FREEDOM of INFORMATION ACT

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Philby, Burgess and MacLean

PART # 8 of 9

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FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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SECTION 12

3

Memorandum to Mr. Belmont
Re: Donald Duart Maclean;
Guy Francis DeMoncy Burgess
[redacted]

(2) What is known about American side of Burgess-Maclean operation?

(3) Why the blackout and who manuevered it?

(4) Who tipped off subjects has never been resolved publicly.

(5) Lack of assurance that opportunities for espionage that subjects enjoyed have been closed and that the espionage ring of which they obviously were members has been broken.

(6) What Americans did they deal with?

(7) Congress did not know until 1955 that British discovered in 1949 that secrets had been leaked and investigated in 1950-51; when did Secretary of State Acheson learn of this?

(8) Sir Percy Sillitoe, head of MI-5 flew to U.S. and conferred on 6-12-51 with J. Edgar Hoover and established reports reflect that he also conferred with G-2. FBI took some action as on 6-13-51 it suddenly withdrew from the International Police Commission then opening sessions at Lisbon; one British newspaper assumed some connection. Statements appearing in papers indicated FBI interviewed certain ex-British naturalized Americans who knew the diplomats. Presumably the results remain in FBI files.

(9) Reference was made to speech of Secretary of Army Brucker 2-17-56 when he mentioned subjects and stated one of them held a high position in British Embassy in Washington over a period of 4 critical years and knew some of our most guarded secrets. The article concluded by asking "Is there any reason why this full story cannot be told and is anyone sure that it cannot happen again.

([redacted])

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI [redacted] DATE: 9/27/56

FROM : SAC, WFO [redacted]

SUBJECT: DONALD DUART MACLEAN;
GUY FRANCIS DE MONCY BURGESS
ESPIONAGE - R

[redacted]

ReBulet 9/17/56 and mylet 8/28/56 concerning request by the Senate Committee on Internal Security for passport data on twenty individuals.

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Volume 548
No. 95

Monday
13th Feb., 1956

PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES

(HANSARD)

HOUSE OF COMMONS

OFFICIAL REPORT

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HOUSE OF COMMONS

Monday, 13th February, 1956

The House met at half-past Two o'clock

PRAYERS

[Mr. SPEAKER *in the Chair*]

PRIVATE BUSINESS

BRITISH TRANSPORT COMMISSION (No. 2) BILL (*By Order*)

Second Reading deferred till Thursday.

CROYDON CORPORATION BILL (*By Order*)

LEEDS CORPORATION BILL (*By Order*)

MANCHESTER SHIP CANAL BILL (*By Order*)

Second Reading deferred till Monday next.

ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS

PENSIONS AND NATIONAL INSURANCE

Earnings

1. **Mr. E. Fletcher** asked the Minister of Pensions and National Insurance if he will arrange for the earnings exemption limit for pensioners to be raised from £2 to £2 10s. a week.

22. **Mr. Gower** asked the Minister of Pensions and National Insurance if he will now take steps to permit old-age pensioners to earn £3 per week instead of £2 per week as heretofore.

The Minister of Pensions and National Insurance (Mr. John Boyd-Carpenter): I have nothing to add to the reply which I gave on 6th February to the hon. and gallant Members for Brixton (Lieut.-Colonel Lipton) and Berwick and East Lothian (Major Anstruther-Gray).

Mr. Fletcher: Would the Minister not agree that this limit is now unduly low and that it penalises thrift, creates great hardship and ought to be increased?

Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: I think the hon. Member will agree that having asked the advice of the Advisory Committee, having secured that Committee's willingness to give the matter priority, it would be very wrong for me to comment.

Mr. Gower: Has my right hon. Friend obtained an impression, both from speeches in the House and views expressed outside, that many people would like to see this matter dealt with with great urgency?

Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: Yes. I am sure that this is a matter which commends itself to a great many people.

Prescribed Diseases (Welding Hazards)

2. **Dr. Stross** asked the Minister of Pensions and National Insurance how many cases of metal fume fever among welders have been brought to his notice; and whether he will schedule lung hazards due to welding as a prescribed disease.

Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: The answer to the first part of the Question is "None, Sir." As to the second, I am not aware of any lung hazards due to welding not already covered by the Act which would satisfy the statutory conditions for prescription.

Dr. Stross: If the Minister receives information and evidence that there is serious risk that some forms of welding do cause fibrosis of the lungs, will he consider taking action?

Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: As I think the hon. Member appreciates, if fibrosis of the lungs results from the process of welding, a claim can already be put in under the existing law in respect of pneumoconiosis. That is why in my answer I referred, perhaps obliquely, to the fact that risks which welders run are already covered in a number of directions.

4. **Dr. Stross** asked the Minister of Pensions and National Insurance whether he is aware of the industrial hazards that may be associated with the process of welding; and whether he will institute research into these hazards, and particularly into the composition of the electrode coatings.

Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: Yes, Sir. But as this matter is being given attention by my right hon. Friend the Minister of Labour and National Service's Factory Inspectorate, I do not think that I should at present be justified in duplicating the research work being done.

point. As to the hammers, they were part of the tool equipment of the Polsten machine gun, and I do not think that they would have been useful for ordinary purposes.

BURGESS AND MACLEAN (STATEMENT)

Mr. H. Morrison (*by Private Notice*) asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he can make a statement with regard to the appearance of Messrs. Burgess and Maclean in Moscow.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Selwyn Lloyd): Yes, Sir. I have certain comments to make on the appearance of these two men and their Press conference. First, it brings out into clear relief the consistent lack of candour of the Soviet authorities in their statements about these men. In addition to what had appeared in the Soviet Press, suggesting that the whole story was Western anti-Soviet propaganda, in October of last year before the debate in the House about the two men, my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer asked Mr. Molotov in Geneva for information about them. Mr. Molotov said that he was quite unable to provide any.

As recently as 12th January, when the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Huyton (Mr. H. Wilson) saw Mr. Khrushchev, he put the same question. Mr. Khrushchev was reported to have replied, "Are they in our country, then? I have not heard anything of them from any Soviet officials, nor have I ever met them, so it stands to reason I cannot know what they are doing."

The House must form its own opinion about the veracity of those statements in view of this latest development. This kind of conduct shows how difficult it is to establish the relations of mutual trust which the Soviet Union profess so much to desire.

The second comment I have to make is with regard to the contents of the statement itself. The House will have noted that it is designed to be used for propaganda purposes and that the two men were not permitted to answer any questions. In fact, no credence can be placed in their word. There is nothing in the statement which causes me to modify that view.

My third comment is that there has been a certain amount of speculation as to the reasons which have led the Soviet Government to change their ground and to announce, through this interview, the presence of these men in Moscow. One view is that it was to forestall awkward questions during the visit of the Soviet leaders to this country and to clear the air. That may be so.

Another view is that after the visit of my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and myself to Washington, and the close accord we reached with the United States Government on so many matters, the Soviet authorities wished to create distrust and to drive a wedge. If this is the explanation, they will not succeed.

Mr. Morrison: May I ask the right hon. and learned Gentleman whether there was anything to prevent the resignation from the Foreign Service of these two persons and their conducting propaganda on the lines of their opinions in our own country? May I also ask him whether it is not a fact that during the war, and since, all British Governments have sought the most friendly relations with the Soviet Union in the cause of peace? Finally, may I ask whether there is now any evidence that these two men were agents acting on behalf of a foreign Power or the Communist Party?

Mr. Lloyd: It is a fact that there is nothing to prevent anyone in the Foreign Service from resigning and conducting such propaganda in this country. In reply to the right hon. Gentleman's second question, the answer is definitely that, in my view, all Governments since the war have sought most genuinely to seek improved relations with the Soviet Union.

As to whether there is any evidence that these men were Soviet agents, suspicion of the person responsible for a known leakage of information to the Soviet authorities was, as was stated in the White Paper, narrowed down to Maclean before he departed. This was confirmed by his departure and, subsequently, by what Petrov has said. No suspicion attached to Burgess before his departure, but strong suspicion fell on him when he departed, and that, also, has been confirmed by what Petrov has said.

Sir J. Hutchison: Would my right hon. and learned Friend agree that, if their

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statements are correct, it is disquieting that two men, who confessed that while they were at Cambridge they were members of the Communist Party, should both subsequently be employed in the Foreign Service and that one of them should be employed in the B.B.C. and the Secret Service? Does my right hon. and learned Friend consider that the steps taken as a result of the Privy Councillors' examination would stop a repetition of that possibility, if it be true?

Mr. Lloyd: I do not accept what my hon. Friend said about the employment of these men. The employment of Burgess is described in the White Paper. On the question of the future employment in the Foreign Service of such men, I think, as was indicated in the debate in the House, that adequate steps have been taken. The Report of the Committee of Privy Councillors is not, I think, a matter for me.

Mr. Daines: May I ask whether the Foreign Secretary noticed in the statement from Moscow that Burgess claims to have served in the Secret Service and M.I.5? Is that correct or incorrect?

Mr. Lloyd: I do not think that that is exactly what Burgess claimed. The fact is that he was employed in a Department which, at the outbreak of war, dealt with propaganda to neutral countries. It was an organisation which later came to be known as S.O.E.

Mr. Peyton: Does my right hon. and learned Friend realise how welcome his clear statement will be in proving beyond doubt that the ludicrous pantomime which was staged in Moscow will gain them nothing?

Mr. Morrison: Arising out of these exchanges, may I ask the Prime Minister whether he has any intention or otherwise of making a statement to the House on the report of the conference of Privy Councillors on the Secret Service?

The Prime Minister: I am obliged to the right hon. Gentleman and to his colleagues for the Report which they have been good enough to present to me. As the right hon. Gentleman knows, it reached me the night before I left for Washington. However, I have given it careful study and we are now engaged in considering the steps to be taken to give effect to it. I hope to be able to make a statement upon it in due course but, as the right hon. Gentleman would understand, and all concerned would agree, I should not be prepared to make the Report public.

WASHINGTON AND OTTAWA (DISCUSSIONS)

The Prime Minister: With your permission, Mr. Speaker, and that of the House, I should like to report on the discussions which I and my right hon. and learned Friend the Foreign Secretary have held recently in Washington and in Ottawa.

The House will recall the situation at the time when these visits were arranged last autumn. The Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers had disappointed hopes that some at least of the problems facing us might have been solved in the spirit of the July meetings. However, the Soviet Government had made it clear at the October meeting that it had no intention of allowing the German people as a whole to decide their future by free elections.

More surprising was the fact that the Soviets refused to lower the artificial barriers which still prevent the free flow of visitors and ideas between the countries of the Western world and the Soviet *bloc*. In the Middle East, we are faced with intervention by the Soviet Government in the shape of the Czechoslovak-Egyptian arms deal.

In these circumstances, it seemed timely to the President of the United States and myself that we should meet to discuss the world situation together. I was, therefore, very glad that the President's recovery enabled him to invite my right hon. and learned Friend the Foreign Secretary and myself to be his guests in Washington. I will now make some detailed points on the discussions.

As regards Europe, we are in complete agreement that Germany, whose division is the main cause of the present tension, should be given the opportunity of reunite in freedom. We reaffirmed our obligations towards Berlin. We were in agreement on the principle of support costs and the equal sharing of the burden of defence between Allies. Discussions are proceeding on this subject with the

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AND FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI [redacted]

DATE: April 25, 1956

FROM : Legal Attache, London [redacted]

SUBJECT: DONALD DUART MAC LEAN;
GUY FRANCIS DE MONCY BURGESS
ESPIONAGE - R

ReBucable April 6, 1956, instructing this office to continue efforts to obtain the complete recommendations in the White Paper submitted by the Privy Councillors in connection with the British Government security measures.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

[redacted]

TO : L. V. BOARDMAN [redacted] DATE: May 24, 1956

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: DONALD DUART MAC LEAN;
GUY FRANCIS DE MONCY BURGESS
ESPIONAGE - R

Remymemo 3-16-56 analyzing British White Paper, which related to security measures recommended by the Conference of Privy Councillors on security. The Conference of Privy Councillors was set up to study British security procedures as a result of the parliamentary debates in this case in November, 1955. The White Paper did not contain all of the recommendations made by the Privy Councillors. Our Legat in London has since been attempting to obtain the complete recommendations.

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : L. V. Boardman [redacted]

DATE: June 6, 1956

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: [redacted]

[redacted]

SYNOPSIS:

Isaac Don Levine, free-lance writer, indicated in press to have told British Embassy, Washington, D. C., in 1939 that two Soviet agents had penetrated British Foreign Service. Indicated one had been executed in Tower of London and the other had all the characteristics of Donald Maclean. Any representations by Levine to British unknown to Bureau. [redacted]

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[redacted]

Memorandum for L. V. Boardman [redacted]

DETAILS:

Newspapers 6-7-56 carried stories that Isaac Don Levine, free-lance writer, testified at hearing of Senate Internal Security Subcommittee that in 1939 he, Levine, had told the British Embassy in Washington, D. C., that two Soviet spies had infiltrated its Diplomatic Corps. Levine testified he got the information from the late Walter Krivitsky. Levine also testified that one of these was later identified as a man named King who held a key spot in the code room of the British Consular Office. According to Levine, the British executed King in October, 1939, in the Tower of London.

Levine said Krivitsky had described the second man as a member of a Scottish family and a young intellectual communist with artistic interests which Levine stated were all characteristics of Donald Maclean.

Volume 545
No. 48

Monday
7th Nov., 1955

PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES

(HANSARD)

HOUSE OF COMMONS

OFFICIAL REPORT

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Money Resolution considered in Committee

ADJOURNMENT DEBATE:
Planning and Development Conference, Bedford College

WRITTEN ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS:
Unemployment Benefit (Committee's Report)

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16

Light Railways Limited, the assets of which have been seized by the Egyptian Government and put up for auction.

Mr. Turton: Since my noble Friend's reply on 30th March, the Egyptian Government have twice put the assets of the company and the concession to adjudication in accordance with the Concession Deed and Schedule of Conditions. There were no tenders, and it is understood that the assets of the company have become the property of the Egyptian Government. Meanwhile, the company's plea that it was *force majeure* that prevented it from running its services efficiently and economically is still before the Egyptian Government. The hearing of the debenture holders' law suits has been postponed until 6th January.

Mr. Braine: Is my right hon. Friend aware that I was told in January that Her Majesty's Ambassador in Cairo was making strong representations to the Egyptian Government on this subject and that the matter then was *sub judice* and that the Egyptian authorities were making some inquiries? Is my right hon. Friend aware that I was told the same thing in March? Does his reply now mean that the British assets have been seized by the Egyptian Government and that there is no question of compensation being paid? If that is so, will further representations be made and at the same time some action taken?

Mr. Turton: In the case of the debenture holders, the matter is before the Egyptian courts and is, therefore, *sub judice*. It would be quite impossible to interfere while the matter is *sub judice*.

ICELANDIC FISHERIES DISPUTE

16. **Wing Commander Bullus** asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what progress has been made to end the three-years-old dispute of this country with Iceland over the fishing industry.

Mr. Turton: I regret that I cannot yet announce any substantial progress. The special Group of the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation, which is considering the dispute, is not yet ready to report.

Mr. Fletcher-Cooke: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the Council of Europe, on Belgian initiative, is interesting itself in this matter? Is he further aware that unless the O.E.E.C. produces some result fairly soon the Council of Europe will inevitably propose—I hope with the blessing of my right hon. Friend—to refer this matter to the peaceful settlement of disputes procedure, which the Council of Europe is at the moment erecting?

