to [REDACTED] these cablegrams ridiculed Russia and Stalin in the extreme and carried out the general theme that if Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill could work together, "they could rule the world". Allegedly the cablegrams, exchanged at a time when Mr. Churchill had not attained the position of Prime Minister, showed a studied conspiracy leading up to America's participation in the war.

According to [REDACTED] young Kent surreptitiously removed copies of these cablegrams from the Embassy's files and later sent them to Premier Stalin. [REDACTED] stated that in view of the contents of the cablegrams Premier Stalin "really knows Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt" and has never been friendly with them. British authorities reportedly became very anxious over the situation and according to [REDACTED] "railroaded" Kent into an espionage conviction. However [REDACTED] stated that Stalin had meanwhile sent copies of the cablegrams to America to some unnamed individual to be used to embarrass the President. These copies are now supposed to be in the hands of some private detective in New York City, and in relating these allegations, [REDACTED] made the point that the developments outlined above took place during 1940, that is, prior to the breach in German-Russian relations.

[REDACTED] also mentioned that Mrs. Kent had sent a radio commentator named Ian Ross McFarlane to London to look into the entire Kent case. Reportedly McFarlane "established" that Kent was "railroaded" and that his conviction was not justified. Allegedly McFarlane has since returned to the United States and the general nature of his findings came to the attention of Senators Nye, Wheeler, Reynolds and Shipstead who reportedly asked [REDACTED] to prevail upon McFarlane to make them available to the Senators. McFarlane refused this request.

- Tolson
- E. A. Tamm
- Clegg
- Glavin
- Ladd
- Nichols
- Tracy
- Harbo
- Belmont
- Mohr
- Winterrowd
- Tele. Rm.
- Nease
- Gandy

RECORDED  
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151 62-43818-443

MAR 25 1944

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DATE OF REVIEW 9/2/91

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OTHERWISE

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In speaking of his motives in this matter [redacted] made it clear that although he was initially introduced to this matter by [redacted] of the Peace Now Movement, he personally is not a pacifist. However, he made the statement that he is violently against this government, but he later clarified this assertion by saying that he is "violently against the New Deal". He stated he would willingly bear arms in the defense of this country "if, for example, the conditions of 1776 were to recur" but indicated he thinks the present war is not one of defense in so far as America is concerned. b7c

Toward the end of the interview [redacted] stated that Mrs. Kent is now attempting to raise \$50,000 in order to secure access to the copies of the cablegrams in question and thereby "expose this deplorable affair". According to the interviewing official at the Ford Motor Company, [redacted] was rather subtle at this point, and although he did not directly solicit funds, he suggested that the Ford Motor Company might be interested in contributing the "paltry" sum of \$15,000 to a fund, the purpose of which would be to secure the cablegrams and thereby expose this entire alleged situation. In further explanation [redacted] reportedly asserted that "the case of Tyler Kent was the most vulnerable approach to attacking the character and good faith of the President" and that he thought the Ford Motor Company might be interested in helping to expose this case. b7c

In answer to this overture the official of the Ford Motor Company reportedly told [redacted] that the Ford Company was not interested in any situation of this type which was "next door to blackmail". b7c



Other information has been received to the effect that the leaders of the Peace Now Movement are very much interested in the Tyler Kent case and are of the opinion that Kent was unjustifiably convicted. Reportedly some of the leaders of the organization feel that if they can "expose" the Kent case "showing that Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt conspired to cause the war", a great boon can be gained in behalf of the pacifist movement, eventually resulting in a negotiated peace. According to the sources of information in this matter it appears that the Peace Now Movement's interest in the Tyler Kent case is definitely that of promoting pacifism while [redacted] interest in the matter seems to be personal and political. b7c

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
32 MAR 25 1944

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b7c

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The conviction of Kent apparently occasioned some comment in the British Parliament and in this connection there is attached hereto a copy of an article concerning the matter which appeared in the November 12, 1941, edition of the "Washington Times-Herald". It is noted that [REDACTED] was reportedly in possession of a copy of this article and displayed it to the official of the Ford Motor Company during the course of the interview recounted previously in this memorandum.

Attachment

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b7c



TRUE COPY

Times-Herald  
Washington, D. C., November 12, 1941

COMMONS AIPS CHURCHILL CABLES  
TO ROOSEVELT

Messages Exchanged Behind Chamberlain's Back,  
M.P. Charges

By Arthur Sears Henning

Questions in the British House of Commons yesterday regarding Winston Churchill's cablegrams to President Roosevelt behind the back of Prime Minister Chamberlain brought into the open a subject of much whispering in official circles here.

The question put to the government in the House of Commons was whether a British subject who sent telegrams to Mr. Roosevelt and thereby evaded the censorship had been prosecuted. Thus the reference was confined to communications sent to the President by Mr. Churchill, who at the time was First Lord of the Admiralty in the Chamberlain cabinet.

No Information on Subject

The understanding here is that not only cablegrams from Mr. Churchill to Mr. Roosevelt behind Chamberlain's back but from Mr. Roosevelt to Mr. Churchill are involved. The White House in response to an inquiry yesterday professed to have no information on the subject.

The correspondence is supposed to have related to British and American policy regarding the European war. Among the questions touched upon are said to have been a more vigorous prosecution of the war than had been achieved by Mr. Chamberlain and the possibilities of the United States taking an active part in support of Great Britain.

According to one version, the device of the lend lease legislation for circumventing the United States neutrality law and the Johnson Act forbidding extension of credit to Britain as a war debt defaulter was discussed in this secret correspondence between the American President and the British navy head.

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DATE 07-20-2001 BY SP5 RQ & ME

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ENCLOSURE

62-43818-443

### Passed Through Embassy

Disclosure of the text of the cablegrams would establish whether Mr. Churchill invited or Mr. Roosevelt made any commitments of the United States Government to a policy of aiding Britain that was not contemplated by existing United States law.

From the outbreak of the war the President had been under fire for permitting, if not encouraging, William C. Bullitt, American Ambassador to France, and other American diplomats to encourage France and Poland to get into the war with promises of American support.

The correspondence between Mr. Churchill and the President passed through the American Embassy in London. Tyler Kent, a young American employed as a clerk in the embassy, made copies of the Churchill and Roosevelt cablegrams and showed them to Capt. Archibald Ramsay, a member of the House of Commons.

### Leak Traced to Kent

The leak of the correspondence soon became known and the responsibility therefore was traced to young Kent. The vengeance of the British and American governments for this breach of trust was swift and certain.

Joseph P. Kennedy, then American Ambassador to Great Britain, discharged Kent, and the British government immediately arrested him on charges of espionage. After Kent had been held in jail for some time he was given a trial. The espionage charges fell flat, but he finally was convicted of larceny of government documents and sentenced to seven years in prison, where he now is.

Captain Ramsay, who had been shown or given copies of the correspondence, was placed under detention under the Defense of the Realm Act.

### Morrison's Answer

The question was brought up in Commons yesterday by Richard R. Stokes, a Laborite who is a bitter opponent of Prime Minister Churchill. Answering the question, Home Secretary Herbert Morrison said:

"No information can properly be given out about confidential documents which were extracted from the American Embassy, but whatever may have been the nature of the documents in question they do not provide the slightest foundation for the suggestion that someone has been guilty of evading the censorship or contravening the defense regulations."

John McGovern, independent Laborite, then said:

"Cannot the home secretary say whether any of these cablegrams or messages were sent by the prime minister behind the back of the then prime minister (Chamberlain)?"

Morrison said he had nothing to add to his answer.

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3-18-44

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

Major General Edwin M. Watson  
Secretary to the President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Watson:

I am attaching a memorandum setting forth certain data recently received by this Bureau, which indicates that one [redacted] and other persons are attempting to secure large sums of money to be used in securing copies of alleged cablegrams said to have been exchanged between the President and Mr. Churchill.

b7c

These alleged cablegrams are said to relate to the so-called Tyler Kent espionage case in England and reportedly the persons interested in this endeavor intend in "exposing the cablegrams" to embarrass the President and bring about a situation favoring a negotiated peace.

I thought this information should be brought to your attention as of possible interest to the President. No action relative to the matter is contemplated by this Bureau at this time, but in the event further information of pertinence is received, it will, of course, be immediately relayed to you.

With assurances of my highest regards,

Sincerely yours,  
J. Edgar Hoover

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DATE 9/2/87 BY SP5 RJH/AC

Enclosure *MA*

- Tolson
- E. A. Tamm
- Clegg
- Coffey
- Glavin
- Ladd
- Nichols
- Rosen
- Tracy
- Carson
- Egan
- Gurnea
- Harbo
- Hendon
- Mumford
- Pennington
- Quinn Tamm
- Nease
- Gandy

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION  
MAILED 12  
MAR 21 1944 P.M.  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

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61 APR 6 1944

OFF FILE IN THE BUREAU

EDGAR HOOVER

DIRECTOR



Federal Bureau of Investigation  
United States Department of Justice  
Washington, D. C.

CC-287

- Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. E. A. Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Coffey \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Acers \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Carson \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Hendon \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Mumford \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Starke \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Quinn Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Nease \_\_\_\_\_
- Miss Beahm \_\_\_\_\_
- Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

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100-202534  
62-43818

March 7, 1944

CLASS. & EXT. BY  
REASON-FCIM II, 1-  
DATE OF REVIEW

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. E. A. Tamm

RE: [REDACTED]

THE AMERICA FIRST PARTY  
INTERNAL SECURITY  
SEDITION

- Mr. Quinn Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Nease \_\_\_\_\_
- Miss Beahm \_\_\_\_\_
- Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Information has recently been received in connection with this investigation, as well as from other sources, to the effect that certain parties have attempted to secure large sums of money from various wealthy people (in one instance the Ford Motor Company) to be used in securing access to copies of certain reported cablegrams which allegedly passed between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill. Allegedly these cablegrams showed that the President and the Prime Minister (even before the latter held that position) conspired with one another in an effort to cause America's entrance into the war without proper justification. These efforts relate to the well-known Tyler Kent, Espionage case in England, and it would appear that the persons behind these efforts are interested in embarrassing the President politically and through the publication of these reported cablegrams to discredit the war effort and thereby cause a negotiated peace. In view of the ramifications involved, detailed information which has been received by the Bureau in this regard is set forth in the following paragraphs.

On February 8, 1944, one [REDACTED] who lives at Washington and describes himself as an agricultural economist called on former SAC [REDACTED] at the Ford Company for an interview, which was apparently arranged by [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] revealed that [REDACTED] one of the leaders of the peace now movement and said to be formerly [REDACTED] Miss Jeanette Rankin, ex-Congresswoman, had introduced him to the mother of Tyler Kent who is Mrs. Ann H. Kent of Washington, D. C. [REDACTED] identified Kent as a young American formerly employed at the American Embassy in London who was convicted in 1940 by British authorities for espionage. [REDACTED] stated, however, that he had learned from Mrs. Kent that young Kent had actually been railroaded inasmuch as young Kent, through his work at the Embassy, had come into the possession of copies of approximately 1,000 cablegrams exchanged between the President and Mr. Churchill. Allegedly these cablegrams ridiculed Russia and Stalin in the extreme and carry out the general theme that if Mr. Roosevelt and Churchill work together "they can rule the world." Furthermore, the cablegrams reportedly show a studied conspiracy leading up to America's entrance into the war without proper justification.

According to [REDACTED] young Kent sent copies of these cablegrams to Stalin and for that reason the latter "really knows Mr. Churchill and Roosevelt" and has never been friendly with them. The British reportedly became very anxious over the situation and according to Baerman "railroaded" Kent into an espionage conviction. However, [REDACTED] stated that Stalin had meanwhile sent copies of the cablegrams to America to some unnamed individual to be used to embarrass the President. These copies are now supposed to be in the hands



53 APR

Letter to [REDACTED] Watson  
3/28/44

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum for Mr. E. A. Tamm

of some private detective in New York City. This conviction took place in 1940, and the other developments outlined above reportedly happened shortly thereafter prior to the breach in German-Russian relations. ~~u~~

~~u~~ also mentioned that Mrs. Kent had sent a radio commentator, named Ian Ross McFarlane, to London to look into the entire Kent case. Reportedly McFarlane has "established" that Kent was railroaded and that his conviction was not justifiable. Reportedly he has since come back to the country and has made his findings available to Senators Nye, Wheeler, Reynolds and Shipstead. However, McFarlane is said to feel that his physical safety is in question and, therefore, he is not inclined to make his findings public. *Harold P. Nye* *Robert H. Reynolds*

In talking further with ~~u~~ made it clear that although he was introduced to this matter by ~~u~~ of the Peace Now Movement he personally is not a pacifist. However, he further made it clear that he is bitterly opposed to the current Administration and apparently he feels that America's involvement in the present war is not justifiable. ~~u~~

At the end of the interview ~~u~~ stated that Mrs. Kent is now attempting to raise \$50,000 in order to secure access to the copies of the cablegrams in question ~~u~~ and thereby "expose this deplorable affair." According to ~~u~~ was rather subtle at this point and although he did not really solicit funds, he suggested that the Ford Company might be interested in contributing the "paltry" sum of \$15,000 to a fund, the purpose of which would be to secure the cablegrams and thereby expose this entire alleged situation. ~~u~~

~~u~~ indicated that he gave ~~u~~ no encouragement whatsoever and told him that the Ford Company would not be interested in any situation of this type which was "next door to blackmail." ~~u~~ thereafter discussed this matter with ~~u~~ ~~u~~ of the Ford Company who instructed that a copy of ~~u~~ memorandum be made available to the FBI at Detroit in order that the Ford Company could go on record as having no part in this plan. ~~u~~

As to the part played by ~~u~~ in this entire affair, it is noted that according to what ~~u~~ told ~~u~~ went over this entire discussion with ~~u~~ for a period of about twelve hours. ~~u~~ indicated that ~~u~~ was interested and thereafter ~~u~~ made an appointment for ~~u~~ to be interviewed by an official of the Ford Company. ~~u~~

[Large black redaction block]

*Harold P. Nye*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*444*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum for Mr. E. A. Tamm

b7c

[REDACTED]

b7c

[REDACTED]

Relative to the Peace Now Movement, it is noted that in connection with the investigation previously information has been received from time to time that the leaders of the group are very much interested in the Tyler Kent case and are of the opinion that Kent was unjustifiably convicted. They apparently believe that if they can make an "expose" showing that this was the case and that Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt "conspired to cause the war" a great boon can be gained in behalf of the pacifist movement, eventually resulting in a negotiated peace. In contrast to [REDACTED] interest in the matter which seems to be entirely political, it definitely appears that the Peace Now Movement's interest is that of promoting pacifism. u

b7c

b1

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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b1

CONFIDENTIAL

Memorandum for Mr. E. A. Tamm

[REDACTED] b1



Although nothing appears in the Bureau's files tending to substantiate the allegations of [REDACTED] and Mrs. Kent that young Kent was "railroaded" for political reasons, it is noted that an article which appeared in the November 12, 1941, edition of the Washington Times-Herald states that at about that time a heated discussion was engaged in in the British Parliament relative to the Kent case. This article indicates that some members of the Parliament asserted that the Kent case had definitely shown that Mr. Churchill had gone "behind the back of Prime Minister Chamberlain" in communicating with Mr. Roosevelt by cablegrams encoded at the American Embassy. A copy of this article was furnished to [REDACTED] by [REDACTED] and is attached hereto for your information. Mr. Baerman also furnished [REDACTED] with a copy of Miss Rankin's speech made before the House of Representatives on December 8, 1942. b7c

The Bureau's files are reflective of no information which can be identified with [REDACTED] b7c

ACTION:

As indicated, the above-set-forth data is brought to your attention for informative purposes. This information is not being disseminated to outside agencies and no specific investigation pertaining to the efforts of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] of the type outlined above has been made by the Bureau. The Bureau in connection with its investigation of [REDACTED] and the Peace Now Movement, will probably receive additional information concerning this matter if these individuals continue their activity toward making an issue of the so-called Tyler Kent case, and in that event any further data of significance will immediately be brought to your attention. b7c

Respectfully,

  
D. M. Ladd  


Attachment

CONFIDENTIAL

449



FROM .

DO-

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

TO

OFFICIAL INDICATED BELOW BY CHECK MARK

- Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. E. A. Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Coffey \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Carson \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Hendon \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Jones \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Mumford \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Quinn Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Nease \_\_\_\_\_
- Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

*Handwritten notes:*  
 Send com -  
 plus memo on  
 whole situation  
 to Gen. Watson.  
 Point out in cover  
 letters we are not  
 taking any action  
 as we thought it  
 best to call to  
 President's attention  
 first!

See Me \_\_\_\_\_  
 Note and Return \_\_\_\_\_  
 Remarks:

**ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED**

**HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED**  
 DATE 9/2/8 BY SP3 BDB/uk

*Handwritten:*  
 Gen Watson  
 3/20/44

*Handwritten:*  
 (5) [Signature]

ENCLOSURE

62-43818-444



United States  
of America

# Congressional Record

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 77<sup>th</sup> CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION

ENCLOSURE

## Some Questions About Pearl Harbor

REMARKS  
OF

HON. JEANNETTE RANKIN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, December 8, 1942

Miss RANKIN of Montana, Mr. Speaker, we have been at war a year. During that time the American people have had abundant opportunity to take stock of the Nation's situation and to raise a large number of pertinent questions, not out of any spirit of disunity but in a firm belief that the Nation's welfare requires a vigilant exercise of the traditional American right of free inquiry.

As a Member of Congress who voted against the declaration of war on December 8, 1941, I wish to take advantage of this anniversary occasion to insert into the Record a number of historically significant documents bearing upon the hitherto obscure antecedents of the Pearl Harbor attack and to raise a few questions of my own as to the meaning of certain activities which led up to that attack.

Pearl Harbor was the greatest thunderbolt in American history. It is proper to inquire, indeed, whether any responsible American source foresaw the Japanese attack. In this regard I wish to present the following remarkable statement, amounting to a prediction, from the Christian Century magazine of November 19, 1941—3 weeks prior to the Japanese attack—page 1433:

It is no secret that the whole colonial structure of the white empires is threatening to fall apart unless we intervene in Asia. Many British leaders would welcome American involvement with Japan. . . . So the thesis of Sidney Rogerson's pre-war book Propaganda in the Next War—that the surest way Britain can bring the United States to her aid will be to involve us in war with Japan—is being validated by events.

"Show me the motive, and I'll show you the criminal," was a favorite saying of Sherlock Holmes. Here we have an apparently well-defined motive and also a suggestion as to the intended method of realization.

What does Mr. Rogerson, who is an English author, have to say specifically about the plans of the British imperial-

ists? His book, Propaganda in the Next War, published in London in 1938 as one of a series of books on The Next War edited by the well-known writer, Capt. Liddell Hart, was banned from export to America by the British censorship in 1929. A copy had been secured earlier by

the Library of Congress, however, and now reposes in the rare-book room. On page 148 Mr. Rogerson makes this admission as to the plans of the British imperialists:

To persuade her—

The United States—to take our part will be much more difficult—

Than in 1914—

so difficult as to be unlikely to succeed. It will need a definite threat to America; a threat, moreover, which will have to be brought home by propaganda to every citizen, before the Republic will again take arms in an external quarrel. The position will naturally be considerably eased if Japan were involved and this might and probably would bring America in without further ado. At any rate, it would be a natural and obvious object of our propagandists to achieve this, just as during the Great War they succeeded in embroiling the United States with Germany.

In other words, 3 years before Pearl Harbor, Britain's imperialists had figured out just how to bring the United States once more to their aid.

But exactly how was Japan to be embroiled with the United States? There is no better way of goading a nation into war than by imposing economic sanctions, especially in the case of nations devoid of essential raw materials. Indeed, at the very time Mr. Rogerson was writing his revealing book, the phrase "economic sanctions mean war"—an echo from the League of Nations' threat to Italy in 1937—was still on everybody's lips. If Britain were merely to induce the United States to sever commercial relations with Japan, who was extremely dependent upon imports of raw materials in exchange for silk and manufactures for the continuance of her economic life, would not that suffice?

