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Foreign
Missile Developments and the
Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015
National Intelligence Estimate
December 2001
This
Estimate was approved for publication by the National
Foreign Intelligence Board under the authority
of the Director of Central Intelligence.
Prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence
Officer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs.Inquiries
may be directed to the NIO
through
the Office of Public Affairs on (703) 482-7778.
Preface
The
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has
requested that the Intelligence Community (IC)
produce annual reports containing the latest
intelligence on ballistic missile developments
and threats and a discussion of nonmissile threat
options. This paper is an unclassified summary
of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE)
that is the fourth annual report.
The
NIE describes new missile developments and our
projections of possible and likely ballistic
missile threats to the United States, US interests
overseas, and military forces or allies through
2015; updates assessments of theater ballistic
missile forces worldwide; discusses the evolving
proliferation environment; and provides a summary
of forward-based threats and cruise missiles.
We examine future ballistic missile capabilities
of several countries that have ballistic missiles
and ballistic missile development programs.
Each country section includes a discussion of
theater-range systems and current and projected
long-range systems.
Our
assessments of future missile developments are
inexact and subjective because they are based
on often fragmentary information. Many countries
surround their ballistic missile programs with
extensive secrecy and compartmentalization,
and some employ deception. Although such key
milestones as flight-testing are difficult to
hide, we may miss others. To address these
uncertainties, we assess both the earliest date
that countries could test various missiles,
based largely on engineering judgments made
by experts inside and outside the Intelligence
Community, on the technical capabilities and
resources of the countries in question, and,
in many cases, on continuing foreign assistance;
and when countries would be likely to
test such missiles, factoring into the above
assessments potential delays caused by technical,
political, or economic hurdles. We judge that
countries are much less likely to test as early
as the hypothetical “could” dates than they
are by our projected “likely” dates.
In
making these projections, we examine the level of success and the pace individual
countries have experienced in their missile
development efforts and consider foreign technology
transfers, political motivations, military incentives,
and economic resources. We have not attempted
to address all of
the potential political, economic, and social
changes that could occur; we have projected
missile developments between now and 2015 independent
of significant political and economic
changes. For example, some countries that currently
have hostile or friendly intentions toward the
United States could change significantly over
the next fifteen years. As we prepare each
annual report, we review strategic trends that
could indicate such changes in order to make
any necessary adjustments in our projections.
Key
Judgments
Most
Intelligence Community agencies project that
before 2015 the United States most likely
will face ICBM threats from North Korea and
Iran, and possibly from Iraq—barring significant
changes in their political orientations—in
addition to the longstanding missile forces
of Russia and China. One agency assesses
that the United States is unlikely to face
an ICBM threat from Iran before 2015.
Short-
and medium-range ballistic missiles already
pose a significant threat overseas to US interests,
military forces, and allies.
-
Emerging
ballistic missile states continue to increase
the range, reliability, and accuracy of
the missile systems in their inventories—posing
ever greater risks to US forces, interests,
and allies throughout the world.
-
Proliferation
of ballistic missile-related technologies,
materials, and expertise—especially by Russian,
Chinese, and North Korean entities—has enabled
emerging missile states to accelerate missile
development, acquire new capabilities, and
potentially develop even more capable and
longer range future systems.
Unless
Moscow significantly increases funding for its
strategic forces, the Russian arsenal will decline
to less than 2,000 warheads by 2015—with or
without arms control.
-
Although
Russia still maintains the most comprehensive
ballistic missile force capable of reaching
the United States, force structure decisions
resulting from resource problems, program
development failures, weapon system aging,
the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and
arms control treaties have resulted in a
steep decline in Russian strategic nuclear
forces over the last 10 years.
The
Intelligence Community projects that Chinese
ballistic missile forces will increase several-fold
by 2015, but Beijing's future ICBM force deployed
primarily against the United States—which will
number around 75 to 100 warheads—will remain
considerably smaller and less capable than the
strategic missile forces of Russia and the United
States.