Mr. Turton: On the first point, the Icelandic Government have recently issued a further memorandum to the Council of Europe, and that is now being studied. On the work of the O.E.E.C., the next meeting of the group has been provisionally fixed for 28th November.

Dr. King: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that it is a tragedy that two free and very friendly nations cannot settle this difficulty between them? Will he not ask the British fishing industry to make a gesture towards peace by dropping the ban on Icelandic fish?

Mr. Turton: I agree it is a tragedy that this dispute should have occurred, but I hope very much that the work being done by the group of O.E.E.C. will have satisfactory results.

FORMER FOREIGN OFFICE OFFICIALS (DISAPPEARANCE)

17 and 18. **Lieut.-Colonel Cordeaux** asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (1) why the secret and widespread inquiries begun by the security authorities in January, 1949, as stated in Command Paper No. 9577 of September, 1955, included no inquiry into the background of Mr. Donald Maclean before he joined the Foreign Service in 1935;

(2) how many Foreign Service officers, having access to highly secret information, have been discharged from the service or removed from their posts as a result of the security checks on all such persons recommended in the report of the committee of inquiry in November, 1951, and put into effect in 1952.

23. **Dame Irene Ward** asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in view of the fact that Guy Burgess's Communist leanings were common knowledge during his career prior to his applying for entry to the Foreign Service, why his Department was unaware of this information; and what steps he has taken to satisfy

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himself of the suitability for further employment in the Foreign Office of the persons who sponsored his entry into the Department.

31. Mr. Warbey asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he will appoint a committee to inquire into methods of recruitment to, and promotion and training within, the Foreign Service.

32. Dame Irene Ward asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs how many entrants to the Foreign Service have been accepted since the war in each year in spite of unfavourable security reports.

Mr. Turton: I would ask the hon. Members to await this afternoon's debate.

Dame Irene Ward: Would not my right hon. Friend be helping the debate if he gave us a little more information before the Foreign Secretary speaks?

Mr. Turton: I am sure the Foreign Secretary is going to make a very full statement at the beginning of the debate, which will give my hon. Friend all the help she needs.

SUDAN (SITUATION)

19. Mr. Spence asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he will make a statement on the present situation in the Sudan; and what action is to be taken to make self-government effective.

11. Mr. Brockway asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if, in view of the measure of agreement in the Legislative Assembly of Sudan, Her Majesty's Government will consent, subject to similar consent by the Government of Egypt, to the Assembly reaching a decision on the issue of the Sudan's future international status without the cost and delay of a plebiscite or further general election.

Mr. H. Macmillan: On 29th October the Sudanese Prime Minister stated that it might be some time before the possibility of a decision on a shortening of the self-determination process laid down in the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of February, 1953, was fully explored by the political parties, and, until it was accepted or rejected, the Government would continue on the presumption that the future of the Sudan would be decided by a plebiscite or along the lines laid down in the Agreement. Her Majesty's Government have decided to agree that a plebiscite be held, but have told the Egyptian Government that they consider that any proposal which the Sudanese Parliament may in the future make about a shortening of the process of self-determination should be given sympathetic consideration by the Codomini.

Mr. Spence: Did my right hon. Friend make any proviso that no plebiscite should be held until an effective administration is again set up in Southern Sudan? Does he not consider that Britain is under an obligation to see that such an administration must be in effect before a general election or plebiscite is held?

Mr. Macmillan: If the plebiscite is held, it will be part of the duty of the International Commission to report whether the conditions are suitable.

Mr. Spence: Has my right hon. Friend made it definite that it must not be held until there is an administration actually in being and effective?

Mr. Macmillan: We are one of the parties to the agreement of February, 1953, and cannot unilaterally denounce it; we must try to make it effective. Of course the situation in the Sudan is one on the things which causes us concern, but that in my view is not a ground for withdrawing from the undertaking that by one means or another the people of the Sudan should have the right to decide what their future should be.

Captain Waterhouse: Do I understand my right hon. Friend to say that the International Commission will not only have the right to supervise the election but also have the right to say whether or not conditions are ripe for the election?

Mr. Macmillan: I think it would be difficult to operate the work of supervision without having some say as to whether it is possible to hold it at all.

Mr. Spence: I beg to give notice of my intention to raise the matter again on the Adjournment.

24. Major Wall asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what special steps Her Majesty's Government propose to take to protect the interests of the Southern Sudanese.

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FORMER FOREIGN OFFICE OFFICIALS (DISAPPEARANCE)

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[*Mr. Buchan-Hepburn.*]

3.34 p.m.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Harold Macmillan): It can rarely have happened in our long Parliamentary history that the political head of a Department should have had to unfold to the House of Commons so painful a story as that which it is our duty to consider today. To understand—though not, of course, to excuse—this story it is necessary to cast our minds back to the 1930s and to recall the kind of background against which the two principal characters grew up.

At that time all kinds of violent opinions were being expressed. The circumstances of the Spanish Civil War, with Fascists and Communists backing the rival forces, divided British and, indeed, European opinion acutely. This had a particularly disturbing effect upon young people, many of whom, we remember, thought it their duty actually to take part in these fierce revolutionary struggles.

When Hitler had made his pact with Stalin and the Second World War began, some of those who had espoused extremist views found that their ideological beliefs exerted a pull which was to prove stronger than their patriotism. This clash of loyalties was buried in 1941 by our alliance with Russia. But, when the war ended and there came an estrangement between this country and Communist Russia, it revived.

Thus it was that men could be found in Britain who could put the interests of another country before those of their own, and could commit the horrible crime of treachery. This occurred not only among criminals and degenerates, but in men holding high technical and scientific posts, among men of philosophic and literary attainments, and, finally, in these two cases, the subject of this debate, in the Foreign Service.

There are many on both sides of the House who, as Ministers or as private Members, have seen the work of the Foreign Service at home and abroad. I know they will agree with me when I say how fortunate we are in this country to have a Foreign Service of the highest quality, giving the most loyal and devoted service to the Crown and to the nation. I think that all of us today are feeling how severe is the blow that has been struck against its reputation. Our Foreign Service regards this case as a personal wound, as when something of the kind strikes at a family, or a ship, or a regiment. We must recognise, too, that this case has caused a profound shock to Parliament and to the general public, both at home and abroad.

Before dealing with the actual handling of this affair, I want to say a few words on the subject of ministerial responsibility. When what is known as the Maclean and Burgess case was entering its final phase, with the findings of the Australian Royal Commission and the publication of the White Paper, I made it clear that full ministerial responsibility must be taken by those Ministers, past and present, who presided over or were connected with the Foreign Office during all this period. This was not a mere act of quixotism or chivalry; it is a plain constitutional truth. It will be a sorry day when we try to elevate something called the Foreign Office or the Treasury or any other Department of State into a separate entity enjoying a kind of life, responsibility and power of its own, not controlled by Ministers and not subject to full Parliamentary authority.

Ministers, and Ministers alone, must bear the responsibility for what goes wrong. After all, they are not slow to take credit for anything that goes right. This does not mean that they have to accept responsibility for wrongful acts on the part of their officials of which they have no prior knowledge. But in discussing this case it is quite wrong to assert that the Foreign Office, if by that is meant "officials" made decisions of their own. Ministers are responsible and, in fact, took all the important decisions. Moreover, they took those decisions in full knowledge of all the relevant facts so far as they were known at the time.

The House will realise that both the Opposition and the present Government share the responsibility. The main acts in the drama took place while the Opposition were in power. The investigation

into the leak, the narrowing of the suspicion down to Maclean, and the escape of the two traitors—that Government took a number of steps before, during and after their flight.

When the present Government succeeded in October, 1951, much had already been done to investigate the whole circumstances of the case and to improve our security measures. From that point, the responsibility rests with them.

The White Paper published on 23rd September has given a short, but, I believe, correct and objective, account of the story of these two men and of the various incidents that surround this strange drama. I have seen a large number of criticisms in the Press and elsewhere arising from the White Paper, and I fear it will be necessary to deal with them in some detail.

First, there is the general question of the amount of information given to the public. We are accused of having said too little and too late. Secondly, there are the detailed criticisms of the way the affair was dealt with throughout its various stages. The chief points at issue are, I think, as follows.

There is the question of the original appointments of Maclean and Burgess divergent as they were. There is the question of their progress in the Service. There is the question of whether, in view of certain incidents in their careers, Maclean and Burgess should have been dismissed the Service, or, at least, whether they should have been posted as they were. There is the question of the watch kept upon Maclean when he became suspect. There is the question of the escape of Maclean, and how he got warning, and whether he should have been prevented from leaving England taking Burgess with him. There is the question of the defection of Mrs. Maclean. There is a general criticism of the incompetence or inefficiency of the security measures taken both by the Foreign Office and by the Security Service.

I will try to deal with all these if I can, but before I do so perhaps the House will allow me to make one or two preliminary observations.

It has been stated that security in the Foreign Office ought to be in the hands of the Security Service. It is argued that Foreign Service officers who are dealing with security are amateurs or are doing a job for which they have no background or training. At present, as the House perhaps knows, each public Department is responsible for its own security—the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Supply, and all the other public Departments. The officials who are for the time being in charge of this work are in the closest and most constant touch with the Security Service and continually seek their advice, and I know of no case where their advice has been disregarded.

It is true that the Foreign Office officials—it is true for the Ministry of Supply or other Departments—are amateurs in the sense that they do not spend their whole careers upon this job. Nevertheless, this has a corresponding advantage, for it means that an increasing number of officers in the Service, both at home and abroad, gain some experience of security work. Security work in the Foreign Service really falls into two categories. Many hon. Members will know this well. There is what one might call the physical and technical side—the boxes, the keys, the ciphers, the precautions against listening in apparatus, and all the rest of that side of it.

Then there is what one might call the human side, involving personalities. It is argued that members of the Service itself have a natural reluctance to report adversely on or to take action against their own colleagues. But I believe—I hope the House, on reflection, will share this view—that, broadly speaking, security as well as efficiency is better safeguarded in this way and a due sense of responsibility is thus maintained.

For my part, I am not much attracted by the only other alternative, that there should be a kind of N.K.V.D. or Ogpu system in our public offices; in other words, that everybody, wherever he goes and whatever he does, high and low, should be watched by an appropriate officer of a police department.

Mr. Percy Daines (East Ham, North): *rose*——

Mr. Macmillan: I have a long speech to make. Perhaps I might be allowed to develop what I have to say in detail.

Mr. Daines: Will the right hon. Gentleman tell us the status of the chief officer in charge of security at the Foreign Office?

Mr. Macmillan: The Permanent Under-Secretary, the Head of the Department. The status of the officer upon whom this would mainly devolve would be that of an Under-Secretary.

Having made that point, there is just one other point that I should like to make before I come to the details. All through the criticisms which have been made—I do not complain of them—I have felt a sense of impatience, and, indeed, natural impatience, that action of a precautionary kind was not taken or could not have been taken when it might still have been effective. I am bound to say that I think some of these complaints are based on a misapprehension of the rights of a citizen in a free society in time of peace. I shall revert to this point at a later stage, but I should like to mark it here.

I would only venture to add this warning. Action against employees, whether of the State or anybody else, arising from suspicion and not from proof may begin with good motives, and it may avert serious inconveniences or even disasters, but, judging from what has happened in some other countries, such a practice soon degenerates into the satisfaction of personal vendettas or a general system of tyranny, all in the name of public safety.

Now I should like to say a word on the question of the handling of publicity. It is said that the statements made either by Foreign Office spokesmen or by Ministers during all these years have been disingenuous and obscure. Why, it is asked, was not more information given earlier in greater volume and spontaneously? Of course, I do not intend to try to convince the House that everything that has been done by myself or my predecessors has been absolutely right and prudent in every detail. Happily, there is very little experience of this sort of thing in our country, and successive Ministers have not found it easy to strike just the right balance between saying too little and saying too much.

I am sure, however, that they have all been influenced by one over-riding consideration. Naturally, the disappearance of the two men opened up a large new field of investigation for the Security Service. These inquiries continued for a long time; indeed, for several years. At any stage while they were in progress a full statement would have indicated to the world the degree to which they were meeting with success. Consequently, as anyone with any experience of this kind of work knows, the investigation itself might have been compromised. If one is working on a line which may lead to success and perhaps to prosecution, the less one talks about it the better and that is what we meant by the paragraph in the White Paper when we said:

> "Counter-espionage depends for its success on the maximum secrecy of its methods. Nor is it desirable at any moment to let the other side know how much has been discovered or guess at what means have been used to discover it."

This governed the problem of the timing of public statements.

Unless we were to publish a kind of running commentary such as would have been highly prejudicial to the work of the Security Service, we had to decide on the right moment for telling what we knew of the story. Ministers may have decided wisely or unwisely, but the paramount consideration—and I want to emphasise it—was for facilitating the work of investigation in its widest sense and, above all—and perhaps this is the most important point—of not endangering valuable sources.

It is worth looking back to the way in which the case developed. When Maclean and Burgess fled in May, 1951, the first thought of those responsible had to be not how much they could tell the public, but what they could do to minimise the harm that had been done. The Security Service still had extensive inquiries to make, not merely to reconstruct the story but to improve the Service. But when Petrov defected on 3rd April, 1954, a whole new vista on the case was opened up.

On 3rd May, 1954, the Australian Government set up a Royal Commission and it was clear that the hearing of Petrov's testimony in many matters—in many matters quite unconnected with Maclean and Burgess—was to be a vital part of the work of that Commission. From then on his credibility as a witness was to be under examination. We knew in April, 1954, that the Australian Government intended to set up a Royal Commission.

When, therefore the Press announced on 28th April, 1954, that Petrov possessed information bearing on the case of Burgess and Maclean, we were unable to confirm or deny the truth of that information. The statement was made in the first place on 28th April that his information was hearsay information, which, of course, it was, and was to be treated with reserve until a fuller account had been received from Australia.

Petrov let it be known that if, as soon as he said anything to the Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation it was to be given publicity in this country, he would then refuse to say any more at all. This is a most important point. Since it was essential that Petrov should give his evidence before the Royal Commission, it was decided not to make any further announcements bearing on his testimony. The Report of the Royal Commission is dated 22nd August, 1955.

It was laid before the Australian Parliament and first became public on 14th September, 1955. It then became possible to answer questions which had hitherto remained unanswered and that was done by the Foreign Office spokesman in reply to questions arising out of an article in the "People" on Sunday, 18th September and the White Paper published nine days after the publication of the Royal Commission's Report.

Having made those first points, I should now like to deal with the specific questions which I mentioned earlier. Since the first three all related to the official careers of Burgess and Maclean and their progress in the Foreign Service, I will deal with them together. I should first emphasise, however, that the circumstances in which the two men entered the Service were very different. Maclean came into the Diplomatic Service before the war by a very severe competitive examination, in which he showed conspicuous ability. I have heard it said that the Civil Service Commission Board, who interview all candidates for the Service, ought to have known of Maclean's reputation for extreme Left-wing opinions while he was an undergraduate. In fact, his college authorities gave him an exceptionally good report in which no mention was made of his Left-wing views. But even supposing that the Board had known that he had expressed Communist opinions as an undergraduate——

Mr. Charles Pannell (Leeds, West): On a point of order. In the nomenclature of politics, "Left-wing" is a connotation for this side of the House. Can I ask you, therefore, Mr. Speaker, to ask the Foreign Secretary to use plain English and refer to Communist affiliations and not Left-wing affiliations?