Is there any evidence of any specific occasion on which the British Government sold this policy of economic sanctions against Japan to the Roosevelt administration? In the Ladies Home Journal of July 1942, page 17, in an article entitled "How War Came," Forrest Davis and Ernest K. Lindley—an intimate

friend of the President—make the following significant revelation:

When they—

President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill—met in a Newfoundland bight for the Atlantic

conference, Churchill wished to meet the issue head-on. He asked the President—as the British, Australians, and Dutch repeatedly had besought this Government before—to join in an ultimative declaration to Japan.

Now, an ultimatum is a demand accompanied by a threat. It sets up a dilemma: "Do so and so—or else." In this case the punitive alternative to be offered to Japan was to consist, as we shall see, of an economic blockade—in other words, sanctions—an admitted provocation to war.

But of what demand was the ultimatum itself—the first horn of the dilemma to be offered to Japan—to consist? And what evidence do we have that President Roosevelt actually accepted Mr. Churchill's Atlantic conference request that such an ultimatum be sent?

There seems to be excellent evidence that such an ultimatum was sent by President Roosevelt. No less an apologist for the administration's foreign policy than Mr. Henry Luce, editor of Time, Life, and Fortune, has admitted both that President Roosevelt served such an ultimatum on Japan, and that it was the sending of this ultimatum which resulted in the Pearl Harbor attack. Mr. Luce alleges that the ultimatum was sent out of America's love for China, but inasmuch as it was sent at Mr. Churchill's instigation at a time when Britain desperately needed an ally in Europe as well as in the Orient and not at the beginning of the Sino-Japanese war, during which indeed we continually sent to Japan both oil and scrap iron, may not the American public wonder whether it was the interests of the British Empire in the Orient which were primarily at stake? Here is Mr. Luce's historic admission, as found in Life magazine for July 20, 1942, page 30:

The Chinese, for whom the United States had delivered the ultimatum that brought on Pearl Harbor—

Expected large lend-lease shipments, and so forth.

Just what was the wording of the ultimatum, then, since its existence is admitted?

A perusal of the Department of State bulletins covering the period from the Atlantic Conference of August 12, 1941, to the attack on Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941, discloses only a single item relating to Japan—a brief mention of repatriation of American and Japanese nationals in the bulletin of October 11, 1941, page 276—though this weekly journal of the State Department was replete with even trivialities regarding other countries during this period, thus indicating that the American people were not being fully informed as to the negotiations with Japan. On December 15, 1941, a week after Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt released a message to Congress purporting to cover the negotiations with Japan.

While candid admission that any of the communications sent Japan constituted an ultimatum is not made the

requirement made on September 3, 1941, that Japan accept the principle of "non-disturbance of the status quo in the Pacific" as detailed in the Department of State Bulletin of December 20, 1941, page 538, apparently constituted the gist of the Roosevelt administration's demands.

This requirement was the equivalent to asking Japan to guarantee the inviolateness of the white empires in the Orient, of which the British Empire comprised approximately 90 percent in both area and population. The American people would have been gratified had President Roosevelt demanded assurance that Japan respect the territorial integrity of the Philippines, to whom we had agreed to grant independence in 1946, but the American public may well wonder where President Roosevelt got the authority to conduct our foreign affairs "as if Congress did not exist"—to quote one of my colleagues—and to commit American lives, fortunes, and prestige to securing a guaranty for British and Dutch imperial interests in the Orient—irrespective of the merits of those interests.

Later, more specific guaranties were demanded of Japan as to China, Indo-China, and so forth.

Concurrently, Japan was presented with the other horn of the dilemma hatched at the Atlantic conference; namely, economic sanctions of ever-increasing severity.

What is the evidence that the Roosevelt administration, which had frozen Japanese assets in this country as early as July 25, 1941, rapidly accelerated its economic strangulation of Japan following the Atlantic conference?

To secure an accurate statistical answer, I applied to both the Department of State and the Department of Commerce, asking for month-by-month figures on American exports to Japan in 1941. To my surprise, I received from both Departments an identical response: "Because of a special Executive order, statistics on trade with Japan beginning with April 1941 are not being given out."

Inasmuch as the Japanese certainly know what they received in the way of goods from the United States throughout

1941, it becomes proper to inquire, "From whom are these statistics being concealed?"

As a Member of Congress, I was, of course, able to exercise my congressional prerogative of securing this data from an administrative department. Because of its allegedly confidential nature, I cannot, however, reveal it at this time.

However, a perusal of other sources throws considerable light upon the extent to which the Roosevelt administration invoked economic sanctions against Japan in the months between the Atlantic Conference and the attack upon Pearl Harbor. For instance, in the New York Times of August 17, 1941, page 7, we read:

Vice President WALLACE, the chairman—

Of the Economic Defense Board—today confirmed reports that this group was already working on projects for exerting trade pressure on Japan.

In other words, in less than a week after the Atlantic Conference the machinery of economic sanctions was getting under way.

Six weeks later the economic stringency in Japan had become acute, as we read in the New York Times of October 24, 1941, page 36:

Japan's raw-material shortage has been sharply aggravated and her industrial activity seriously disrupted by the cessation of her trade with important foreign countries, the Department of Commerce reported today.

Ship movements and trade between Japan and the United States, the British Empire, and the Netherlands Indies, it is pointed out, have become virtually nonexistent.

By December 2, 1941—5 days before Pearl Harbor—we read in the New York Times of that date, page 6:

Japan has been cut off from about 75 percent of her normal imports as a result of the Allied blockade, the National Industrial Conference Board reported yesterday. In an analysis entitled "The Effects of the Allied Economic Blockade on Japan," the Board asserted that despite the drastic restrictions imposed by that Government to stretch out available supplies, the blockade may ultimately prove disastrous.

"Premier Hideki Tojo of Japan dispatched the Kurusu mission to Washington because Japan today is on the verge of economic collapse . . . Contemporary China, fortnightly digest of the Chinese News Service, Inc., stated yesterday.

A week before the attack on Pearl Harbor I asked a prominent non-Japanese oriental:

Is the situation in the Pacific as serious as it appears?

Yes—

He replied—

It is serious. Japan has no choice but to go to war or to submit to economic slavery for the rest of her existence.

The question remains, Did President Roosevelt realize that "economic sanctions mean war" at the time he appears to have adopted Mr. Churchill's suggestion to impose them as the punitive alternative for his ultimatum to Japan?

It is hard to see how he could have failed to realize this, inasmuch as he himself had made the following statement to the Volunteer Participation

Committee on July 24, 1941, as reported in the Department of State Bulletin of July 26, 1941, page 72, and also in the Saturday Evening Post of February 7, 1942, page 26:

Now, if we cut the oil off, they—

The Japanese—

probably would have gone to the Dutch East Indies a year ago, and you would have had war.

Whereupon, immediately after the Atlantic Conference of 2 weeks later, Mr. Roosevelt proceeded to invoke these self-acknowledged war-producing sanctions.

Was it not strange that Mr. Roosevelt, who, by refusing for years to enforce the Neutrality Act of 1936 to prevent shipments of war supplies to Japan despite popular demand, had largely contributed to supplying that nation with the raw materials for the armament now being

used against our own troops, after the Atlantic Conference when an incident with Japan seems to have been desired, suddenly changed his policy and not only cut off war supplies but virtually everything required by the civilian population of Japan as well?

As a member of the President's own party, Congressman HAYTON W. SUMMERS, of Texas, chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, remarked in a letter to the Saturday Evening Post, published in that periodical on April 4, 1942, page 26:

We have been a very foolish people, which has made it possible for . . . politicians to get away with murder. This blaming the Pearl Harbor tragedy on the treachery of the Japs is like the fellow who had been tickling the hind leg of a mule trying to explain his bungled-up condition by blaming the mule for having violated his confidence.

ASTOUNDING as the Pearl Harbor attack was to the American public as a whole, if it was anticipated by the administration why did the President permit our forces at Pearl Harbor to be taken by surprise? Even if a Japanese attack was desired, certainly no one desired a successful attack.

The answer seems to be that everything possible was done to warn our forces at Pearl Harbor of the extreme likelihood of attack. According to the report of the Roberts commission on the facts of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short, who were in charge of the Hawaiian area, were sent repeated warnings by the War and Navy Departments.

Thus we read in the text of the Roberts report, as given in Senate Document No. 159, pages 6-9, and also in the New York Times of January 25, 1942, page 30, that—

On October 16, 1941, the commanding general, Hawaiian department, and the commander in chief of the fleet were advised by the War and Navy Departments of the possibility of an attack by Japan.

Another warning was sent on November 24, 1941.

The Roberts report continues:

On November 27, 1941, the Chief of Staff of the Army informed the commanding general, Hawaiian department, that . . .

hostilities on the part of Japan were momentarily possible. . . . On the same day—

November 27, 1941—

the Chief of Naval Operations sent a message to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, which stated in substance that the dispatch was to be considered a war warning . . . that Japan was expected to make an aggressive move in the next few days.

Additional warnings were sent November 28, November 29, November 30, December 1, December 3, December 4, December 6, and December 7—the last one arriving in Hawaii after the Japanese onslaught had begun.

Thus, we see that for 2 weeks prior to the Pearl Harbor attack almost daily warnings had been sent, not to mention less frequent precautionary dispatches earlier. What more could have been done in the way of warnings is hard to see. Indeed, do not the frequency, urgency, the very wording of these warnings, indicate in themselves that the Pearl Harbor attack came as no surprise whatever to the President?

Why, then, were our forces taken unawares December 7, 1941? Apparently simply because a deep-rooted and traditional sense of overconfidence insulated our Pacific commanders from taking these warnings seriously.

Has Prime Minister Churchill ever admitted attempting to get the United States into this war?

Yes; quite frankly—after we were in. Why was it that previously he said he wanted only the "tools"? In February 1942, in a speech delivered before the House of Commons in an effort to save his administration at the time of the fall of Singapore, this boast was wrung from him—as reported in the New York Times of February 16, 1942, page 6:

When I survey and compute the power of the United States and its vast resources and feel that they are now in it with us, with the British Commonwealth of Nations all

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together, however long it lasts, till death or victory, I cannot believe that there is any other fact in the whole world which can compare with that. This is what I have dreamed of, aimed at, and worked for, and now it has come to pass.

A blunt acknowledgment, surely.

Has either Mr. Churchill or Mr. Roosevelt ever acknowledged that the Atlantic conference was the specific occasion of their efforts to get the United States into the war by embroiling us with Japan?

It is hard to see what else the following admission from Mr. Churchill's speech in Parliament, January 28, 1942—as reported in the New York Times of that date, page 10—can be called:

It has been the policy of the Cabinet at almost all costs to avoid embroilment with Japan until we were sure that the United States would also be engaged. . . .

On the other hand, the probability since the Atlantic conference, at which I discussed these matters with President Roosevelt, that the United States, even if not herself attacked, would come into the war in the Far East and thus make the final victory assured, seemed to allay some of these anxieties, and that expectation has not been falsified by the events.

This would seem to indicate that not only did President Roosevelt accede to Churchill's pressure to send an ultimatum to, and impose sanctions upon, Japan but made a blanket commitment to bring America into the war even if Japan did not attack.

A very curious piece of evidence appeared in the Saturday Evening Post of October 10, 1942, page 9, in an article by Lt. Clarence E. Dickinson, United States Navy, entitled "I Fly For Vengeance." Lieutenant Dickinson relates:

On this cruise we had sailed from Pearl Harbor on November 28—

1941—

under absolute war orders. Vice Admiral Wm. F. Halsey, Jr., the commander of the aircraft battle force, had given instructions that the secrecy of our mission was to be protected at all costs. We were to shoot

down anything we saw in the sky and to bomb anything we saw on the sea. In that way, there could be no leak to the Japs.

Could such orders have been issued by Vice Admiral Halsey except by specific direction from the Commander in Chief, namely, the President of the United States?

In other words, if Lieutenant Dickinson's account is true, did not the President at least 9 days before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, without a declaration of war, authorize an identical attack upon the Japanese—also without a declaration of war?

Today approximately 1,000,000 American boys are fighting from three to eight thousand miles away from home. The American people are willing to struggle for the "four freedoms" but we realize that we must retain them at home if we are going to give them to others. Exercising our traditional right of free speech and free inquiry, we are going to continue to ask and to seek answers to all questions as they arise.

When are we going to get the full story of what happened at the Atlantic Conference? We asked for it then and ask for it now.

When President Roosevelt had so persistently refused to enforce the Neutrality Act against Japan when public opinion definitely demanded it, why did he so suddenly change his policy at the Atlantic Conference?

A year ago, one of my congressional colleagues, having observed for months the adroitness with which President Roosevelt had brought us ever closer to the brink of war in the Atlantic only to be continually frustrated in the final step by a reluctant Congress, seeing fate present the President on December 7, 1941, with a magnificent moral categorical, right out of the blue—a casus belli beyond all criticism—exclaimed in despair: "What luck that man has!"

But was it luck?

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# Roosevelts Reprove Churchill

Had the wife of any other President than Mr. Roosevelt publicly reprove the head of a government with which we were allied in war, it would have been certainly a national and probably an international scandal.



Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt

When Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt at a public press conference reprove British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, it hardly surprises Americans—though we don't yet know how it affected Britons. Americans are used to Mrs. Roosevelt zipping around the world aboard Army bombers and leaving a trail of indiscretions in her wake.

She does these things apparently because she feels that she was elected co-President with her husband, or at the least First Assistant President. As a matter of fact, she was never elected to any office.

This latest indiscretion of Mrs. Roosevelt's was her Tuesday press conference remark, regarding Mr. Churchill's friendly attitude toward Spain, that "Mr. Churchill has thought a certain way for 60 years, and I don't think he wants to change the way he has thought for 60 years."

That is to say that Mr. Churchill is a marble-headed old foggy who had learned all he was destined ever to learn by the time he was nine years of age.

What had irked Mrs. Roosevelt was Mr. Churchill's discussion of Spain's persistent neutrality in his Commons speech a few days ago. Mr. Churchill said in substance that when Britain was on the hot spot in 1941-42 Franco had neither seized Gibraltar nor let Hitler send soldiers through Spain to seize Gibraltar. This, though Franco was obligated to Hitler and Mussolini for help furnished his rebel army in the Spanish Civil War. Mr. Churchill said that you naturally feel some gratitude toward a man who refrained from knocking you down when he could have knocked you down.

A few hours after Mrs. Roosevelt uttered about Mr. Churchill, the President chimed in at his press conference with a loud disagreement with Mr. Churchill on the subject of Spain. Spain, he said, is still shipping

- Mr. Tolson ✓
- Mr. E. A. Tamm ✓
- Mr. Clegg ✓
- Mr. Coffey
- Mr. Glavin
- Mr. Ladd ✓
- Mr. Nichols ✓
- Mr. Rosen
- Mr. Tracy
- Mr. Mohr
- Mr. Carson
- Mr. Harbo
- Mr. Hendon
- Mr. Mumford
- Mr. Jones
- Mr. Quinn Tamm
- Mr. Nease
- Miss Gandy

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entirely too much material, such as wolfram, <sup>Germany</sup>. Wolfram, according to the Standard Dictionary, is (1) tungstate of iron and manganese (Fe, Mn) WO<sub>4</sub>... a source of tungsten; or (2) same as tungsten. Mr. Churchill may have some kindly feelings toward Spain, but Spain's conduct continues "unsatisfactory" to Mr. Roosevelt.

\* \* \*

What these twin Roosevelt reprovals to Mr. Churchill may indicate is that the Allied triumvirate—the United States, Britain and Russia—is already beginning to go the way of most triumvirates. Two of

**Triumvirate** the triumvirs usually get together to

**Split Begins** nudge the third out of power and prestige.

The Allies have not yet won the war. Indeed, we are told daily that the fiercest fighting is yet to be done. But already the Roosevelts are veering this nation toward Russia and away from Britain.

Why they are doing so is not hard to figure out.

Spain continues neutral because it bled itself white and half-starved in its civil war of 1936-39 and its people want peace at almost any price. In that war, Russia helped the Spanish Communists, just as Italy and Germany helped the Spanish conservatives. This is made evident in Ernest Hemingway's "*For Whom the Bell Tolls*."

The Reds and their fellow travelers have a mortal hatred for Franco, Spain's current dictator, because he won the Spanish War and the Communists lost it. The Reds and their fellow travelers in this country are all-out for a fourth term for Roosevelt, as you can see by a glance at any of their publications. The reddish CIO has started a fourth-term drive into which it openly says it will put several million dollars of the members' money.

Hence, it is smart politics for Mr. and Mrs. Roosevelt to take public raps at Spain and at anybody—Mr. Churchill included—who says a kind word in public for the war-ruined Spanish people. That will help keep the domestic Reds and fellow travelers in line for the fourth term.

What it will do to the Allies' postwar plans is another question. Those plans now are, at least in public, for Britain, the United States, Russia and China to run the world as benevolent big powers—despite Mrs. Roosevelt's other foolish remark at her Tuesday press conference about every United Nation in the world having an actual voice in postwar world government. How could Belgium and Russia have a veto on each other after the war?

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## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: December 5, 1947

FROM : D. M. Ladd

SUBJECT:

STYLES

|                |   |
|----------------|---|
| Mr. Tolson     | ✓ |
| Mr. E. A. Tamm |   |
| Mr. Clegg      |   |
| Mr. Glavin     |   |
| Mr. Ladd       | ✓ |
| Mr. Nichols    |   |
| Mr. Rosen      |   |
| Mr. Tracy      |   |
| Mr. Carson     |   |
| Mr. Egan       |   |
| Mr. Gurnea     |   |
| Mr. Harbo      |   |
| Mr. Hendon     |   |
| Mr. Pennington |   |
| Mr. Quinn Tamm |   |
| Tele. Room     |   |
| Mr. Nease      |   |
| Miss Holmes    |   |
| Miss Gandy     |   |

While talking to Senator Bridges on other matters, he stated that while he was in Europe the past summer that he had had a private conference with Churchill, that Churchill was very much concerned about the Russian picture and stated that the only salvation for the civilization of the world would be if the President of the United States would declare Russia to be imperiling world peace and attack Russia.

He pointed out that if an atomic bomb could be dropped on the Kremlin wiping it out, it would be a very easy problem to handle the balance of Russia, which would be without direction. Churchill further stated that if this was not done, Russia will attack the United States in the next two or three years when she gets the atomic bomb and civilization will be wiped out or set back many years.

Winston  
Bridges stated that he concurs in Churchill's views and that he sincerely hopes that our next President will do just that before Russia attacks the United States.

DML:da

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# Iran-Red Tiff UNO's

By R. H. SHACKFORD  
United Press Staff Correspondent

LONDON, Jan. 16—The Iranian delegation disclosed today that it has received new instructions from Teheran to place the Iranian dispute with Soviet Russia before the United Nations.

Only yesterday the Iranian Ambassador to London, Seyed Hassan Taqizadeh, told the assembly that he might present the Iranian-Russian quarrel for United Nations consideration if an agreement between the two countries wasn't reached soon.

The Iranian move ran counter to efforts by the big powers to keep controversial issues out of the first Assembly's agenda.

First serious talks among the big powers to find the man for the \$35,000 per year secretary general post in the UNO were to begin shortly after the

arrival of Soviet Vice Foreign Commissar Vishinski from Moscow.

Selection of a secretary general candidate will be the first substantive issue before the new Security Council, which meets Thursday for the first time.

Actual election of the secretary general is by the General Assembly, but it must be done on recommendation of the Security Council. Seven of the 11 council members must approve the recommendation, including all the Big Five.

Gen. Eisenhower, Churchill and Anthony Eden are among the world figures mentioned for the job.

