Testimony of Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, FBI
Before
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
October 17, 2002
"Joint
Intelligence Committee Inquiry"
Chairman
Graham, Chairman Goss, Senator Shelby, Congresswoman Pelosi
and Members of the Committees. Thank you for the opportunity
to appear before you this morning to discuss the events of
September 11, 2001 and the FBI's counterterrorism efforts
since that tragic day. Before addressing these matters, I
would like to take a moment to honor the victims who died
at the hands of Al Qaeda terrorists. We cannot begin to imagine
how difficult this past year has been for the families. There
can be little doubt that the pain, the anger, and the grief
is as fresh today as it was on that Tuesday morning last year.
Families have lost mothers, fathers, daughters and sons --
the public safety community has lost courageous firefighters
and law enforcement officers -- all of them, innocent people
going about their daily lives. We in the FBI extend our deepest
sympathy to the surviving family members and victims of these
attacks and to assure them that the FBI is determined to honor
the memory of their loved ones by never wavering in our fight
against terrorism.
Mr. Chairman, I would also like to take a moment to recognize
and thank a number of people for their exceptional support.
First,
I would like to express my deep and abiding gratitude to Director
Tenet and General Hayden for their leadership as we work together
to confront the challenges before us. As I have stated many
times since September 11th, the terrorist threat is far too
great for any one agency to address on its own. We must all
work together -- at the federal, state, local, and international
level -- to successfully combat terrorism.
Louis
Freeh, my predecessor as Director of the FBI, who appeared
before this Committee last week, gave a thoughtful, historical
perspective about his efforts during the 1990s to combat terrorism
at home and abroad. He is owed a debt of gratitude for his
service as an FBI Agent, a federal prosecutor, a U.S. District
Court Judge, and as FBI Director.
I would also like to acknowledge the superb team of FBI employees
who provided extraordinary support to this Committee for the
past six months. As you know, members of your staff took up
permanent residency at FBI Headquarters on April 1, 2002.
Since then, we have assigned 20 of our best analysts, Agents,
and lawyers, who have worked night and day to accommodate
this Committee's requests. These employees have provided your
staff with secure workspace, equipment, clearances and other
logistical provisions; they have identified, located and processed
for release to the Committee over 24,000 pages of sensitive
documents; and they have arranged for Committee staff to conduct
over 150 interviews of FBI employees across the country and
in our Legal Attache offices around the world. The FBI's cooperation
with this inquiry has been extensive.
Finally,
and most importantly, I would like to recognize the men and
women of the FBI, particularly those serving as analysts and
agents in the counterterrorism program. These are dedicated,
hardworking, and underappreciated public servants who were
devastated by the events of 9/11. These men and women have
struggled day in and day out to do their jobs despite inadequate
resources and enormous workloads. I have been honored to work
alongside these employees -- and all the men and women of
the FBI -- for the past year. Their unrelenting perseverance
and their unassuming heroism have truly been an inspiration.
I.
HISTORY OF THE TERRORIST THREAT
I believe
it is important to remind this Committee and the American
people that the mission of the FBI's counterterrorism program
-- to identify, prevent, deter and respond to acts of terrorism
-- is broad and multi-faceted. While the events of 9/11 have
brought into focus the threat posed by Usama Bin Laden and
the Al Qaeda network, we must recognize that the threats we
face are not limited to one individual, one group, or one
country. Our counterterrorism efforts must address the threats
posed by a multitude of international and domestic terrorists.
Our recent
history reflects growing threats from a variety of groups
and individuals. For example, religious extremists committed
the bombings of the World Trade Center in 1993; Khobar Towers
in 1996; the Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and the
U.S.S. Cole in October 2000. More structured terrorist organizations
were responsible for numerous other terrorist attacks. Hizballah,
for example, killed more Americans prior to 9/11 than any
other terrorist group, including Al Qaeda, with their 1983
truck bombings of the US Embassy and US Marine Corps barracks
in Lebanon, the 1984 bombing of the US Embassy Annex in Beirut,
and the 1985 hijacking of TWA Flight 847. Also, right-wing
terrorist groups espousing principles of racial supremacy
and anti-government rhetoric have become a serious menace,
as tragically evidenced by the April 1995 bombing of the Alfred
P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City.