North
Korea’s multiple-stage Taepo Dong-2, which is
capable of reaching parts of the United States
with a nuclear weapon-sized (several hundred
kg) payload, may be ready for flight-testing.
-
North
Korea in May 2001, however, extended its
voluntary moratorium on long-range missile
flight-testing until 2003, provided that
negotiations with the United States proceed.
Iran
is pursuing short- and long-range missile capabilities.
- Tehran
has 1,300-km-range Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic
missiles (MRBMs) that could be launched in
a conflict.
Iran
is pursuing an ICBM/space launch vehicle (SLV)
system. All agencies agree that Iran could
attempt a launch in mid-decade, but Tehran is
likely to take until the last half of the
decade to flight test an ICBM/SLV; one agency
further believes that Iran is unlikely to conduct
a successful test until after 2015.
Iraq,
constrained by international sanctions and prohibitions,
wants a long-range missile and probably retains
a small, covert force of Scud-variant missiles.
-
If
UN prohibitions were eliminated or significantly
reduced, Iraq would be likely to spend several
years reestablishing its short-range ballistic
missile (SRBM) force, developing and deploying
solid-propellant systems, and pursuing MRBMs.
-
All
agencies agree that Iraq could test
different ICBM concepts before 2015 if UN
prohibitions were eliminated in the next
few years. Most agencies, however, believe
that it is unlikely to do so, even
if the prohibitions were eliminated. Some
believe that if prohibitions were eliminated
Iraq would be likely to test an ICBM
masked as an SLV before 2015, possibly before
2010 if it received foreign technology.
Several
countries could develop a mechanism to
launch SRBMs, MRBMs, or land-attack cruise missiles
from forward-based ships or other platforms;
a few are likely to do so—more likely
for cruise missiles—before 2015.
Nonmissile
means for delivering weapons of mass destruction
do not provide the same prestige, deterrence,
and coercive diplomacy as ICBMs; but they are
less expensive, more reliable and accurate,
more effective for disseminating biological
warfare agents, can be used without attribution,
and would avoid missile defenses.
Foreign
nonstate actors—including terrorist, insurgent,
or extremist groups that have threatened or
have the ability to attack the United States
or its interests—have expressed an interest
in chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear
(CBRN) materials.
Introduction
The
ballistic missile remains a central element
in the military arsenals of nations around the
globe and almost certainly will retain this
status over the next fifteen years. States
willingly devote often scarce resources in efforts
to develop or acquire ballistic missiles; build
the infrastructures necessary to sustain future
development and production; and actively pursue
technologies, materials, and personnel on the
world market to compensate for domestic shortfalls,
gain increased expertise, and potentially shorten
development timelines.
Most
US Intelligence Community agencies project that
during the next 15 years the United States most
likely will face ICBM threats from North Korea
and Iran, and possibly Iraq—barring significant
changes in their political orientations—in addition
to the strategic forces of Russia and China.
One agency assesses that the United States is
unlikely to face an ICBM threat from Iran before
2015.
The
threats to the US homeland, nevertheless, will
consist of dramatically fewer warheads than
today owing to significant reductions in Russian
strategic forces. China has been modernizing
its long-range strategic missile force since
the mid-1980s, shifting from reliance primarily
on silo-based liquid-propellant CSS-4s to mobile
solid-propellant systems. The Intelligence
Community projects that by
2015, the total number of Chinese strategic
warheads will rise several-fold, though it will
remain still well below the number of Russian
or US forces.
North
Korea has extended until 2003 the missile launch
moratorium it announced late in 1999, although
the North continues to work on the Taepo Dong-2
program. The Taepo Dong-2—capable of reaching
parts of the United States with a nuclear weapon-sized
payload—may be ready for flight-testing. The
initial test likely would be conducted in a
space launch configuration. Iran also is pursuing
a longer range missile capability.
Short-
and medium-range ballistic missiles, particularly
if armed with WMD, already pose a significant
threat overseas to US interests, military forces,
and allies. Moreover, the proliferation of
missile technology and components continues,
contributing both to the production of SRBMs
and MRBMs and to the development of even longer
range systems.