Mr. Macmillan: I said extreme Left-wing, which I think was a fair point. Perhaps the hon. Member for Leeds, West (Mr. C. Pannell) will wait for what I was about to say.

I was about to ask the House, whether supposing the Board had known that he had expressed even Communist sympathies as an undergraduate, in those days would the House have felt that such a man should automatically be excluded from the public service. [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] Would the House not have regarded those leanings as one of the aberrations of youth which he might be expected to live down. It is not fair to bring in an atmosphere of today when judging events of the 1930's. It is important to realise that until and after Maclean's appointment in Cairo in 1948 the quality of his work was not only good, but outstanding among his contemporaries.

During his first fourteen years in the Service his conduct gave rise to no adverse comment. His behaviour in Cairo, which culminated in a sudden application for sick leave, at the time was interpreted as the result of a prolonged period of overwork and strain. He was regarded as a valuable member of the Service and there was every reason to suppose and to hope that he might make a full recovery from what appeared to be a sort of nervous breakdown.

The Foreign Office, like, I think, any other decent employer in the circumstances—it should be remembered that at the time there was no suspicion of any kind as to his loyalty—tried to see that a man who had served for fourteen years got the right medical treatment and had a chance of recovery. It is quite easy to say that our trusting him in that position was wrong. Perhaps it was. It is very easy to be wise after the event. But he was given a second chance, and at the end of five months' medical treatment

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was put at the head of the American Department.

This Department in the Foreign Office deals principally with Latin-American affairs. Major questions relating to the United States are dealt with regionally—for instance, N.A.T.O. affairs would come under the Western Organisations Department, Middle East affairs would come under the Middle Eastern Department. The United States questions which are dealt with by the American Department are largely routine, welfare of forces, visitors, and the like. The appointment implied no promotion for Maclean and provided an opportunity to watch his conduct and his health.

At this time, may I remind the House, no suspicion rested on him. As soon as he fell under suspicion, in the middle of April, 1951, one of those informed was Sir Roger Makins, now our distinguished and highly successful Ambassador in Washington. Sir Roger was then his immediate chief, being the Superintending Under-Secretary of the group into which this Department fell. It is, however, quite untrue, as has been suggested, that Sir Roger Makins was in any way responsible for the conduct of an inquiry, or that he checked or cleared Maclean. It is not the case at all and such a suggestion is false and grossly unfair to Sir Roger Makins. That is the career of Maclean up to date. Burgess's career——

Mr. E. Shinwell (Easington): How did Maclean come under suspicion?

Mr. Macmillan: I am coming to that later. It is in great detail. That is Maclean's career up to date, how he got in, how promoted, and what was his career up to the date of the suspicion.

Burgess's career in the Foreign Service was, of course, totally different from that of Maclean's. He was taken on as temporary Press Officer in the News Department of the Foreign Office, which was then housed in the Ministry of Information, in 1944. His previous career, to the extent that it was then known, gave what seemed to be a respectable background. He had served with the B.B.C. for six years.

From early 1939 until the end of 1940, Burgess worked in the special Department which, on the outbreak of war, was responsible for propaganda to neutral countries. The appointment to the News Department was temporary and did not involve establishment. In 1945, he took advantage of the opportunity open to temporary officers to apply for establishment in the junior branch of the Foreign Service. He appeared before a Civil Service Commission Board which duly recommended him for establishment.

In fairness to the Board, I ought to say that it was impressed by Burgess's excellent academic record as well as by the good reports which it received covering his employment in the B.B.C. and in the Foreign Office News Department. However, I must also say that we now know that Burgess's work while with the wartime Department, to which I have referred, had been unsatisfactory. It is, unfortunately, the case that during the war—and perhaps one can hardly wonder at it—many wartime Departments did not keep good records about their temporary staff.

The fact remains that neither the Foreign Office nor the Civil Service Commission knew of Burgess's failings. This process by which he was established was not completed until October, 1947. In the meantime, the late Mr. Hector McNeil, who was then Minister of State, asked that Burgess be appointed to his private office as a personal assistant because of his experience in drafting and general publicity work, and this was done in December, 1946.

Burgess proved useful to Mr. McNeil who recommended him for promotion to the senior branch of the Foreign Service, but as there was a good deal of doubt about his suitability for the senior branch, and as he had little experience of the ordinary duties of the Foreign Office it was decided that he should be given a thorough trial on routine work in the Far Eastern Department.

While he was working in that Department, allegations were made that during a period of leave abroad, late in 1949, he had been guilty of a serious indiscretion about intelligence matters. The charges were fully investigated by a disciplinary board, and he was severely reprimanded, informed that he would be transferred and that his prospects of promotion would be diminished.

There was much discussion as to his future post. It was desirable to send him to a post where his general suitability for the Foreign Service could be properly tested. It was, therefore, decided to send him to Washington for a period of trial on routine work.

There have been suggestions that, having been guilty of serious indiscretions, he was promoted. That is not so. He remained, as he had been since his establishment, a member of the fourth grade of the junior branch of the Service. In Washington, Burgess was a failure. The Ambassador reported unfavourably both upon his office work and upon his behaviour outside, and in May, 1951, four years after his establishment and nine months after his appointment at Washington, he was recalled, and the conclusion was reached that he would have to leave the service. Until the day of Burgess's disappearance there were no grounds for suspecting that he was working against the security of the State. He had been indiscreet, but, then, indiscretion is not generally the characteristic of a secret agent.

There is one further point that I think, in fairness to the late Mr. McNeil, I ought to mention. I observe that a former Minister and Privy Councillor recently stated that he had warned McNeil about Burgess when he became his personal assistant. I am bound to say that I feel very sorry about the timing of this particular revelation.

So much for the official careers of the two men. I think that I have said enough to show that it simply is not true that they were protected by senior officials. It may be argued that their superiors ought to have known more about them, and I shall have something to say later about the subsequent improvements in the Foreign Office system of reports on the staff.

I must now deal with the other questions which I posed about the escape of the two men, the competence of the measures taken to keep Maclean under observation and how he got warning of it. To understand the problem, I must first say something of the background. It was in January, 1949—a very important date—that a report was received that certain British information had become available to the Soviet authorities a few years earlier. However, there was no indication as to how it had become available. The leak might not even have been from British sources.

Diligent inquiries were begun immediately, but the field of possibilities to be covered was very large. Further evidence—which was not available when the investigation began—gradually came to light, and it is, in fact, greatly to the credit of the security authorities that the circumstance in which that information had leaked to the Soviet Government became known at all. I cannot give the details, but it was an almost incredible act of skill that, given the magnitude of the task, how broad the possible field was and the paucity of the information available, the field was gradually narrowed down in the course of two years to one suspect, and that the right one.

The House will not expect me to give full details of the investigations, but I hope that it will accept my assurance that they were pursued with diligence and efficiency. But, even when suspicion narrowed down to Maclean, the evidence was both inconclusive and circumstantial. The best, perhaps the only, chance of obtaining evidence which could be used to support a prosecution lay in obtaining admissions from him. But there was no firm starting point for an interview with him. It was highly desirable to obtain further information about his contacts and activities which could be used as a reason for questioning him.

A watch was, therefore, put upon him for the primary purpose—indeed, the sole purpose—of securing such information. As was said in the White Paper, everything depended upon the interview, and its success depended also on the use of an element of surprise. If he were alerted to the fact that he was under investigation or suspected it, all hope of obtaining the essential confirmatory evidence would probably have gone for good.

For that reason, the decision not to watch him at Tatsfield was deliberately taken after a careful survey had been made of the technical problems involved in keeping him under observation in the neighbourhood of his home. The conclusion was that the risk that he would be put on his guard would be too great. Obviously, it is far more difficult in the country to conceal from a man the fact

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that he is being watched than it is to watch his movements or his contacts in London.

I should, perhaps, remind the House that in the case of Fuchs the Security Service decided to take exactly the same risk, and they were justified in the result. The object of the watch was to obtain evidence of contact or of something that he did that would be conclusive against Maclean. It was in no sense its purpose to prevent him leaving the country. It is perhaps worth remembering that there is no power to prevent a man against whom no charge can be brought from leaving this country. Whether this gap in our security ought to be closed is another question, and I will come to it in a moment.

Mr. David Logan (Liverpool, Scotland Division): Would the right hon. Gentleman explain how two men in responsible positions and guilty of an aggravated offence, if proved, both got leave of absence at the end of the week, and why both of them, when they were supposed to be guilty of treason, were allowed to leave the country?

Mr. Macmillan: The first point was, of course, that to have refused week-end leave—which would have been very unusual—would have put the man on his guard all the more. And as the object was to try to catch him in an action which would justify a charge, it was very important not to refuse leave or any other normal advantage given to the servant; and, as I have tried to explain, there is no power under the law of England to prevent a man leaving against whom the Executive is not prepared to produce a charge. Whether there ought to be I will come to in a moment, but that was the law as it then stood, and, indeed, as it stands today.

Nevertheless, it seems more than probable that Maclean somehow discovered that he was under observation. How, I do not know—we do not know. We do not know for certain. The arrest of Fuchs on 2nd February, 1950, may well have caused Maclean to wonder whether his activities in America might not eventually be uncovered. Looking back on it, we may wonder whether this event contributed to his breakdown in Cairo in April, 1950. Assuming he was suffering from a general uneasiness on this score, it would need only the slightest indication that the circle was narrowing to put him on his guard. He would have been particularly sensitive to any hint, direct or indirect, that he was under investigation. Although, therefore, the circumstances of the disappearance are certainly explainable in terms of what is called a "tip off," it is quite possible that Maclean may have taken flight with Burgess because one or other of them noticed circumstances, or a combination of circumstances—to which they would have been particularly sensitive, of course—which may have aroused their suspicions.

Mr. R. T. Paget (Northampton): Did not the withdrawal of the secret documents give that "tip off," and in view of that why have we to assume that there was a third traitor here at all?

Mr. Macmillan: I am coming to that point. That is another possibility, and I am trying to deal with all the possibilities.

Although, as I say, the circumstances are explanatory in the terms of a "tip off," they are not necessarily the effect of that. That is what I am trying to say. However, the possibility of a "tip off" had to be seriously considered and searching and protracted investigations into this possibility have been undertaken, and are proceeding even at the present time.

In this connection, the name of one man has been mentioned in the House of Commons, but not outside. I feel that all hon. Members would expect me to refer to him by name and to explain the position. He is Mr. H. A. R. Philby, who was a temporary First Secretary at the British Embassy in Washington from October, 1949, to June, 1951, and had been privy to much of the investigation into the leakage. Mr. Philby had been a friend of Burgess from the time when they were fellow undergraduates at Trinity College, Cambridge. Burgess had been accommodated with Philby and his family at the latter's home in Washington from August, 1950, to April, 1951; and, of course, it will be realised that no time before he fled was Burgess under suspicion.

It is now known that Mr. Philby had Communist associates during and after his university days. In view of the circumstances, he was asked, in July, 1951,

to resign from the Foreign Service. Since that date his case has been the subject of close investigation. No evidence has been found to show that he was responsible for warning Burgess or Maclean. While in Government service he carried out his duties ably and conscientiously. I have no reason to conclude that Mr. Philby has at any time betrayed the interests of this country, or to identify him with the so-called "third man," if, indeed, there was one.

As regards others whose names have been in any way associated with this affair, I have made, or caused to be made, and studied myself, the most careful, rigorous and impartial investigation into each case which I have been able to have made; and I can assure the House that nobody is being in any way shielded. I am sure that my predecessors would not have hesitated to have taken the appropriate action, if they had found evidence of guilt, but, in fact, no such evidence was found. A number of Foreign Service officers who had associated, as office colleagues or outside, with Maclean and Burgess were examined by the Foreign Office Security Service. If, of course, any evidence not already available can be produced by anybody either inside or outside this House, I trust that it will be made available to the authorities.

Mr. Herbert Morrison (Lewisham, South): It is said in a newspaper this morning—though I appreciate entirely what the Foreign Secretary has said—that Philby and his family have disappeared. Does he regard that a matter of significance in all the circumstances of the case?

Mr. Macmillan: I have no reason to believe that they have. In fact, I think it is very improbable that they have.

Mr. R. J. Mellish (Bermondsey): It may be that Philby has gone into hiding because of the scandalous publicity arising from certain statements.

Mr. Macmillan: Well, I was trying to state the case as fairly and as absolutely accurately as I can. I must emphasise, however, that on the important question of what decided the two men to escape we really have, as the hon. Member has suggested, very little evidence.

As stated in the White Paper, arrangements were made to keep certain highly classified material from Maclean, but these arrangements were not as hamhanded or crude as some people may believe. Nevertheless, it is not impossible that in spite of all the precautions, Maclean—whom we now know was an experienced agent—may have become aware of them.

Suspicion has also been cast on those who were aware of the decision of the then Foreign Secretary that Maclean should be interrogated. That decision was taken on 25th May, 1951, but the evidence of Petrov suggested that the flight of the two men was planned well before that date and, therefore, that really answers the case of any suspicion falling upon those who were privy to the decision of the right hon. Gentleman.

Mr. Sidney Silverman (Nelson and Colne): I understood from the right hon. Gentleman's account of the matter earlier that right up to the day when Burgess fled this country there was no suspicion against him at all and there was no investigation on security grounds. If I have that right, can the right hon. Gentleman then say why Burgess should run away?

Mr. Macmillan: Well, the fact that there was no suspicion on the part of the authorities against him does not mean that he may not have been conscious of his own guilt, and, therefore, thought that the best thing was to be off. I am just stating that there was not any suspicion against him. I think that that deals with that matter. I have been asked for full details, and I think that I ought to give them.

There is then the question of Mrs. Maclean. It is said that she ought to have been prevented from going to Switzerland to live with her mother, Mrs. Dunbar. It may be said that if was naive to rely on Mrs. Maclean's assurance, and her mother's assurance, that they would keep in touch with the Security Service; and on Mrs. Maclean's alleged desire to educate the children out of England.

However, the point is that Mrs. Maclean is really of little importance. Anything she knew before Maclean left she must have got from him. She had no means of obtaining any information after he left, and whether she remained in this

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Hon. Members will ask what lessons have been learned and what steps have been taken—that really is the vital point—to try to ensure that there can be no repetition of such a deplorable story. This leads me to the question of security checks. Since 1945, a check has regularly been made on all new entrants into the Foreign Office and all new temporary employees. This check is made to ensure that no adverse security record is held against candidates for employment.

Since 1945, all officers already employed have been so checked, but it is acknowledged that this check is not adequate—what is called the negative check—since it will only reveal persons who have already come to the notice—unfavourable notice, if you like—of the security authorities. Indeed, when applied to Maclean and Burgess, it revealed nothing about the subversive political associations of their early days. From 1951 onwards, it was recognised that more must be done to check the reliability of persons holding important positions in the public service.

At the beginning of 1952, a regular system of positive vetting was introduced. This procedure entails detailed research into the whole background of the officer concerned, including his school and university career and any previous employment before joining the Foreign Service. In a large number of cases, personal inquiries are made of university tutors, past employers and others who have personal knowledge of the candidate. Since 1952, about 900 cases, involving the senior, junior and clerical branches of the Foreign Service, have been examined. So far, there have been four cases in the Foreign Service in which an officer's political activities and associations have led to his leaving the Service altogether. In about half-a-dozen other cases it has been considered prudent to move officers to other work of less importance to the national security, or to accept their resignations.

