US Intelligence and the End of the Cold War, The Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University, 18- 20 November 1999.
Novmeber, 18 - 20, 1999George Bush Presidential Conference Center
on the Texas A&M University
Symposium co-sponsor: George Bush School of Government
and Public Service
An unclassified conference on "US Intelligence and the End of the Cold War," sponsored by CIA’s Center for the Study of Intelligence and the George Bush School of Government and Public Service, took place on 18-20 November 1999 at the George Bush Presidential Conference Center on the Texas A&M University campus in College Station. The event drew some 400 attendees, including former President Bush; DCI George Tenet; former DCIs Richard Helms, William Webster, Robert Gates, and R. James Woolsey; other former senior intelligence officers from both sides in the Cold War; former senior US policymakers; academic specialists on the Cold War, and other interested citizens. This article presents highlights of speeches and synopses of panel presentations that—together with a book produced by the CIA History Staff specifically for this conference—formed the core of the three-day event. (The book is discussed further in a "Scholars’ Roundtable" below.)
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US Intelligence and the End of the Cold War, The Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University, 18-20 November 1999 |
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Welcome Robert Gates, Interim Dean, George Bush School of Government and Public Service Panel I: Predicting the Collapse of the Soviet Union Gerald Haines, Chair; Bruce Berkowitz, Charles Gati, Douglas MacEachin, Thomas Powers, and Charles Wolf Panel II: Intelligence and the Arms Race Howard Graves, Chair; Stephen Hadley, Arnold Kanter, Ronald Lehman, and James Woolsey Panel III: Espionage and Counterintelligence James Olsen, Chair; Oleg Kalugin, Paul Redmond, and Allen Weinstein Panel IV: Providing Intelligence to Policymakers Lloyd Salvetti, Chair; Robert Gates, David Jeremiah, Richard Kerr, Robert Kimmit, and Paul Wolfowitz Panel V: The Use of Intelligence by Policymakers George C. Edwards III, Chair; Richard Cheney, Brent Scowcroft, and William Webster Memorial Ceremony President George Bush, DCIs George Tenet, Richard Helms, Robert Gates, William Webster; and Col. Ryszard Kuklinski Scholars Roundtable H. W Brands, Chair; Benjamin Fischer, Lloyd Gardner, Melvyn Leffler, and John Prados |
Keynote Speeches
President George Bush
In his luncheon remarks on 19 November, former President Bush looked
back at the turbulent and far-reaching changes in the world order that
occurred during his presidency. He reiterated his admiration for the contributions
of CIA and the rest of the Intelligence Community to US national security,
and for the courage and resourcefulness of America’s intelligence officers.
He credited his brief tour (1976-1977) as DCI as having underscored for
him the value of intelligence and the need for it.
Excerpts:
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There can be no substitute for the President’s having the best possible intelligence in the world, which means we still must rely on CIA and indeed the entire Intelligence Community.
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I wouldn’t have wanted to try tackling any of the many issues we confronted without the input from the Intelligence Community. Not for one second.
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The PDB, the President’s Daily Brief, was the first order of business on my calendar. I made it a point from day one to read the PDB in the presence of the CIA officer and either Brent [National Security Advisor Scowcroft], or sometimes his deputy. This way I could ask the briefers for more information on matters of critical interest, and consult with Brent on matter affecting policy.
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Conferences like this one, I believe, can serve a very useful purpose: The give and take on display here this week is exactly the kind of big-picture, long-range thinking we need to solve the many new questions that have emerged in the wake of the Cold War.
Judge William Webster: Former DCI, Former FBI Director
Judge Webster, in delivering his speech at the conference’s opening
dinner, refuted charges that US intelligence had failed to anticipate
the collapse of the Soviet Union. He credited the now-declassified National
Intelligence Estimates with having played a "vital role" in
helping several presidents maintain strong US defenses while also reaching
satisfactory agreements with the USSR on arms control.
Excerpts:
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The evidence refutes the common charge, a charge that regrettably has already made its way into some history books—that US intelligence failed to apprise policymakers of the Soviet Union’s grave economic problems.
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[National Intelligence Estimates] also refute the allegations that US intelligence failed to anticipate the collapse of Soviet power in eastern and central Europe, and then in the USSR itself.
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By early 1989, CIA was warning policymakers of the deepening crisis in the Soviet Union and the growing likelihood of an implosion of the old order. Perestroika meant "katastroika" for the Soviet system. In other words, Gorbachev’s reforms were creating the opposite of their intended result.
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I believe a careful examination of newly released documents shows that US intelligence contributed new information and insights that helped American policymakers bring the most protracted and most dangerous conflict of the 20th century to a peaceful end.
Robert Gates: Interim Dean, The George Bush School of Government and
Public Service
Former DCI Gates, the dinner speaker on 19 November, also rebutted
charges that CIA failed to alert policymakers to indications of Soviet
weakness and incipient collapse. In addition, while acknowledging shortcomings,
he outlined some of the Agency’s many successes and achievements during
that period.