The
trend in ballistic missile development worldwide
is toward a maturation process among existing
ballistic missile programs rather than toward
a large increase in the number of countries
possessing ballistic missiles. Emerging ballistic
missile states continue to increase the range,
reliability, and accuracy of the missile systems
in their inventories—posing ever greater risks
to US forces, interests, and allies throughout
the world. A decade ago, US and allied forces
abroad faced threats from SRBMs—primarily the
Scud and its variants. Today, countries have
deployed or are on the verge of deploying MRBMs,
placing greater numbers of targets at risk.
Proliferation
of ballistic missile-related technologies, materials,
and expertise—especially by Russian, Chinese,
and North Korean entities—has enabled emerging
missile states to accelerate the development
timelines for their existing programs, acquire
turnkey systems to gain previously non-existent
capabilities—in the case of the Chinese sale
of the M-11 SRBM to Pakistan—and lay the groundwork
for the expansion of domestic infrastructures
to potentially accommodate even more capable
and longer range future systems.
North
Korea has assumed the role as the missile and
manufacturing technology source for many programs.
North Korean willingness to sell complete systems
and components has enabled other states to acquire
longer range capabilities earlier than otherwise
would have been possible—notably the sale of
the No Dong MRBM to Pakistan. The North also
has helped countries to acquire technologies
to serve as the basis for domestic development
efforts—as with Iran’s reverse-engineering of
the No Dong in the Shahab-3 program. Meanwhile,
Iran is expanding its efforts to sell missile
technology.
States
with emerging missile programs inevitably will
run into problems that will delay and frustrate
their desired development timelines. The impact
of these problems increases with the lack of
maturity of the program and depends on the level
of foreign assistance. Most emerging missile
states are highly dependent on foreign assistance
at this stage of their development efforts,
and disturbance of the technology and information
flow to their programs will have discernible
short-term effects. The ready availability
of assistance from multiple sources, however,
makes it likely that most emerging missile states
will be able to resolve such problems and advance
their missile programs, albeit with a slippage
in development time.
Projecting
When a Country Could and Is Likely
To Test an ICBM
Expertise
from inside and outside the Intelligence Community
was used to examine many possible options
for ICBM development and to determine when
a country could test each option, based
largely on technical, industrial, and economic
capabilities. These judgments indicate when
countries would be capable of testing if they
met certain conditions, such as beginning
engine testing by a certain date. This formulation
also addresses what a country may be capable
of achieving if a decision were made to try
to field a missile as rapidly as possible
and if the program progressed without significant
delays. Other factors—including potential
technical problems, motivations and intentions,
and political and economic delays—then were
applied to assess the likely timing of the
country testing an ICBM. These judgments
provide the Intelligence Community assessments
of the most likely course of events
based on a variety of factors.
Providing
assessments of when a country could
and is likely to test an ICBM takes
into account uncertainties and cases where
a solid evidentiary base is not available
for making more definitive assessments. The
availability of foreign assistance is frequently
a critical driver in both formulations, and
is so noted, especially when foreign assistance
accelerates the program dramatically. These
assessments of future missile developments
are, by their nature, subjective. This
Estimate examines the level of success and
the pace individual countries have experienced
in their missile development efforts and considers
foreign technology transfers, political motivations,
military incentives, and economic resources.
But it does not attempt to address
all of the potential political, economic,
and social changes that could occur; it
projects missile developments between now
and 2015 independent of significant
political and economic changes. As each annual
report is prepared, we review strategic trends
that could indicate such changes and make
necessary adjustments to the projections.
The
probability that a missile with a weapon of
mass destruction will be used against US
forces or interests is higher today than
during most of the Cold War, and it will continue
to grow as the capabilities of potential adversaries
mature. More nations have ballistic missiles,[1] and they have already been used against US and allied
forces during the Gulf war. Although the missiles
used in the Gulf war did not have WMD warheads,
Iraq had weaponized ballistic missile warheads
with BW and CW agents and they were available
for use.