At the
same time, the FBI and our partners have prevented significant
terrorist acts: the 1993 plot to bomb New York landmarks;
the 1995 plans to bomb US commercial aircraft transiting the
Far East; the 1997 plot to place four pipe bombs on New York
City subway cars which was narrowly averted by the New York
Joint Terrorist Task Force; the 1997 prevention of possible
detonation of 10 letters bombs at Leavenworth Federal Prison
and two offices of the al-Hayat newspaper; and the 1999 investigation,
in coordination with the US Customs Service, which resulted
in the conviction of Ahmed Ressam for a plot to bomb Los Angeles
International Airport at the turn of the millennium.
In addition
to the terrorist activities of these individuals and groups,
the FBI is confronting a growing interest in the acquisition
of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists and other groups.
Given the potential for inflicting large-scale injury or death,
the efforts of international and domestic terrorists to acquire
weapons of mass destruction have been a significant and growing
concern for the FBI. Prior to September 11, 2001, the number
of weapons of mass destruction -- or "WMD" -- cases
initiated for 2001 was 100, of which 67 were biological. Since
9/11 and the anthrax attacks of last fall, the FBI has responded
to approximately 7,089 suspected anthrax letters, 950 incidents
involving other potential weapons of mass destruction -- such
as bomb threats -- and an estimated 29,331 telephone calls
from the public about suspicious packages.
In the
1990s, terrorist groups started using new information technology
and the Internet to formulate plans, recruit members, communicate
between cells and members, raise funds, and spread propaganda.
Their aptitude with this technology facilitates their terrorism
preparation and operations and raises the specter that they
will use their cyber-tools against our critical infrastructures.
In response to these disturbing trends, Director Freeh designated
Counterterrorism a Tier One priority in May 1998, and he began
focusing additional attention and resources on the program.
By late 1999, the FBI's Senior Executive Managers had formulated
and were implementing an initiative designed to position the
FBI to be at its maximum capacity to address the Counterterrorism
threat by the year 2005. As Dale Watson, Executive Assistant
Director for Counterterrorism testified before this Committee,
the initiative was still underway on September 11, 2001.
II. THE SEPTEMBER 11th INVESTIGATION
Immediately
after the September 11th attacks, the FBI, the law enforcement
community and the US and Foreign Intelligence Communities
joined forces to find out everything we could about the hijackers
and how they succeeded. Our immediate goal was simple -- to
prevent another attack by fully understanding how the terrorists
perpetrated this one.
The
FBI's contribution to this effort has been significant. Thousands
of FBI Agents from each of our 56 field offices have participated
in the investigation; agents have covered over 337,000 leads
and have produced more than 165,000 FD-302 reports of investigation;
nearly 300 Special Agents and 85 Support employees have been
detailed to more than 30 Legal Attache offices overseas to
assist in pursuing leads and coordinating the investigation
with our international colleagues; and to date, the FBI Laboratory
has received over 660 submissions of evidence from the crash
sites and related searches, representing approximately 7,332
items of potential evidence.
Thanks
to these efforts and the unprecedented cooperation of the
intelligence and law enforcement communities -- both domestic
and international -- our investigation has revealed many of
the details about the planning, financing and perpetration
of these attacks. While our investigation continues and will
likely develop new and significant details for years to come,
let me summarize the findings presented in my testimony before
this Committee in June.
Each of the hijackers, apparently selected to avoid notice,
came easily and lawfully from abroad under valid visas: fifteen
were Saudi Arabia nationals, two were United Arab Emirates
(UAE) nationals, and one each were from Lebanon and Egypt.
The plot for the September 11th attacks was conceived in Afghanistan,
with details developed and coordinated in Hamburg, Germany.
The hijackers entered the United States lawfully through 8
different cities over a period of 19 months.
While in the United States, the hijackers effectively operated
without suspicion, triggering nothing that alerted law enforcement.
They committed no crimes with the exception of minor traffic
violations. They dressed and acted like Americans, shopping
and eating at places like Wal-Mart and Pizza Hut.
They relocated frequently and did not hold jobs. When several
received speeding tickets in the days leading up to September
11, they remained calm and aroused no suspicion.
None of the nineteen suicide hijackers is known to have had
computers, laptops, or storage media of any kind, although
they are known to have used publicly accessible Internet connections
at various locations. They used a minimum of 133 different
pre-paid calling cards to call from various pay phones, cell
phones, and land lines.