Excerpts:
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CIA’ s [analytical] work on growing Soviet internal problems stands up far better in hindsight than criticism suggests …. By 1987 CIA was warning policymakers of the deepening crisis in the Soviet Union and the growing likelihood of the collapse of the old order.
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Preventing surprise was CIA’s mission, and with respect to the Soviet collapse, it fulfilled that mission more than two years ahead of time.
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I sent a memo to President Bush on July 18, 1989, based on … reporting from CIA. It said, "The odds are growing that in the next year or two, there will be popular unrest, political turmoil, and/or official violence [that may include] significant political instability." With President Bush’s express approval, that fall Brent [Scowcroft] and I established … a contingency planning effort to prepare for the possibility of a Soviet collapse.
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[CIA analyst] Kay Oliver, briefing President Reagan in November 1985, [told him that] "we cannot foresee the time, but we can see the tendency eventually to confront the regime with challenges to its political control that it cannot contain."
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My most memorable memory of that briefing was during … my conversation with the President … I heard this incredible noise— whrrrr—and the President … adjusted his hearing aid. [A short time later, the noise recurred] … and he plucked his hearing aid out of his ear and pounded it in his hand and then leaned over to me and whispered: "It’s my KGB handler trying to reach me."
Gerald Seib of the Wall Street Journal spoke at the conference’s 20 November luncheon. Asked how well the press had performed in foreseeing the end the Cold War, he said: "I don’t think we did all that much better, and maybe not all that much worse than anyone else did." He noted some advantages—such as greater freedom of movement—that journalists often have over intelligence officers, as well as some disadvantages, such as generally weaker language skills.
Panel Discussions
Panel I: Predicting the Collapse of the Soviet Union
A common theme among presentations by most members of this panel consisted
of their challenges to Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s claims that the
CIA and the rest of the US intelligence community failed to anticipate
the collapse of the Soviet Union, resulting in a costly and unnecessary
US defense buildup. Thomas Powers took a somewhat different approach,
contending that most observers (including those at CIA) "understood
that the unequal [East-West] struggle could not go on forever," but
they "thought it would end in a war," not a Soviet collapse.
Because such a war was anathema to most people, psychologically we had
a very deep investment in believing that nothing was going to happen—forever."
Panel II: Intelligence and the Arms Race
Members of this panel examined the Intelligence Community’s performance
in providing intelligence on the former USSR to support US arms control
negotiators. Panelists concluded that the intelligence agencies hadperformed
well in covering most Soviet weapons systems; chemical weapons were cited
as an exception. Panel members also gave recognition to the value of satellite
imagery to US arms control strategists, particularly in the negotiations
that resulted in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) agreement. Former
DCI and CFE negotiator Woolsey discussed the tactics he used to enable
the US position to prevail in these negotiations. Mr. Woolsey also maintained
that the ABM Treaty needed to be re-negotiated because one of the two
nations to which it was to be applied no longer existed.
Panel III: Espionage and Counterintelligence
This panel focused on Soviet and US Cold War intelligence and counterintelligence
operations against each other. Panelists Paul Redmond, former CIA Associate
Deputy Director for Operations/Counterintelligence, and retired KGB Gen.
Oleg Kalugin exchanged good- humored boasts, barbs, and loaded questions
about their services’ counterespionage activities against one another,
prompting panel member Allen Weinstein to quip, "I did not realize
I would be mediating a CIA-KGB Gong Show." Other subjects included
the KGB’s allegation that US intelligence organizations had pursued a
program to kidnap and murder Soviet operatives.
Mr. Redmond replied, "we weren’t, and we probably couldn’t have pulled
it off anyway." Gen. Kalugin observed that "the Soviet mentality
and experience shaped [Moscow’s] view of the world—kidnapping, murder,
lies; we thought the other side was no better." Redmond spoke of
a Soviet plan to kidnap US intelligence officers in Lebanon; Gen. Kalugin
conformed that there had been such a plot, but he said that at the last
moment, then-Soviet leader Andropov "shouted into the telephone,
‘Listen, stop it! Stop it! They will do the same to us, resulting in warfare
among the intelligence services, and they [the West] have an advantage
over us in many parts of the world.’" Other subjects discussed included
Radio Liberty, which Gen. Kalugin characterized as "great;"
Amnesty International, which the Russians had
claimed was run by CIA (Mr. Redmond emphatically denied this); and whether
Russian "re-defector" Vitali Yurchenko had been a genuine defector.
(They concluded he was in fact a real defector.)
Panel IV: Providing Intelligence to Policymakers
Lloyd Salvetti, in introducing the panelists, noted that this panel
was, in effect, a re- creation of the Bush Administration’s Deputies Committee.