Some
of the states armed with missiles have exhibited
a willingness to use chemical weapons with other
delivery means. In addition, some nonstate
entities are seeking chemical, biological, radiological,
and nuclear (CBRN) materials and would be willing
to use them without missiles. In fact, US territory
is more likely to be attacked with these materials
from nonmissile delivery means—most likely from
terrorists—than by missiles, primarily because
nonmissile delivery means are less costly, easier
to acquire, and more reliable and accurate.
They also can be used without attribution.
Nevertheless, the missile threat will continue
to grow, in part because missiles have become
important regional weapons in the arsenals of
numerous countries. Moreover, missiles provide
a level of prestige, coercive diplomacy, and
deterrence that nonmissile means do not.
Russia
Russia
maintains the most comprehensive ballistic missile
force capable of reaching the United States,
although force structure decisions resulting
from resource problems, program development
failures, weapon system aging, the dissolution
of the Soviet Union, and arms control treaties
have resulted in a steep decline in Russian
strategic nuclear forces over the last 10 years.
From a high of approximately 10,000 warheads
in 1990, Russia now maintains almost 4,000 warheads
on its ICBMs and SLBMs.
SLBMs
The disintegration of the Soviet Union,
developmental problems, and resource constraints
have resulted in significant SSBN/SLBM program
delays and the requirement to simultaneously
extend the service lives of older systems while
maintaining newer, more capable systems.
The
Intelligence Community has various projections
of Russia’s strategic forces for 2015, all less
than 2,000 deployed nuclear weapons. The availability
of resources, inclusion of missiles with multiple
independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs),
and the success of development programs are
the key factors in determining the ultimate
force size.
Theater
Ballistic Missile Force
Russia
has the most technologically evolved and best-equipped,
maintained, and trained theater ballistic missile
force in the world today. The SS-21 and SS-26
SRBMs provide Russian general-purpose ground
forces with a rapid, precision-guided, theater
deep-strike capability.
China
Strategic Missile
Forces
China's
current ICBM force consists of large, liquid-propellant
missiles armed with single nuclear warheads.
Of these ICBMs, about 20 are CSS-4 silo-based
missiles that can reach targets in the United
States. The Chinese also have about a dozen
CSS-3 ICBMs that are almost certainly intended
as a retaliatory deterrent against targets in
Russia and Asia. China also has a medium-range
SLBM (the CSS-NX-3/JL-1).
Beijing
is concerned about the survivability of its
strategic deterrent against the United States
and has a long-running modernization program
to develop mobile, solid-propellant ICBMs.
The IC projects that by 2015, most of China’s
strategic missile force will be mobile.
China
has three new, mobile, solid-propellant strategic
missiles in development—the road-mobile CSS-X-10
ICBM (also called the
DF-31), which is now in the flight-test stage;
a longer range version of the DF-31; and the
JL-2 SLBM. This modernization effort, which
dates from the mid-1980s, forms the foundation
of Beijing’s efforts to field a modern, mobile,
and more survivable strategic missile force.
China
has had the capability to develop and deploy
a multiple reentry vehicle system[3] for many years, including
a MIRV system. The IC assesses that China could
develop a multiple RV system for the CSS-4 ICBM
in a few years. Chinese pursuit of a multiple
RV capability for its mobile ICBMs and
SLBMs would encounter significant technical
hurdles and would be costly.
The
IC has differing projections of the overall
size of Chinese strategic ballistic missile
forces over the next 15 years, ranging from
about 75 to 100 warheads deployed primarily
against the United States. MIRVing and missile
defense counter-measures would be factors in
the ultimate size of the force. In addition,
China would have about two dozen shorter range
DF-31 and CSS-3 ICBMs that could reach parts
of the United States.
Theater
Ballistic Missile Force
China
maintains a robust CSS-5 MRBM force and continues
to increase the capabilities of its SRBM force
deployed opposite Taiwan.
Conventionally
Armed Ballistic Missiles
China’s
leaders calculate that conventionally armed
ballistic missiles add a potent new dimension
to Chinese military capabilities, and they
are committed to continue fielding them at
a rapid pace. Beijing’s growing SRBM force
provides China with a military capability
that avoids the political and practical constraints
associated with the use of nuclear-armed missiles.