The nineteen suicide hijackers used US checking accounts accessed
with debit cards to conduct the majority of financial activity
during the course of this conspiracy.
The hijackers conducted meetings and communications without
detection, took apparent surveillance flights, and passed
through airport security screening without notice.
In August, the hijackers purchased tickets for the September
11th flights either in cash directly at the ticket counters,
at a travel agency, or using the Internet.
In the weeks immediately preceding September 11th,
the hijackers moved into position, gathering in East Coast
cities in Massachusetts, Maryland and New Jersey.
They boarded cross-country flights in the early hours of September
11th, doing nothing that would arouse suspicion.
I believe
that the context in which these 19 individuals were able to
come to the United States, take advantage of the liberties
this country has to offer, and operate without detection is
important to a full understanding of how these attacks were
perpetrated.
III.
FBI's POST-9/11 INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY
In addition
to investigating the 9/11 attacks, the FBI and our partners
have undertaken investigations and operations over the last
year that have dealt blows to a number of terrorist groups.
Two weeks ago, the Joint Terrorism Task Forces in the Portland,
Oregon office and the Detroit, Michigan office arrested four
individuals on charges of aiding, and in some cases, trying
to join Al Qaeda fighters. Two other individuals were charged,
one of whom had his visa revoked and was taken into custody
by Malaysian authorities pending deportation to the US The
other remains a fugitive. The indictment alleges that all
six members of this group conspired to levy war against the
US, to provide material support to foreign terrorist organizations,
and to contribute services to Al Qaeda and the Taliban.
Last month, the Buffalo, New York Joint Terrorism Task Force
executed search warrants on properties located in Lackawanna,
New York and arrested individuals who had traveled overseas
in the Summer of 2001 to attend the al-Farooq terrorist training
camp located near Kandahar, Afghanistan. During their stay
at the camp, these individuals received terrorism training
and a speech from Usama bin Laden.
In May, the FBI served a material witness warrant on
a US citizen, Abdullah Al Muhajir, also known as Jose Padilla,
as he entered the United States from Pakistan at Chicago's
O'Hare International Airport. Soon thereafter, Padilla was
transferred to the custody of the Defense Department where
he is being detained as an "enemy combatant."
Last week in Chicago, the Executive Director of Benevolence
International Foundation (BIF), a purportedly charitable organization,
was charged in a racketeering conspiracy to fraudulently raise
funds for Al Qaeda and other violent groups, as part of a
multi-national criminal enterprise over a 10-year period.
The FBI's Terrorist Financial Operations Section conducted
the financial investigation of BIF, in addition to 40 other
major counterterrorism cases. Although the details of these
investigations remain classified, they have denied Al Qaeda
millions of dollars in financing.
As a result of US military and intelligence community action
in Afghanistan, Pakistan and other foreign lands, a large
volume of paper documents, electronic media, videotapes, audiotapes
and electronic equipment has been seized. The FBI, CIA, DIA
and NSA have established a coordinated effort to exploit these
seized materials. The Document Exploitation project identifies
and disseminates pieces of intelligence gleaned from its review
of these materials.
These
are just a sampling of the investigative and preventive efforts
that have born fruit over the last year. There are others,
but those operations remain classified and have been described
in closed sessions with the Members of this Committee.
IV.
FBI's POST-9/11 REFORMS
The 13
months since the September 11th attacks have been a time of
great change for the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Starting
immediately after the planes hit, when over half of our 11,500
agents suddenly found themselves working terrorism matters,
it became clear that our mission and our priorities had to
change. Today, the FBI has twice the number of Agents permanently
assigned to counterterrorism as were assigned prior to 9/11.
Other permanent changes have been carefully considered and
implemented.
Virtually
every morning since September 11th, Director Tenet and I have
briefed the President, updating him on the investigation and
our response to the various threats we are receiving worldwide.
The President wants to know what the FBI is doing -- along
with the CIA and our other partners -- to protect Americans
against terrorism. That is his bottom line, and it is the
touchstone of our efforts to refocus the FBI.
We have
been addressing the shortcomings of the Bureau and the Intelligence
Community that were highlighted by the September 11th attacks.