This positive vetting procedure is not confined to the Foreign Service. It is now operated in all Government Departments having access to classified material involving the security of the State. Immediately after the disappearance of Maclean and Burgess, the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Lewisham, South, who was then Foreign Secretary, set up a committee to look into all aspects of the security arrangements in the Foreign Service. The committee was an official one, and it may perhaps be criticised on that account, but I think that it was a wise act of the right hon. Gentleman, who chose officials singularly well suited to their task—men with great records of devotion to the public service. The committee was presided over by Sir Alexander Cadogan, and Sir Neville Bland and Sir Norman Brook, Secretary to the Cabinet, were the other members.

The committee reported in November, 1951, approving the security check, including the plans for positive vetting which had already been prepared. It recommended that vetting should be extended to all members of the senior branches and the senior grades of the junior branches of the Foreign Service. In fact, the present practice of the Foreign Service goes beyond that recommendation, since many more junior grades, which must inevitably be employed on highly classified work, are positively vetted. The committee considered not only political unreliability in itself, but the problem of character defects, which might lay an officer open to blackmail, or otherwise undermine his loyalty and sense of responsibility.

Shortly after the disappearance of Maclean and Burgess, and before the Cadogan Committee reported, fresh instructions had been issued by the Permanent Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office to heads of missions and other senior officials impressing upon them the need to watch in particular the forms of behaviour among their staff likely to sap an officer's discretion or sense of responsibility or his public duty, or to expose him to undue influence or blackmail or to heighten in undue measure the tension of his existence. The committee commented on these instructions with approval and emphasised that not only the heads of missions but some junior officers in charge of sections throughout the Foreign Service, and, indeed, in other services, ought to be reminded of their

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responsibility for the security and personal reliability of the staffs serving under them, and instructions were issued in this sense.

Mr. R. H. S. Crossman (Coventry, East): May I ask the right hon. Gentleman one question on vetting? Did he say that there was no vetting at the Foreign Office before 1945; that is to say, between 1939 and 1945 officials were not submitted to political vetting to which other people who came into the Government service had to submit?

Mr. Macmillan: I said it was of a negative kind. It was merely said, "Have you got anything against this man?" and the point of the positive vetting is diligent research into the previous records. In the old days, we should have been rather shocked at positive vetting, but we have had to accept it as one of the necessities of present conditions.

I want to refer to a point to which I have seen some allusion made—recruitment for the Foreign Service. Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman is to raise the matter, because I saw something in one of the newspapers this morning which made me think that he might intend to do so. It is said that recruitment is kept to a closed circle, and that its members are taken too narrowly from one social group. I think I should remind the House exactly what has happened about the Foreign Service. There is so much going on that it is always difficult to remember, and the public memory is short.

During the war, my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, then Foreign Secretary, gave great thought to the question of the future of the Foreign Service. He proposed a scheme to his colleagues in the Coalition Government on which much labour was spent, and this scheme made certain radical changes. The scheme was set out in a White Paper, and certain arrangements under it required an Order in Council and a Bill. All this was under the Coalition Government in 1943.

The Leader of the Opposition, the Deputy Leader of the Opposition and Mr. Bevin, who subsequently became Foreign Secretary, held high positions in the Coalition Government. After the war, Mr. Bevin succeeded as Foreign Secretary and held that office, if I remember rightly, for five years. He was certainly not the man to be unduly impressed by the outward semblance of things; he went to the inner core. He was not a defender of privilege, and, at the same time, was not a man to yield to prejudice. It fell to him to implement the scheme which had been laid down by the Act of 1943. If he had not been satisfied with it, I am sure that in his five years at the Foreign Office he would not have hesitated to propose some amendment or alteration. Actually, he felt for the Foreign Service a loyalty and devotion which has been amply rewarded by the respect and affection in which his name will always be held at the Foreign Office.

It may be worth emphasising what were the major points of the Eden-Bevin reforms, if I may call them that. First, the amalgamation of the Foreign Office and Diplomatic Service with the Consular Service and the Commercial Diplomatic Service into a single whole. That was the first big point. Secondly, the reorganisation of the arrangements for recruitment and training with a view to opening the service to anyone with sufficient qualifications. I ought to add, for there has been much misunderstanding on this point, that the work of selecting recruits for all except the most junior grades of the Service has for a long time been in the hands of the Civil Service Commissioners. I want to emphasise this. The Foreign Service is not a service renewing itself by co-option. Its new members have for a long time been chosen by an outside body.

It is sometimes said that the Foreign Service, like the rest of the Civil Service, is a sort of closed shop, that its failures are protected and that there is no means of getting rid of incompetent or unsuitable people. I would, however, point out, that since the introduction of the Foreign Service Act, 1943, members of the Foreign Service have not enjoyed the same degree of security as that of the rest of the Civil Service, for this Act introduced arrangements more like those of the fighting Services, which provide for compulsory retirement of established members who do not make sufficient progress to justify their retention or promotion. Fifty-nine officers have been retired under this Act in the last ten years. The House will also observe that the new scheme for the conduct of the Service and the amalgamation and other

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[MR. MACMILLAN.] conditions applied not merely to new entrants but to existing officers who became subject to the new conditions as to postings, promotion and retirement.

The House will see that the remodelling of the Foreign Service was initiated by a Conservative Foreign Secretary and, after exhaustive inquiry, by a Coalition Government. It was implemented by a Labour Foreign Secretary only ten years ago in a Parliament which, with all its faults or merits, cannot be accused—I am speaking of the Parliament of 1945—of being too prejudiced in favour of the past or standing too rigidly upon ancient ways. Therefore, it does not seem to me that a case for a further inquiry into the recruitment and organisation of the Foreign Service has been made out.

Now, with regard to the Security Service and the Maclean case there is one point that I should like to emphasise. I spoke just now of how this information was got and how it had to be sifted. The information originally available necessitated a search in a field of about 6,000 people. That is to say, on the technical character of how this was got, there were 6,000 people each of whom might have been the man. These the Security Service eventually narrowed down to one. That in this case, unlike the Fuchs case they were unable to obtain sufficient evidence to justify a charge is, of course, to be regretted.

The difficulties in our system of law are very real. Of the skill, perseverance and loyalty of the Security Service there can be no doubt. I should like to add this tribute: It is indeed remarkable that we are able to recruit men of such high character and attainments. The rewards are not very large; the responsibilities are very great. After all, most of us gain some satisfaction in life not only from doing a job well but from the public acknowledgment of success. These men are cut off from all that. They work in secret. Most of their successes—and there are, indeed, successes—must be kept quiet. Any failure hits the headlines. For this service, then, not fame but patriotism is the spur and the reward.

On the more general aspects of security I should like to add this: I am satisfied, and I hope the House will be satisfied, that all these new arrangements which have been made have enormously strengthened the security system. I doubt whether any substantial improvement can be made within our existing system of law, on which I will say a word before I sit down; but, unfortunately, it is not sufficient to satisfy ourselves that we have taken all possible steps. We cannot ignore the fact that this incident, following upon others in the world of science, has had a serious effect upon our reputation abroad. That is inevitable. Of course, many of the allegations made by irresponsible people are so exaggerated that they carry with them their own refutation. Nevertheless, there is a real danger that a feeling might be spread among our Allies that our own reliability, hitherto regarded as a model, is no longer to be trusted.

It is of the greatest importance for our defence and our safety, depending as they do on close relations of confidence with our Allies, in the old world and in the new, that successive Governments should be known to have taken all steps within their power to stop any loopholes and to strengthen any legitimate methods of defending our vital secrets. Do not let foreign observers compare the present position with the situation as it was some time ago. I can honestly say that it is my belief that every practical means has been taken which is open to the Executive. I would, therefore, make an appeal that we should not injure our own interests by spreading abroad a false and, still more, an outdated picture of our security system as it stands today.

Before I conclude I hope the House will bear with me for one or two moments more for some final reflections. As I have already stated, we have to face a world completely changed from anything the older ones among us knew or thought possible; and what a change it is. Since 1689 in England and since 1745 in Scotland there has been no real dispute about the character of the régime. Bitter as have been political conflicts at certain times, there has been no question for all these years of serious acts of treachery to the country. We have to go back to the period of the wars of religion to find any parallel for the new ideological conflicts which divide the world and which may continue to divide it for many years to come.

It is difficult for the older ones among us to realise the new situation which

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Fascism, Nazism, Communism and other totalitarian methods of government have produced. It is hard for us to conceive of a son betraying his father or a father denouncing his own children. We cannot imagine a state of mind which regards spying as a virtue and treachery as a duty. We have to read again the problems that confronted the Elizabethan statesmen, Burghley and Walsingham, when the Secret Service first developed, when espionage and counter-espionage, plot and counter-plot were inseparable from international politics.

This brings us up directly against a new problem. It is really that of public security in a free society during a period of intense ideological warfare. We could, of course, reintroduce some methods and take again some powers which we abandoned long ago and we hoped had gone for ever. Even in a modified form these would have been very helpful in dealing with the case which I have had to outline to the House today. The story might easily have been unravelled if less regard had been had to the law.

Here, may I say that I was struck by a criticism which appeared recently in one of the popular papers. Why, asked this critic, was Mrs. Maclean not prevented from leaving England. This is what it said. I quote from the article:

"... the authorities said they would have had no legal power to stop her. There is no law for this."

Then it goes on:

"Could not they have found one?"

There we have the very nub of the problem. Could not they—that is, the authorities—have found one? Hitler would have found one, of course. Mussolini would have found one. Stalin had got one.

In time of war we, too, were forced to find new measures to control the rights of the individual, but they were never very much liked here, and I do not suppose that there was any product of war more distasteful to those who had to operate them or to the general public than the powers under Regulation 18B. In recent years, however, the question of treachery, particularly treachery inspired not by motives of personal gain but by misplaced ideological convictions, has loomed much larger in our national life than at almost any time in our long history; and nowadays it is not only the bureaucracy who are the holders of our national secrets. Perhaps even more secrets are in the hands of large sections of industry and of the scientific world.

With this extension of the problem we are brought face to face with the fundamental question of liberty. How can the interests of security be maintained without damage to our traditional liberties? At what point do reasonable and necessary security measures become the repugnant attributes of the police State? In short, how do we, in modern times, achieve good security in a democratic society?

The review which I have given of the security measures taken in recent years will, I hope, convince the House that everything that it is possible to do under existing law—or everything that we can see—has been done to protect us against treason and subversion by Government servants, or by others, who have secret material. To the extent that security practices can be improved under existing laws every effort has been made to achieve it, and I believe that these measures make the recurrence of an affair such as this exceedingly improbable—I do not say that they make it impossible.

I repeat, however, that these measures do not, and in my view cannot, go beyond the letter and the spirit of the law. At any rate, before the limitations of the existing law were relaxed, were it no more than this, I think that Parliament would have to weigh very carefully the balance of advantage and disadvantage, for it would, indeed, be a tragedy if we destroyed our freedom in the effort to preserve it.

4.40 p.m.

Mr. Herbert Morrison (Lewisham, South): Mr. Deputy-Speaker, before I proceed with my speech, perhaps I may be permitted to stray beyond the bounds of order for a few moments to refer to the deeply regretted death of my right hon. Friend William Whiteley, Member for Blaydon. He was respected in all quarters of the House. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] He was a very fine Member of Parliament, a man of the most upright character, and I would say, having seen a good many Chief Whips—and I think that the Government Chief Whip will agree—that William Whiteley will stand out as one of the great Chief Whips in the House of Commons; a

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servant not only to his party, but a man who also had a sense of duty to the House as a whole, including the Opposition. We all deplore his passing. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."]

We have heard a very able, full and competent speech by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and I am sure that the House as a whole is thankful to him for the information which he has given this afternoon. I think the Government were right themselves to take the initiative in offering a debate on this matter, and that it is right that a debate should take place. It will probably be rather less exciting than one felt that it might be when the Government announced it. The atmosphere has somewhat cooled down. We are grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his speech, although I must say that while I agree with the great bulk of it—as will be apparent in the course of my observations—I am not quite as satisfied as he is with things as they are.

This is not a party political matter. We are concerned with the problem of Government and administration, and I hope that it will be handled as such throughout the debate. We, in our country, have a very great Civil Service, of which we can be proud. I do not think that there is any better in the world. I agree that the Civil Service of the Foreign Office is also one which does credit to the country, both at home and abroad. It is true that, now and again, a tradition of earlier policies and earlier biases is to be found in the Foreign Office, and it is necessary for the Secretary of State to push hard to get it altered. The Foreign Service is a very good one. Having had, for a short period, contact with other foreign services I am inclined to say that I know of none better than ours. But there is always a temptation for a Minister in charge of a Department—or a Minister who has been in charge of a Department—rather to assume that that Department is completely perfect. That, of course, would be foolish and unwise. There are always imperfections, and it is as well to bear that in mind.

The Secret Service—for which, in its wider aspects the Prime Minister is responsible—and was—is also a good one as a whole. During the greater part of the war I was Secretary of State for the Home Department and Minister of Home Security. I had a great deal to do with the Secret Services or, at least, had a good deal of knowledge from them and although I was not in charge of them, I watched their work. Compared with the secret services in Nazi Germany ours were eminently superior. I did not think much of the Nazi Secret Services. I thought a great deal of our own. In the beginning of the war, they were, perhaps, a little reckless in their political judgment, and sometimes saw Communists—and even Fascists—where they did not fully exist but my experience was that they improved as time went on.

I agree with the Foreign Secretary that we all feel that this incident of Burgess and Maclean is a disgrace to our country. With him, I know that the Foreign Office—the Foreign Service as a whole—felt that it was a disgrace and a reflection upon the Service. It was also an unhappy incident for the Security Services. We are all sad about it; just as we were sad about the case of Fuchs, of Dr. Nunn May, and of Pontecorvo, cases which were, if anything, more serious even than these cases, and which might have a greater effect upon the future peace of the world even though they did not raise so much excitement.

However, we have to keep a sense of proportion about these things. If we remember the number of men employed in our public services, the number of cases of this kind are very limited. That does not mean that we should underestimate them, nor that we should not be worried about them. Each is a worrying incident, but things have occurred in this way before. After all, the noblest band of men in history had their Judas. He suffered, and I think that these men will suffer, in one way or another, in due course.

The existence of Communism and Fascism creates a new security problem. The Communist—and, indeed, the Fascist; he does not exist so much now, but he could again if our economic situation became really serious—are both different from the ordinary espionage agent, in this respect: they both have a loyalty, not to their own country but to another country or other countries. I do not know that they have a sense of guilt about this external loyalty. They may even feel that it is a virtue. If one

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reads the Communist daily newspaper, or reads the periodicals or other information coming one's way, one cannot help but feel that they have not the slightest feeling of obligation or loyalty to the United Kingdom—that their loyalty is to another country.

I reserve the right to disagree with my own country if I think that my own country is wrong in a given course of policy. I reserve the right to agree with other countries if I think that they are right, but I am always very suspicious of anybody, whether a Government servant or somebody else, who persistently expounds the view that our country is always wrong, and the Communist countries are always right. There is something wrong with that, and it gives rise to legitimate suspicion.

It is sometimes said that Communism is a religion. I do not think that is fair to religion. I think that in some ways it is a disease. In fact, my right hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan), some years ago, very rightly said, "The Communist party is not a party; it is an organised conspiracy". There is a great deal of truth in that.