The latest Chinese SRBMs provide a survivable
and effective conventional strike force and
expand conventional ballistic missile coverage.
The
IC projects an SRBM force in 2005 of several
hundred missiles.
North
Korea
North
Korea has hundreds of Scuds and No Dong missiles
and continues to develop the longer range Taepo
Dong-2, which will enable the North to target
the United States. In May 2001, however, Kim
Chong-il unilaterally extended the North’s voluntary
flight-test moratorium—in effect since 1999—until
2003, provided negotiations with the United
States proceeded.
Ballistic Missile
Programs
Taepo
Dong-2
The multiple-stage Taepo Dong-2—capable
of reaching parts of the United States with
a nuclear weapon-sized payload—may be ready
for flight-testing. The North probably also
is working on improvements to its current design.
The
Taepo Dong-2 in a two-stage ballistic missile
configuration could deliver a several-hundred-kg
payload up to 10,000 km—sufficient to strike
Alaska, Hawaii, and parts of the continental
United States. If the North uses a third stage
similar to the one used on the Taepo Dong-1
in 1998 in a ballistic missile configuration,
then the Taepo Dong-2 could deliver a several-hundred-kg
payload up to 15,000 km—sufficient to strike
all of North America. A Taepo Dong-2 flight
test probably would be conducted as an SLV with
a third stage to place a small payload into
the same orbit the North Koreans tried to achieve
in 1998.
No
Dong
The 1,300-km-range No Dong remains the longest-range
ballistic missile North Korea has deployed.
WMD
Payload Options
The
Intelligence Community judged in the mid-1990s
that North Korea had produced one, possibly
two, nuclear weapons, although the North has
frozen plutonium production activities at Yongbyon
in accordance with the Agreed Framework of 1994.
North Korea also has chemical and biological
weapons programs.
Foreign
Assistance
North
Korea is nearly self-sufficient in developing
and producing ballistic missiles and has demonstrated
a willingness to sell complete systems and components
that have enabled other states to acquire longer
range capabilities earlier than would otherwise
have been possible and to acquire the basis
for domestic development efforts.
Iran
Iran’s
missile inventory is among the largest in the
Middle East and includes some 1,300-km-range
Shahab-3 MRBMs, a few hundred SRBMs, and a variety
of unguided rockets. Tehran’s
longstanding commitment to its ballistic missile
programs—for deterrence and war-fighting—is
unlikely to diminish.
Ballistic Missile Programs
Shahab-3.
The 1,300-km-range Shahab-3 MRBM—based
on the North Korean No Dong—is in the late stages
of development.
ICBMs/SLVs
In addition to SRBM and MRBM development,
Iran is likely to develop space launch vehicles
to put satellites into orbit and to establish
the technical base from which it could develop
IRBMs/ICBMs capable of delivering payloads to
Western Europe and the United States. Iran
is likely to test these vehicles initially as
SLVs and not as ballistic missiles to demonstrate
an inherent IRBM/ICBM capability without risking
the potential political and economic costs of
a long-range missile test. Iran certainly is
aware of the North Korean SLV/missile program
and the benefits P’yongyang has tried to gain
from the inherent ICBM capability posed by the
Taepo Dong-1 and -2.
- Iranian
acquisition of complete systems or major subsystems—such
as North Korean TD-2 or Russian engines—could
accelerate its capability to flight-test an
ICBM/SLV.
If
Iran were to acquire complete TD-2 systems
from North Korea, it could conduct a flight
test within a year of delivery, allowing time
to construct a launch facility. Iran is unlikely
to acquire complete ICBM/SLV systems from
Russia.
In
contrast, a halt or substantial decrease in
assistance would delay by years the development
and flight-testing of these systems.
WMD
Payload
The Intelligence Community judges that Iran does not yet have
a nuclear weapon. Most agencies assess
that Tehran could have one by the end of the
decade, although one agency judges it will take
longer. All agree that Iran could reduce this
time frame by several years with foreign assistance.