Eisenhower doesn't want it. The British Labor government opposes Churchill, who is unenthusiastic about it, anyway. There also is British opposition to Eden, but less than to Churchill.

The Russians are understood to favor Stanoje Simic, Yugoslav Ambassador to

Washington. Other groups pro Lester B. Pearson, Canadian Minister to Washington.

British officials held private conferences today to crystallize their views on the candidates. They have abandoned their belief that the secretary general should come from a small country, if possible.

The British approached the prospect cautiously, for they believed it might be fatal to the UNO if one of the Big Five was forced to use its veto on the secretary general issue.

Today's plenary sessions had a prospect of excitement, and delegates looked ahead toward the speech by Foreign Secretary Bevin tomorrow. British sources said he would deal with the mandate question in some detail. He will not offer to put Palestine under UNO mandate, they said, because

*Mr. Tolson*  
*Mr. E.A. Tamm*  
*Mr. Clegg*  
*Mr. Glavin*  
*Mr. Ladd*  
*Mr. Nichols*  
*Mr. Rosen*  
*Mr. Tracy*  
*Mr. Carson*  
*Mr. Egan*  
*Mr. Gurnea*  
*Mr. Harbo*  
*Mr. Hendon*  
*Mr. Pennington*  
*Mr. Quinn*  
*Mr. Nease*  
*Miss Gandy*

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WASHINGTON  
January 16



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# Riff UNO's Headache

Vice Foreign Com-  
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Anglo-American Commission is still in-  
vestigating the question.  
The Iranian delegation will meet to-  
day to decide whether to raise the is-  
sue of relations with Russia in the  
General Assembly or to present it to  
the newly created Security Council.  
The new instructions from Teheran  
superseded the speech of Taguizadeh  
yesterday in which he reserved the  
right to raise the issue if the big powers  
failed to solve the Soviet-Iranian prob-  
lem at this session of the Assembly.  
Taguizadeh said today that the di-  
rective from his government allowed  
the delegation here to choose whether  
to raise the matter before the As-  
sembly or otherwise.  
Only the possible persuasion of the  
big powers could prevent Iran from  
raising the question. The UNO charter

provides that "any member of the  
United Nations may bring any dispute  
or situation which might lead to inter-  
national friction "to the attention of  
the Assembly or Security Council."  
**COUNCIL MEETS TOMORROW**  
The first Security Council meeting  
was scheduled for tomorrow. But the  
Iranian issue was not likely to be raised  
at that time. The session was expected  
to be devoted to preliminary organiza-  
tion and opening statement.  
The first step under the charter for  
the Council would be to recommend to  
the parties that they try to settle their  
differences by negotiation, arbitration,  
judicially, by regional agencies or ar-  
rangements, "or other peaceful means  
of their own choice."

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- Mr. Tolson .....
- Mr. E. A. Tamm .....
- Mr. Clegg .....
- Mr. Glavin .....
- Mr. Ladd *PS* .....
- Mr. Nichols .....
- Mr. Rosen .....
- Mr. Tracy .....
- Mr. Carson .....
- Mr. Egan .....
- Mr. Gurnea .....
- Mr. Harbo .....
- Mr. Hendon .....
- Mr. Pennington .....
- Mr. Quinn Tamm .....
- Mr. Nease .....

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*File*

*[Handwritten signatures]*

WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS  
January 16, 1946

# CAPITOL STUFF

By JOHN O'DONNELL

**T**HERE are times when the mere multitude can sit back and reflect happily on the idea that their rulers can behave as so many political stumble bums. Like a blood transfusion to the somewhat wasted Democratic idea comes the proof that the Big Brain in the White House and his associated world-rulers and global master-minds are capable of pulling bonehead plays on the political diamond or gaily stepping on banana peels which litter the path to enduring fame.

The Big Brain's associates, Britain's Winston Churchill and Pal Joey, Stalin in Moscow have heard the call to leap in and help the election of F.D.R. to a fourth term in the White House.

Wise and experienced political brains might have counseled that there is danger—political danger for F.D.R. in such an invasion of the domestic field.

But no! Both Winnie and Pal Joey have jumped into the family fight and are now hip-deep in the all-out effort to see that F.D.R. is re-elected next November 7.

The Dewey forces are for the moment holding back their counterblast—but expect it to cut loose at the moment that censorship permits the revelation that the fourth term candidate's "good friend Winston" is within the domestic borders of the United States during the present campaign.

**W**E NOTE that Fred Pasley of this bureau, back from Quebec where he heard Churchill toss-off the observation about a Roosevelt-Churchill meeting "next year," reports from the White House that Prime Minister Churchill is "standing-by" at the moment—and we might add, if all the stories in the Capital are true, is "standing very near by."

Now you can't convince the Dewey workers that the fourth term candidate didn't stage the recent war conference in Quebec and hasn't linked himself up in the popular eye with Britain's Prime Minister without a sneaking idea in the back of the White House brain that all this would work to get votes next November 7 and build up his "indispensable man" thesis—"after all, I'm the only one who gets along with Winnie and Joe Stalin. Don't spoil the party by sending in a stranger."

**A**T ALL events, the usually politically shrewd Churchill, willy-nilly, has now become a part of our national election campaign—and Churchill's part will undoubtedly become greater in the next few days.

Now at the same time, Pal Joey in Moscow is following Churchill's example and putting in his plugs for F.D.R.—neatly skating around any forthright indorsement of the fourth term candidate, but in there punching just the same.

Over in Moscow, Stalin has blown his publicity whistle, told the Soviet writing boys to follow the thick red line and whoop it up for F.D.R.'s re-election by denouncing Dewey and the Republican party in the Soviet publication, War and the Working Class.

**T**HE Stalin contribution to Roosevelt re-election propaganda takes the somewhat wobbly line that all good Communists in the United States should vote against Dewey because, says Russia-for-Roosevelt, the Republican party is backed up by the National Association of Manufacturers, du Pont, Ford, General Motors and behind these are lined up Fascist elements, etc., etc., etc.

The reasoning behind the Churchill and Stalin immediate efforts to help out Roosevelt's fourth term campaign grate against each other at many points. But they simmer down to the same thing:

- Mr. Tolson
- Mr. E. A. Tamm
- Mr. Clegg
- Mr. Coffey
- Mr. Glavin
- Mr. Ladd
- Mr. Nichols
- Mr. Rosen
- Mr. Tracy
- Mr. Mohr
- Mr. Carson
- Mr. Hendon
- Mr. Mumford
- Mr. Jones
- Mr. John Tamm
- Mr. Nease
- Miss Gandy

*M. J. Dewey*  
*10/22/44*  
*Dewey*

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WASHINGTON TIMES-HERALD  
MORNING EDITION 9/22/44

Britain's Churchill and Russia's Stalin have charged into the local fight with a common battle cry: "Franklin's our boy."

**N**OW, politically speaking, these are not smart tactics and however much they please F.D.R. at the moment, there are ancient veterans in the headquarters of the Democratic National Committee of the B.H. (Before Hillman) variety who now wag their heads ominously.

Now such smart operators in the Roosevelt camp as Comrade Earl Browder of the Communists-for-Roosevelt Brigade and Tovarich Sidney (clear it with Sidney) Hillman are far too slick to be trapped into such political fumbblings as these recent bobbles of Pal-Joey and "my good friend Winston." Not for a second.

**U**P BEFORE the Congressional Investigating Committee, Brother Browder softly assured his inquisitors that 98 per cent of the American people were against communism.

Which suggested that you shouldn't pay too much attention to the Communist-backing of F.D.R. And Brother Hillman, of course, modestly blushing under the grant of political power granted him by F.D.R. at the Chicago convention, denies all Communist affiliations.

**W**E NOTE today that the official AFL publication, "The Labor Union Newspaper," returns to its furious attack on the Hillman-Moscow-Roosevelt tie-up with the blunt charge:

"To American labor the most disquieting thing about the CIO Political Action Committee is its frank and unblushing alliance with revolutionary communism."

The federation paper, after duly noting that Roosevelt-Lieutenant Hillman last August "indignantly denied" that he was a Communist, goes into interesting details of the Russian-born Hillman's close personal relations with Lenin.

It reports the occasion when Hillman, accompanied by Browder and William Z. Foster, made a pilgrimage to Moscow, conferred with Lenin, and doped out a scheme for Communist control of American labor.

**T**HIS attempt failed. But, reports the AFL publication: "His (Hillman's) Soviet sympathies, while slumbering, have never dimmed. They have burst into flame again with the emergence of Russia as a military conquerer under Stalin."

# WALLACE BY OUTCRY IN U.S.

But Pooh-Poohs Prosecution  
Talk—Likens His Speaking  
to Churchill's Visit Here

## DISPUTE ENTERS COMMONS

Conservative Asks Whether  
Government Knew of BBC  
Speech by American

By MALLORY BROWNE

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

LONDON, April 15—Having read the Logan Act, Henry A. Wallace is "satisfied that he need pay no more attention to talk in the United States of legal action," it was said tonight on his behalf.

[The House Committee on Un-American Activities suggested Monday that Mr. Wallace's speeches and actions abroad were covered by the Logan Act. This law makes it a crime to deal unauthorizably with foreign governments to "influence the measures or conduct of any foreign government . . . in relation to any dispute" with the United States "or to defeat the measures" of the United States.]

In Mr. Wallace's opinion, the law is "completely inapplicable" to his speeches in Britain and he has no intention of modifying his stay here or his tour on the Continent as a result of the mounting furor against him in the United States, it was said.

### Going to Stockholm

The former Vice President has frankly acknowledged surprise at the volume of the protest at home. Some persons who have had an opportunity to see him in the last forty-eight hours believe that "jolted" more accurately expresses the effect on him of the storm of criticism in the United States.

Mr. Wallace's attacks on the Truman Doctrine of confining communism will come up in the House of Commons on Thursday, after he has left for Stockholm. A parliamentary question put today by a Conservative, L. D. Gamman, asks whether a British Broadcasting Corporation program "on the thirteenth of April by Mr. Henry Wallace, in which domestic and foreign policy of the United States Government was attacked, was made with the knowledge of or after consultation with His Majesty's Government."

The questioner then asked there are any previous instances of a foreign statesman granted similar facilities for BBC to criticize his own government" and whether the British Government "will offer a similar opportunity to any United States statesman who supports the domestic and foreign policy of President Truman's administration."

Broadcasting tonight to the United States, Mr. Wallace drew a parallel between his speaking tour in Britain and Winston Churchill's speaking last year in Fulton, Mo., and expressed surprise that some groups in the United States wished to suppress his right to voice his views abroad.

It is doubted whether this comparison will be relished in London. Mr. Wallace's speeches in Britain have not had any sponsorship similar to that Mr. Truman gave to Mr. Churchill's Fulton speech. Actually Mr. Wallace's main purpose in making the comparison was to point out that those who now criticized him for allegedly trying to influence a foreign government should have been much more vocal in criticizing Mr. Churchill when the former Prime Minister spoke.

Some observers in Britain are comparing Mr. Wallace, not with Mr. Churchill, but with Prof. Harold J. Laski's tour in the United States last year. Professor Laski's speeches criticizing Foreign Secretary Bevin's policy, as well as the policy of the United States, aroused a wave of resentment against him not only in the United States but also in Britain and even in his own party, the Labor party.

Mr. Wallace was a guest of various British Members of Parliament at a luncheon today and at a dinner in his honor in the House of Commons.

### Attends Commons Session

LONDON, April 15 (AP) — Mr. Wallace attended a session of the House of Commons today and also discussed scientific farming data with Minister of Agriculture Tom Williams.

The conservative Yorkshire Post said the former Vice President had a perfect right to speak in Britain.

"How can he hope to heal the differences dividing the world unless he can speak freely to all who are willing to hear?" the Post said. "Again, the right of public men to speak regardless of the embarrassment they may cause the Government is part of the American tradition, and this tradition is part of the wider tradition of American free speech."

### French Officials Cautious

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

PARIS, April 15—It is understood on high authority that the French Government will avoid anything remotely resembling official honors for Mr. Wallace when he visits Paris about April 22.

ul Ramadier will not officially or give a luncheon for him, as is often done for distinguished guests, it was said tonight. Official circles added that if Mr. Wallace asked M. Ramadier it would be difficult for the Premier to refuse.

Vincent Auriol, President of the Republic, is on his way to West Africa. Edouard Herriot, who as President of the Assembly becomes

the virtual head of state in the absence of the President, is expected to solve the problem by remaining in his home town, Lyon, or, if he comes to Paris, by refraining from participating in formal receptions for Mr. Wallace if there are any, which appeared doubtful. This cautious attitude is a result of messages from Henri Bonnet, Ambassador to Washington, informing the French Government of indignation provoked in the United States by Mr. Wallace's visit to Europe. The message urged French

officials in effect to watch their step so as not to create an impression in the United States that they were on the side of Mr. Wallace and against President Truman. Since this delicate problem has been discussed between United States Ambassador Jefferson Caffery and Pierre-Henri Teitgen, Acting Foreign Minister, some official quarters believed that Mr. Caffery had conveyed a message from Washington emphasizing the unofficial character of Mr. Wallace's visit.

- Mr. Tolson.....
- Mr. E. A. Tamm.....
- Mr. Clegg.....
- Mr. Glavin.....
- Mr. Ladd.....
- Mr. Nichols.....
- Mr. Rosen.....
- Mr. Tracy.....
- Mr. Carson.....
- Mr. Egan.....
- Mr. Gurnea.....
- Mr. Harbo.....
- Mr. Hendon.....
- Mr. Pennington.....
- Mr. Quinn Tamm.....

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This is a clipping from page 12 of the New York Times for 4-16-47

Clipped at the Seat of Government

63 MAY 5 1947

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# Wallace Criticizes Churchill for Failing to Fight for Peace

## Says Briton Dares Not Confess Conviction War Is Inevitable

By the Associated Press

OSLO, Norway, April 19.—Henry A. Wallace declared tonight that it was "a great source of sorrow to me" that Winston Churchill was not fighting for peace.

The former American Vice President and cabinet officer told 1,000 Norwegian trades union leaders that Mr. Churchill "dare not confess publicly the private convictions of his group that war is inevitable." "I am not a crypto-Communist," Mr. Wallace declared. "I am a progressive story."

(Mr. Churchill, addressing a Conservative Party rally in London Friday, described Mr. Wallace as a "crypto-Communist," which he defined as "one who has not got the courage to explain the destination for which he is speaking." He said also that Mr. Wallace was trying "to separate Great Britain from the United States and to weave her into a vast system of Communist intrigue which radiates from Moscow.")

### Peace Called Fighting Cause.

Mr. Wallace, who arrived in Oslo from Stockholm only a few hours before he addressed the union leaders, did not mention Mr. Churchill's name in noting that the former British Prime Minister's attack on them had been broadcast to Norway. "Peace is not something passive. . . ." Mr. Wallace said. "Since peace is a fighting cause, it is a source of great sorrow to me that Britain's great fighting leader cannot use his genius in fighting for peace.

"This great man says I will not reveal my ultimate goal. I say he dare not confess publicly the private

(See WALLACE, Page A-7.)

# Wallace

(Continued From First Page.)

conviction of his group that war is inevitable."

Mr. Wallace said Americans were being described as hysterical in their attitude toward Russia.

"If I knew only what I read in the American press I also would be hysterical," he said.

### Praises American Press.

The former cabinet member praised American reporters, saying they were "progressive and forward-looking," and also praised the American press being on the whole the best in the world.

"I am not accusing them of deliberately publishing untruths," he said, "but the American press does engage in selective use of the truth that is the last word in propaganda. We must have the whole truth if we are to maintain peace."

Mr. Wallace said that when he spoke the United States press ignored him. "When I return," he added, "I suppose the blanket of silence will fall again. I have broken through the silken curtain of that silence by coming to Europe."

Citing the Spanish-American War as a case resulting, he said, from selective newspaper treatment, Mr. Wallace said, "That is why I am so disturbed when we send naval vessels on goodwill tours in foreign waters. If anything happened to our vessels who would know the cause of the incident? There may still be Nazis. How easy for them to provoke an international incident. That is why I am so deeply concerned when the press loads facts on one side."

### Speaks to 1,500 Students.

Mr. Wallace dashed on foot from the crowded labor temple to a hall where 1,500 students heard him assail what he called trends toward war and urged them to fight for a stronger United Nations.

"Sooner or later, all Nordic races will reach maturity and conclude that war is characteristic of childish minds," he predicted.

Mr. Wallace, whose original program of a single speech in Norway

has been expanded to include four platform appearances and a radio address, was welcomed to Oslo as one of the most important voices of the common man.

That description of Mr. Wallace came from Theodor Brock, famed wartime mayor of Narvik, who joined with Norway's minister of education, Kaare Fostervoll, in welcoming him at a luncheon attended by representatives of the country's six political parties, including two cabinet members.

Mr. Fostervoll said Mr. Wallace could claim a unique achievement in bringing together at the same table representatives of the Conservative, Christian, Labor People's, Farmers' and Communist Parties.

Some Revision in Law. Addressing the meeting, Mr. Wallace predicted any United States laws curbing the right of Americans to speak freely about their own government in foreign countries would be modified to conform to the charter of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

Referring to reports from the United States of proposals that his passport be withdrawn and that the Logan Act be invoked against him because of his attacks on President Truman's foreign policy, Mr. Wallace said:

"The right of any world citizen to speak his mind is merely carrying out the injunction given in the UNESCO charter. I believe any United States laws which may be in conflict with that charter will be modified."

Tomorrow he will address a public meeting at a large Oslo theater and will speak at a Farmers' Party (Conservative) meeting on agricultural subjects.

## Stassen Assails Talking On Foreign Policy Abroad

STOCKHOLM, Sweden, April 19 (AP)—Harold E. Stassen, aspirant for the Republican presidential nomination, who has been making a fact-finding tour of Europe, declared today "it is not proper to discuss the foreign policy of the United States in a foreign country."

The former governor of Minnesota held a news conference only a few hours after Henry A. Wallace left Stockholm by plane for Oslo, Norway. Mr. Wallace has criticized President Truman's proposal for aid to Greece and Turkey and has called for "peace and understanding with Russia."

Mr. Stassen said that after his return to the United States he would confer with leaders of the Republican party before publishing his views and impressions of his European trip.

The Republican Party, he said, has an excellent chance of winning the presidential election in 1948 "if we have a good program" and if Republican Congressmen now in office retain the confidence of the people.

"All America—both the Republican and Democratic Parties—are moving forward in world policy and will not go back to the policy of the 20s," Mr. Stassen said when asked whether Republicans would revert to earlier policy if victorious in the presidential election.

Before his press conference Mr. Stassen conferred with Prime Minister Tager Erlander and had luncheon with Foreign Minister Oesten Unden.

Although Mr. Wallace and Mr. Stassen do not meet in Stockholm.

- Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. E. A. Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Carson \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Egan \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Gurnea \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Hendon \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Jones \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Pennington \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Quinn Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Nease \_\_\_\_\_
- Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

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 WASHINGTON STAR  
 Page A-1 & A-7

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they may do so in Oslo, as Mr. Stassen is scheduled to leave for Oslo by plane tomorrow morning.

### **Cot Says He Arranged Wallace Visit as Friend**

PARIS, April 19 (AP).—Pierre Cot, French leftwing politician, said today that in arranging the visit here of Henry A. Wallace he was acting as an "old friend" and not as the agent of any French political party.

Mr. Cot, air minister in the cabinet of Leon Blum and several other wartime and prewar cabinets, formerly was a radical-Socialist, a conservative party, but now ranks himself as an independent. In the National Assembly he generally votes with the Communists.

Mr. Cot said he had mapped a three-day schedule for Mr. Wallace that includes an appearance before the National Assembly's foreign affairs committee, a speech to the Centre de la Politique Etrangere, a sort of foreign policy association, and another speech before a meeting in the Sorbonne. In addition Mr. Wallace will speak before the original local chapter of the American Veterans Committee which recently split on the issue of admitting Communists.