We have heard, and we acknowledge, the valid criticisms, many
of which have been reiterated by this Committee. For example,
the Phoenix memo should have been disseminated to all field
offices and to our sister agencies; and the 26-page request
from Minneapolis for a FISA warrant should have been reviewed
by attorneys handling the request. These incidents have informed
us on needed changes, particularly the need to improve accountability,
analytic capacity and resources, information sharing, and
technology, to name a few. We have taken steps to address
those shortcomings, some of which I would like to highlight
today.
Reorganization of the Counterterrorism Division
In November
of last year, Congress approved my proposal for a reorganization
of FBI Headquarters. Under this reorganization, the Assistant
Director for Counterterrorism is responsible for management
of the national terrorism program and for select cases and
operations which require national-level management due to
special circumstances, situations, or sensitivity. This management
structure is a recognition that counterterrorism has national
and international dimensions that transcend field office territorial
borders and require centralized coordination to ensure that
the individual pieces of an investigation can be assembled
into a coherent picture.
This
ensures accountability for the program. Under the prior system
-- whereby field offices, and particularly the New York Field
Office, would have primary responsibility for terrorism cases
-- responsibility was diffused and Bureau leadership could
not easily be held accountable for the program. Under the
reorganization, the Assistant Director for Counterterrorism
is accountable for taking all steps necessary to maximize
our counterterrorism capacity.
One
of the ways in which Headquarters supports the field in maximizing
their counterterrorism capabilities is through the newly created
"flying squads." These squads augment local field
investigative capabilities with specialized personnel and
support FBI Rapid Deployment Teams, thereby providing a surge
capacity for quickly responding to fast-breaking situations
in locations where there is no FBI presence.
Analytical
Enhancements
This
Committee is familiar with the FBI's analytical shortcomings,
as demonstrated by the limited dissemination and analysis
afforded the Phoenix memo. Over the last year, we have undertaken
the following measures to enhance our analytical capacity:
We have created the Office of Intelligence, which is the component
of the FBI that will oversee development of the analyst position
and career track, and will ensure that intelligence is shared
as appropriate within the FBI and the rest of the United States
Government. I am grateful to Director Tenet for his willingness
to detail experienced CIA managers from the Directorate of
Intelligence to the FBI to set up and manage our Office of
Intelligence.
We have significantly increased the resources allocated to
analysis. With regard to Intelligence Operations Specialists
(IOSs), who provide direct support to investigations, we are
proposing a total staffing level of 205, with 89 currently
on board and 44 in various stages of the background investigation
process. With regard to Intelligence Research Specialists
(IRSs), who provide strategic analysis, we are proposing a
total staffing level of 155, with 70 currently on board and
73 in the background investigation process.
The FBI
has requested an additional 28 IOSs and 114 IRSs in its 2003
budget. I am concerned that until the 2003 budget is approved,
the FBI will be held to current spending levels. A long term
Continuing Resolution could have a significant impact on our
analytical program.
We have created a College of Analytical Studies (CAS) to provide
training for all FBI analytical support personnel. The CAS
is intended to become a featured component of training at
the FBI Academy, along with New Agents Training and the FBI
National Academy.
Through the efforts of our expanded Terrorist Financial Review
Group and the interagency teams conducting document exploitation,
we have augmented FBI capabilities to perform financial and
communications analyses of terrorist groups and networks.
Information
Sharing Enhancements
Much
has been made of the reportedly hostile relationship and turf
battles between the FBI and the CIA. As you have heard from
Director Tenet, the relationship between the FBI and the CIA
has never been stronger or more productive. While we concede
that there were isolated failings in the information flow
between the two agencies prior to 9/11, we must not overlook
the fact that a successful, systematic effort has been underway
for years to develop and build upon our agencies' relationship.
Starting
with Dale Watson's detail to the CIA's Counterterrorism Center
in 1996, we have had a regular exchange of employees. At this
time, we have 11 employees assigned to the CIA's Counterterrorism
Center and the CIA has eight managers and dozens of analysts
assigned to the FBI's Counterterrorism Division. Each of these
employees has unfettered access to the computer databases
and communications systems of the other agency. Every morning,
a CIA official detailed to the FBI joins other FBI executives
in my office for the twice daily briefing sessions. I rely
on his counsel as much as I rely on my own executives. Also,
I meet with George Tenet every morning when we brief the President,
and I have nothing but the greatest respect for him and his
agency.