Iran has biological and chemical weapons programs.
Foreign
Assistance
Foreign assistance—particularly from Russia,
China, and North Korea—will remain crucial to
the success of the Iranian missile program for
the duration of this Estimate.
CONTENTS
Iraq
Baghdad’s
goal of becoming the predominant regional power
and its hostile relations with many of its neighbors
are the key drivers behind Iraq’s ballistic
missile program. Iraq has been able to maintain
the infrastructure and expertise necessary to
develop missiles, and the IC believes it has
retained a small, covert force of Scud-type
missiles, launchers, and Scud-specific production
equipment and support apparatus. For the next
several years at least, Iraq’s ballistic missile
initiatives probably will focus on reconstituting
its pre-Gulf war capabilities to threaten regional
targets and probably will not advance beyond
MRBM systems.
Ballistic
Missile Programs
Prior
to the Gulf war, Iraq had several programs to
extend the range of the Scud
SRBM
and became experienced working with liquid-propellant
technology. Since the Gulf war, despite UN
resolutions limiting the range of Iraq’s missiles
to 150 km, Baghdad has been able to maintain
the infrastructure and expertise necessary to
develop longer range missile systems.
-
The
IC assesses that Iraq retains a small covert
force of Scud-variant missiles, launchers,
and conventional, chemical, and biological
warheads.
We
cannot project with confidence how long UN-related
sanctions and prohibitions will remain in place.
They plausibly will constrain Iraq during the
entire period of this Estimate. Scenarios that
would weaken the prohibitions several years
from now also are conceivable, allowing Iraq
to reconstitute its missile infrastructure and
begin developing long-range missiles before
the end of the decade. The discussion that
follows addresses developments that could and are likely to occur should UN prohibitions be significantly weakened
in the future.
Iraq
is likely to use its experience with Scud technology
to resume production of the pre-Gulf war 650-km-range
Al Hussein, the 900-km-range Al Abbas, or other
Scud variants, and it could explore clustering
and staging options to reach more distant targets.
Iraq could resume Scud-variant production—with
foreign assistance—quickly after UN prohibitions
ended.
-
With
substantial foreign assistance, Baghdad
could flight-test a domestic MRBM
by mid-decade. This possibility presumes
rapid erosion of UN prohibitions and Baghdad's
willingness to risk detection of developmental
steps, such as static engine testing, earlier.
An MRBM flight test is likely by
2010. An imported MRBM could be
flight-tested within months of acquisition.
For
the first several years after relief from UN
prohibitions, Iraq probably will strive to reestablish
its SRBM inventory to pre-Gulf war numbers,
continue developing and deploying solid-propellant
systems, and pursue MRBMs to keep pace with
its neighbors. Once its regional security concerns
are being addressed, Iraq may pursue a first-generation
ICBM/SLV.
Although
Iraq could attempt before 2015 to test
a rudimentary long-range missile based on its
failed Al-Abid SLV, such a missile almost certainly
would fail. Iraq is unlikely to make such an
attempt. After observing North Korean missile
developments the past few years, Iraq would
be more likely to pursue a three-stage TD-2
approach to an SLV or ICBM, which would be capable
of delivering a nuclear weapon-sized payload
to the United States. Some postulations for
potential Iraqi ICBM/SLV concepts and timelines
from the beginning of UN prohibition relief
include:
Most
agencies believe that Iraq is unlikely
to test before 2015 any ICBMs that would threaten
the United States, even if UN prohibitions were
eliminated or significantly reduced in the next
few years. Some believe that if prohibitions
were eliminated in the next few years, Iraq
would be likely to test an ICBM probably
masked as an SLV before 2015, possibly before
2010. In this view, foreign assistance would
affect the timing and the capability of the
missile.
WMD
Payload Options
Baghdad
had a crash program to develop a nuclear weapon
for missile delivery in 1990, but coalition
bombing and IAEA and UNSCOM activities significantly
set back the effort. The Intelligence Community
estimates that Iraq, unconstrained, would take
several years to produce enough fissile material
to make a weapon. Iraq has admitted to having
biological and chemical weapons programs before
the Gulf war and maintains those programs.