Mr. Emrys Hughes (South Ayrshire): We say that about the Tories.

Mr. Morrison: If I could think of something to quote to please my hon. Friend, I would do so, but I have not got such a quotation ready.

Nevertheless, there are some Communists who are innocent, sincere but deceived. It is the case that in the Security Service we are up against a new problem. Formerly, a man who was a national of another country was hired as a spy, or even a national of one's own country was hired as a spy—that was the game, and they were often very brave men. But the new situation of a voluntary act of service in the interests of a foreign power against one's own country is a very serious matter for security in all sorts of ways.

Let no one think that this aspect is confined to the working classes: I do not think that anyone does think so. In fact, the cases with which we are concerned are not of that character. There have been some working-class cases, but the funny thing about the middle and upper classes, the well-to-do class, is that if they go wrong in this fashion they are, if anything, worse than other people—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."]—it is so. They begin by revolting against their families and they finish up by secretly revolting against the State. That is rather curious. What I have said about the Communists is equally true about the Fascists.

Mr. C. Pannell: Perhaps my right hon. Friend will address himself to the point to which the Secretary of State did not address himself, namely that, generally speaking, this talk about the liberty of the subject has not been applied circumspectly to members of the working-classes; the Ministry of Supply screened, and effectively screened, persons, including members of my union, on the slenderest suspicion, and that, broadly speaking, the tests of the Foreign Office were not equitably inflicted upon the working classes.

Mr. Morrison: I think that there may be some truth in what my hon. Friend says. I was Minister of Supply for a few months. Some workmen were dismissed before my arrival. I had complaints from a Labour Member of Parliament, the late Arthur Jenkins, about it, and I went into it and came to the conclusion that they had been dismissed on inadequate information and on inadequate grounds. Therefore, I think there is, or that there was at any rate, some truth in what my hon. Friend says.

I agree that it would be wrong to assume that because a man is a Communist or a Fascist at university he must be necessarily guilty for life. All sorts of things happen among university undergraduates. I never studied at a university. I am a product of the elementary schools, and I am not ashamed of the fact. But all sorts of things happen at the universities. Abnormal ideas are evolved, and, indeed, sometimes university students are encouraged to evolve them because they are thought to be good for the youthful mind.

There was, for example, the motion carried at the Oxford University Debating Society that they would not fight for their King and country, and many people were understandably shocked about it. But the House may be sure that three-quarters, and may be more, of those young men did fight for their King and country when war came. So what happens at university is not conclusive either

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way. If we were to take it as conclusive that because a man was a Communist or a Fascist in his university life, he must, therefore, be permanently held under suspicion as likely to betray secrets of State, I think that we should be degenerating into McCarthyism, because that was exactly what McCarthyism was—a probing back and the assumption that if there had been such a relationship the man must be held to be guilty.

The dates of all these incidents are revealed in the White Paper, and five Governments in all were involved—the pre-war Conservative Government, the Coalition Government, two Labour Governments and the present Government. Therefore, we are all in it. Five Governments have been concerned with these two men, and I feel that we must all do our best to help the House, but we must have due regard to security in the process. I will tell the House what I know about this matter during the short period that I held office as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

So far as I can recall, I never met Mr. Burgess. I met Mr. Maclean only once, and that was at a social gathering, which bears out the point that his office as Head of the American Department was not of the kind which would bring him into frequent contact with the Secretary of State. I will tell what I know. As I say, five Governments were involved, as well as a number of Ministers at the Foreign Office. Unfortunately, two of the Ministers who were at the Foreign Office during part of the time—Mr. Bevin and Mr. McNeil—have died. Nothing I shall say should be taken as criticism of them—they are not here to answer for themselves—but I may have to refer to matters which occurred during their period of office.

I will tell the story of my own part in this matter. In the middle of April, 1951, I was verbally informed, in general terms, of leakages that had occurred. At that time, it was still not known who were the informants, although suspicion narrowed down to a quite limited number of people. To the best of my recollection the names were not mentioned to me.

The Security Service arranged to investigate, and it sought and obtained full Foreign Office co-operation. I hope that no one here or outside the House will think that anybody in the highe reaches of the Foreign Office who wer responsible in this matter would for on moment have sought to protect any o their colleagues from a charge o espionage. I am quite sure that the would not, and that would be an unjus suspicion.

At a later date, as outlined in th White Paper, Maclean became the prin cipal suspect, and as a consequence som top-secret papers were withheld from him That was a decision which, no doubt occasioned some difficulty because i might arouse suspicion. On the othe hand, if the papers had continued to b supplied to him, it would have laid th authorities open to great criticism in du course if trouble arose. In all thes matters we have to remember thi dilemma of the security authorities. Apar from the small security branch of th Foreign Office, the wider security authori ties, of course, were responsible to th Prime Minister and not to the depart mental Ministers, which is quite right.

The evidence against these men at th material times right up to their departur was insufficient to warrant decisive action on charges of espionage. If they had been arrested and ultimately found innocent, that would have brought discredit both on the Foreign Office and the Security Service, and charges of goodness knows what would have been made. The evidence was insufficient. It could not justify arrest, and further evidence was needed in order to justify effective action.

There was another reason why precipitate action could not very well be taken. That was that one of the most valuable things to do in counter-espionage is not only to find out the man or the men who are responsible for espionage but to find out their contacts and the channels through which they act and from whom they receive their orders. Therefore, precipitate action might destroy the wide operation of unravelling the network o espionage against our country.

Mr. Daines: Could my right hon Friend, who was Home Secretary at thi time, explain why the ports were no alerted in case Maclean went; and secondly, could my right hon. Frien explain why Maclean's passport was no withdrawn? May I draw my right hon Friend's attention to the fact that pass ports have been withheld from Britis

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citizens. There was the case of Dr. Burhop, who wanted to attend a scientific conference on the Continent, and his passport was withheld. My main question is, why were the ports not alerted?

Mr. Morrison: That is a perfectly legitimate point to raise. I am inclined to think that they ought to have been alerted, but, having said it, I do not know what one would have done effectively if they had been alerted. There is this to be said, of course, that it would have been very useful to have known immediately if they had gone and by what route. They might have been followed. Therefore, I think that my hon. Friend has raised a fair point of criticism.

With regard to the withdrawal of passports, I do not think that can be done. Of course, in war we did all sorts of things—I had a hand in them.

Mr. H. Macmillan: The law about passports is very complicated. I think it is possible to refuse a passport. I do not think it is possible effectively to withdraw a passport. In law the passport, it is quite true, is the property of Her Majesty, and the person who holds the passport does so as a kind of tenant, but the only way in which one could effectively get a passport back would be by applying to the court, and therefore evidence would be required to prove to the court why the passport ought to be withdrawn. Therefore, it cannot effectively be withdrawn except by the kind of evidence which would be regarded as satisfactory enough to support the bringing of a charge.

Mr. Morrison: There would have had to be some sort of charge, some sort of evidence given, in which case one is in a dilemma. Undoubtedly it was done in war-time. On the spur of the moment I cannot deal with the point raised by my hon. Friend the Member for East Ham, North (Mr. Daines), but undoubtedly it was done in war-time, when there used to be a delightful area of doubt at to who was most responsible for the passport and visa business—the Home Secretary or the Foreign Secretary. We got on as best we could. Nevertheless, there is something in what my hon. Friend says.

It is important that the contacts should be touched and the network of espionage uncovered. I would remind the House that it is not unusual—and I think this is well known—for the police even to leave at liberty a known criminal against whom they have got complete evidence and against whom they would undoubtedly secure a conviction. Sometimes the police leave him at liberty for a time in order to find his contacts and to spread the net rather wider. That is what happened in April, 1951.

The first minute that I received on this matter from the officers of the Department was on 25th May, 1951. On the same day the Security Services reported to the Prime Minister as their political chief. On that day I authorised the questioning of Maclean. The Security Services took the view that they must choose the right time for that questioning, for the reasons which I have given, and which are outlined in paragraph 10 of the White Paper, and to secure further evidence.

In the light of the Maclean and Burgess experience, I set up the committee of inquiry to which the Foreign Secretary has referred, and I was grateful to the members of that committee for the work they did, though they reported after I had ceased to be Foreign Secretary. They reported to my successor in November, 1951 and, as we have heard, further security checks were recommended, and according to the White Paper they have been put into effect.

It has been asked why Burgess was on leave. Burgess was not exactly on leave. He was in substance suspended with a view either to his resignation or dismissal after he had been heard by a disciplinary board. It was during this period that he disappeared. But I will return to the merits of these two gentlemen—if that is the right word—later.

I must say in justice that the case of Burgess—that is to say, of his troubles in Washington—was not raised with me as it was hoped he would resign. It would have come to me after the disciplinary board had heard him. I think I ought to have been told earlier about the troubles of Mr. Burgess in Washington, and I am inclined to take the view that after he had been heard by the disciplinary board it should have dismissed him. Further, it must not be forgotten that even then it would not have prevented him from escaping from this country.

Mr. Daines: My hon. Friend said a moment ago that he set up a committee

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of inquiry just after he heard of the Maclean affair. [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] What my right hon. Friend conveyed to me was that he was cognisant of the Maclean case only just before the setting up of the committee of inquiry. Clause 10 of the White Paper says:

"In January, 1949, the security authorities received a report that certain Foreign Office information had leaked to the Soviet authorities some years earlier."

Was my right hon. Friend, as Foreign Secretary, informed of that by his heads of departments, or by the security services?

Mr. Morrison: I said I was informed in general terms about certain problems which had arisen in the middle of April, 1951. To the best of my recollection that was the first time. I do not know, of course, what had been conveyed to earlier Foreign Secretaries. My hon. Friend has misunderstood what I said about the inquiry. It was not into the case of Burgess and Maclean specifically but into the question of whether the internal arrangements affecting security were adequate. It was a useful inquiry, which I think did useful work.

I come to the record of these two men and my reasons for thinking that there is ground for some unhappiness about the way in which they were treated. Maclean was guilty of disgraceful conduct in Cairo in 1950. Apparently he got drunk, got out of hand, went to a party in a flat and proceeded to smash the place up. I do not think that overstrain and drunkenness are adequate explanations or, if they are, that they are adequate excuses for conduct of that sort on the part of an important officer of the Foreign Office serving abroad.

Both men were Communists at Cambridge, and I have dealt with that point. The White Paper says both of them were cured when they left the university. Whether that was so or not we cannot now be quite sure. The White Paper assumes that because Burgess joined the Anglo-German Club that is evidenced to the effect that he was cured. I am speaking from memory, but my recollection is that the Anglo-German Club about 1935-36 was a body under some suspicion as being under Nazi influence.

Mr. Hugh Dalton (Bishop Auckland): It stank with Nazis.

Mr. Morrison: My right hon. Friend, being more proletarian in his language than I am, and having had a university education, says it stank with Nazis, and I am prepared to accept that. It is no defence of Burgess, in any event, that he slid from the Communists to the Anglo-German Club.

It is recorded in the White Paper, and has been stated by the Secretary of State, that early in 1950 Burgess was reported for indiscreet talk about secret matters in the later part of 1949. For that, after a hearing by a disciplinary board, he was severely reprimanded. Later—but this was not until 1950 or 1951, I am not quite sure which—there were complaints as to his work and behaviour at Washington. The State Department complained about is reckless motor driving, and he was careless with confidential papers. That situation was dealt with and he was brought home and was due for either resignation or dismissal. In my judgment, in the case of Burgess also, in view of careless talk about secret matters in 1949, a severe reprimand was not good enough. I think that in both of these cases they should, for those offences, have been dismissed.

I do not like to say this but I feel I must say it. It is not a peculiarity of the Foreign Office for it runs through the Civil Service, and the motives are, I think, in many ways meritorious. It is not a matter to be recklessly condemned. I think that in the Civil Service as a whole—whether it is more so in the Foreign Office I do not know—there is a tendency, if an officer falls down on his job or is guilty of an offence which is somewhat serious, to say, "He is an old colleague. Can we not do something about it to prevent him from being fired?"

Often what happens is that he may be transferred to other work. [HON. MEMBERS: "Promoted."] I would not say "promoted," for that is perhaps going rather far, but one never knows. He may be transferred to another State Department, and new State Departments are particularly likely to get such men. Or he may be rebuked. I think that a little sacking now and again would not do any harm. It would do some harm to the men concerned but it might do a lot of good to the rest of the Service.

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I think that in the Civil Service generally, and to some extent in local government—whether it is more so in the Foreign Office I do not know—there is a tendancy generally to help colleagues out of trouble. In some cases that is right but in some cases the colleagues ought to be left in trouble and ought to be fired. But do not let the House think from this that there is any legitimate charge against the Civil Service that they would seek to protect a man who had been guilty of espionage against his country.

The next question I ask myself is this: was Maclean—and therefore Burgess—tipped off, as the saying is? Or was it the cut in confidential papers which warned him? I am inclined to think that he was tipped off by somebody. If so, I wish we could find the somebody. I am inclined to think that these men were tipped off. Certainly it was a remarkable coincidence that I should have given that order on 25th May and they were missing on the night of 25th May.

I have received a letter from a respected friend of mine whose judgment of men and affairs I respect. He asks me not to give his name, although it is available to the Foreign Office if they want it and if it is any use to them. He does not want to be pursued with publicity in this matter because it is not very nice. This is what he says:

"I was very interested to read your remarks about Maclean and Burgess the other day because I know them both and actually lunched with Maclean the day before he disappeared. The point I wanted to mention to you was that on that day I am sure that he had no intention of leaving England in the way he did. He spoke to me so normally of his private affairs, his wife's confinement and his plans for the immediate future that I am convinced he was not then intending to leave the country. This makes me feel that subsequent to meeting me on 24th May he received some warning that he was under suspicion and immediately left the country with Burgess. It may be, therefore, that someone in the Foreign Office told him on 25th May that you had authorised him to be questioned."

Of course, it was not only the Foreign Office who knew, for the Security Service knew as well. I read that letter for what it is worth as the impression of a man who lunched with Maclean that day before his departure. I am inclined to think that Maclean was tipped off by somebody who knew what was going to happen.

We are much obliged to the Foreign Secretary for telling us about Philby. There are definite statements that the family are missing and no doubt if it should become of significance the right hon. Gentleman will be good enough to inform the House.

I come to my conclusions. I think that any wild or extreme criticism of the Foreign Service would be unfair and would be wrong. I have met a large number of the members of the Service, as have other hon. Members without experience of Ministerial office, in other countries. It is clear that the Secretary of State must be the master of the Department, irrespective of what his political opinions may be, but the latest reforms were made as recently as war-time.

There have, of course, been roughly three stages in the history of the British Foreign Service. There was the old days, when aristocratic gentlemen became ambassadors without any pay at all. Then there was the later period when competitive recruitment had developed in part but not to its present standard. Then there were the reforms initiated by the present Prime Minister and, as has been said, largely carried out by Mr. Ernest Bevin.

The second stage of Foreign Office people have survived and their ideas are not quite the same as those of the post-war, reformed recruitment. There are survivals but time will solve that problem, and it is passing. They are largely university men—all of them I suppose in the higher reaches. That is true of the home Civil Service as well. Whether it is necessary that there should be such a high proportion of university people I do not know. Whether the products of primary and secondary education could get through I do not know. Many people who are now getting to the universities started their education in primary schools. They get through by certificates and competitive examinations—which did not happen in the early days—and enter the public service. Recruitment to the Foreign Service, so far as I know, is substantially the same in principle as recruitment to the home Departments, that is to say it is all through the Civil Service Commission. The examination is somewhat different from that for the home Departments but by and large it is not enormously different.