This
Committee has presented select testimony that is critical
of the FBI's historical unwillingness and technological inability
to share information with not only the CIA but with other
federal agencies, and with our state and local law enforcement
colleagues. Since 9/11, I have instituted several changes
which have resulted in significant improvements in communication
and coordination of many aspects of information sharing. I
would like to summarize some of the initiatives the FBI has
adopted in this regard since 9/11.
We established Joint Terrorism Task Forces in each of our
56 field offices. Prior to 9/11, only 35 offices had JTTFs.
The partnering of FBI personnel with investigators from various
local, state and federal agencies on these task forces encourages
the timely sharing of intelligence that is absolutely critical
to our counterterrorism mission.
We established a new National Joint Terrorism Task Force at
FBI Headquarters to complement task forces established in
each of the FBI's 56 field offices and to improve collaboration
and information sharing with other agencies. We currently
have representation of 26 federal agencies and two state and
local law enforcement officials who report to the FBI's Command
Center as part of this initiative.
We have undertaken the Joint Terrorism Task Force Information
Sharing Initiative (JTTF ISI) involving the St. Louis, San
Diego, Seattle, Portland, Norfolk and Baltimore field offices.
This pilot project, which was first initiated in the St. Louis
office, will integrate extremely flexible search tools that
will permit investigators and analysts to perform searches
on the "full text" of investigative files -- not
just indices. An analyst or investigator will be able to smoothly
transition from searching text, to reviewing results, to examining
source documents, to developing link diagrams, to generating
map displays. To insure proper security, four graduated levels
of security access are being built into the system.
We created the Office of Law Enforcement Coordination (OLEC)
to enhance the ability of the FBI to forge cooperative and
substantive relationships with all of our state and local
law enforcement counterparts. The OLEC, which is run by a
former Police Chief, also has liaison responsibilities with
the White House Office of Homeland Security.
We established the FBI Intelligence Bulletin which
is disseminated weekly to over 17,000 law enforcement agencies
and to 60 federal agencies. The bulletin provides information
about terrorism issues and threats to patrol officers and
other local law enforcement personnel who have direct daily
contacts with the general public, contacts which could result
in the discovery of critical information about those issues
and threats.
As a
result of these initiatives, the FBI has received numerous
letters of support and gratitude from state and local officials
and from the International Association of Chiefs of Police.
I would like to submit some of those letters to the Committee
and ask that they be included as part of the official record
of this inquiry.
These
initiatives represent the priority and emphasis that the FBI
leadership and I have put on our commitment to share information
and data with other federal agencies, with our state and local
law enforcement partners, and amongst ourselves. The institutional
change reflected by these initiatives has produced -- and
will continue to produce -- measurable progress in the coordination
and integration of law enforcement efforts at all levels of
government.
Technology
We are
also addressing the shortcomings of the Bureau's information
technology. Over the years, we have failed to develop a sufficient
capacity to collect, store, search, retrieve, analyze and
share information. Prior testimony before this Committee has
described the problems the FBI is experiencing because of
outdated technology. Thanks to support from Congress, the
FBI has embarked on a comprehensive overhaul and revitalization
of our information technology infrastructure. That process
is well under way, but I want to caution you that these problems
will not be fixed overnight. Our technological problems are
complex, and they will be remedied only through careful and
methodical planning and implementation. We have made progress
in the past year, and we have laid the groundwork for significant
progress in the months and years ahead.
The
first major step in the right direction is our Trilogy Program.
The Trilogy Program was designed as a 36-month effort to enhance
our effectiveness through technologies that facilitate better
organization, access and analysis of information. The overall
direction of the Trilogy Program is to provide all FBI offices
with improved network communications, a common and current
set of office automation tools, and easy-to-use, re-engineered,
web-based applications.
Under
the FBI's old legacy investigative information system, the
Automated Case Support (ACS), users navigate with the function
keys instead of the point and click method common to web based
applications. Simple tasks, such as storing an electronic
version of a document today, require a user to perform twelve
separate functions, in a "green screen" environment.