Foreign Assistance
Foreign
assistance is key to Iraqi efforts to develop
quickly longer range missiles. Iraq relied
on extensive foreign assistance before the Gulf
war and will continue to seek foreign assistance
to expand its current capabilities.
Libya
Ballistic
Missile Programs
The
imposition of UN sanctions has impeded Libyan
efforts to obtain foreign assistance for its
longer range missile programs. Nevertheless,
even if Libya were to obtain a No Dong-class
MRBM, Tripoli would be likely to continue to
try for longer range systems to increase the
number of US and NATO targets it can hold at
risk. If a missile were offered with range
sufficient to strike 2,500 kilometers into Europe,
Libya would try to obtain it.
Libya lacks the infrastructure
required to develop by 2015 a ballistic missile
system with sufficient range to target US territory.
Libya’s paths to obtaining an ICBM during the
time frame of this Estimate probably would be
to purchase a complete missile system or to
set up a foreign assistance arrangement where
foreign scientists and technicians design, develop,
and produce a missile and the necessary infrastructure
in Libya.
WMD Payload Options
Libya
has biological and chemical weapons programs.
Libya would need significant foreign assistance
to acquire a nuclear weapon, but Tripoli’s nuclear
infrastructure enhancements remain of concern.
Foreign
Assistance
Libya’s
missile program depends on foreign support,
without which the program eventually would grind
to a halt.
Syria
Missile
Programs
Syria
maintains a ballistic missile and rocket force
of hundreds of FROG rockets, Scuds, and SS-21
SRBMs. With considerable foreign assistance,
Syria progressed to Scud production using primarily
locally manufactured parts.
Syrian
regional concerns may lead Damascus to seek
a longer range ballistic missile capability
such as North Korea’s No Dong MRBM. The IC
judges that Syria does not now have and is unlikely
to gain an interest in an ICBM capability during
the time frame of this Estimate.
WMD
Payload Options
Syria
has developed CW warheads for its Scuds and
has an offensive BW program. The IC remains
concerned about Syria’s intentions regarding
nuclear weapons.
Foreign
Assistance
Foreign
assistance is critical to Syrian efforts to
improve its production capabilities and to gain
access to export-controlled components and technology.
India
New
Delhi believes that a nuclear-capable missile
delivery option is necessary to deter Pakistani
first use of nuclear weapons and thereby preserve
the option to wage limited conventional war
in response to Pakistani provocations in Kashmir
or elsewhere. Nuclear weapons also serve as
a hedge against a confrontation with China.
New Delhi views the development, not just the
possession, of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles
as the symbols of a world power and an important
component of self-reliance.
Missile
Programs
Growing
experience and an expanding infrastructure are
providing India the means to accelerate both
development and production of new systems.
New Delhi is making progress toward its aim
of achieving self-sufficiency for its missile
programs, but it continues to rely on foreign
assistance.
Converting
the Indian SLV into an ICBM?
Rumors
persist concerning Indian plans for an ICBM
program, referred to in open sources as the
Surya. Some Indian defense writers argue
that possession of an ICBM is a key symbol
in India’s quest for recognition as a world
power and useful in preventing diplomatic
bullying by the United States. Most components
needed for an ICBM are available from India’s
indigenous space program. India could convert
its polar space launch vehicle into an ICBM
within a year or two of a decision to do so.
The
Sagarika SLBM probably will not be deployed
until 2010 or later.
Foreign
Assistance
India
continues to push toward self-sufficiency, especially
in regard to its missile programs. Nevertheless,
New Delhi still relies heavily on foreign assistance.
Pakistan
Pakistan
sees missile-delivered nuclear weapons as a
vital deterrent to India’s much larger conventional
forces, and as a necessary counter to India's
nuclear program. Pakistan pursued a nuclear
capability more for strategic reasons than for
international prestige.