The invitation to appear before the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee was extended about a month ago, Mr. Cot said, by Marcel Cachin, a Communist who happens to be committee chairman. Under Assembly rules a foreigner may not appear before a session of the entire chamber, but the foreign affairs group is inviting all other deputies to attend.

Mr. Wallace, who arrives Tuesday, will be a guest of honor at a luncheon given by the National Union of Intellectuals, of which the scientist Frederic Joliot-Curie is secretary-general. Dr. Joliot-Curie is a Communist, but Mr. Cot said the group is comprised of intellectuals of various shades of political opinion.

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WASHINGTON STAR  
Page A-1 & A-7

# Merry-Go-Round

By Drew Pearson

NOW THAT ALL the hulla-baloo over Poland has subsided, inside diplomatic reports from Europe indicate that the Lublin-Warsaw Polish government is not going to be such a Russian puppet government after all.

Despite the fact that the Lublin - Warsaw Poles were called all sorts of pro-Red names by the London Poles, they are now getting just as independent and, to some extent, arrogant, as their London brothers.

Or, as some neutral diplomats summarize it:

"A Pole will always be a Pole whether he's in London or Lublin."

Illustrative of how the Poles are feeling their oats was a meeting which took place at Moscow last week regarding the Polish row with Czechoslovakia. The meeting was attended by Russian Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs Vyshinsky; also by ex-Premier Mikolajczyk of the London Poles, plus Edward Morowski.

Morowski, though supposedly a Soviet puppet, started the fireworks by ranting against the Czechs. He said the Czechs had no right to Teschen, a small coal mining town which had always been Czech, but which the Poles snatched away from Czechoslovakia when she was powerless in Hitler's hands after Munich.

Soviet Commissar Vyshinsky emphatically differed with Morowski. He pointed out that the Poles have peaceful means for settling their disputes, should not use the aggressive tactics of the Nazis. Finally Morowski subsided.

## Soviet Hold Slips

OTHER UNCENSORED diplomatic reports show that the Warsaw-Lublin Poles are getting tougher and more developments which for some queer reason, have been hushed up by European censorship:

1 Twelve Catholic papers are now being published in Poland. (There has been considerable opposition to the Lublin Poles by Catholic groups, on the grounds that the church was being suppressed.)

2 The Warsaw-Lublin Poles have indicated they want an alliance with the United States and Great Britain just as strong as that with the Soviet. This, they say, would guarantee Polish in-

3 Poles are already demand-

ing that the Red Army withdraw from Poland; also, that the Soviet secret police withdraw.

4 The Lublin Poles also resent the latest Russian attitude of friendliness to the German people, which they criticize as a symbol of unprincipled Soviet bidding for German support in order to counter-balance the pro-Germanism of certain British leaders.

5 The Lublin Poles also resent Russia's opposition to Polish expansion in the northwest, where the Poles would like to take over the German city of Stettin.

6 Finally, the Lublin Poles resent the fact that the Russians now insist upon bringing outsiders into the Polish government—in line with the Hopkins-Stalin conversations. Stalin promised Hopkins to give ex-Premier Mikolajczyk of London and other Polish leaders cabinet seats in the Lublin government, which means that some of the Lublin Poles will have to give up their cabinet posts. Naturally, they are sore.

So it looks as if the Polish puppet pot, which once boiled against the London exiled Poles, is now simmering against its friends in Moscow.

## Hands Off Churchill

ONE OF THE WELL-KEPT secrets of the last Presidential campaign was a statement Winston Churchill prepared urging the American people to reelect Franklin Roosevelt.

The statement, however, was never made public. Roosevelt heard what Churchill was planning to do and stopped it. He explained to the British Prime Minister that much as he appreciated his good intentions, the American people resented outside interference in their politics.

Undoubtedly Churchill was planning reciprocity for the help which Harry Hopkins had given him two years before. At that time, the winter of 1942, just after Pearl Harbor, Churchill faced growing criticism in Parliament.

So Harry Hopkins went to London and with Roosevelt's blessing dropped the word quietly in British political circles that the President of the United States appreciated the fine cooperation he was getting from the Prime Minister and would be sorry to see any change of British leadership.

*W. S. S. S.*

*File*

THE WASHINGTON POST  
DATE: 6-22-45

INDEXED

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0 AUG 24 1945

# Record Opened Over Protest By Churchill

## Roosevelt Knew Of A-Bomb Progress, Document Shows

By John M. Hightower and  
Warren Rogers, Jr.  
Associated Press Staff Writers

Publication of long-secret Yalta papers failed today to still the controversy that has raged for a decade over the wartime Big Three meeting.

The half-million-word American record of the historic session was made public last night by the State Department—reportedly over the objection of Prime Minister Churchill.

Secretary of State Acheson had said only Tuesday that the 834 pages of documents would not be made public now. The State Department gave no official explanation as to why he changed his mind. It was understood, however, that the decision was made after Republican Senators protested that the New York Times had obtained a copy of the papers.

### Atom Bomb Date Set

The papers disclosed that Premier Joseph Stalin had made a veiled threat of "difficulty" in taking Russia into the war against Japan unless President Roosevelt agreed to sweeping concessions.

*Yalta Conference*

Mr. Roosevelt did agree, giving Russia new strategic position in the Northwest Pacific and a powerful hand in Manchuria.

Significant in this connection, among the pre-conference documents, was a letter from Maj. Gen. L. B. Groves, head of the Manhattan Project which developed the atomic bomb. The letter showed Mr. Roosevelt was notified and approved progress on development of the atomic bomb several weeks before the Yalta meeting.

Gen. Groves' letter, dated December 30, 1944, predicted the first atomic bomb would be ready about August 1, 1945. As it turned out, the first combat bomb was dropped on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945. Japan surrendered eight days later.

### Three U. N. Votes for Russia

The record disclosed also that Roosevelt told Stalin and Churchill it was "very embarrassing" to him to yield to another Russian demand for Ukrainian and White Russian membership in the United Nations—giving Russia three votes in the General Assembly.

They disclosed long arguments by Mr. Roosevelt and Churchill

(Continued on Page A-5, Col. 1)

- Mr. Tolson
- Mr. Boardman
- Mr. Nichols
- Mr. Belmont
- Mr. Harbo
- Mr. Mohr
- Mr. Parsons
- Mr. Rosen
- Mr. Tamm
- Mr. Sizoo
- Mr. Winterrowd
- Tele. Room
- Mr. Holloman
- Miss Gandy

*file*

*BENIGAN*

*5-Whitaker*

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- Wash. News
- Wash. Star
- N. Y. Herald Tribune
- N. Y. Mirror

Date: **MAR 17 1955**

**60 MAR 24 1955**





ALGER HISS

### Hiss Says He Tried To Block Soviet Move

By the Associated Press

NEW YORK, Mar. 17.—Alger Hiss said last night that he unsuccessfully opposed Russian proposals at the Yalta Conference to admit extra Soviet republics as independent members of the United Nations.

Asked about the Yalta documents, made public by the State Department, Hiss said he has considered that "my position at all times was pro-American" rather than anti-Soviet.

Hiss, whose role at the Yalta Conference has been a controversial issue for years, clarified some cryptic notes published by the State Department as part of the Yalta documents.

Hiss' notes, written in an amateur shorthand, concerned the agreement at the 1945 Roosevelt-Churchill-Stalin conference to allow Russia three votes in the General Assembly of the United Nations, then being launched. Russia got votes for White Russia and the Ukraine as well as for itself.

Hiss was assigned at the Yalta conference to keep records and advise his superiors on matters dealing with the U. N.

He said last night he turned his notes over to the State Department when he left the service, "in the hope that they would be useful to my associates."

Hiss was released last November after serving three and one-half years in the Lewisburg (Pa.) Federal Penitentiary for perjury for denying before a Federal grand jury that while a State Department official he passed out department secrets for pre-war Russian spy ring. He has protested his innocence again since release.

- Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Boardman \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Parsons \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Sizoo \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
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- Mr. Holloman \_\_\_\_\_
- Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

# Britons Angry At Disclosures In Yalta Papers

## Critical of Roosevelt And Idea of Giving Hong Kong to China

By the Associated Press

LONDON, Mar. 17.—Britons were shocked and angered today by disclosures in the Yalta papers—especially President Roosevelt's suggestion Hong Kong be turned over to China.

The Foreign Office and British press generally considered Washington's publication of the records a diplomatic blunder. The "man in the street" was hopping mad on learning some of the inside maneuverings at the conference.

Talk on the morning commuter trains coming into London was more concerned with Yalta than even the current split in the British Labor Party over rebel Aneurin Bevan.

Critical references to the late President Roosevelt as a political schemer could be heard from Britons who heretofore have almost universally revered him as a great statesman.

### British Pride Hurt

The average Briton's pride appeared hurt particularly by two Roosevelt suggestions—to turn Hong Kong over to China and to exclude the British from the postwar administration of Korea.

Hong Kong, a British crown colony for 114 years, has been built up into the largest banking center in the Far East.

One Englishman in a black bowler hat—the trademark of London's Wall Street known as "The City"—was heard to say in a loud voice on one train:

"Roosevelt was mad if he thought we'd ever give Hong Kong to the Chinese. Why, it's one of the most valuable places left in the old empire. And it certainly sounds odd compared with the Americans now crying about giving the Chinese a few barren islands right in China's backyard."

Another remarked: "It's also nice to know Roosevelt tried to leave us out of Korea. I wish the British soldiers who died fighting there could have known about it."

### Cool to Big Three Talks

As for the prospect of Big Three talks the tenor of the curbstone debate was "who can trust anyone on diplomatic secrets."

The United States disclosures immediately aroused British fears that they would raise a bar to another Big Three meeting at the top level. The conservative Daily Mail commented that the publication "could help to discourage the Russians" from joining in such a conference.

Both Prime Minister Churchill and Foreign Secretary Eden advocate "open covenants secretly arrived at," contending that the Russians use public meetings only for propaganda platforms. When Sir Winston first proposed a top-level parley two years ago, he stressed that it should be confined to a few persons meeting in "privacy and seclusion."

TAIPEI, Formosa, Mar. 17 (AP).—Nationalist Chinese officials, bitterly familiar with the effects of the Yalta conference which gave Soviet Russia special rights in Manchuria, evinced only scant interest today in the records published by the U. S. State Department.

*File*

*W. H. ...*

- Wash. Post and Times Herald \_\_\_\_\_
- Wash. News \_\_\_\_\_
- Wash. Star \_\_\_\_\_
- N. Y. Herald Tribune \_\_\_\_\_
- N. Y. Mirror \_\_\_\_\_

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the elections will be held in a fair way. I do not care much about Poles myself.

"Stalin: There are some very good people among the Poles. They are good fighters. Of course, they fight among themselves, too. I think on both sides there are non-fascist and anti-fascist elements.

Prime Minister: I do not like this position. Anybody can call anybody anything. We prefer the terminology democratic parties.

"Stalin: I refer to the declaration on liberator areas. On the whole I approve it. I find in a certain paragraph the same expression, anti-nazism and anti-fascism.

"President: This is the first example for the use of the declaration. It has the phrase 'to create democratic institutions of their own choice.' The next paragraph contains the following: '(C) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people.'

"Stalin: We accept that paragraph 3.

#### Like Caesar's Wife

"President: I want this election in Poland to be the first one beyond question. It should be like Caesar's wife. I did not know her but they said she was pure.

"Stalin: They said that about her, but in fact she had her sins.

"President: I don't want the Poles to be able to question the Polish elections. The matter is not only one of principle but of practical politics."

A little later Mr. Churchill referred to the Atlantic Charter and said he had once sent an interpretation of his about the charter to Wendell Willkie, the 1940 Republican presidential nominee, who died before the Yalta conference.

Mr. Roosevelt asked: "Was that what killed him?" The record notes "laughter" in the conference.

The discussion involved whether France should be permitted later to associate itself with the declaration on liberated areas. Stalin said it would be better to leave it to the Big Three.

#### Postwar Planning.

The question of the role of the great powers in the postwar period was discussed at a dinner meeting on February 4. According to a record made by Mr. Bohlen, it went like this:

"Marshal Stalin made it quite plain on a number of occasions that he felt that the three great powers which had borne the brunt of the war and had liberated from German domination the small powers should have the unanimous right to preserve the peace of the world. . . .

"He said that it was ridiculous to believe that Albania would have an equal voice with the three great powers who had won the war and were present at this dinner. . . .

"The President said he agreed that the great powers bore the greater responsibility and that the peace should be written by the three powers represented at this table.

"The Prime Minister said that there was no question of the small powers dictating to the big powers but that the great nations of the world should discharge their moral responsibility and leadership and should exercise their power with moderation and great respect for the rights of the smaller nations."

#### Discuss U. N. Procedure

After Stalin and Mr. Roosevelt had left the dinner, Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden with the late Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, jr. discussed voting procedure in the Security Council of the proposed United Nations.

Mr. Churchill said he inclined to the Russian view that the procedure should preserve the unity of the Big Three, apparently meaning that they should hold the real power of decision. Mr. Eden "took vigorous exception," according to Mr. Bohlen, on the ground that neither the English public nor small nations would support such a principle. Soon afterward Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden left "obviously in disagreement" on a voting formula.

The formula eventually worked out vested decision on issues of war and peace primarily in a

big five group including China and France but provided for full participation of six elected smaller nations in the work of the Security of Council. Each of the Big Five was given the right of veto on major questions.

#### Asked Secrecy on Germany.

In a meeting on February 5 Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill talked about dismemberment of Germany. Mr. Roosevelt said the first paragraph of proposed German surrender terms did not mention "dismemberment" nor make the idea sufficiently clear. He said he tended to share Stalin's view that it would be better to include the word.

Churchill objected that "you don't want to tell them" because it would make the Germans fight harder. He said Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower was opposed to telling them. Stalin said the terms should not be made public until the time of surrender and added bluntly, "I want it agreed

(1) To Dismember and (2) to put dismemberment into the surrender terms."

Mr. Churchill said he would agree to a study "of the question of the best means of studying a method of dismemberment."

#### French Role Considered

Stalin said he would have no objection to accepting "some formula which would make dismemberment possible and it was eventually understood that the principle was agreed to. Germany was not dismembered, except into Communist and Western zones after the Big Three split.

Mr. Churchill said he felt the French should have an occupation zone in Germany. Stalin questioned whether this would not mean that France would become a "fourth power in the control machinery."

Mr. Churchill insisted and asked President Roosevelt's view. Roosevelt replied that "I can get the people in Congress to co-operate fully for peace not to keep an army in for a long time. The would be the limit. States troops are Mr. Roosevelt said "just as satisfied" while sharing in the were not in the Chinese."

# Yalta Disclosures Serve as Fuel for 10-Year Dispute

(Continued From First Page)

with Stalin over their demands for creation of free governments in post-war Poland and other Eastern European countries liberated from the Nazis.

Stalin agreed to a declaration and procedures for setting up democratic regimes. But within a few years the Soviets solidified Communist rule from the Baltic to the Black Sea.

The Big Three conference was held at Yalta in the Russian Crimea in February, 1945. Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill had met some months earlier at Teheran, mainly on co-ordinating military strategy against Nazi Germany.

## At Odds on German Methods

At Yalta they grappled with great political issues, including the future of Germany. The record shows they agreed on "dismemberment" of Germany in principle, but not on how it should be cut up.

But the overriding problem from the American point of view and perhaps from the Russian one as well was Russia's prospective entry into the war against Japan.

Russia agreed to come in once Germany was defeated. The war in Europe ended May 7, 1945. Russia entered the conflict with Japan on August 9, 1945, three days after the United States dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima. Japan surrendered August 14, 1945.

The agreement between Roosevelt and Stalin on Russian entry into the Pacific war has produced years of political controversy in the United States.

## Denounced by Republicans

Many Republican Senators and others denounced Roosevelt's concessions as an unnecessary grant of position and power to Stalin. Roosevelt's defenders have replied it was the price he had to pay to assure Russian military action against the Pacific enemy, as his military advisers were urging.

State Department officials are understood to have hoped that publication of the record would end the long dispute. It appeared, however, that the record simply furnish more ammunition for it.

In addition, a question was raised as to whether the published record was complete in all details. The State Department itself said some omissions had been made for reasons of national security or elimination of repetitious material or to avoid "needless offense" to foreign nations or to individuals.

## Cut at Churchill Request

Two deletions were made at the request of Prime Minister Churchill, the only surviving member of the Big Three. Adjacent paragraphs indicated they concerned Mr. Churchill's ideas of France's postwar position. Even with these and possibly other omissions, Mr. Churchill had declined to agree to the publication.

There were no major disclosures. The chief results of the Yalta conference had long since been known.

The Far East concessions permitted Russia to take over the Kurile Islands north of Japan, the southern half of Sakhalin Island and operation of the Chinese Eastern and South Manchurian railroads. The Russians also gained rights in the Chinese port of Dairen and the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base.

Except of the Kuriles, these were rights or positions which Russia had held 50 years before, then lost in 1905 through war with Japan.

## Stalin Cites "Difficulties"

In a meeting with Mr. Roosevelt at Yalta on February 8, 1945, Stalin said that if his conditions were not met "it would be difficult for him and Molotov to explain to the Soviet people why Russia was entering the war against Japan."

A record of this exchange was kept by Mr. Roosevelt's interpreter, Charles E. Bohlen, now American ambassador in Moscow.

Mr. Bohlen recorded Stalin as saying the Soviet people "understood clearly the war against Germany which had threatened the very existence of the Soviet Union, but they would not understand why Russia would enter a war against a country with which they had not great trouble."

"He said, however, if these political conditions were met,"

the notes continued, "the people would understand the national interest involved and it would be very much easier to explain the decision to the Supreme Soviet."

"The President replied that he had not had an opportunity to talk to Marshal Chiang Kai-shek and he felt that one of the difficulties in speaking to the Chinese was that anything said to them was known to the whole world in 24 hours."

## Sought To Internationalize

At another point Mr. Roosevelt said he would like to take care of the Russian interest in using the port of Dairen by making it an internationalized port. He related this to the question of Hong Kong.

"The President said he hoped the British would give back the sovereignty of Hong Kong to China," the Bohlen record showed, "and that it would then become an internationalized free port. He said he knew Mr. Churchill would have strong objections to this suggestion."

Nothing ever came of Roosevelt's idea about internationalizing Hong Kong. Nor for that matter was Dairen internationalized, although the Big Three agreed that should be done. The Russians simply took over it

Dairen and Port Arthur when they were able.

In the same conversation Stalin indicated to Mr. Roosevelt that he was considering moving 25 divisions of troops to the Far East when they could be freed from duty in Europe.

## Trusteeship Suggested

Mr. Roosevelt also told Stalin he had in mind for Korea a trusteeship by Russia, the United States and China until the Korean people learned self-government, which he thought might take 20 to 30 years. Stalin and Roosevelt agreed that no foreign troops should be stationed in Korea.

Roosevelt said he thought it was unnecessary for the British to participate, but they might "resent" being left out. Stalin said they would certainly be offended and should be included.

In addition to Mr. Bohlen's notes, records were kept by other staff members, including Alger Hiss, a State Department aide later imprisoned for perjury in denying he had given documents to a prewar Communist spy ring.

It was in his notes that Mr. Roosevelt was quoted as finding it "very embarrassing" to put the Soviet Ukraine and Soviet White Russia into the United Nations as independent members.

Hiss kept his notes in abbreviated form, having taken them in longhand. There was no official stenographic record of the conference, and the published record, aside from official documents, comprises independent accounts of members of the United States delegation staff.

## Churchill Reaction

After Mr. Roosevelt said he found the three United Nation votes for Russia embarrassing, Hiss recorded this reaction from Churchill:

"Church: If brought out publicly now without any explanation will cause trouble."