That will soon change with Trilogy. Automated workflow will
allow for a streamlined process to complete tasking. Storing
a document for the record will occur with a click of the mouse
button. This will make investigative and intelligence information
immediately available to all personnel with appropriate security.
Multimedia
functionality will allow for the storage of information in
its original form. Under the old system, agents cannot store
non-compatible forms of digital evidence in an electronic
format, and instead have to describe the evidence and indicate
where the evidence is stored in a control room. Multimedia
functionality will facilitate electronic storage of digital
evidence and media to the investigative case file, allowing
access to the information from the desktop.
The
original plan for Trilogy was development and deployment over
36 months from the date of the contract awards for the infrastructure
and applications development, May and June 2001, respectively.
The events of September 11, 2001 impacted many aspects of
the FBI, including the Trilogy Program. Recognizing the urgent
need for improved information technologies, I ordered that
Trilogy implementation be accelerated, with emphasis on those
capabilities most urgently needed to support the FBI's priority
cases. In response, Congress provided additional funding,
and Trilogy's network and desktop infrastructure improvements
were accelerated. The resulting improvements are significant.
Infrastructure
enhancements are being deployed in two phases. The first phase,
called "Fast Track", entails installation of Trilogy
architecture at our 56 Field Office locations and as many
of our Resident Agencies as can be completed before the second
phase begins. This architecture includes new network printers,
color scanners, local area network upgrades, desktop workstations,
and Microsoft Office applications. By the end of April 2002,
deployment at all 56 FBI Field Offices and two Information
Technology Centers (ITCs) was completed. Fast Track is continuing
to deploy this infrastructure to our Resident Agencies.
The
second phase of infrastructure deployment is called "Full
Site Capability," representing the complete infrastructure
upgrade. The full upgrade will provide wide area network connectivity,
new encryption devices to protect our data, new operating
systems and servers, and new and improved e-mail capability.
Completion of this phase was moved from the accelerated date
of July 2002 to March 2003 to allow additional time to test
and deploy a secure, operational system.
We also
recognize that we have a critical need to share Top Secret
and Sensitive Compartmented Information (TS/SCI.) data internally,
primarily among analysts. We are planning a phased implementation
at FBI Headquarters followed by deployment within the Intelligence
Community of a system that will markedly increase our ability
to conduct strategic analysis.
Once
we catch up to a standard PC environment, the future looks
very positive. We are planning for a technology refreshment
program (TRP) which will incorporate our technology as it
becomes available and will replace Trilogy network and workstation
hardware, network data storage, server hardware, and embedded
software on a periodic basis to prevent system performance
degradation. A viable infrastructure technology refreshment
plan is essential to maintain the benefits of the Trilogy
investment and the efficiency and capabilities of FBI investigative
support systems and to better plan and budget for out year
expenditures.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the
aftermath of the September 11th attacks, the FBI quickly recognized
that the organization needed to change in order to address
the terrorist threat facing this nation. As I have indicated,
the FBI has faced many challenges over the past 13 months
and has made significant progress in addressing these challenges.
I am proud of the flexibility and the willingness of the FBI
workforce to do whatever it takes -- to change whatever needs
changing -- to prevent another terrorist attack.
Despite
our accomplishments and the success of the FBI reorganization
in addressing our shortcomings, however, our transformation
must continue. We cannot grow complacent. The FBI must develop
a workforce that possesses specialized skills and backgrounds,
that is equipped with the proper investigative, technical,
and analytical tools, and possesses the managerial and administrative
competencies necessary to deal with a complex and volatile
environment. To assist in these efforts, the FBI is in the
midst of an internal re-engineering review to examine virtually
every aspect of FBI operations, administration, policy and
procedure. As a result of this review, we anticipate additional
changes to FBI programs that will enable us to most effectively
and efficiently utilize the tools and the resources Congress
has provided.
Mr. Chairman, I am confident that we will ultimately prevail
in our fight against terrorism, but we will do so only if
we work together. Our agents must work closely with our local
and state law enforcement partners -- our field offices must
work with our Headquarters -- the Bureau must work with the
CIA and our law enforcement and intelligence counterparts
around the world -- and the counterterrorism components of
the Executive Branch must have a meaningful and constructive
relationship with our colleagues in Congress. These relationships
are the lifeblood of our campaign against terror, and we must
do everything in our power to sustain and nurture them.
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