Ballistic
Missile Programs
Since
the 1980s, Pakistan has pursued development
of an indigenous ballistic missile capacity
in an attempt to avoid reliance on any foreign
entity for this key capability. Islamabad will
continue with its present ballistic missile
production goals until it has achieved a survivable,
flexible force capable of striking a large number
of targets throughout most of India. Pakistan’s
missiles include:
-
The
Shaheen II, a road-mobile two-stage solid-propellant
MRBM that Pakistan is developing. (Based
on several mockups publicly displayed in
Pakistan, the Shaheen II probably would
be able to carry a 1,000-kg payload to a
range of about 2,500 kilometers.)
Foreign
Assistance
Foreign
support for Pakistan’s ambitious solid-propellant
ballistic missile acquisition and development
program has been critical.
Forward-Based
Missile Threats to the United States
Several
countries are technically capable of developing
a missile launch mechanism to use from forward-based
ships or other platforms to launch SRBMs and
MRBMs, or land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs)
against the United States. Some of these are
likely to develop and deploy forward-based systems—more
likely cruise missiles—during the period of
this Estimate. Nevertheless, long-distance
strikes against the United States probably would
be operationally difficult. Other methods would
be less complicated—CBRN terrorism, for example.
Ballistic Missile
Threats
An
SRBM or MRBM could be launched at the United
States from a forward-based sea platform within
a few hundred kilometers of US territory. Using
such a sea platform would not pose major technical
problems, but the accuracy of the missile probably
would be reduced significantly because of the
movement of the ocean. Still, the accuracy
probably would be better than for some of the
ICBMs discussed in this Estimate. The simplest
method for launching a shipborne ballistic missile
would be to secure a TEL onboard the ship and
launch the missile from the TEL. Somewhat greater
accuracy could be obtained by placing the TEL
on a stabilization platform to compensate for
wave movement. Another option would be to add
satellite-aided (GPS or GLONASS) navigation
to the missile.
The
Land-Attack Cruise Missile Threat
One
to two dozen countries probably will possess
a land-attack cruise missile (LACM) capability
by 2015 via indigenous development, acquisition,
or modification of such other systems as antiship
cruise missiles or unmanned aerial vehicles.
Most LACMs will have a range of a few hundred
km—posing primarily a theater-level threat—but
with sufficient range to be forward-deployed
on air- or sea-launch platforms.
Cruise
Missile Threats
From
a technical standpoint, cruise missiles are
a better alternative than ballistic missiles
in launching from forward areas. Many countries
would therefore see these missiles as advantageous
in attacking the United States. The most plausible
alternative for a forward-based launch would
be a covertly equipped commercial vessel.
Technically,
cruise missiles can be launched from fighter,
bomber, or even commercial transport aircraft
outside US airspace. Both the perceived US
capability to detect and track threats approaching
the coast, and the limited range of most foreign
fighter and bomber aircraft, however, tend to
mitigate such a threat. Modifying a commercial
aircraft to become a cruise missile platform
would entail significant aerodynamic, structural,
electrical, and possibly flight control system
modifications. Cruise missile launches from
a submarine would have the advantage of being
relatively covert. The technical sophistication
required to design or to modify a cruise missile
for launch from torpedo or missile tubes, however,
almost certainly would require detailed assistance
from the defense industry of a major naval power.
Nonmissile
WMD Threats to the United States
Nonmissile
means of delivering weapons of mass destruction
do not provide the same prestige or degree of
deterrence and coercive diplomacy associated
with ICBMs. Nevertheless, concern remains about
options for delivering WMD to the United States
without missiles by state and nonstate actors.
Ships, trucks, airplanes, and other means may
be used. In fact, the Intelligence Community
judges that US territory is more likely to be
attacked with WMD using nonmissile means, primarily
because such means:
Terrorist
Interest in CBRN
Foreign
nonstate actors—including terrorist, insurgent,
or extremist groups—have used, possessed, or
expressed an interest in CBRN materials. Most
of these groups have threatened the United States,
and all of them have the ability to attack the
United States or its interests. The events
of September 11 and its aftermath have caused
the Intelligence Community to focus significantly
more resources on the threat from terrorism,
and we are obtaining more information on potential
terrorist actions.
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