The decision actually was not publicly announced when the Yalta meeting ended. When it later leaked out to the American press, it became the first of the great Yalta controversies. Critics contended Mr. Roosevelt had made an unjustifiable concession to Stalin. The fact that no announcement had been made officially also stirred up a hue and cry about what were other secret agreements at Yalta.

The argument for trusteeship for democratic governments in the countries of Eastern Europe in many of the Yalta notes.

Exchange of views on the subject. Notes kept by Mr. Roosevelt. Matthews recorded that Hiss and I exchanged views on the subject. I said, however, that I did not think it was

BRANKIN

**THE AMBASSADOR IN THE SOVIET UNION (HARRIMAN) TO THE PRESIDENT.**

Top Secret  
MOSCOW, 18 July 1944.

Sent by the United States Naval Attache, Moscow, via Navy channels.

Personal and top secret for the President from Harriman.

I recommend that you consider omitting from your message to Marshal Stalin your (No. 27) the following sentence: "Your army is doing so magnificently that the hop would be much shorter to Scotland than the one taken by Molotov two years ago." The implication of this sentence is that Marshal Stalin should fly over enemy occupied territory. Because of the dangers inherent in such a flight I feel there may be resentment on the part of Stalin's principal advisors which might jeopardize the prospects of the meeting itself. Because of the real fear that I have of such a reaction by the Soviets I have taken the liberty of holding delivery of your message awaiting your reply.

**STALIN TO ROOSEVELT**

Apparently transmitted by the Soviet Embassy, Washington.

Secret and personal from Premier J. V. Stalin to President F. D. Roosevelt.

I share your thought about the desirability of a meeting between you, Mr. Churchill and myself.

However, I must say, that now, when the Soviet armies are involved in battles on such a wide front, it would be impossible for me to leave the country and depart for a certain period of time from the conducting of front matters. All my colleagues consider it absolutely impossible.

July 22, 1944.

**ROOSEVELT TO STALIN**

Top secret.  
(Washington) 27 July 1944.  
Number 32. Top secret and personal. For Marshal Stalin from the President.

I can fully understand the difficulty of your coming to a conference with the Prime Minister and me in view of the rapid military progress now being made but I hope you can keep such a conference very much in mind and that we can meet as early as possible. Such a meeting would help me domestically and we are approaching the time for further strategical decisions.

ROOSEVELT

**HARRIMAN TO PRESIDENT**

Top secret. Moscow, 24 September 1944.

Personnel and top secret for the eyes of the President only from Harriman.

This evening I explained to Marshal Stalin that you had asked Gen. Hurley to call on him to explain your concern over China and to give him personally a message regarding a future meeting. Stalin interrupted to say that he had been ill with the gripe when Hurley was in Moscow, that in the past he had been able to shake it in a few days but that this time he had been ill for several weeks. He looked more worn out than I have ever seen him and not as yet fully recovered. I explained that you had in mind a meeting in the latter part of November and that as it was too late for Alaska the Mediterranean might provide a suitable place. He said that a meeting was very desirable but that he was afraid his doctors would not allow him to travel. . . . I am satisfied that Stalin is anxious to meet you

- Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Boardman \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
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- Mr. Sizoo \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Holloman \_\_\_\_\_
- Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

but he is definitely worried about his health.

**PRESIDENT TO HARRIMAN**

Top secret. 4 October 1944.

Will you please deliver the following message to Marshal Stalin at once:

"While I had hoped that the next meeting could have been between you, Churchill and myself, I appreciate that the Prime Minister wishes to have an early conference with you. You, naturally, understand that in this global war there is literally no question, political or military, in which the United States is not interested. I am firmly convinced that the three of us, and only the three of us, can find the solution to the still unresolved questions. In this sense, while appreciating the Prime Minister's desire for the meeting, I prefer to regard your forthcoming talks with Churchill as preliminary to a meeting of the three of us which, so far as I am concerned, can take place any time after the elections here.

In the circumstances, I am suggesting, if you and Mr. Churchill approve, that our Ambassador in Moscow be present at your coming conference as an observer for me. Naturally, Mr. Harriman would not be in a position to comment on the Government's attitude to the important matters which you and the Prime Minister will very naturally discuss . . .

**YALTA DOCUMENTS**

CONFIDENTIAL

File 5-11-62-77668

By the Associated Press  
Following are textual excerpts from the State Department's compilation of documents bearing on the Yalta Big Three conference:

**Introduction**

In February, 1945, President Franklin D. Roosevelt conferred with Prime Minister Churchill at Yalta in the Mediterranean, with Churchill and Stalin at Yalta in the Crimea, and again with Churchill at Alexandria in Egypt. . . . No unpublished documentation could be found for the Alexandria conference, which consisted merely of a private conversation on February 12 between Roosevelt and Churchill.

**Pre-Conference Papers**

**PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT TO MARSHAL STALIN**

(Washington) 17 July, 1944

Top Secret.  
Priority.

Sent to the United States Naval Attache, Moscow, via Navy channels.

Number 27a. Top secret and personal. From the President for Marshal Stalin.

Things are moving so fast and so successfully that I feel there should be a meeting between you and Mr. Churchill and me in the reasonably near future. The Prime Minister is in hearty accord with this thought. I am now on a trip in the Far East and must be in Washington for several weeks on my return. It would, therefore, be best for me to have a meeting between the 10th and 15th of September. The most central point for you and me would be the north of Scotland. I could go by ship and you could come either by ship or by plane. Your army is doing so magnificently that the hop would be much shorter to Scotland than the one taken by Molotov two years ago. I hope you can let me have your thoughts. Secrecy and security can be maintained either aboard ship or on shore.

ROOSEVELT

- Wash. Post and Times Herald \_\_\_\_\_
- Wash. News \_\_\_\_\_
- Wash. Star \_\_\_\_\_
- N. Y. Herald Tribune \_\_\_\_\_
- N. Y. Mirror \_\_\_\_\_

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NOT RECORDED

MAR 21 1955  
50 MAR 25 1955

Date: 3-22-55

# Partial Text of State Department Papers on Yalta Big 3 Parley

- Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Boardman \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
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### SCOPE OF COVERAGE

The editors have aimed to present in this volume as definitive and comprehensive a coverage of the Malta and Yalta conferences as could be made at the present time. To achieve this purpose it was necessary to obtain much documentation that was never in the files at the Department of State, notably presidential and military papers. . . . Records of some of the conference discussions do not exist, and there may be papers of significance among private collections to which access has not been made available. . . . A few collections of papers have not become available, including those of Mr. James F. Byrnes, who attended the conferences as special assistant to President Roosevelt; Mr. Averell Harriman, Ambassador to the Soviet Union at that time, and more particularly, the conference papers of Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., who was present as Secretary of State. It may be doubted, however, that any of these would change significantly the basic record of United States policy here presented.

The records of the conferences themselves fall into three major categories: (1) Minutes of international discussions in which American representatives participated with either the British or the Russians or both; (2) documents which figured in the international negotiations at the conferences; (3) intradelegation documentation relating to conference subjects.

With respect to the Yalta conference there are minutes of all international military meetings in which the United States chiefs of staff participated. . . . No records were found, however, of the private Roosevelt-Churchill meetings. There are minutes or notes on most of the other political discussions but these are not so complete or definitive as might be desired.

For a majority of the political meetings at Yalta there will be found in this volume two or more accounts, generally in the form of minutes prepared by Charles E. Bohlen, Edward Page, or H. Freeman Matthews, or rough notes in abbreviated long-hand taken by Matthews or Alger Hiss.

The classification of the document (top secret, secret, confidential, or restricted) is included in the printed heading if such information appears on the document itself. It should be noted, however, that in 1944 and 1945 many documents were not given any formal classification, although they were handled as if classified.

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Roosevelt.

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*Briggs*  
*July 1944*

*12-12-44*  
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- Wash. Post and Times Herald \_\_\_\_\_
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*1355*  
*12-12-44*

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Will you please deliver the following message to Marshal Stalin at once:

"While I had hoped that the next meeting could have been between you, Churchill and myself, I appreciate that the Prime Minister wishes to have an early conference with you. You, naturally, understand that in this global war there is literally no question, political or military, in which the United States is not interested. I am firmly convinced that the three of us, and only the three of us, can find the solution to the still unresolved questions. In this sense, while appreciating the Prime Minister's desire for the meeting, I prefer to regard your forthcoming talks with Churchill as preliminary to a meeting of the three of us which, so far as I am concerned, can take place any time after the elections here.

In the circumstances, I am suggesting, if you and Mr. Churchill approve, that our Ambassador in Moscow be present at your coming conference as an observer for me. Naturally, Mr. Harriman would not be in a position to commit this Government relative to the important matters which you and the Prime Minister will, very naturally, discuss. . . ."

The above message will indicate to you that I wish you to participate as an observer.

I can tell you quite frankly, but for you only and not to be communicated under any circumstances to the British or the Russians, that I would have very much preferred to have the next conference between the three of us for the very reason that I have stated to the Marshal. I should hope that this bilateral conference be nothing more than a preliminary exploration by the British and the Russians leading up to a full dress meeting between the three of us. You, therefore, should bear in mind that there are no subjects of discussion that I can anticipate between the Prime Minister and

Stalin in which I will not be greatly interested."

—ROOSEVELT

ROOSEVELT TO PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL

Sent to the United States Naval Attache, London, via Navy channels.

Top Secret  
Priority

Washington, 4 October, 1944.

Number 626. 4 October 1944. top secret and personal from the President for the Prime Minister.

I can well understand the reasons why you feel that an immediate meeting between yourself and Uncle Joe is necessary before the three of us can get together. The questions which you will discuss there are ones which are, of course, of real interest to the United States, as I know you will agree. I have therefore instructed Harriman to stand by and to participate as my observer, if agreeable to you and Uncle Joe, and I have so informed Stalin. While naturally Averell will not be in a position to commit the United States—I could not permit anyone to commit me in advance—he will be able to keep me fully informed and I have told him to return and report to me as soon as the conference is over.

I am only sorry that I cannot be with you myself, but I am prepared for a meeting of the three of us any time after the elections here, for which your meeting with Uncle Joe should be a useful prelude, and I have so informed Uncle Joe.

Like you, I attach the great importance to the continued unity of our three countries. I am sorry that I cannot agree with you, however, that the voting question should be raised at this time. That is a matter which the three of us can, I am sure, work out together and I hope you will postpone discussion of it until our meeting. There is, after all, no immediate urgency about this question which is so directly related to public opinion in the United States and Great Britain and in all the United Nations. . . .

ROOSEVELT.

STALIN TO ROOSEVELT.

Secret and personal from President J. V. Stalin to President Franklin Roosevelt.

During the stay of Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden in Moscow, we have exchanged views on a number of questions of mutual interest. . . . Ambassador Harriman has

certainly informed you about all important Moscow conversations. I also know what the Prime Minister had to send you his estimate of the Moscow conversations. On my part, I can say that our conversations were extremely useful for the mutual ascertaining of views on such question as the attitude toward the future of Germany, the Polish question, policy in regard to the Balkan states, and important questions of further military policy. During the conversations, it has been clarified that we can, without great difficulties, adjust our policy on all questions standing before us, and if we are not in a position so far to provide an immediate necessary decision of this or that nature, as for example, on the Polish question, but nevertheless, more favourable perspectives are opened. I hope that these Moscow conversations will be of some benefit from the point of view that at the future meeting of three of us, we shall be able to adopt definite decisions on all urgent questions of our mutual interest. . . .

CHURCHILL TO ROOSEVELT  
(Seven paragraphs deleted by State Department.)

Paragraph 8: I was delighted to hear from U. J. (Churchill's usual reference to "Uncle Joe" Stalin.) That you had suggested a triple meeting toward the end of November at a Black Sea port. I think this a very fine idea and hope you will let me know about it in due course. I will come anywhere you two desire.

ROOSEVELT TO CHURCHILL  
Top Secret. 18 November 1944.

It does not seem to me that the French provisional government should take part in our next conference as such a debating society would confuse our essential issues.

ROOSEVELT.

SECRETARY OF STATE STETTINUS TO HARRIMAN.

In addition to myself and Bohlen, whom you know about, I shall bring with me to Argonaut H. Freeman Matthews, and Hiss, for Dumbarton Oaks mat-



ters, and four men who will act as secretaries. . . .

**CHURCHILL TO ROOSEVELT**  
Top Secret

London, 22, October, 1944.

(Four paragraphs deleted by State Department.)

Para. 5. We (Churchill and Stalin) also discussed informally the future partition of Germany. U. J. wants Poland, Czecho and Hungary to form a realm of independent anti-Nazi pro-Russian states, the first two of which might join together. Contrary to his previously expressed view, he would be glad to see Vienna, the capital of a federation of South-German states, including Austria, Bavaria, Wurttemberg, and Baden. As you know, the idea of Vienna becoming the capital of a large Danubian federation has always been attractive to me, though I should prefer to add Hungary, to which U. J. is strongly opposed.

Para. 7. As to Prussia, U. J. wished the Ruhr and the Saar detached and put out of action and probably under international control and a separate state formed in the Rhineland. He would also like the internationalization of the Kiel Canal. I am not opposed to this line of thought.

**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FILES**

The commanding general, Manhattan District project (Groves), to the Chief of Staff, United States Army (Marshall): Top Secret War Department, Washington, December 30, 1944.

Subject: Atomic Fission Bombs To: The Chief of Staff

It is now reasonably certain that our operation plans should be based on the gun type bomb, which, it is estimated, will produce the equivalent of a ten thousand ton TNT explosion. The first bomb, without previous full scale test which we do not believe will be necessary, should be ready about 1 August 1945. The second one should be ready by the end of the year and succeeding ones at . . . (State Department deletion) intervals thereafter.

Our previous hopes that an implosion (compression) type of bomb might be developed in the late spring have now been dissipated by scientific difficulties which we have not as yet been able to solve. The present effects of these difficulties are that more

material will be required and that the material will be less efficiently used. We should have sufficient material for the first implosion type bomb sometime in the latter part of July.

The plan of operations while based on the more certain, more powerful gun-type bomb also provides for the use of the implosion-type bombs when they become available. . . . (State Department deletion) the time schedule must not be adversely affected by anything other than the difficulties of solving our scientific problems. The 509th Composite Group, 20th Air Force, has been organized and it is now undergoing training as well as assisting in essential tests. . . .

L. R. GROVES,

Major General, U. S. A.

(Indorsements):

To S/W I think the foregoing proposal should be approved with your concurrence G. C. M (Marshall).

The Sec. of War and the President both read this paper and approved it. 12 30 44 L. R. G (Groves).

**CHURCHILL TO ROOSEVELT**

(State Department deleted four paragraphs.)

Para. 5. Major war criminals U. J. took an unexpectedly ultra-respectable line. There must be no executions without trial, otherwise the world would say we were afraid to try them.

**ROOSEVELT-STALIN MEETING**

February 4, 1945, 4 p.m.

LIVADIA PALACE

Present

United States Soviet Union

President Marshal Stalin  
Roosevelt Foreign  
Mr. Bohlen Commissar  
Molotov  
Mr. Pavlov

Bohlen Minutes

Top Secret

Subject: General discussion. The President said that he had been very much struck by the extent of German destruction of the Crimea and therefore he was more bloodthirsty in regard to the Germans than he had been a year ago, and he hoped Marshal Stalin would again propose a toast to the

execution of 50,000 officers of the German army.

Marshal Stalin . . . said the Germans were savages and seemed to hate with a sadistic hatred the creative work of human beings.

The President agreed with this. Marshal Stalin then inquired about the military situation on the Western front.

The President said he felt that the armies were getting close enough to have contact between and he hoped Gen. Eisenhower could communicate directly with the Soviet staff.

Marshal Stalin agreed and thought it was very important that the staffs while here would work out the details of this suggestion.

The President then inquired how Marshal Stalin had gotten along with Gen. De Gaulle.

Marshal Stalin replied that he had not found De Gaulle a very complicated person, but he felt he was unrealistic in the sense that France had not done very much fighting in this war and De Gaulle demanded full rights with the Americans, British and Russians who had done the burden of the fighting.

The President then described his conversation with De Gaulle in Casablanca two years ago when De Gaulle compared himself with Joan of Arc as the spiritual leader of France and with Clemenceau as the political leader.

Marshal Stalin replied that De Gaulle does not seem to understand the situation in France. . . .

The President said he had recently heard that the French government did not plan to annex outright any German territory but they are willing to have it placed under international control.

Marshal Stalin replied that was not the story De Gaulle had told in Moscow—there he said the Rhine was the natural boundary of France and he wished to have French troops placed there in permanency.

The President said he would now tell the Marshal something indiscreet, since he would not wish to say it in front of Prime

Minister Churchill, namely that the British for two years have been the idea of artificially lining up France into a strong which would have 200,000 on the Eastern border of to hold the line for the required to assemble a British Army. He said the . . . a peculiar people . . . to have their cake at it, too.

The President then said that he understood the tripartite zones in regard to occupation of Germany were already agreed upon, to which Marshal Stalin appeared to agree, but he went on to say that one outstanding question was that of a French zone of occupation. The President said he had had a good deal of trouble with the British in regard to zones of occupation. He said that he would (have) preferred to have the north-west zone which would be independent of communications through France, but the British seemed to think that the Americans should restore order in France and then return political control to the British.

Marshal Stalin inquired whether the President thought France should have a zone of occupation, and for what reason.

The President said he thought it was not a bad idea, but he added that it was only out of kindness.

Both Marshal Stalin and Mr. Molotov spoke up vigorously and said that would be the only reason to give France a zone.

**TRIPARTITE DINNER MEETING**

February 4, 1945, 8:30 p.m.

Livadia Palace

PRESENT

United States: President Roosevelt, Mr. Byrnes, Mr. Hariman and Mr. Bohlen.

United Kingdom: Prime Minister Churchill, Foreign Secretary Eden, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr and Maj. Birse.

Soviet Union: Marshal Stalin, Foreign Commissar Molotov, Mr. Vyshinsky, Mr. Gromyko and Mr. Pavlov.

Bohlen minutes: Top Secret

Subject: Voice of smaller powers in postwar peace organization.

. . . Marshal Stalin made it quite plain on a number of occasions that he felt that the great powers which had borne the brunt of the war and had liberated from German domination the . . . powers should have . . . right to . . . of the world . . . present.



He said that he could serve no other interest than that of the Soviet state and people but that in the international arena the Soviet Union was prepared to pay its share in the preservation of peace. He said that it was ridiculous to believe that Albania would have an equal voice with the three great powers who had won the war and were present at this dinner.

Marshal Stalin said that he was prepared in concert with the United States and Great Britain to protect the rights of the small powers but that he would never agree to having any action of any of the great powers submitted to the judgment of the small powers.

The President said he agreed that the great powers bore the greater responsibility and that the peace should be written by the three powers represented at this table.

The Prime Minister said that there was no question of the small powers dictating to the big powers but that the great nations of the world should discharge their moral responsibility and leadership and should exercise their power with moderation and great respect for the rights of the smaller nations. (Mr. Vyshinski said to Mr. Bohlen that they would never agree to the right of the small powers to judge the acts of the great powers, and in reply to an observation by Mr. Bohlen concerning the opinion of American people he replied that the American people should learn to obey their leaders. Mr. Bohlen said that if Mr. Vyshinski would visit the United States he would like to see him undertake to tell that to the American people. Mr. Vyshinski replied that he would be glad to do so.)

The Prime Minister, referring to the rights of the small nations, gave a quotation which said: "The eagle should permit the small birds to sing and care not wherefor they sang . . ."

### SECOND PLENARY MEETING,

February 5, 1945, 4-8 p.m.,

Livadia Palace

Bohlen Minutes

Top Secret

Subject: Treatment of Germany.

... Marshal Stalin stated that he thought it would bring up many complications if we should have four nations instead of three participating in the determination of German matters.