[MR. MORRISON.]

The question I want to submit for the consideration of the Prime Minister and the Government—I was involved in earlier arguments about it—is based on the fact that the Foreign Service is separate from the home Civil Service. It is separately recruited, it maintains its own life and, I think my right hon. Friend the Member for Bishop Auckland (Mr. Dalton) will agree, it is not as much subject to Treasury co-ordination as is the home Civil Service [*Interruption.*] My right hon. Friend thinks it is much the same. The point I want to raise is whether it is right that the Foreign Service should be entirely separate from the home Civil Service?

In the home Civil Service there are transfers between one Department and another. It is a very good thing that there should be transfers between Department and Department. That gives men a varied experience, and their knowledge becomes richer and more varied in knowledge. I readily concede the point that we must have a substantial proportion of Foreign Office people who are to be in the Foreign Office for life. There is some dilution now, however, in respect of the labour attachés, who are recruited through the Ministry of Labour, but I am not at all sure that it would not be a good thing for men from other home Departments to be transferred to the Foreign Office and for men from the Foreign Office to be transferred to home Departments in order that they might get a wider variety of experience through the collective experience of the Foreign Office and the home Civil Service.

I suggest to the Government that in these circumstances, and in the light of these unhappy and beastly incidents, there is a case for an inquiry. I still think, in view of public apprehension, or even misunderstanding, that there should be an inquiry into recruitment to and promotion in the Foreign Office and into the administration of the Foreign Office. That should include the problem of the very heavy burden which falls on the Secretary of State in modern times. It is much heavier than it used to be, and has had grave effects on the health of more than one Secretary of State. I think that aspect ought to be looked into to see whether there is any delegation to existing junior Ministers and for Parliament to be told about it.

Such an inquiry would do no harm if the Foreign Office emerged well out of such an inquiry that would be for the good of the Foreign Office, and, if there were improvements to be made, that would be for the good of the country. That task could be done by a Select Committee or some other suitable body.

I think the Foreign Secretary is wrong in resisting any inquiry into that matter, because we should remember the heavy burden on the Foreign Secretary. It is almost impossible for him to devote the attention to administrative details and personal questions in the Department which is possible for a Minister in charge of a home Department. The Department knows that, with the consequence that it is quite possible for the Department not to take to the Secretary of State or one of the other Ministers matters which in a home Department would be taken to the Minister. That is not because the Department is trying to dodge the Minister, but because it knows that the Secretary of State is so heavily burdened that it must "chance its arm" a bit. I think these matters need looking into. Otherwise we shall have trouble over the health of future Foreign Secretaries, as we have had over the health of past Foreign Secretaries.

Secondly, there is a case for looking into security, partly in the light of the circumstances of the Burgess and Maclean case, and partly in order to be satisfied that the Security Services are good. Here we are dealing with a different story altogether. It is much more difficult to have an inquiry into the security services. It clearly cannot be a public inquiry; that would be ridiculous. Nor can it be an inquiry with a public report; that, I think, is out of the question. We cannot expose to the public view the security machine of our own or other countries. We cannot risk a divulging of the secrets either of espionage or counter-espionage. On that matter there should be investigation by a judge or judges in private, a private report being made to the Prime Minister, but I think that step ought to be taken. I hope that the Prime Minister, in his reply can give us and the country some comfort about that matter.

I do not know whether all my hon. Friends will take this view, but both fields might be covered by a Committee

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of Privy Councillors, representing both sides of the House, and with experience which makes them specially qualified in these matters—but inquiry there must be. We are up against a new problem in these matters. The country will not be satisfied without an inquiry of some sort, covering an adequate field, for our country has a right to know that adequate action is being taken arising out of an experience which is disturbing and worrying to us all.

5.27 p.m.

Colonel Alan Gomme-Duncan (Perth and East Perthshire): The two speeches to which we have listened this afternoon will undoubtedly have impressed the House. Although we may not agree with everything that has been said, I think it most desirable that the debate should open with such thorough speeches, one from each side.

It seems to me that there are three main issues before us. The first I do not think has been mentioned so far in Parliament or in the Press, but it may be a vital link in the whole story, or mystery. What connection is there between Guy Burgess and Dr. Otto John, the West German security chief, who defected to the Communists in 1954? Otto John was chief legal adviser to Lufthansa before the war and became a member of the Canaris Group, which plotted the death of Hitler.

When that went wrong his brother was executed by the Gestapo and he escaped through Spain and came to London about the end of 1944. In the last months of that year he worked for the B.B.C. Later he was employed in the Foreign Office and afterwards by a London law firm. He returned to Germany in 1949 and was appointed president of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution—which is a high falutin' way of saying, the security machine-watching and reporting on neo-Nazi activities. That appointment was made with the consent of the British and American Governments.

Is it a fact—my information is that it is in the B.B.C. offices and, later, in the Foreign Office—that there is information to the effect that Otto John was a close associate of Guy Burgess? I hope that my right hon. Friend will answer that, if he can, when he replies. They certainly had all too much in common outside their public duties.

As head of the counter-Communist intelligence in Bonn, John would have received information from British and United States sources. It is known that he was in touch with a number of what might be called double agents, agents working each way. Did Otto John maintain his contact with Burgess? If he did, he could have been very useful indeed to him and Maclean, and possibly also to Mrs. Maclean. I believe that the Government have the information that can answer this question, and I hope that if possible, if security will permit, something may be said on that point.

The second vital issue affects the internal administration of the Foreign Office, to which both right hon. Gentlemen who have spoken have already referred in some detail. I should like to say straightaway that I have not the slightest reflection to make on any of the right hon. Gentlemen who have held the important and difficult office of Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. In spite of anything that I may say, I hope that that is fully realised.

The Fighting Services have a system of regular confidential reports on officers. They are made annually—in the Navy, I believe, it is sometimes six-monthly—and they give their seniors a clear picture not only of their ability, but also of their moral character and behaviour; and that is very important. Excessive drinking is a weakness that would be recorded.

The Foreign Office, I understand, has a similar system of reports. I asked my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary in two Questions the other day if he would place in the Library a copy of these forms, which he very kindly did. But I also asked what arrangements existed in his Department for the submission of confidential reports on personnel. On behalf of the Foreign Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Joint Under-Secretary replied:

"The heads of Foreign Service missions abroad and of departments in the Foreign Office report regularly on their staffs on printed forms which vary for each branch of the Service. . . . A report on each member of the senior branch of the Service is sent in at least every two years. For new entrants to the branch reports are submitted every six months during the period of probation. Reports on all other branches are sent in at least once a year."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 26th October, 1955; Vol. 545, c. 35.]

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So we have the clear statement that there is a comprehensive system of reporting on forms for the purpose in the Foreign Office in much the same way as in the Services.

Lieut.-Colonel Marcus Lipton (Brixton): Was the hon. and gallant Member told how or on what date the forms to which he has referred were introduced?

Colonel Gomme-Duncan: No. I was not; I did not ask for that. I asked what the system was at the moment. I agree with the hon. and gallant Member that the date is of some importance in this case.

From that reply given by my right hon. Friend the Under-Secretary arise questions of great importance, questions that must be answered by the Government if they will do so. Who reported on Burgess and Maclean, and what was written about them? There are these different forms, particularly the one which is called F.2 and which deals with Branch A and the first four grades of Branch B in the Foreign Service. That one has a section which calls for reliability reports, of contact with foreigners reports and social behaviour reports, and at the end a large space is left for a detailed pen picture—that is the actual wording—of the officer reported upon.

The reporting on officers of any branch of Service, including the Foreign Office, is a most distasteful job for the senior officer who has to do it. That makes it all the more important that there must be a man of moral courage to say what is correct. In the Fighting Services, the officer reported upon has to sign the report himself, but as far as I can make out from the Foreign Office forms, the officer reported upon does not have to sign. That makes it much easier for the officer making the report to be aboslutely frank than if he had to show it to the man, human nature being what it is. It does away for any excuse for moral cowardice.

Was there a report on Burgess and Maclean? Was their behaviour, or misbehaviour, recorded, and what was said? Was this very important item of information included: that in 1940, I understand, Maclean was associating with the representative in London of the Tass Agency? Everybody knows that the Tass Agency, in any country where there has been an inquiry, has been proved to be the centrepiece of an espionage system. Was that known at the time? It seems to me that a very great deal depends upon the answer to that question.

The third issue arises from a statement made by the Leader of the Opposition when he was Prime Minister in March, 1948. He was explaining the proposals of the then Labour Government for screening State employees. Very briefly, not giving the whole details, the right hon. Gentleman said:

"I have said that there are certain duties of such secrecy that the State is not justified in employing in connection with them anyone whose reliability is in doubt.

Experience, both in this country and elsewhere, has shown that membership of, and other forms of continuing association with, the Communist Party may involve the acceptance by the individual of a loyalty, which in certain circumstances can be inimical to the State."

The right hon. Gentleman went on to say:

"The Government have . . . reached the conclusion that the only prudent course to adopt is to ensure that no one who is known to be a member of the Communist Party, or to be associated with it in such a way as to raise legitimate doubts about his or her reliability, is employed in connection with work, the nature of which is vital to the security of the State."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 15th March, 1948; Vol. 448, c. 1703-4.]

That is a very prudent, very comprehensive and very desirable state of affairs which the right hon. Gentleman deserves full credit for bringing into effect.

But why was the principle laid down by the Prime Minister of that time and not carried out, apparently, in the case of Burgess and Maclean? Both were known to have past associations with Communists, and while in Paris in 1938 Maclean made no secret of his sympathy with the Spanish Communist Party. In the same year, as has been mentioned by the right hon. Member for Lewisham, South (Mr. H. Morrison), Burgess underwent the mysterious conversion into pro-Nazism. But both were undoubtedly

"employed in connection with work, the nature of which is vital to the security of the State."

Both had access to secret papers, and it is known now that Maclean was making microfilms of them for the Russians. How and why were they exempted from the screening which was supposed to have been applied to all servants of the State.

s laid down by the Prime Minister of hat day in 1948? It is much more important to probe these things than to hase individuals in the security department.

There is, however, one thing that Parliament can and should do, and I think that this debate will bring it out more clearly than before. There should be sufficient money and staff for the security services to do their jobs properly. I believe that they have been starved of these things. The worst thing that could happen would be for the Burgess-Maclean incident—I call it no more—to develop into a party wrangle. I see no signs of that happening and I am quite convinced that the House would not lower itself by doing it on such a vitally important matter for the country.

Parliament's duty is to ensure that such a thing cannot happen again. After all, it is a truism, but it is quite true to say, that what has happened has happened; but that is no reason why those who have been proved incompetent should be employed in high office any longer. What this House wants—and, I believe, the country as well—is reassurance and evidence that such things cannot occur again reasonably. It is no good saying that something is utterly impossible, but we want to be reasonably sure that that cannot happen again.

I doubt whether, so long as the men who were responsible for security at that time remain in high positions, the confidence of the country will be maintained. Let us, however, keep our consideration of the matter on the high level at which it has started. I beg the House with great humility, for it is not a matter for party wrangling, is not a matter of personalities, but a matter of the national interest and of the best possible safeguarding of our beloved country.

5.40 p.m.

Mr. R. H. S. Crossman (Coventry, East): I shall try, in saying what I have to say, to keep the debate on the high level that the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Perth and East Perthshire (Colonel Gomme-Duncan) has set for us back benchers in following those two excellent speeches from the Front Benches, the speech of the Foreign Secretary and the speech of my right hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham, South (Mr. H. Morrison).

Indeed, as a Labour back bencher who has from time to time criticised the Foreign Secretary, and the Prime Minister, too, I should like to congratulate the Foreign Secretary, for the second half of his speech, which dealt with the tremendous problem of the combination of freedom and public security in a world of clashing ideologies, was a classic statement of principle which we can all, I hope, agree upon and accept. It can do nothing but good that that statement of principle was made. However, the first half of the right hon. Gentleman's speech was a completely unsuccessful effort to explain away his own White Paper, and that is something which we must discuss.

I think it is rather futile to waste our time holding an inquest on Burgess and Maclean. What we ought to consider today are the lessons we can learn for the future from that lamentable incident. I shall try to confine most of my remarks to that problem, but I think that in this debate we are faced with two opposite difficulties. Certainly, there is a danger that we shall encourage witch hunting, and, goodness knows, at one part of the Foreign Secretary's speech I was slightly afraid. That was when he said that we had to consider our allies in what we did. I hope he did not mean that he thought our allies, the Americans, had been more successful in dealing with these problems than we have.

I am sure he did not mean it, because if we have shown a degree of lassitude they have shown an extreme in loyalty tests which, I think, has done more damage to their liberties and to the strength of America in the world than Burgess and Maclean have done to us. Think of the State Department. Think of the panic efforts to impose loyalty there by elaborate code! Think of the effect of the feeling that officials could not risk writing what they really meant in their diplomatic messages for fear of being read aloud at a Congressional inquiry. That is an object lesson of the dangers of extreme panic about security.

But there is another side to this. We must see that the cause of McCarthyism was not so much the effect of the fear of espionage as the popular suspicion, that for political reasons either politicians or high officials were covering up the signs of people in privileged places. Indeed, I believe that if the Truman Administration had gone into matters thoroughly and

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had been seen not to have been covering up matters, then the McCarthy hysteria might have been prevented beforehand. Therefore, it seems to me absolutely essential in this Burgess and Maclean case that any suspicion of covering up, any suspicion, not of these two, but of other people, being "covered" who were responsible for the fact that they could do what they did must be removed. Frankly, neither the White Paper nor the Foreign Secretary's speech has wholly removed those suspicions from my mind.

I was very glad that the Foreign Secretary said that we have to remember that security does not apply only to a couple of thousand high officials in Whitehall who are dealing with secret documents. It applies to the tens of thousands of industrial workers, especially those in aircraft factories. They are subject to security, too.

When I was listening to my right hon. Friend's description of his perturbation of mind when considering the case of Maclean, to his description of what was the real agony of making up his mind whether the man should be kept on, and when I considered all the trouble that was taken for Maclean, I could not help recollecting an incident brought to my attention last August of a constituent of mine, an aircraft factory worker in Coventry. He was sent for by the personnel manager and was told that he was a security risk because he was a member of the local branch of the Communist Party. He was dismissed from the factory overnight. There was no court of appeal for him. There were not "three wise men" to consider his case. There was no sort of protection for him. He was chucked out because of an untrue allegation.

I do not want to argue the case, because I am dealing with it elsewhere, and I acknowledge that the Minister of Supply has been very helpful, but it made me think, and I made some inquiries. We have to face the fact that security covers all our aircraft factories and that literally scores of people are now being moved from one position to another, very often without their knowing why and having their careers blighted by security charges. I wonder whether the procedure in other cases is based on as idle gossip as the accusation against my constituent, from which I am trying to liberate him.

I say to the Foreign Secretary and to the Prime Minister that the faintest suspicion that security regulations are enforced ruthlessly on the small fry in the factories but with infinitely greater restraint and conscientiousness the higher up a man is—that suspicion is utterly destructive of democracy in this country. I must say that I wish my constituent had received the amount of licence which was accorded to Burgess and Maclean. My constituent was completely innocent, but was thrown out on common gossip. There was not the care taken over him that was taken over these two men in highly key positions. The thoroughness and care taken in their cases contrasts with the rough treatment accorded to an aircraft factory worker who talked one night out of school.

