INTRODUCTION
This article
is based on the monograph copyrighted and published in 1997 by
The American Society for Photogrammetry and Remote Sensing (ASPRS),
located at 5410 Grosvenor Lane, Suite 210, in Bethesda, MD, USA.
The ASPRS has been America's professional society dedicated to
the development of the art and science of photogrammetry, remote
sensing, and geographic information systems since its founding
in 1934 (see the forward to the text by former Director of Central
Intelligence, Richard Helms). On February 22, 1995, President
Clinton authorized the declassification and public release of
imagery acquired by Corona, the first US reconnaissance satellite,
America's earliest successes in taking pictures of the earth's
surface from space. What follows are extracts from the introduction
and chapter abstracts. They give the flavor of the text but are
not meant to be a replacement for reading the whole, exciting
story. The comprehensive collection of articles in the ASPRS monograph
opens the formerly classified Corona story, first to historians
and remote sensing specialists, but more importantly to those
in the general public who have an interest in the Cold War and
space technology.
These copyrighted
extracts are reproduced with the collaboration of the editor,
Dr. Robert A. McDonald, of the National War College, National
Defense University, Washington, DC, by permission of the ASPRS.
For information
on purchase of the hard-cover text of the monograph, contact the
American Society for Photogrammetry and Remote Sensing (ASPRS),
located at 5410 Grosvenor Lane, Suite 210, in Bethesda, MD, USA.
In 1965 there
was a Broadway hit, Man of La Mancha, in which Don Quixote, the
illusion of protagonist, Miguel de Cervantes, sang of an impossible
dream. At this same time during the 1960s there was a national
security intelligence "hit"--a secret, US intelligence
program for space reconnaissance. This program, Corona, grew out
of imaginative thinking and appeared to be an impossible dream.
It was designed to "right the unrightable wrong" of
being denied information by the Iron Curtain. It was targeted
to help "fight the unbeatable foe" of the Cold War Soviet
Union. Launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base, it reached out
into orbit and became an unreachable star that could watch the
Soviet Union.
Corona was the world's first imaging reconnaissance satellite
and operated during the height of the Cold War to collect pictures
over the denied areas behind the Iron and Bamboo Curtains. During
its operational life, this satellite program collected over 800,000
images in response to the national security intelligence and mapping
requirements of the time. On the average, individual images covered
a geographic area on the Earth's surface of approximately 10x120
miles. Corona had sister programs, Argon for mapping imagery,
and Lanyard, a short-lived program designed for higher-quality
imagery.
The
Geostrategic Context
(top)
The 1950s
had been uncertain and dangerous times. In 1953, the Soviet Union
tested a hydrogen bomb; in the summer of 1957 they successfully
tested an intercontinental ballistic missile; and in the fall
of that year they launched the first artificial satellite, Sputnik.
US policy makers were uneasy about what they were seeing and hearing
from the Soviets about their military and space successes. There
even were those who suggested that the Soviets might drop bombs
on the US from space (Studeman, 1995). But the US Intelligence
Community had very little hard evidence of the true Soviet military
capabilities. "In the absence of reliable information about
the nature of the Soviet threat, we had no choice but to build
up our own forces" (Deutch 1995). The USSR--with its satellite
countries--had become a disciplined, closed society that was suspicious
and demonstrated a penchant for controlling the flow of information.
At the same time there was growing US public concern over the
potential Soviet threat, especially from nuclear weapons. The
Soviets had a formidable security service that proved difficult
for Western intelligence to penetrate (Helms, 1983). Reconnaissance
attempts with high-flying balloons and aircraft only could provide
the US with limited useful information. Corona would change all
of that with its burst of images. "[T]he intelligence explosion
of the century was on, a relentless stream of detailed data which
turned analytical work on these so-called denied areas'
from famine to feast:" (Helms, 1983).
The objective of the Corona program was to use a space platform
to acquire photographic intelligence to help satisfy the requirement
for what was viewed as much-needed information. Its engineering
was based on theoretical concepts that were yet to be demonstrated
and used a technology that was based on neither confident data
nor proven hardware. Questions that we take for granted today
had yet to be answered: If you successfully launched a camera
into orbit, would it work? If you took pictures from a satellite,
could they see through the Earth's atmosphere? Could you launch,
control, and recover a spacecraft?