The Prime Minister replied that he felt that this brought up the whole question of the future role of France in Europe

and that he personally felt that France should play a very important role. He . . . went on to say that Great Britain did not wish to bear the whole weight of an attack by Germany in the future and for this reason they would like to see France strong and in possession of a large army. He said it was problematical how long the United States forces would be able to stay in Europe.

The President replied that he did not believe that American troops would stay in Europe much more than two years.

Marshal Stalin . . . repeated that he wished to see France a strong power but that he could not destroy the truth, which was that France had contributed little to this war and had opened the gate to the enemy. In his opinion, he said, the control commission for Germany should be run by those who have stood firmly against Germany and have made the greatest sacrifices in bringing victory.

The President remarked that he had also been through the last war and that he remembered very vividly that the United States had lost a great deal of money. He said that we had lent over \$10 billion to Germany and that this time we would not repeat our past mistakes. He said that in the United States after the last war the German property that had been sequestered during the war had been turned back to the German owners, but that this time he would seek the necessary legislation to retain for the United States all German property in America. . . . The President concluded. . . . That despite his desire to see the devastated area in all countries, in the Soviet Union, in Great Britain, in France, and elsewhere, restored, he felt that reparations could not possibly cover the needs. He concluded that he was in favor of extracting the maximum in reparations from Germany but not to the extent that the people would starve. . . .

### THIRD PLENARY MEETING

February 6, 1945, 4 P.M.

Livadia Palace.

Matthews minutes.

President: I should like to bring up Poland. As I said in Teheran, in general I am in favor of the Curzon Line. Most Poles, like the Chinese, want to save face. . . . The Poles would like East Prussia and part of Germany. It would make it easier for me at home if the Soviet government could give something to Poland.

Stalin: The Prime Minister has said that for Great Britain the question of Poland is a question

of honor. For Russia it is not only a question of honor but also of security. . . . It is necessary that Poland be free, independent and powerful. It is not only a question of honor but of life and death for the Soviet state. That is why Russia today is against the Czarist policy of abolition of Poland. We have completely changed this inhuman policy and started a policy of friendship and independence for Poland. This is the basis of our policy and we favor a strong independent Poland. . . . I prefer that the war continue a little longer and give Poland compensation in the West at the expense of Germany. . . .

Now as a military man I must say what I demand of a country liberated by the Red Army. First there should be peace and quiet in the wake of the army. The men of the Red Army are indifferent as to what kind of government there is in Poland but they do want one that will maintain order behind the lines. The Lublin Warsaw government fulfills this role not badly. There are agents of the London government connected with the so-called underground. They are called resistance forces. We have had nothing good from them but much evil. So far their agents have killed 212 Russian military men. . . . When I compare the agents of both governments I find that the Lublin ones are useful and the others the contrary. . . .

Prime Minister: I must put on record that both the British and Soviet governments have different sources of information in Poland and get different facts. Perhaps we are mistaken but I do not feel that the Lublin government represents even one third of the Polish people. . . .

### ROOSEVELT-STALIN MEETING,

February 8, 1945, 3:30 p.m.,  
Livadia Palace.

Present

United States: President Roosevelt, Mr. Harriman and Mr. Bohlen.

Soviet Union: Marshal Stalin, Foreign Commissar Molotov and Mr. Pavlov.

Bohlen Minutes

Top Secret

Air Bases in the Far East

The President said that with the fall of Manila the war in the Pacific was entering into a new phase and that we hoped to establish bases on the Bonin Islands near the islands near Formosa. He said the time had

come to make plans for additional bombing of Japan. He hoped that it would not be necessary actually to invade the Japanese Islands and would do so only if absolutely necessary. The Japanese had 4 million men in their army and he hoped by intensive bombing to be able to destroy Japan and its army and thus save American lives.

Marshal Stalin said he did not object to the United States having bases at Komsomolsk or at Nikolaevsk.

Far East: Russian Desires.

Following the discussion of certain military questions involved in the Far East, Marshal Stalin said that he would like to discuss the political conditions under which the USSR would enter the war against Japan. . . .

The President said he felt that there would be no difficulty whatsoever in regard to the southern half of Sakhalin and the Kurilue Islands going to Russia at the end of the war. He said that in regard to warm water port in the Far East for the Soviet Union, the Marshal recalled that they had discussed that point at Teheran. He added that he had then suggested that the Soviet Union be given the use of a warm water port at the end of the South Manchurian railroad, at possibly Dairen. He went on to say that there are two methods for the Russians to obtain the use of this port: (1) Outright leasing from the Chinese; (2) Making Dairen a free port under some form of international commission. He said he preferred the latter method.

Marshal Stalin said there was another question and that involved the use by the Russians of the Manchurian railways. He said the Czars had use of the line running from Manchouli to Harbin and from there to Dairen and Port Arthur, as well as the line from Harbin running east

to Nikolsk-Ussurisk connecting ~~there~~ with the Kabarovsk to Vladivostok line.

The President said that again, although he had not talked with Marshal Chiang Kai-shek on the subject, there were again two methods of bringing this about: (1) To lease under direct Soviet operation; (2) Under a commission composed of one Chinese and one Russian.

Marshal Stalin said that it is clear that if these conditions are not met it would be difficult for him and Molotov to explain to the Soviet people why Russia was entering the war against Japan. They understood clearly the war against Germany which had threatened the very existence of the Soviet Union, but they would not understand why Russia would enter a war against a country with which they had no great trouble. He said, however, if these political conditions were met, the people would understand the national interest involved and it would be very much easier to explain the decision to the Supreme Soviet.

The President replied that he had not had an opportunity to talk to Marshal Chiang Kai-shek and he felt that one of the difficulties in speaking to the Chinese was that anything said to them was known to the whole world in 24 hours.

Marshal Stalin agreed and said he did not think it was necessary yet to speak to the Chinese and that he could guarantee the security of the Supreme Soviet.

Marshal Stalin went on to say that in regard to the Chinese, T. V. Soong was expected to come to Moscow at the end of April, and he said that when it was possible to free a number of Soviet troops in the West and move 25 divisions to the Far East he thought it would be possible to speak to Marshal Chiang Kai-shek about these matters.

Marshal Stalin said that in regard to the question of a warm water port the Russians would not be difficult and he would not object to an internationalized free port.

#### TRUSTEESHIPS

The President then ~~said~~ he wished to discuss the question of trusteeships with Marshal Stalin. He said he had in mind for Korea a trusteeship composed of a Soviet, an American and a Chinese representative. He said the only experience we had had in this matter was in the Philippines where it had taken about 50 years for the people to be prepared for self-government. He felt that in the case of Korea the period might be from 20 to 30 years.

Marshal Stalin said the shorter the period the better, and he inquired whether any foreign troops would be stationed in Korea.

The President replied in the negative, to which Marshal Stalin expressed approval.

The President then said there was one question in regard to Korea which was delicate. He personally did not feel it was necessary to invite the British to participate in the trusteeship of Korea, but he felt that they might resent this.

Marshal Stalin replied that they would most certainly be offended. In fact, he said, the Prime Minister might "kill us." In his opinion he felt that the British should be invited.

The President then said he also had in mind a trusteeship for Indo-China. He added that the British did not approve of this idea as they wished to give it back to the French since they feared the implications of a trusteeship as it might affect Burma.

Marshal Stalin remarked that the British had lost Burma once through reliance on Indo-China, and it was not his opinion that Britain was a sure country to protect this area. He added that he thought Indo-China was a very important area.

The President said France had

(Continued on Page A-5, Col. 1)

(Continued From Page A-4)

done nothing to improve the natives since she had the colony.  
**INTERNAL CONDITIONS IN CHINA**

The President said that for some time we had been trying to keep China alive.

Marshal Stalin expressed the opinion that China would remain alive. He added that they needed some new leaders around Chiang Kai-shek.

The President said Gen. Wedemeyer and the new Ambassador, Gen. Hurley, were having much more success than their predecessors and had made more progress in bringing the Communists in the north together with the Chungking government. He said the fault lay more with the Kuamintang and the Chungking government than with the so-called Communists.

**TRIPARTITE DINNER MEETING**

**FEBRUARY 8, 1945, 9 P.M.**  
**YUSUPOVSKY PALACE**

Marshal Stalin acted as host. Present:

United States: President Roosevelt, Secretary Stettinius, Fleet Admiral Leahy, Mr. Byrnes, Mr. Harriman, Mr. Flynn, Mrs. Boettiger, Miss Harriman, Mr. Bohlen.

United Kingdom: Prime Minister Churchill, Foreign Secretary Eden, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, Sir Alexander Cadogan, Field Marshal Brooke, Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal, Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham,

ham, Gen. Ismay, Field Marshal Alexander, Mrs. Oliver.

Soviet Union: Marshal Stalin, Foreign Commissar Molotov, Fleet Admiral Kuznetsov, General of the Army Antonov, Mr. Vyshinsky, Mr. Beriya, Mr. Maisky, Marshal of Aviation Khudyakov, Mr. Gusev, Mr. Gromyko, Mr. Pavlov.

**Bohlen Minutes**

**Top Secret**

**Subject: General Conversation.**

The atmosphere of the dinner was most cordial, and 45 toasts in all were drunk.

In a toast to the alliance between the three great powers, Marshal Stalin remarked that it was not so difficult to keep unity in time of war since there was a joint aim to defeat the common enemy which was clear to everyone. He said the difficult task came after the war when diverse interests tended to divide the allies. He said he was confident that the present alliance would meet this test also and that it was our duty to see that it would and that our relations in peacetime should be as strong as they had been in war.

The Prime Minister then said he felt we were all standing on the crest of a hill with the glories of future possibilities stretching before us.

Justice Byrnes proposed a toast to the common man all over the world.

**SIXTH PLENARY MEETING**

**February 9, 1945, 4 p.m.**  
**Livadia palace**

**Bohlen Minutes**

**Top secret**

The President said he understood the foreign ministers had another report to make, and he would ask Mr. Stettinius, who presided today, to give it.

Mr. Stettinius . . . reported on the results of the discussion at the meeting of foreign ministers on the matter of providing machinery in the world organization for dealing with territorial trusteeships and dependent areas, as follows:

It was agreed that the five governments which will have permanent seats on the Security Council should consult each other prior to the United Nations conference providing machinery in the world charter for dealing with territorial trusteeship and dependent areas.

The prime minister interrupted with great vigor to say that he did not agree with one single word of this report on trusteeships. He said that he had not been consulted nor had he heard of this subject up to now. He said that under no circumstances would he ever consent to 40 or 50 nations thrusting interfering fingers into the life's existence of the British Empire. As long as he was minister, he would never yield one scrap of their heritage.

Mr. Stettinius explained that this reference to the creation of machinery was not intended to refer to the British Empire, but

that it had in mind particularly dependent areas which would be taken out of enemy control, for example, the Japanese islands in the Pacific. . . .

The Prime Minister accepted Mr Stettinius' explanation but remarked it would be better to say it did not refer to the British Empire. He added that Great Britain did not desire any territorial aggrandizement but had no objection if the question of trusteeship was to be considered in relation to enemy territory. He asked how Marshal Stalin would feel if the suggestion was made that the Crimea should be internationalized for use as a summer resort.

Marshal Stalin said he would be glad to give the Crimea as a place to be used for meetings of the three powers. . . .

**HOPKINS NOTE TO THE PRESIDENT**

**Yalta, February 10, 1945.**

Mr. President, the Russians have given in so much at this conference that I don't think we should let them down. Let the British disagree if they want to—and continue their disagreement at Moscow. Simply say it is all referred to the reparations commission with the minutes to show the British disagree about any mention of the \$10 billion.

**STETTINIUS NOTE TO THE PRESIDENT**

(Ribbon copy, bearing the initials of Stettinius as drafter and

the following penciled notation in Hiss' handwriting: "Bohlen says 'The President has already taken this up with Stalin with Satisfactory results.' (A. H.)"

(Yalta) February 10, 1945.  
MEMORANDUM FOR THE  
PRESIDENT

Subject: Recommendation that the three powers encourage Kuo-Mintang-Communist unity in the war effort against Japan.

As this is likely to be the final plenary session, I suggest that some time during today's meeting you find occasion to urge the Marshal and the Prime Minister to see that full encouragement is given by their governments to Kuomintang-Communist unity in the war effort against Japan.

TRIPARTITE DINNER  
MEETING

Vorontsov Villa  
Bohlen Minutes  
Top Secret

Subjects: Reparations from Germany.

Communique.  
British and American politics.  
Jewish problems.

At the beginning of dinner the conversation was general. . . .

After considerable discussion between the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin as to English politics, the President said that in his opinion any leader of a people must take care of their primary needs. He said he remembered when he first became President, the United States was close to revolution because the people lacked food, clothing and shelter, but he had said, "If you elect me President I will give you these things," and since then there was little problem in regard to social disorder in the United States. . . .

(Matter here deleted by State Department.)

Marshal Stalin said the Jewish problem was a very difficult one—that they had tried to establish a national home for the Jews in Birobidzhan but that they had only stayed there two or three years and then scattered to the cities. He said the Jews were natural traders but much had been accomplished by putting small groups in some agricultural areas.

The President said he was a Zionist and asked if Marshal Stalin was one.

Marshal Stalin said he was one in principle but he recognized the difficulty . . .

EIGHTH PLENARY MEETING

February 11, 1945, noon,  
Livadia Palace

Editorial note: There are no full minutes of this meeting in the Bohlen collection. . . . There is, however, a subsequent page in the Bohlen collection, entitled "Report of Last Day's Proceedings" . . . reproduced below . . .  
Bohlen Note  
Secret

At the last plenary session, the communique was discussed and most of the conversation dealt with the details of language, the results of which are apparent in the final communique agreed upon. The Soviet suggested that in the part of voting procedure no reference be made to the fact that the proposal accepted was put forward by the President. Marshal stated that there would be no objection to the President, or any other American official, making it public that the United States' proposal had been adopted, but he felt such a reference did not properly belong in a communique. The Soviet suggestion was adopted.



**THE FINAL DINNER AT YALTA**—A dinner as the historic 1945 Big Three conference ended in Yalta. The late Edward R. Stettinius, jr., then Secretary of State, is at left, lifting his glass. The late President Franklin Roosevelt is flanked by Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill. At far right is V. M. Molotov, the Russian Foreign Minister. The man seated beyond Stalin is not identified but next to him, face partly hidden, is Sir Anthony Eden, now the British Foreign Secretary.

# Reds Want Peace, Declares Wallace

**Not Inevitable**

## Churchill Sees War in Appeasement

London, April 20 (AP).—Winston Churchill said tonight that war is not inevitable but would be inevitable if Britain and the United States were to follow a policy of appeasement and one-sided disarmament.

The wartime prime minister made the statement to the Associated Press in reply to Henry A. Wallace's remark in a speech at Oslo tonight that Churchill "dare not confess publicly the private convictions of his group that war is inevitable."

Churchill said also he did not call Wallace a "crypto-Communist" in a speech last Friday. The text of Churchill's statement:

"I did not describe Mr. Wallace as a crypto-Communist. This misstatement was given publicity by the B.B.C., who made immediate correction on their misrepresentation being pointed out.

"What I said was 'We have had here lately a visitor from the United States who has foregathered with that happily small minority of crypto-Communists who are making a dead set at the foreign policy which Mr. Ernest Bevin, our Foreign Secretary, has patiently and steadfastly pursued with the support of nine-tenths of the House of Commons.'

Mr. Wallace says that I dare not confess publicly the private convictions of my group that war is inevitable.

My view is as follows: War is not inevitable but it would be inevitable if Britain and the United States were to follow the policy of appeasement and one-sided disarmament which brought about the war."

In reporting Friday's speech the British Press Association, an agency serving most British newspapers, omitted the word "foregathered." It said Churchill described the visitor to Britain, obviously Wallace, as "with" the crypto-Communists. Churchill described these as a small British group of leftist laborites and Independents, including some members of Parliament.

Wallace, in Oslo last night, said he was not a crypto-Communist but a Progressive Tory.

## Norwegians Told U. S. Public Doesn't Back Congress

Oslo, April 20 (AP).—Henry Wallace declared today that Russia is more anxious for peace than any other country. He charged the "majority" of United States Congressmen do not reflect the views of average Americans in their support of the "stop communism" policy.

He told a Norwegian audience: "We all long for peace but even greater than our desire is Russia's desire for peace.

"That desire is so great that I do not believe Russia will ever pull out of the United Nations."

### Defends Veto Right

Wallace said the United Nations faced the danger of becoming a combination of great powers aligned against Russia.

He said the right of veto in the Security Council and Russia's desire for peace, were the only two things that might avert the danger.

The former United States Vice President and Cabinet member asserted that the "hardening of certain lines" in the United States constituted the greatest danger to peace. He added:

"I saw those lines and left the Government."

### Assails Congressmen

In a reference to the Truman doctrine of aid to the Middle East, Wallace declared:

"The American people will turn to the United Nations instead of allowing the Government to build up its military might and to use force to push down freedom-loving groups as at present."

Wallace also assailed the "majority of American Congressmen" for their stand on the Government's policy toward Russia. He claimed they did not represent the opinion of the rank and file of Americans in regard to present Russian policy.

He concluded with the appeal: "Don't hate. Don't hate Communists. Don't hate Russians. If you believe in the United Nations, don't hate—understand."

- Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. E. A. Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Carson \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Egan \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Gurnea \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Hendon \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Jones \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Leonard \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Pennington \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Quinn Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Nease \_\_\_\_\_
- Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

*John*

**Wallace Arrives in Denmark**  
Copenhagen, Denmark, April 20 (AP).—Henry A. Wallace arrived in Copenhagen tonight on his European speaking tour after climaxing his appearances in Norway with an assertion that it would be unfortunate for world peace if anything happens inside Russia to upset its system of government at the present time.

Before leaving for Copenhagen he told an audience of 2000 in Oslo, that Scandinavians should preserve a friendly understanding of the Russians, and added: "It is important that the Russian system be successful as well as the American and the Socialist systems. Russia needs to feel secure so she will be able to give her citizens a greater measure of freedom to travel in and out of the country and become more friendly with other peoples."

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44-55

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81 MAY 3 1947

This is a clipping from the  
WASHINGTON POST  
dated 4-21-47 Page 3

62 MAY 8 1947

# Wallace Warns Of Anti-Soviet Combine in UN

Henry A. Wallace told an audience of 2,000 Norwegians in a motion picture theatre yesterday that there was a "grave danger that the United Nations may become a combination of certain powers against the Soviet Union"

"It would be unfortunate for peace if anything set back the progress of communist planning in Russia," Wallace said.

"I hope Russia is sufficiently secure in a few years to allow greater freedom of movement in and out of the Soviet Union. The only answer to the fundamental problem of international understanding is for

peoples to know each other better."

Referring again to American criticism of his speech abroad, Wallace said:

"If I think criticism of the United States will produce peace, I shall criticize the United States.

"I am confident the American people will arrive at a decision on the side of peace to use the United Nations and not to act unilaterally or use force.

"America will recover from the hysteria virus as a child recovers from the measles."

He was to speak at a farmers' meeting before taking off last night for Copenhagen, Denmark.

## CHURCHILL FEEVED

Plainly nettled by what Wallace said about him in Oslo the night before, Winston Churchill issued a sharply-worded statement saying:

"Mr. Wallace says that I dare not confess publicly or privately the convictions of my group that war is inevitable."

"My view is as follows: war is not inevitable, but it would be inevitable if Britain and the United States were to follow the policy of appeasement and one-sided disarmament which brought about the last war."

Churchill denied that he had called Wallace a "crypto-Communist"—a Communist who doesn't have the courage to admit he's one—but said that Wallace was associating with such people.