Therefore, I say that our major preoccupation must be to see, if we are to have security regulations, as we must—that they are imposed with the most ruthless equality. No! That is wrong. They should be imposed with greater severity the higher one goes! Surely those who have official State secrets in their hands, those who have access to secret documents, must accept a severer interpretation of security than workers in aircraft factories. If some of them say, "We are such sensitive souls, and our talents, though very great, are not the sort of talents which can thrive in a world of red tape security," then they must be told they must go elsewhere. They must be told that their genius must be dispensed with.

But although security is essential, we ought to keep its range as small as possible, and it must be enforced most of all in areas like the Foreign Office or the three Services. With that as a background let us consider the White Paper on Burgess and Maclean. I start with the last paragraph of it, which tells us why we could not be told.

"Counter-espionage [illegible] depends for its success upon the maximum secrecy of its methods"

it says.

I had better declare my interest in this subject. During the war I was both a temporary member of the Foreign Office, and so directly responsible to the present Prime Minister. I was also a member of a secret department and at one time

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responsible to the present Foreign Secretary in Algiers. When I talk of secrets and security, therefore, I talk with some personal experience. I know perfectly well that much of what I learned about it is now out of date—the type of security which we accepted and which included the steaming open of one's letter and the tapping of one's telephone conversations—not unusual things to happen, I then supposed, when one had secrets.

I am sure the Prime Minister will know what I mean when I tell him that in a secret department the greatest temptation in the world is to use secrecy not in the national interest but in the Departmental interest, or in the personal interest, to "cover up". Every politician, every Minister, every general is tempted at some time or another to suppress information, not because it is helpful to the enemy but because it may be harmful to his future reputation or to a friend—or to that organisation to which he belongs. Every ambassador, also, is constantly tempted to suppress information which seems to contradict the way in which he is running the policy of our country in his area.

But secret departments are the worst because they are subject to no Parliamentary control. The Prime Minister technically is responsible for the Secret Service, but it is clear from the Burgess and Maclean case that the Service did not bother to tell many Cabinet Ministers what it was doing. I gather that the Foreign Secretary hardly knew before 25th May, and I gather that the Prime Minister of the time was not told, although the Secret Service was responsible to him, that for two years it had been investigating somebody at the Foreign Office.

Mr. H. Morrison: I said that the Prime Minister was told at the time I was told—on 25th May, to the best of my recollection.

Mr. Crossman: Therefore, for two years our counter-intelligence had been doing an elaborate investigation of 6,000 people. The investigation was narrowed down to one person, in the course of two years; of all this the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary were told nothing. That may be perfectly all right. I know enough about secret departments to know how much they resent telling politicians anything at all, because they regard politicians as very "leaky" people and very dangerous people to whom to tell secrets. The trouble, of course, is that secret departments are not responsible to Parliament.

Despite the Foreign Secretary's commendation of their patriotism, which I do not deny, I say that there is nothing more morally corrupting than the power to lie because it is claimed to be in the nation's interest, or to keep secrets by saying that it is in the nation's interest. That corrupts. And that is why these Secret Departments, in the very essence of their nature, are liable to the moral corruption of constantly using national security to "cover up." They do it either out of rivalry with another Department—a rivalry on which Secret Service organisations seem to spend most of their time—or because a friend has gone wrong and someone wants to cover the matter up. Therefore, when someone quotes this paragraph from the White Paper, I as an old member of the gang, do not believe a word of it. That is just what the Minister was bound to say if those concerned were "covering up."

I admit that "The Times" has been getting rather extreme of late in its judgment on all sorts of issues, but on Saturday, in a leading article headed "The Ostriches," I think it got matters roughly right. It said:

> "As the authorities no doubt calculated when holding back information for so long, many targets for criticism have now moved on . . . The suspicion is bound to be that, after the early days when the interests of secrecy had to be heeded, there were political reasons for putting off information in the hope that the storm would blow itself out."

This, of course, is confirmed by the Foreign Secretary's speech today.

The right hon. Gentleman was just a bit short about the Petrov case, but those of us who have read the Petrov material know that Petrov provided no evidence whatsoever except hearsay evidence. At least nothing else has been published. He said what he had to say, for £5,000. I gather from an extraordinary passage in the Foreign Secretary's speech that Petrov refused to talk if his revelations were published in Britain. Presumably, he wanted to sell his information to a newspaper, because he then would be paid for the articles, whereas if what he

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had to say was reported as straight news he would not get the money!

All that Petrov said was what he picked up in gossip from somebody else. The hearsay blew up into a major scandal and the Petrov case forced publication here. There is reason to believe that we would have had no White Paper if the Petrov case had not forced publication upon the Government. That worries me and makes we wonder a little, and that wonder is increased when I look at the White Paper itself.

The Foreign Secretary very properly said that he believed in ministerial responsibility. All right. Let him be responsible for this. It is easy to talk about ministerial responsibility if it consists only of being noble—and staying in office. Ministerial responsibility to me means taking the punishment if something outrageous is done. If the Foreign Secretary takes responsibility for this, the only decent thing to do is to resign.

The White Paper, as it stands, far from defending the Foreign Office, puts it deeper into the mire. If, after four years, this tissue of palpable half-truths and contradictions is the best that the Government can produce, the impression of "covering up" is more strongly substantiated than ever. Those responsible are very highly intelligent people, and if this is the best that they can do there must be some reason for what they are doing being so completely unconvincing.

Paragraphs 10 and 11 of the White Paper give elaborate reasons why these people were allowed to get away. We are told in paragraph 11 that it is possible that Maclean

"... observed that he was no longer receiving certain types of secret papers."

The Government are now saying, "We were not quite so ham-handed as that in denying secret papers." But if Maclean had been a spy for 16 years, and if the chief reason for his being a spy was removed from him, I do not see how one could stop his access to top secret material without his noticing it. If he was denied the papers that must surely have tipped him off. We are told, by the way, in an earlier paragraph of the White Paper, that he was given a job in the American Department in order to give him an unimportant rôle where he might rehabilitate himself. But the Head of the American Department seems to have had access to the most secret types of papers. Anyway, Maclean is tipped off by not having the papers. Then comes the problem of whether to search his house or not. We are solemnly told that his house cannot be searched, or that there must be no suggestion of it for fear he runs away.

It was not uncommon, during the war, for a man to be suspected. I dare say that the Prime Minister was responsible for us when we did certain things. When we had a person under suspicion and he was denied secret papers all we did was to say to him, "I warn you that you are under suspicion. Of course, you are not guilty. We are only investigating, but one way in which your guilt will be proved will be if you 'skedaddle.'" We found it a very effective way of keeping people still while investigation was going on.

Am I now to believe that Maclean could not be detained at the ports if he had been warned that his flight would prove his guilt? Anybody knows that that could have been done, and we ask ourselves why that was not done in this case. Why, in this case, was there such solicitude about the lady? I know that she was going to have a baby, but such solicitude is not always shown. I know of times when people have been treated rather roughly. This was an astonishingly tender treatment.

The Prime Minister (Sir Anthony Eden): This is very interesting. The hon. Gentleman is making points to which I will try to reply later, but the parallel which he is making between wartime and the case of Maclean is not, of course, a true parallel. The control which we had over the ports during the war was quite different from the control of the ports under the right hon. Member for Lewisham, South (Mr. H. Morrison), when he was Foreign Secretary.

The hon. Member may have other information, but I believe it to be true, and the legal opinion given to me has always been that there has been no power within the Government of this country to stop British people at the docks. That was the problem, both in respect of Maclean and of Mrs. Maclean. For the later, I take personal responsibility, for it was my own decision in her case. I

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had all the papers and I came to the conclusion that I had neither the possibility of stopping, nor the right to stop, Mrs. Maclean.

Mr. Crossman: I entirely agree about Mrs. Maclean. I do not see why she should not have joined her husband, but I was talking about a search of the house not being made because she was expecting a baby.

My suspicions are nearly all based on this paragraph. It is not a question of the ports. It is a question of whether we could not have kept Maclean from going by telling him frankly that he was under suspicion. I assume that he had already been tipped off by not having the secret papers. I now ask why we might not have tried saying to him, "Maclean, you are under investigation, and if you move that proves your guilt." I think he would have stayed in that case. At least, it would have been a risk worth taking, whereas, this way, it was certain what would happen. You tip him off, you do not keep a watch on him, you allow him a long week-end. After that it is certain that he will "skedaddle," whereas, by my method, we might possibly have bluffed him into staying.

I would remind the Prime Minister, if he has Dr. Fuchs in his mind, that at the critical moment the police bluffed Fuchs into a confession before they actually had the evidence in their hands. I am asking myself, therefore, why that was not done in this case, when we had already withdrawn the papers and had, therefore, warned Maclean of his plight. It still puzzles me.

The Foreign Secretary made it clear to us that one of our difficulties was that M.I.5, the counter-intelligence organisation, is not responsible for the actions which are taken. It is responsible for advising each Government Department upon the records and the personalities of the people there, but the actions are left to the Department in question. Therefore, we can never know whether the Foreign Office was not sufficiently strongly advised by M.I.5 or whether, despite the advice, something held it back from taking the necessary action.

That brings me to my own suspicion—Maclean belonged to the *élite* of the *élite*; he was one of the inner group of really gifted men, one of the half-dozen stars for top promotion; an intimate friend, a confidant, a man who spent long evenings with half-a-dozen people who are now in key positions. I am not blaming anyone. I am only saying that if a man has been desperately misjudged, if risks are taken for him—and, of course, risks were taken for Maclean; if a risk is taken and it does not come off, then certain people are not very anxious to have the extent of the risk they took on his behalf exposed.

We find a striking sentence at the beginning of the White Paper about Maclean's conduct:

> "Maclean was guilty of serious misconduct and suffered a form of breakdown which was attributed to overwork and excessive drinking."

Surely it is clear that the excessive drinking was the result and not the cause? Anybody looking at this can see that the man was suffering from a terrible psychological strain, the strain of being a traitor. He had those two loyalties which drove him into drink and drove him into treason. [*Interruption.*] [AN HON. MEMBER: "Wise after the event."] Very well! I say this to the Prime Minister: it is rumoured that before he went Maclean hinted to certain close friends that he was under a terrible strain. I have even been told that he gave broad hints as to what the strain was; and I am further told that his friends regarded all this merely as signs of nervous breakdown. The trouble is that we cannot investigate these rumours. If there had been a full investigation, we could have found out from his Foreign Office confidantes exactly what Maclean said in his confidential talks.

The curse of the policy of the White Paper, the policy of concealment, has been that those rumours have grown and grown in this country. And not unreasonably, for someone has to explain why, when suspicion had narrowed down to one man, there was this curious hesitation to take the risk which was taken with Dr. Fuchs. We are not talking about ports now; we are talking about facing Maclean with it and breaking him down. We are talking about the long shot which came off with Fuchs. Why was it not tried with Maclean?

I do not think that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs will think me unfair when I say that at least until recently, the Foreign Office has been under

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one great difficulty, the defect of its virtue. It has a sense of exclusiveness about it. My right hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham, South hinted at this. I believe there is a sense in the Foreign Office that when a chap has become a member of the club, he can do no wrong. Everybody outside, of course, knows nothing about foreign policy. Even if "The Times" correspondent has been a long time in a place where the ambassador has been working only one month, the ambassador apparently is capable of telling the expert truth in his telegrams, but "The Times" can say nothing of value. I accuse the Foreign Office of the kind of exclusiveness shown by those who are defending a privileged position somewhat precariously.

This is a peculiarity of the Foreign Office. As I have said, during the war I was a member of a secret auxiliary department for psychological warfare, attached to the Foreign Office. The Prime Minister knows, because he was in charge of our department, that we had to obey the security rules. It was a nuisance that we could not telephone over an ordinary line the content of a secret document but, instead, had to use a "scramble." It was a nuisance that we could not recruit certain people. I may have thought—indeed, I did think—that the security regulations which prevented me from recruiting those people were wrong, but I had to observe them.

It was much more irritating when I found that although we had to keep the regulations, the Foreign Office next door did not have to bother about them. The Foreign Office was too high and mighty. It was *infra dig.* for the Foreign Office to abide by the common laws of security. The Prime Minister laughs, but he knows that this was a fact——

The Prime Minister *indicated dissent.*

Mr. Crossman: If the right hon. Gentleman shakes his head again I will say one of the unpleasant things which I did not mean to say. There was a difference in the security treatment of the auxiliary department and of the Foreign Office—between the types of people we could recruit and the types recruited by the Foreign Office. The Foreign Office was allowed certain moral types which were forbidden to us. That has now been admitted by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs when he revealed th those types have been dismissed sin 1952. Yet they were there in 1945 a during the war.

I could go into detail about this d parity. There was a curious pervert liberalism which tolerated as eccentrici inside the Foreign Office conduct whi would have been condemned if anybo else had done the same thing outside t Foreign Office. The plain fact about th case is that the security officer ought no to have come into this question at al For even if these men had not been su pected of any relationship with Russi they were unfit to be members of th Foreign Office. Yet they were permitte to be members of the Foreign Office.

What did the Secretary of State fo Foreign Affairs say? That the Foreig Office felt this as a personal wound. could not agree more. It was a personal wound requiring to be "covered up." In a sense, it was the tradition of the Foreign Office which had been jeopardised by Maclean and Burgess. They had been allowed an eccentricity and it had turned out to be treason. Of course, the Foreign Office was extremely upset when what it had regarded as Donald Maclean's funny way of "talking Left-wing" turned out to be treason.

As for the other fellow, I am amazed that the Foreign Office could consider accepting him as a member when they knew all about him. I am amazed that the Foreign Office considered a man of that type, a man who had been noted in his previous secret department as a "no good" as brilliant, irresponsible, utterly "gabby," the very type who should not be allowed anywhere near a secret paper. How did he get in?

It was mentioned that Hector McNeil was the Minister. I appreciate the way in which the right hon. Gentleman made this reference. But I want to add that it is the job of senior civil servants to advise young Ministers. Was there any advice given to Hector McNeil that another type of personal private secretary might be better than Burgess? No, something much queerer occurred. The Foreign Office accepted Burgess not for the "A" but for the "B" class. His mind was absolutely first-rate, he was a brilliant fellow, wonderful at languages. The deficiencies in Burgess were moral. Are we to be told that "A" class means

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hat people are moral, but that "B" lass people are immoral?

What is even queerer is that when lector McNeil asked whether Burgess ould be put up into the "A" class the quest was resisted. Why? If the rounds were failings of personal charac- r he should not have been either "A" "B"—[An Hon. Member: "Or 'C' 'D'."] As an hon. Friend says, or "C" or "D," and if he was merely being udged on his intellectual merits, he hould have been in the A class or owhere.

This is proof that the Foreign Office as worried about Burgess, but not wor- ied enough, because he had already got is foot inside the door of the *élite*. There e have the two of them, Maclean right n the *élite* of the *élite* and Burgess push- ng his way up by means of some some- hat unsavoury personal connections hich perhaps got him in in the first place. A competent establishment officer hould have forbidden Burgess ever to have been appointed, and should certainly have thought twice about giving Maclean, only three months after his nervous breakdown—notice that it was only three months after the breakdown—the appointment as a head of a Department.