The panel consisted entirely of former members of that Committee, which
was chaired by the deputy national security adviser (Dr. Gates held the
post from 1989-1991). Other members included the number-two or number-three
officials of four entities—the State and Defense Departments, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and the CIA. Additional departments and agencies participated
if topics on the agenda necessitated their presence.
The panelists identified a variety of factors— including those related to intelligence—that made the Deputies Committee a critical forum in national security decisionmaking during President Bush’s tenure. Dr. Gates noted, for example, that the panel consisted of people who respected, trusted, and could speak frankly with one another, and who approached the Committee’s work in a collegial spirit. These were very senior people who could commit their department or agency and its leader, had the trust of and easy access to that leader, and could, in Dr. Gates’s words, "strip away all of the bureaucratic baloney and get down to what was the really key issue" that the Committee and/or the President had to decide.
Panel V: The Use of Intelligence by Policymakers
The three panel members all commented favorably on the overall utility
of intelligence to US policymakers. They also identified some weak spots.
Secretary Cheney noted that "when I arrived at the Defense Department
… the floodgates had opened. There was this enormous volume of material,
and I had to find some way to … reduce it to manageable proportions."
Although CIA’s reports were "very good," according to Mr. Cheney,
he also valued briefings from experts in the academic world as
well as from CIA and other intelligence agencies on "what does this
mean … [and] what should we be thinking about, and so forth." He
added, "I think [the Bush Administration] was very, very well served
on balance—that we got a lot of excellent analysis, a lot of it thought-provoking,
that required us to really think about what we were doing and why."
General Scowcroft observed that decisionmakers often are faced with "ambiguity and lack of hard data;" thus, a key purpose of intelligence is to provide some key "concrete facts." And, he added, while consumers generally have confidence in intelligence experts’ facts and interpretations of those facts, they tend to be more skeptical when it comes to intelligence officers’ predictions. Judge Webster made a related point, noting that policymakers may be interested in our predictions but often will give preference to their own. Partly for this reason, according to the Judge, he found "a very clear preference among policymakers for current intelligence rather than Estimates." Judge Webster also noted that it can be very difficult to obtain the human intelligence that is often the only way to get at our adversaries’ intentions. Gen. Scowcroft identified some other problems, such as analysts’ "mind-sets" and the tendency to assume that foreign leaders reason as we do. These phenomena, he indicated, caused US intelligence to fail to forecast the 1973 Arab-Israeli war.
Scholars’ Roundtable
The purpose of this final session was to have several scholars reflect
on the entire conference, including speeches, panel discussions, and the
conference volume titled At Cold War’s End: US Intelligence on the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 1989-1991, prepared for the conference.
Benjamin B. Fischer of the History Staff compiled and edited the book
and wrote the Preface, which provides context for the book and the conference.
The rest of the book consists of 24 declassified and released National
Intelligence Estimates and CIA papers on the USSR that were written between
1989 and 1991.
The scholars on the panel, while praising the book and commending the CIA for making these documents available, urged that Intelligence Community agencies now move quickly to declassify and release additional material on this and other topics. They contended that such action is essential for scholars seeking to address such controversial matters as the intelligence agencies’ performance in forecasting the collapse of the Soviet Union. Some panel members and other participants in the conference singled out the tightly controlled President’s Daily Brief, the CIA’s daily analytical report to the President, as a document that needs to be made available to scholars trying to gain an accurate, comprehensive understanding of the intelligence agencies’ performance in anticipating the historic events of 1989-1991. Professor Melvyn Leffler contended that the CIA’s self-image of its openness is not widely shared in the scholarly community or among the public at large.
Memorial Ceremony
The culmination of the conference was a memorial service "In
Memory of Those Who Died That Others Might Be Free," which honored
foreign agents who had lost their lives in the Cold War’s "silent
intelligence war." DCI George Tenet delivered the eulogy. The service
was organized and conducted by the Texas A&M University Corps of Cadets,
Band, and Singing Cadets. The ceremony also honored the memory of the
Texas A&M students who died in the bonfire accident that occurred
on the eve of the conference.
Also present at the memorial service as a speaker and honoree was Col. Ryszard Kuklinski, a Polish army officer who provided crucial information on Warsaw Pact military plans to the West during the 1970s and early 1980s. (He escaped from Poland in late 1980.) DCI Tenet called Col. Kuklinski a "true hero of the Cold War, a man who risked great danger to work for us …. It is in great measure due to the bravery and sacrifice of patriots like Col. Kuklinski that Poland and the other once-captive nations of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are now free." In his brief but moving response, Col. Kuklinski responded that he was "deeply honored to represent my many, anonymous comrades who served on both sides of the front line. I am pleased that our long hard struggle has brought peace, freedom, and democracy not only to my country but to many other people as well."
Henry R. Appelbaum
Editor