*Handwritten signature*

This is a clipping from  
Page 2 of the  
DAILY WORKER

Date 4-21-52  
Clipped at the Seat of  
Government 410

INDEXED

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63 JUN 3 1947

# Churchill's Condition

The sympathy of freemen everywhere is going out to Sir Winston Churchill in his indisposition as it did when he fell victim of double pneumonia during the war. Generally the British are not so secretive about the health of their heads of government as this country is. But this time there is a certain amount of mystery about Churchill's ailment. It is wrapped in enough vagueness, indeed, to give rise to rumors of a diplomatic angle—connected with the desire to have another postponement of the Bermuda conference.

Assuming that Churchill's indisposition has a political aspect, it is just as well to let the Bermuda conference slide a while. A conference sans agenda sans preparation would be bound to flop. As we said when the project was bruited, we see no present reason for it anyway. Most of the issues that would have to be tackled are in such a state of flux that there is no need to go beyond the ministrations of regular diplomacy. Korea is in a half light between peace and war, and no help, but rather harm, would come from "high level" interposition. Momentous events are beginning to stir in Germany, but they require day-to-day exploitation and diplomatic exchanges of the kind that will be undertaken at the coming meetings of Foreign Ministers. And in Moscow itself the succession fight for personal power has become so obvious that the talk of a post-Bermuda Big Four conference as a serious parley seems absurd. As one acid observer commented, "What do the sponsors of the Bermuda conference want to do, anyway—create another Stalin?"

However, the speculation about a political illness on the part of Sir Winston doesn't square with his consuming anxiety to go "high level" in world diplomacy. This anxiety may or may not be shared by the rest of the Churchill government; but, judging from the comments from Britain, Churchill's colleagues, in requesting meetings of foreign ministers, are equally concerned with their chief over a swap of news and ideas on Russia, with the view of talking things over eventually with the Kremlin. So, most likely, the Prime Minister is really ill. The curious statement issued by Churchill's son-in-law supports this theory. He confirmed that Churchill is suffering from fatigue. What Churchill has shouldered in the last six months would have finished a normal man. In addition to his prime ministerial and parliamentary work, he has taken over Foreign Secretary Eden's work, run a couple of conferences of the Commonwealth, and attended one ceremony or function after another in connection with the Coronation. Of course, Churchill is an iron man, but his is, after all, a human constitution.

Still Mr. Soames... The press of recent duties would... mental... Winston Churchill's ambition to wind up his illustrious career with some diplomatic coup or another... it would be natural if he has been in a state of agitation over the frustration of the Bermuda meeting. But beyond that, our guesses are just as good as yours. All we can feel as we follow the news of him is the same sympathy which is affecting millions of people the world over.

- 0-19
- Tolson ✓
  - Ladd ✓
  - Nichols ✓
  - Belmont
  - Clegg
  - Glavin
  - Harbo
  - Rosen
  - Tracy
  - Gearty
  - Mohr
  - Winterrowd
  - Tele. Room
  - Holloman
  - Sizoo
  - Miss Gandy

*W.A.H.*

G. I. R. -10

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63 JUL 21 1953

Date: JUL 23 1953



*Allyson  
W...*

By ADAM LAPIN

THE San Francisco Conference meets as the world is still steeped in mourning for the great architect of a lasting peace, of a durable association of nations with power to prevent aggression.

But President Truman has taken the only course open to him in refusing to postpone the conference, the course which his immediate predecessor would have urged on him.

The San Francisco Conference will mark the end of a phase, the preliminary discussion and drafting of plans for security organization begun at Dumbarton Oaks and completed at Yalta by Franklin Roosevelt, Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill.

In this country the conference marks the beginning of a new phase, of the crucial fight for approval by the United States Senate, without tricky reservations and crippling amendments, of the peace machinery which will be developed by the United Nations at San Francisco.

It is on this fight that the outcome of the conference will in a very real sense depend.

President Truman has made perfectly clear in his first report to Congress just where he stands on United Nations cooperation generally, and specifically on the problems of the San Francisco Conference. He stands where Roosevelt stood. He stands for the closest cooperation with our Allies. He stands for a security organization with the power and force to function effectively.

The American people of all political beliefs and all classes have dedicated themselves more surely than before to achieving Franklin Roosevelt's life work, to work for a security organization which will assure that our fallen dead will not have died in vain. They have responded to Truman's plea for unity behind Roosevelt's policies.

# WATCH OUT! Snipers Attack Frisco



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87 MAY 10 1945

This is a clipping from  
page 3 sec. 2  
THE WORKER  
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76 MAY 12 1945

**It Will Be a  
Difficult Fight**

But something else is clear too. It will be a difficult, closely fought battle, and a battle as important as its consequences for all nations and any which have been fought on the winning war fronts. It would have been difficult for Roosevelt. And it will be difficult for Truman. He will need all the support he has asked for. There are perhaps three main prerequisites in this battle: First, organization of the people to make effective their support of the San Francisco Conference. Second, coalition support in the press, cutting across party and sectional lines, for the conference agenda. Third, an educational campaign to clarify the issues and problems.

to identify and expose the enemies of San Francisco. Substantial progress has been made along the lines of organization to support the conference. In many cities Dumbarton Oaks weeks have been conducted, with the participation of groups of all kinds ranging from bar associations to trade unions. The CIO has been conducting a United Nations month to rally the support of its members for Bretton Woods and Dumbarton Oaks. Middle class groups like the League of Women Voters have been aggressive and active. Americans United, an organization formed to fight for the Roosevelt foreign policy, has emerged as a clearing house and a center for the diverse groups supporting San Francisco. It has helped to coordinate and knit together the work of various organizations supporting an effective security organization.

But very serious problems still remain in achieving the second and third prerequisites. No real coalition has as yet been formed in the Senate. The sheep have not yet been separated from the goats in GOP ranks. And this failure is closely associated with the failure to expose the proposals of men like Herbert Hoover and Senator Arthur Vandenberg which would wreck the San Francisco Conference and shatter the hope for world peace. As long as there is lacking widespread understanding of what men like Hoover and Vandenberg are trying to do it is almost impossible to drive a real wedge between those Republicans who support San Francisco and those who do not. Perhaps the clearest example illustrating the problem was the narrow one vote margin in the Senate against Senator Robert

Taft's proposal rigidly prohibiting the use of Lend-Lease for postwar reconstruction, even prohibiting the sale of Lend-Lease articles after the war. **Would Seriously Hamper Lend-Lease** This amendment would have seriously interfered with the phase of Lend-Lease by which orders for machine tools, explosives and the like necessary for prosecution of the war as well as for postwar reconstruction would have interfered with an orderly transition for Lend-Lease to United Nations reconstruction programs. It would have undermined the confidence of allies in the willingness of the United States to support them after the war. Only the day before Senator Vandenberg had in the Senate on Lend-Lease supplied a precedent for economic isolationism. He said that the United States is neither big enough, rich enough to become a dominant power to the whole world. He had given a battle to those who would fight Bretton Woods and the economic program which is essential to the success of San Francisco. But this was a party proposal. It had been put forward by a leading Republican, by Senator Taft, who is the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in the Senate. And it is Republican who have had a generally good record on foreign policy. The amendment would have been a serious setback.

This was not so much a political move. The use of Lend-Lease for postwar reconstruction would have been a serious setback. It would have undermined the confidence of allies in the willingness of the United States to support them after the war. Only the day before Senator Vandenberg had in the Senate on Lend-Lease supplied a precedent for economic isolationism. He said that the United States is neither big enough, rich enough to become a dominant power to the whole world. He had given a battle to those who would fight Bretton Woods and the economic program which is essential to the success of San Francisco. But this was a party proposal. It had been put forward by a leading Republican, by Senator Taft, who is the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in the Senate. And it is Republican who have had a generally good record on foreign policy. The amendment would have been a serious setback.

And it is a fact that there has been almost universal confusion in this country on the proposals put forward by men like Vandenberg and Hoover. Only the Daily Worker dissented from the acclaim for Vandenberg's speech proposing that political decisions made during the war be reviewed later on, be kept in a state of suspension. There has since been a gradual awakening on the meaning of Vandenberg's speech. But, again with the exception of the Daily Worker, there has been no public criticism in this country of Hoover's articles and speeches all designed to prevent a lasting and secure peace.

At the bottom of this idea to make political decisions tentative, in effect to make the accord of Yalta and everything it stands for tentative, is the deep-rooted anti-Soviet orientation of Hoover, Vandenberg and their supporters.

What decisions do they want to review? The inclusion of the Baltic states into that federation of nations known as the Soviet Union. The setting up of democratic states, committed to cooperation with the Soviet Union, in Poland, Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria.

### They Talk

#### About 'Justice'

And this same underlying anti-Soviet attitude marks every other proposal they have. Hoover and Vandenberg talk about justice. What do they mean by justice? They mean justice for the discredited reactionary and collaborationist states of both Eastern and Western Europe.

They neglect the rights of small nations. Again they grasp for those nations which have established friendly relations with the Soviet Union. They mean the

more important than they mean to undermine the whole basis for any lasting security organization. They mean to attack the fundamental principle that the Big Three are the cornerstone of the new collective security, that responsibility in the organization must be commensurate with the ability to carry it. And they mean to break up the big three by creating distrust and misunderstanding of the Soviet Union.

Consider, for example, Hoover's proposal in his Philadelphia speech that the definition of aggression should be enlarged to include "direct or indirect subsidized governmental propaganda in other nations." Here is a perfect set-up for anti-Soviet attacks for rehashing the ancient charges that the Soviet Union subsidizes Communist movements in various countries, for permitting reactionary governments to allege that the Soviet Union is guilty of aggression because of something someone said in a newspaper or a magazine.

The failure on the part of responsible political figures and newspapers, both liberal and conservative, to meet the Hoover-Vandenberg propaganda is one of the most serious threats to the San Francisco Conference, and to the successful approval acceptance of the conference decisions by the Senate.

### A Job for the Trade Unions

Here is a job of major proportions for the labor movement, for all the various organizations which are supporting Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco. That support cannot continue to be general. It must become specific. It must deal with the challenge presented by the enemies of international cooperation.

In his first address to Congress, President Harry Truman appealed "to every American, regardless of party, race, creed or color, to support our efforts to build a strong and lasting United Nations organization."

That appeal must be met by the delegates to San Francisco and



*Prime Minister Churchill, President Roosevelt and Premier Stalin at the Yalta Conference.*

We are resolved upon the earliest possible establishment with our allies of a general international organization to maintain peace and security. We believe that this is essential, both to prevent aggression and to remove the political, economic and social causes of war through the close and continuing collaboration of all peace-loving peoples.

The foundations were laid at Dumbarton Oaks. On the important question of voting procedure, however, agreement was not then reached.

The present conference has been able to proceed very rapidly.

We have agreed that a conference of United Nations should be called to meet at San Francisco in the United States to prepare the charter of such an organization.

It is the intention of the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union to attend this conference.



shouldn't have too much trouble merely crossing a warship infested ocean.

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\* **BROWNE, MARY MUMPERE SHAVER**  
See Shaver, M. M.

\* **BURNS, CECIL DELISLE** 1879—Jan. 22, 1942 Educator; former British Minister of Reconstruction; author of several books of political philosophy; opponent of the "fairy tale" method of teaching history.

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Time 39:40 Ja 19 '42

\* **CHURCHILL, WINSTON (LEONARD SPENCER)** Nov. 30, 1874—Prime Minister of Great Britain; First Lord of the Treasury; Minister of Defence

Address: b. 10 Downing St, London, S. W. 1, England; h. Chartwell, Westerham, Kent, England



British Press Service

WINSTON CHURCHILL

Winston Churchill was a seven months' child—although that fact does not entirely account for his early nickname: "Young Man in a Hurry." In *Time's* words "wholly English and part American," he was the eldest son of the Right Honorable Lord Randolph Churchill, the great exponent of "Tory Democracy," and an American beauty, the former Jeanette Jerome. His paternal grandfather was the seventh Duke of Marlborough, his maternal grandfather, Leonard Jerome, who was at one time editor of and largest stockholder in the *New York Times*, who founded the first two American race courses, and who represented his country at Trieste after the Civil War, making and losing several fortunes during an adventurous lifetime.

This descendant of aristocrats, statesmen, and adventurers spent the first winter of his life at Blenheim Palace in England, but his first recollections are of Ireland, where Lord Randolph went as secretary to his father, who had been appointed Viceroy of Ireland. Two years after the family's return to England in 1879 the small, headstrong, red-headed boy was shipped off to the fashionable and strict St. James' School, where he was miserable until in 1883 his family transferred him to a less pretentious school at Brighton. He was miserable again when he entered Harrow, aged thirteen. There he proceeded to puzzle all the masters by his apparent backwardness in subjects like Latin and mathematics as contrasted to his precocity in English composition. Relegated to the third division of the Fourth Form, during his public school career he distinguished himself mainly by winning a prize for reciting 1,200 lines of Macaulay's *Lays of Ancient Rome*, by becoming Head of Fags, and by winning the Public School Championship in Fencing. It was surely not an auspicious beginning.

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### CHURCHILL, WINSTON—Continued

Lord Randolph's son was not worried. He had spent the last three of his four and a half years at Harrow in the Army Class, and military matters aroused more enthusiasm than Latin declensions. After three tries he qualified for a cavalry cadetship at Sandhurst, and left Harrow with a light heart and a bad taste in his mouth. He "could learn quickly enough the things that mattered," horses and guns really mattered, and so it was logical enough that one of Harrow's failures should pass out of Sandhurst eighth in a batch of 150. In March 1895 young Churchill was gazetted to the 4th Hussars. Stationed in India, he improved his polo and his mind, devouring Gibbon, Macaulay, Plato, Aristotle, Schopenhauer, Malthus, and Darwin with little discrimination but great curiosity and a sudden relish for the sort of education he had missed. In 1895, during a three months' leave, he saw action, too. He had always thought it "a pity that it all had to be make-believe, and that the age of wars between civilized nations had come to an end forever"; now he at least had an opportunity to join civilized Spain in a war against uncivilized Cuba. At the same time he began his career as a newspaper correspondent by sending back reports to the *Daily Graphic*, and after his return it was not long before he was working away at a novel, *Savrola* (1900). This was the story of a political leader in the all too obviously imaginary state of Laurania, "a man vehement and of a high, daring cast of mind" who had a remarkable resemblance to himself.

Action only whetted the young soldier's appetite for adventure, and in the British Empire which he later described as "fanned by the quiet loyalty of hundreds of millions of faithful people under every sky and climate" there were still many opportunities. In 1897 transferred to the 31st Punjab Infantry, he served with the Malakand Field Force in India; the next year he joined Sir William Lockhart's Tirah Expeditionary Force as a "mere orderly"; and the same year, getting himself attached to the 21st Lancers, he served with the Nile Expeditionary Force and was present at the Battle of Khartoum. He collected a phenomenal number of medals for daring in action.

But during all these campaigns Churchill's had been a dual role, that of soldier and war correspondent for various papers. The real fruits of his adventures were two books which brought him fame and enemies, most of the latter in higher Army circles. *The Malakand Field Force* (1898) was full of the sort of advice and comment that made the brass hats snarl when it came from a youngster, and *The River War* (1899) actually dared to criticize Lord Kitchener. Besides, grumbled the generals, it was well known that young Churchill had succeeded in getting himself attached to all these various expeditions only by reason of the influence of his mother (Lord Randolph was dead) and her friends. Churchill looked the situation over and decided that journalism was more profitable than the military life, anyway—even though he was not yet command-

ing his later \$2,500 per article. A career in journalism being easily combined with politics, in 1899 he stood as a Conservative candidate for Parliament from the constituency of Oldham. He was defeated.

Then came the Boer War. An hour after the Boer ultimatum Churchill was off to the wars again, an excellent contract with the *Morning Post* in his pocket. On October 11, 1899 he put to sea; and a little more than a month later he was taken prisoner by a Boer eventually identified as Louis Botha, later Prime Minister of South Africa. After a month's imprisonment the incredible young man escaped, and, a price on his head, made his way to British-held territory after experiences that made uncomfortable living but good reading. By the time he rejoined the British fighting forces he was, without question, the national hero. He took off his uniform for the second time on July 17, 1900, and on the voyage from Cape Town to Southampton spent the great part of his time practicing election speeches.

Eleven constituencies were offered to the returned warrior, but at the general election in October, Churchill remained faithful to Oldham. The Tory slogan was "Every seat lost to the Government is a seat gained to the Boers," and Churchill was victorious this time. His book on the Boer War, *Ian Hamilton's March* (1900), was highly successful and tremendously profitable; his lecture tour, which took him as far as the United States and Canada, even more so; and when Churchill returned to take his seat in Commons it might have been assumed that his career would proceed in a less stormy fashion from now on.

It did not. Churchill had not rid himself of his habit of advising and criticizing everyone and everything in sight, including his own Party. Before long there was a little group of Conservatives in Commons known as the "Hooligans" because they shared this habit. The "Hooligans," like the Liberals, believed in free trade, and by siding with the Liberals on still another issue, opposition to the Army Reform Scheme, Churchill proved that an ex-soldier was not necessarily a militarist. By 1903 he was announcing: "I have passed formally from the position of an independent supporter to the position of a declared opponent of the present Government," and the Liberal Association of North West Manchester was inviting him to stand as its next candidate. Even more amazing to those who had known his father was a speech which he made about this time, filled with concern for the "toilers at the bottom of the mine," with indignation at the "great vested interests," at "aggression abroad," at "dear food for the millions," and "cheap labor for the millionaire." In the biography of his father published in 1906, *The Life of Lord Randolph Churchill*, one of the biggest sensations in English biographical literature, Churchill, however, showed that he believed that it was the Tories who had actually betrayed his father's ideas.

Fortune was with Churchill even in his change of party. The Liberals swept into power in 1906, and he with them. He received

his first state post that year, becoming Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies; in May 1907 he was also appointed a Privy Councillor by King Edward; and in 1908, when Asquith took over, he was made President of the Board of Trade. The last-mentioned change of portfolio required a by-election, and this time he stood from Manchester and lost. This was partially because of opposition by the exponents of woman suffrage to a Liberal candidate who was still Conservative enough to believe woman's place was in the home. But the Liberals of Dundee offered him their seat, and from Dundee he was safely elected. A few months later, in September 1908, he married a Dundee girl, the Honorable Clementine Hozier—"and lived happily ever after." (There are three daughters, Mary, Sarah, and Diana; one son, Randolph.)

As president of the Board of Trade from 1908 to 1910 Churchill worked closely with Lloyd George, then Chancellor of the Exchequer. At this time they were both thought of as pacifists and radicals, except possibly by pacifists and radicals. Churchill battled against the Naval Estimates of the First Lord of the Admiralty, introduced the Miners' Hours Bill, the Licensing Bill, the Small Holdings Bill, the Old-Age Pensions Bill, and the Education Bill, and campaigned against the House of Lords, which had rejected Lloyd George's first budget. He was returned in the 1910 elections in spite of continued opposition from the suffragettes and in spite of the fact that the Liberals were by this time losing ground. But then Churchill's "radicalism" was slipping, too. Given the office of Home Secretary after his election, he not only called out troops against striking workers on two separate occasions, but personally acted as "Scotland Yard commandant" during the famous attack on the anarchists of Sidney Street.

Nor did Churchill's opposition to armament expenditures withstand Agadir. Having impressed Asquith by a memorandum of his to the Committee of Imperial Defence in which he sketched the probable course of a war against Germany which he finally saw as likely, in 1911 he was invited to become First Lord of the Admiralty. Immediately he established a new board and made new war plans for the fleet, ordering a state of constant readiness. Between 1911 and 1914 he was responsible for the creation and development of the Royal Air Force (he himself learned to fly during this period), for the Navy's shift from coal to oil fuel, for the building of eighteen tanks, and for many other innovations. More than one of his changes were, however, unauthorized and accomplished only by the invasion of the jurisdiction of other departments, and there were constant battles over his high-handed methods as well as over Irish Home Rule (which he favored) and over Woman Suffrage (which he still opposed). But when the War came the British fleet was ready. On July 14, 1914 Churchill sent it to a station in the North Sea in order to remove it from possible danger of a sudden attack on seaports. On August 4 he sent the memorable telegram: "Open hostilities against Germany."