It is no good the Foreign Secretary or the Prime Minister, or, indeed, my right hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham, South, telling me that I am a suspicious type of person. Perhaps I am, and perhaps I understand this, because I lived in this sort of world. But the average man in the street, when told that this is a true and satisfactory explanation, knows perfectly well that whatever clever men produced this type of bunkum, it is always for the same reason. In Britain, influential people do not want to have too much interrogation or inquiry into what went on in the Foreign Office *élite*.

The crime in the Foreign Office was, first, to turn a blind eye to Maclean's deficiencies for far too long; to prefer private friendship and belief in him to public duty, and then when he had gone, to prefer Departmental loyalty to duty to this country. We are a democracy and we really have the right to know the facts when something has gone wrong.

I want, in conclusion, to say two things briefly about the proposals for an inquiry which have come from this side of the House. First of all, I will say a word about our proposals for an inquiry into security. After the Foreign Secretary's speech I feel much less need for this inquiry than I did before the debate. But, then, I never believed that security was the main problem in this case. The main problem is the establishment of the Foreign Office, and the conduct that was committed in the Foreign Office.

Still on security, I have one point to make in addition to what my right hon. Friend said. I think the Foreign Secretary was absolutely right in saying that we are back in the Elizabethan age and that treason has become a possibility; I would say that it is a possibility for every thoughtful man. Everyone who faces the world's dilemmas today finds his national loyalties in conflict with others. We have talked about Russia, but there might be a conflict between our national loyalty and American interests. The Russians are not the only people who have secret services. I can conceive of a time when an Englishman might think it his duty to pass information on to America, feeling he had a moral duty to do so, and then, later, he might well be proved to be a traitor if the world went the wrong way for him.

The Foreign Secretary is right. This is a basic problem. Surely, then, the Prime Minister will agree that policemen are really no good for this job. We have to detect the type of person who is not a common criminal. Such a person is not detectable in the ordinary way; he is not a spy selling himself for money. For this task one has to have an understanding of Marxism and other philosophic problems of the modern world. I should feel a great deal more confident if I had been told that we are to have a heads of M.I.5 not ex-policemen but people who have studied deeply the ideologies of the modern world and can put themselves in the place of young men and know what they are feeling. We want a new type of person for this task. The less we have of security the better, provided that the quality of it is really first-rate.

Secondly, I would remind the House that this searching for spies is really a relatively small part of security. Nine-tenths of security means security against carelessness, security to prevent information going to the enemy, either because of their technical power to break down

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our codes, because of documents being left about, or because of careless talk; and it should be that way, for we get nine-tenths of our information about the other side by reading their newspapers, by doing things which can be done in public, or by using techniques for getting inside which are not known to them.

This means that the Foreign Office, like every other part of the Civil Service, must have strict rules about carelessness and cannot go on saying, "We are too talented and sensitive to work under security rules." As a matter of fact, it is a great relief to have security rules. Those of us who had the secret for ten weeks before D-day thanked God for security. There it was, a corset to keep us safe. If we put the documents back in the safe, we were safe. If we telephoned on the correct line, we could not be court-martialled.

It is untrue to say that this type of security, if sensibly enforced, is demoralising. If there is not too much of it, and every regulation makes sense, the Foreign Office should not think it *infra dig.* to be like an ordinary officer in the Army or an aircraft worker, who is subject to this sort of thing. I hope that what the Foreign Secretary means is that the Foreign Office did learn this lesson in 1951 and has already accepted the need to observe security regulations.

As for security against the spy, I think that this issue is relatively unimportant. The number of people to whom this sort of thing will be applied in our country is small. Our great danger is that of getting so panicky about the relatively small problem of searching out spies in the Foreign Office that we shall neglect the big problem of setting up a security organisation against leaks.

The final point is this. The real problem of the Foreign Office is not security at all, but whether the reforms which were introduced ten years ago were soundly based and have produced the right results. I may be told that they were introduced ten years ago and that it is much too early for another inquiry. I should have thought that the period of ten years was just about right and that it was, therefore, just about time to look at the effect. As the Foreign Secretary reminded us, this was, after all, a Coalition reform. Again, we are looking at the matter as a Council of State and not as parties. What did the reform do? It cut the Foreign Office from the rest of the Civil Service, made it autonomous, and, at the same time, sadly undermined the specialist services inside the Foreign Office.

I was very struck by three excellent articles in the *Manchester Guardian* last week—three thoughtful articles—on the subject. My tentative conclusion is that we got the worst of both worlds. We certainly lost by the diminution of the specialised services; and we probably gained nothing, instead. The autonomy granted to it only increased the arrogance of the Foreign Office and the jealousy of the rest of the Civil Service. That was the result of giving the Foreign Office this privileged position.

I should like to see the Foreign Office part of the Civil Service along with everybody else, but encouragement to foster the specialist services, which it requires just as every other Department requires them. I do not see that the case for cutting it off has been proved in any way nor, if I may say so to some of my hon. Friends below the Gangway, do I believe that the so-called democratisation of the Foreign Office has had any of the effects which Ernest Bevin hoped for.

Let us be candid. If we take 100 boys from lesser grammar schools, we do not take 100 people who are less snobbish than those from larger grammar schools. What we have done generally—I am glad we have done it—is to take the best from the secondary and smaller grammar schools in rather larger quantities and so reduce the high proportion of the old public school. But if anybody thinks that that is democratisation, that is not the case. It very often happens that a person who comes up from below and enters the Foreign Office, with its august position, in order to obtain the protective colouring required, becomes more Foreign Office than the rest. Indeed, in my little experience of going round embassies, I have found that, on the whole, the man from the smaller grammar school is even more Foreign Office than those who came from the kind of school from which I come. Therefore, do not let us talk too much about the effect of democratisation on the Foreign Office. I do not think there has been any democratisation and if there had been, I am not sure that it would have the effect we desired.

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Mr. T. L. Iremonger (Ilford, North): Is there not a slight difficulty there? If one were to insist upon comparatively high academic requirements, would it not be slightly difficult to recruit pupils from secondary modern schools?

Mr. Crossman: I did not suggest that it should be exclusively from secondary modern schools. I do not think that anybody seriously maintains that we should recruit for the Foreign Office any differently than for the rest of the Civil Service, that is to say, predominantly from the universities. I said that the effect of the democratisation was merely that we took recruits from slightly lesser known grammar schools as well as from the better ones.

I suggest to the Prime Minister that there is really a case for looking at the position again after ten years and seeing how it is working; for seeing whether we should not put back the Foreign Office as part of the Civil Service; for seeing that security arrangements are accepted and not thought to be *infra dig*. I beg everyone to realise that the best sort of security is to choose one's civil servants correctly, and to trust them. Nothing is more disastrous than to believe that one will catch a lot of spies by being terrified of one's civil servants. The method of recruitment must be made correct; the discipline of the office must be made correct; the heads of Departments must be people who know their stuff; the establishments officer must be correct. If all those things are done, we will have a Civil Service far more loyal than we would have if we introduced American loyalty tests.

6.21 p.m.

Mr. Rupert Speir (Hexham): Like the hon. Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman), I should declare that during the war I was connected with some of the Intelligence departments of this country. I confess, to my surprise, that I agreed with a great deal of what the hon. Member had to say. This is the first time I have found myself in so much agreement with him. Having said that, I must also say that I do not think that he was altogether fair to the Foreign Office. He omitted to point out that the Foreign Office had already decided to get rid of Burgess before he fled from this country. I also feel that the hon. Member was somewhat wise after the event. If he and some of the other critics had been as wise at the time as they now are, they would have been very useful members of our Intelligence Services.

I cannot agree with the hon. Member when he says that the debate should be entirely dominated by the Foreign Office and conditions of Foreign Office recruitment. After all, both the individuals concerned might have been employed by any other Department of State. We ought, therefore, to give consideration to the adequacy of our Security Services as well as to conditions of recruitment for the Foreign Office. The debate is very much to be welcomed, because, during the past four years, our Secret Services have been very much maligned. Some wild and irresponsible charges have been made against them, and not being able to answer or refute the charges has put them very much in the same position as the unfortunate patient of a garrulous dentist who carries on a conversation with the patient who is not able to answer back.

The Secret Service does not come out of this affair too badly. Sufficient credit has not been given to M.I.5 for the fact that it was on the tracks of Maclean when he left the country. Indeed, it was probably because M.I.5 was trailing him that he bolted. But for M.I.5's investigations Maclean might still be in the Foreign Office, still be betraying his country and still be passing secrets to foreign Powers. M.I.5 ought to be given considerable credit for the fact that out of 6,000 possibles they had spotted who it was who was responsible for this leakage of information. As the Secretary of State said in his opening remarks, it is indeed easy to be wise after the event. It is easy now to ask why the two men were not more carefully watched and why they were allowed to leave the country.

I do not believe that those critics and others appreciate to the full the difficulties which face a Security Service in a free society. As paragraph 26 of the White Paper points out:

"In some countries . . . Maclean would have been arrested first and questioned afterwards."

We do not do that sort of thing in this country. The difficulties are immense. If one is carefully and closely to watch a suspect—and Maclean was only a suspect

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[MR. SPEIR.] —the difficulties of not arousing his suspicion are tremendous. It was the hon. Member for East Ham, North (Mr. Daines) who asked why Maclean's passport was not withdrawn. I can think of no more certain way of arousing a suspect's own suspicion than to withdraw his passport.

Mr. Daines: The hon. Member rather misunderstands the inference of what I said. I was saying that the order should have gone to the ports, so that if Maclean had got to the ports, he could have been held there and had his passport withdrawn. That was done in the case of Dr. Burhop. He had his passport withdrawn.

Mr. Speir: I misunderstood the hon. Member. What I wanted to emphasise was that there are immense difficulties in the way of keeping a 24-hour watch on a suspect without his knowledge, and that, unlike in a police State, the resources of our Security Services are comparatively limited. As has been already emphasised, the great point now is to see that all the gaps in our system have been adequately dealt with. Everyone is agreed that what we want to do is to make sure that the lessons of this unfortunate case have been properly learned. I was very glad indeed to hear from the Secretary of State that our system of vetting for confidential employment, not only in the Foreign Office, but in other Government Departments has been tightened up. I agree with the hon. Member for Coventry, East when he says that it is just as important that we should have a proper system of vetting for employment in secret research work in industry. He spoke about one of his constituents who had been removed because he was a branch secretary of the Communist Party.

Mr. Crossman: Falsely alleged to be.

Mr. Speir: I find it difficult to believe that he was removed if the information was really false, because in my experience the Security Services have been very careful indeed in the advice which they have given. It is my belief that they have all too often given the benefit of the doubt to the individual. In these conditions of cold war we just cannot afford to take any risks.

Although I do not want to see a McCarthy attitude growing up in this country, although we do not any kind of witch hunting although there is no need for p action, there is a need for tigh ing up the arrangements for vetting those connected with confidential empl ment, be it Government employment otherwise. Anyone with doubtful affi tions should not be given confiden employment. After all, today there plenty of other jobs available. I h that the vetting will, therefore, be car out in a thorough and fearless fashion

While talking about the work of Intelligence Services, I should like to in a plea for greater support for some them, whether they deal with count espionage or otherwise. At prese economy is in the air and every Gove ment Department is being urged to c expenditure as much as possible. I a convinced that it would be false econo of the worst kind now to reduce o expenditure on our Intelligence Servic I agree with my hon. and gallant Frie the Member for Perth and East Perthshi (Colonel Gomme-Duncan) when he sa that he considers that the Intelligence Se vices have, in the past, been kept far to short of funds to enable them to car out their proper work.

There is, of course, the difficulty whic the right hon. Member for Lewisham South (Mr. H. Morrison) mentioned, an that is that so much of the work of o Intelligence Services is not known to th public, or to Parliament. That i obviously so because their work is of secret nature and has to be carried o behind the scenes. It is quite true th since the war a great deal has bee published about their activities; some o us think that far too much has, in fac been published. However, for all tha a great deal still remains unpublished and I hope that it will continue to remai unpublished. But discretion has on very definite disadvantage. It is th Parliament and the public cannot asse the true value of these Intelligenc Services.

I agree that it would reassure th House and the country if an inquiry wer held at the present time into the adequac of our Intelligence Services. It certainl seems to me that some of those service could be considerably improved. To giv one small example, it is fairly obviou that the work of our forces in Cypru

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as been handicapped and hindered by ck of adequate intelligence.

Mr. Crossman: Bad policy.

Mr. Speir: Bad policy may enter into , but there has also been a lack of dequate intelligence, as there was, first of all, in Kenya and originally, too, in Malaya. Bad intelligence means that our men are killed and wounded unnecessarily. I believe that we could improve our Intelligence Services all over the world. At the moment they are being neglected and skimped, and I should like the Government to give an assurance that they intend to see that whatever economies are made, they will not be false economies so far as the Intelligence Services are concerned.

It is quite clear from what is going on in the Far East, the Middle East, the Near East, in Europe, and, indeed, all over the world, that, in spite of the welcome smiles now emanating from Moscow, the Communists are still waging a ruthless cold war. A cold war is, very largely, an intelligence war; and I hope that the Government will note that fact and will act accordingly.

6.33 p.m.

Mr. Frank Tomney (Hammersmith, North): It seemed to me that the Foreign Secretary in opening this debate was not primarily speaking to this House in confidence. He was trying, if I understood his speech and its tone aright, to reassure the people of England that although we have been through a difficult time, we have now got the issue under control and that, from now on, everything will be all right. That, shortly, seemed to me to be the message that he was trying to give to the House and the country.

Quite frankly, nobody that I have met believes in either the content or the essence of the White Paper, and that goes for the men in the pubs, the factories, the workshops and the clubs. It is, as was said by my hon. Friend the Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman), an attempt to cover up something within a circle of associates in the Foreign Office, to protect somebody from the follies of misjudgment, mismanagement and neglect.

Unless there is an independent inquiry into the workings of the espionage and security services of the Foreign Office, the thinking man in the street will not be reassured. We have moved on a long way since 1867. We have moved on from the initial conditions qualifying entry into the Foreign Service; we have moved on into another world populated by opponents of a cunning and vicious nature—into a world of Communism whose methods and policies, and the way in which they must be fought, do not yet seem to be fully understood in some circles in Whitehall.

I think we can say that at this moment civilisation as we know it is poised on a fine point of judgment in time, and what we may or may not do within the next few decades may well decide whether the world goes Communist or not. What in its most simple entity is the Communist doctrine? It is a belief in the sovereignty of man over the sovereignty of God. That is what gives it its faith. It attracts to its ranks, by virtue of its faith, liberal and progressive thinkers, eccentrics, people with grudges and those who either on account of physical or mental failings are political or moral outcasts. That is why it recruited to itself Burgess and Maclean. I beg the House not to misinterpret or to misunderstand the full force of the threat and challenge of this danger.

It is now known that both Burgess and Maclean were watched from their university days onwards and up to the time that they entered the Foreign Service. It is well known that men with these peculiar weaknesses are the subject of political blackmail and can be used in the chancelleries of the world against their own country. It is known that the Communists use such men to their own advantage.

Until we get in our security services, whether M.I.5 or anywhere else, a new type of mind conditioned to the forces with which it has to deal, we shall never be able to combat the challenge which the Communist doctrine offers to the free world. It has used and will use in every country into which it goes every progressive movement, whether it be the British Soviet Society, the National Council of Women, this or that front, the British Peace Committee or any other organisation, to infiltrate and to start world movements in order to take Western civilisation and democracy off their guard.

Some very cryptic things have been said today about the American system of

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