Churchill's role in the First World War is still a controversial matter. He himself has written a work of several volumes, *The World Crisis* (1923-1929), defending it. (Lord Balfour called it "Winston's brilliant autobiography disguised as a history of the universe.") Churchill has been blamed for the fall of Antwerp—where, incidentally, he took personal command of the defense after having been sent there to examine the military situation until recalled to his post of duty. And he has been blamed even more for the disastrous Gallipoli campaign, which was started on his insistence that, by forcing the Dardanelles, Germany could best be attacked on her flank. On the other hand, he and many military commentators claim that his plans would have been successful if they had actually been carried through as he had wished.

In any case, in 1915 Churchill lost the Admiralty amid a storm of criticism, and was appointed to "the well-paid inactivity" of the Chancellery of the Duchy of Lancaster. For a time he also had a place on the War Council, but when it was reconstituted he resigned in order to fight in the front-line trenches in France. For five months, until May 1916, he was a lieutenant colonel commanding the 6th Royal Scots Fusiliers. Then he returned to England to defend his conduct as First Lord of the Admiralty before the Statutory Commission of Inquiry into the Dardanelles Expedition, and to sit in Parliament. By July he was once more back in the saddle as Minister of Munitions in Lloyd George's Administration. "Not allowed to make the plans, I was set to make the weapons." He supplied the Army and Air Force with all war materials, equipped the United States Army in France, helped to sustain Italy after the demoralizing Caporetto defeat, and once more earned Labor's hatred by his "work or fight" order of 1918, which broke a strike of the munitions workers.

"Khaki elections" were always Churchill's meat, and he carried Dundee in the election after the War. Two offices were now waiting for him: Secretary of State for War and for Air. His main task the execution of the intervention against the Bolsheviks, he bolstered the Whites in Russia for two years, and in diatribes against the "foul baboonery of Bolshevism" invited Germany to join the anti-Communist front in return for all imaginable help from England. (He had already advocated lifting the food blockade against Germany after the Armistice.) Next, when in 1921 Balfour was defeated and a new Government formed, he landed in the office of Under-Secretary for the Colonies. As such he played a great part in the conclusion of the Anglo-Irish Treaty of December 1921 and in persuading Commons to ratify it, an act which won him the undying hatred of Irish extremists but the friendship of Michael Collins.

The next year was an unprecedentedly bad year for Churchill. Lloyd George resigned; he himself proceeded to lose Dundee by campaigning as an anti-Socialist (he believed that the Liberals and the Conservatives should unite against the Socialist threat); he was operated on for appendicitis; and, "without office, with-

### CHURCHILL, WINSTON—Continued

out a seat, a party or an appendix," he decided to retire. After a visit to the Riviera, where he dictated *The World Crisis*, he bought a pleasant English country house and spent a few months doing nothing more political than laying bricks, painting (a hobby which he had adopted when recovering from Gallipoli), and writing. His enemies rejoiced, but prematurely. An incorrigible politician, before long he was standing for election again—as an independent who would "engage the Socialist menace in mortal combat and, if possible, destroy it utterly." In the autumn of 1924, after one defeat, he was elected from the Epping Division of Essex.

Churchill immediately and miraculously assumed the place of second in command of the Conservatives. He was given the post of Chancellor of the Exchequer, a post which he held until 1929, when Ramsay MacDonald staged a comeback. There were five years in office, during which his most controversial acts were three: restoring his country to the gold standard; helping to break the general strike of 1926 by ordering other newspapers to cease publication and himself putting out the vehemently anti-labor *British Gazette*; and leaving the country saddled with some \$1,500,000,000 of debt. After Labor's short-lived victory (the first National Government followed soon after MacDonald's accession to power), Churchill, who was to remain a mere M. P. for the next ten years, visited Canada. There he worked on his remarkable six-volume biography of the first Duke of Marlborough, *Marlborough, His Life and Times* (1933-1938); and in 1931 he visited and lectured in the United States once more.

In the bitter years that followed, members of his own Party gave Winston Churchill the mocking titles of "Cassandra" and "warmonger" because of his speeches both in Commons and out, warning of the dangers of a policy of disarmament and appeasement in face of a rapidly re-arming Germany. (Many of these speeches have been published in the four volumes, *While England Slept* [1938]; *Step by Step, 1936-1939* [1939]; *Blood, Sweat and Tears* [1940]; and *Into Battle* [1941].) "Britain's hour of weakness is Europe's hour of danger," he announced after the Lausanne Disarmament Conference of 1932. Always his main concern was the British Empire. Even before the rise of Hitler<sup>14</sup> to power he had seen an embittered Germany as a potential rival, but at that time the Soviet Union and Communism itself seemed to him an even greater threat. He had therefore welcomed Fascism in Italy, assuring Roman journalists in 1927 that "if I had been an Italian, I would have been entirely with you from the beginning to the end of your victorious struggle against the bestial appetites and passions of Leninism. . . . Your movement has abroad rendered a service to the whole world." A friend of the Mediterranean accord between Italy and Great Britain, during the Ethiopian War he was to ask that sanctions be lifted against Italy, peace concluded as soon as possible, and the incorporation of Abyssinia

into the Italian Empire be swiftly recognized; as late as January 1939 he was to speak tactfully of Mussolini<sup>15</sup>, who had brought Italy "out of incipient anarchy into a position of dignity and order."

Hitler was something else again. Not that one could not "admire his patriotic achievements"; indeed, "if our country were defeated, I hope we should find a champion as indomitable to restore our courage and lead us back to our place among the nations"—but Hitler's effectualness in carrying out the program of *Mein Kampf* could hardly escape his attention.

Furthermore, Churchill was willing to learn from events. Although for two years he had supported the British policy of "non-intervention" in Spain ("I will not pretend that, if I had to choose between Communism or Nazism, I would choose Communism. I hope not to be called upon to survive in a world in a government of either of those dispensations"), and although his son Randolph was one of Franco's<sup>16</sup> foremost British propagandists, by April 1938 he was more dubious than he had been about Franco's "independence" from his Fascist allies. In November of that year he ventured his opinion that "the British Empire would run far less risk from the victory of the Spanish Government." Although a Conservative who would fight at the drop of a hat against even mild Tory proposals to give India a little more independence, who regretted the abdication of Edward VIII, and who believed that Roosevelt's<sup>17</sup> "war on private enterprise" was "leading the world back into the trough of depression," by this time he was also urging cooperation with the U. S. S. R. in the interests of world peace.

Before Munich, Churchill spoke eloquently of Britain's overwhelming need for planes, advocated national service as a realistic measure; after Munich, he announced, bluntly, to Commons: "You were given the choice between war and dishonor. You chose dishonor and you will have war." On the day the Nazis entered Prague his talents and energies were being used to complete a 300,000-word history of the English people. But on the day that England declared war on Germany his abilities could no longer be ignored even by Chamberlain, and he was back at his First World War post, First Lord of the Admiralty. In April 1940 he became chairman of the Armed Services Committee; on May 11, after Norway, Prime Minister, Minister of Defence, and First Lord of the Treasury; and October 1940, with Chamberlain's death, Conservative Party leader.

"War is a game to be played with a smiling face," Churchill once said. Sometimes this opinion had caused him to make mistakes. As Lord of the Admiralty he smiled, for instance, at Hitler's invasion of Norway; as Prime Minister and Minister of Defence he was still smiling, thinking of the French Army as England's strong and sure arm. But that Europe's hour of supreme danger, following the fall of France, was not Britain's hour of weakness was chiefly due to the confidence and heartening eloquence of the Prime Minister, who promised his people nothing but "blood, sweat, toil, and tears." "We shall defend our island, whatever



the cost may be, we shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing grounds, we shall fight on the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills; we shall never surrender." "Let us to the task, to the battle, and the toil." "Give us the tools and we shall finish the job." Churchill's speeches during the days when the bombs were raining on England and a Nazi invasion was expected momentarily were "battle cries, dirges for the fallen, and hymns of victory." He "brought back the arrogance and splendor of Elizabethan language"; and his words embodied the spirit of England, fighting alone until, with Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union, Churchill, Conservative Party leader who had in 1940 urged Allied aid for Finland, welcomed an ally.

Churchill has had to face criticism. His Government's policies toward Spain and Vichy France have been attacked; there has been criticism for the campaign in Crete, for the failure to open up a second front in Europe, for the failure to exploit all the potential resources of India and other colonial countries through a more enlightened policy, for the failure to speed up production to full peak; and long before the fall of Singapore bitter words were coming from Australia. Often urged to rid his Cabinet of the men responsible for a half-hearted prosecution of the war effort, he clung to his friends until after the fall of Singapore and the escape of the Nazi ships from the port of Brest, when for the first time it seemed that his personal position would be shaken if he did not make extensive Cabinet changes.

But it has been generally agreed that no other man can unite such a great part of England around him and his policies; though his faults may be many, his qualities are apparently indispensable and unique. He has therefore faced most debates without fear for the results should a vote of confidence be taken, obviously enjoying the discomfiture of less mentally agile opponents as he speaks in Commons, "his feet slightly apart, his short, stocky body rocking on his heels, his two hands grasping the lapels of his coat." In January 1942 members of the House of Representatives of the United States, Britain's new Ally, were treated to the same sight, as he pledged an invasion of the Continent in 1943. They, too, were carried off their feet with enthusiasm. Churchill's visit to the United States marked his second meeting with President Roosevelt since he had become Prime Minister. Months before, the Atlantic Charter had been drawn up during a conference at sea of the two English-speaking leaders.

It is strange that the man who is generally acknowledged as the best speaker of the world today has had to overcome the handicap of a lisp and a stammer. Neither is noticeable, for he lets his sentences roll out in a "curious dot-and-dash tempo" which has been much imitated. Not a good extemporaneous speaker, he memorizes what he has to say whenever he can, dictating it first to a secretary. Collections of his speeches have been prolific. But in recent years he has found time to write, besides articles and those books already men-

tioned, *Amid These Storms: Thoughts and Adventures* (1932); *My Early Life* (1934), published in the United States (1939) as *A Roving Commission*, an autobiography; and *Great Contemporaries* (1937), a collection of essays on such world figures as Hitler, Trotsky, Alfonso of Spain. His literary style is vigorous, vivid, and impressionistic, filled with frank egotism and exuberant humor. As one critic puts it: "Mr. Churchill wears the purple, it is true; but he wears it with gusto, and nobody can deny that he wears it with a difference." Obviously a man who can combine both a literary and a political career must be a man of phenomenal energy, and Winston Churchill is that. "Over-engined," someone called him once.

A "knack for looking crumpled," a "self-satisfied smile that trembles between a grin and a pout," a cigar, a "bulldog manner," and a "grotesque array of hats," paraphernalia which he manipulates with all the joyous unself-consciousness of a small boy or a born actor, are not the least of Churchill's charms. His interests are far from being purely intellectual. He enjoys reading history, biography, books on military strategy, politics, and economics; but he is capable of taking at least an equal pleasure in backgammon, tennis, the theatre (particularly revues and musical comedies)—and good food. "My idea of a good dinner," he said in leisurely and unrationed days, "is first to have good food, then to discuss good food, and after this good food has been elaborately discussed, to discuss a good topic—with myself as chief conversationalist." Lord Birkenhead once said: "Mr. Churchill's tastes are simple; he is easily contented with the best of everything." And John Gunther<sup>11</sup> repeats a remark which Churchill may or may not have made during a walk in the slums of the Midlands. "Fancy living in one of these streets—never seeing anything beautiful—never eating anything savory—never saying anything clever!"

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**CONNAUGHT, ARTHUR WILLIAM PATRICK ALBERT, DUKE OF (kon'ot)**  
 May 1, 1850—Jan. 16, 1942 Last of four sons of Queen Victoria; Governor-General of Canada 1911 to 1916; senior field marshal of the British Army.

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**CROWELL, T(HOMAS) IRVING 1867(?)**  
 —Jan. 12, 1942 Chairman of the board of the Thomas Y. Crowell Company, New York book publishers, with whom he had been associated for sixty years.

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**CURTIS, HEBER D(OUST) June 27, 1872**  
 —Jan. 8, 1942 Internationally known astronomer; famous for expeditions to all parts of the world in search of rare solar phenomena; head of observatories at the University of Michigan.

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**DOIHARA, KENJI (dō-i-hā-rā ken-ji)**  
 Aug.(?), 1883— Commander in chief of the Japanese Air Force  
 Address: War Department, Tokyo, Japan

Bland, stocky little Major General Kenji Doihara, in 1942 commander in chief of the Japanese Air Force, is an acknowledged master of intrigue. His reputation was not made in the air, but in Manchuria and northern China, where he spent long years as a secret agent, professional propagandist, and soldier-diplomat. A man with very strong "Pan-Asia" feelings who is supposed to have had "more Chinese acquaintances . . . than any living Chinese in active political life," he originated the pre-1937 Japanese policy of dividing China's northern provinces from those of the south by fomenting and encouraging "autonomy" movements and setting up puppet governments, and he tried almost singlehandedly to carry it out. To a great extent he was successful.

Born a poor boy in Okayama, Japan, in August 1883, Doihara became a specialist in Chinese at the Japanese Military Academy, from which he was graduated first in his class. Later he went on to attend the Military Staff College, from which he was graduated in 1912. According to John Gunther<sup>24</sup>, one of his early jobs was to support the Anfu group of Chinese leaders who ruled Peking (later renamed Peiping) with Japanese connivance and sold concessions to the Japanese at outrageous prices; and when the clique broke up he smuggled its leader to safety in a laundry basket. He served for years as an adviser to the Chinese Ministry of War, but his contract was finally liquidated when he fell under suspicion. Next he went to Peiping to become assistant military attaché to the Japanese Legation under General Honjo. He was already known as an authority on men and affairs in the most distant sections of China, and his talents were soon being put to maximum use.

In 1931 General Honjo was appointed commander of the Japanese Kwantung forces, and he immediately made Doihara (then a mere colonel) his chief intelligence officer with the title of chief of the Bureau of Military Relations and headquarters at Mukden, Manchuria, the "nerve center" of the Army's secret service. It is Doihara who was supposedly responsible not only for conceiving the daring plan which resulted in the "Mukden incident" and the subsequent occupation of Manchuria by Japanese troops, but also for bringing from Tokyo secret instructions to General Honjo which gave the latter full discretionary powers to act. When a Japanese officer was assassinated, Doihara spread rumors that the assassin was being protected by Chinese authorities. Tension grew. Finally, on September 18, 1931, a manufactured "bombing" on the Chinese Manchurian Railway line at Mukden, ascribed by the Japanese to Chinese terrorists, brought the Kwantung Army into action. The Sino-Japanese conflict had begun.

INTERNATIONAL

70

In London this week one of the very few living men of whom it could be said without question: He is a great man, celebrated a birthday. Prime Minister Winston Churchill was 70.

Three years before Churchill was born, Bismarck made the German Empire Europe's No. 1 power by defeating France. This same year, and as a result of the same war, Paris gave Europe the first example of a new revolutionary political form—the commune or soviet.

During the whole course of Churchill's life, Britain had been engaged in a hidden or open life & death struggle with Germany. In World War I the struggle had bled Britain white. In World War II Britain had had her closest squeak since Napoleon. More than any other single man, Winston Churchill had saved the Empire and in doing so had saved Western civilization. But there had been a price.

Now, as the Organizer of Victory looked toward Europe, he could not but feel: well done. Europe's No. 1 power was all but crushed. But that crushing had brought forth a new power in Europe. In the mighty form of Russia, the commune—the second of those political fates that stood near Winston Churchill's cradle—had emerged as a potential power such as Germany could never have hoped to be. Russia embodied a new form of social, economic and political organization—Socialism. Already most of Europe had felt her influence, as the heavings and threshings in the liberated countries clearly showed. And she was a vast Asiatic power. The mass of Russia in Asia weighed down upon the whole long northern line of Britain in Asia.

What did Russia portend for Britain and the world? Winston Churchill had invested heavily in the belief that Russia wanted and needed at least a generation of peace. Beyond that he could scarcely go. Even before that time had elapsed, Winston Churchill's task would have passed into other hands: "The old order changeth, yielding place to new—new faces, other minds."

For the present, the world might well say of him what he had said of his friend, South Africa's Prime Minister Jan Christian Smuts: "The great General Smuts . . . that wonderful man with his . . . eyes watching from the distance the whole panorama of European affairs, does well deserve our gratitude."

**New Power**

A plan for the formation of a new Balkan state—federated Yugoslavia—was announced officially from Moscow last week. A new chapter in Balkan and European history had begun.


Scarcely a month had passed since the

Red Army entered Belgrade. Sappers had removed 4,158 mines, 7,270 unexploded bombs, 76,298 live German shells, most of the hidden German soldiers. Partisan boys drilled in streets over which stretched banners emblazoned with new Yugoslavia's red star, Russia's hammer & sickle. Big pictures of Russia's Stalin, Yugoslavia's Tito stared side by side from every shop window. The grey-clad troops of the Red Army rolled ceaselessly toward the Hungarian front in U.S. Lend-Lease trucks. Overhead, Russian *Stormoviks* and *Yaks* roared.

**Empty Symbol.** At the gate of the Royal Palace, fierce, shabby Partisans mounted

¶ Until Yugoslavia was fully liberated, King Peter's interest would be protected by a regency. If Yugoslavs voted against King Peter's return, as Tito expected they would, the regency would automatically end.

**Approval by Moscow.** With this plan in his pocket, British-supported Dr. Subasich flew, not to London for the approval of Prime Minister Winston Churchill, but to Moscow for Stalin's O.K. After three days of Kremlin conferences, Stalin approved. Said the official Soviet communiqué: "The Soviet Government welcomes Marshal Tito's and Prime Minister Subasich's efforts to unite all truly



British Combine

**TITO, CHURCHILL & SUBASICH**  
*In the shop windows it was Tito and Stalin.*

guard. But the palace was an empty symbol. Young King Peter, exiled in London, might never live there again. Boys & girls of the Serbian Anti-Fascist Youth Congress chanted: "We don't want Peter, we want Tito." Said Tito: "Old Balkan differences will never again appear in the Balkans."

**Advice by Moscow.** For three weeks the Partisan National Liberation Committee had been busy creating, on paper, the new Yugoslavia. Twice Tito had flown to Moscow, conferred with Stalin and the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Viacheslav M. Molotov. Last week a plan for the reorganization of Yugoslavia was evolved:

¶ Yugoslavia would consist of six federated, autonomous districts (Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia), each with its own local government, schools, customs.

¶ Over the six local governments would be a central government, with a cabinet of 28 members, including the governors of the six districts. Tito probably would be Prime Minister.

democratic national forces . . . and to create a democratic, federative Yugoslavia."

Promptly, Marshal Tito promised amnesty to all the Chetnik followers of General Draja Mihailovich (against whom he had fought since 1942) who surrendered before Jan. 15. Tito also ordered 2,000 industrial and commercial enterprises, several banks, 30,000 farms nationalized.

**Territorial Demands.** The new power at once began to expand. Yugoslav Macedonians insisted that Yugoslavia's new Macedonian district should include not only Bulgarian Macedonia but Greek Macedonia.

Said Bulgarian Prime Minister Kimon Georgiev, whose country is controlled by the Red Army and Communist-dominated Partisan bands: "I can definitely state Bulgaria will create no difficulties." But Greek Macedonia is the richest of all Greek provinces and includes the big Aegean port of Salonika.

Already aging Dr. Josip Smoljaka, Tito's Foreign Minister, had exchanged sharp words with Italy's Count Carlo Sforza over Yugoslav claims to Trieste.

94-3-4-11-494<sup>33</sup>