The
Corona Story (top)
The Man of
La Mancha, and the life of its protagonist, Miguel de Cervantes,
are metaphors for the Corona program. De Cervantes' life ``...
was a catalogue of catastrophe... What sort of man was this...who
could suffer unceasing failure and yet...produce the staggering
testament..."? (Wasserman, 1976). What sort of program was
Corona? What kind of people were behind it? Who could suffer the
unceasing failures of 13 shattered mission attempts before they
finally could produce a testament to their quest--before they
could launch an artificial satellite that would fly in a 100 nautical
mile polar orbit above the Earth and from there take pictures
that ultimately could show objects that were as small as 2 meters?
Man of La Mancha "had its inception in Madrid in 1959"
when author Dale Wasserman was in Madrid (Richards, 1976). This
was the same time that Corona was being conceived on the launch
pad. Its first failed mission was in February of 1959. The play
and musical went on to be written and were first presented at
the ANTA Washington Square Theatre in New York City on November
22, 1965. It was a tremendous success and considered one of the
best musicals of the 1965-66 season (Richards 1976). By then,
Corona had gone on to become an operational satellite that was
flying Mission 1026 over the USSR. It was being hailed a tremendous
success and was considered one of the best sources of intelligence
on the Soviet Union.
Corona was built from 1959 to 1972 by the Space Systems Division
of Lockheed Martin Missiles & Space (formerly Lockheed MSC
Space Systems Division). Lockheed was awarded the prime contract
in 1956 for Weapons System 117L, an umbrella classified program.
The Corona project evolved from WS-117L, and Lockheed became the
prime contractor and served as technical adviser and integrator
for all Corona equipment other than the Thor booster. Lockheed
developed the Agena upper stage and integrated and led the test,
launching, and on-orbit control operations of Corona (Star, 1995).
The first successful Corona flight, which acquired 3,000 feet
of film and covered more than 1,650,000 square miles of Soviet
territory, was making its mark. During this August 1960 flight,
the Corona program had acquired more overhead photographic coverage
of the Soviet Union than all of the U-2 flights to that date.
From a technological perspective, it was the first space program
to recover an object from orbit and the first to deliver intelligence
information from a satellite. It would go on to be the first program
to employ multiple reentry vehicles, pass the 100 mission mark,
and produce stereoscopic space imagery. Its most remarkable technological
advance would be the improvement in its ground resolution from
an initial 40-foot capability to an ultimate 6-foot resolution.
Corona would provide evidence that the Soviets had made exaggerated
claims of their military capability. The "heart" we
heard about in Joe Darion's lyrics for "The Impossible Dream"
could "lie peaceful and calm" knowing that the Cold
War threat was not as great as we had thought. This monograph
tells the story of the quest for photosatellite reconnaissance
through 22 articles organized into seven sections:
- The
Prelude to Space Reconnaissance
- The
Beginning of Space Reconnaissance
- The
Technology Behind the Pictures
- The
People and Their Organizations
- Declassification
and Opening Secrets to the Public
- The
Impact of Space Reconnaissance
- The
Future
Prelude
to Space Reconnaissance
The first
section has two articles that describe American strategic reconnaissance
capabilities and policy issues that preceded Corona. Jonathan
Lewis discusses the U-2 story that was a model for the development
of Corona. He looks at the evolution of the U-2 from the perspective
of Richard Bissell, who also played a key role in the development
of Corona. Lewis pays particular attention to the organizational
dynamics and management style that were fundamental to the U-2's
development. The focused, business-oriented mission; the single-line,
streamlined management structure; the risk-taking innovation;
and the need for secrecy all previewed Corona's development. In
his conclusion, Lewis leaves us with questions to consider as
we examine the Corona story.
R. Cargill Hall offers insight into how a concept for a strategic
reconnaissance capability ultimately led to the birth of Corona.
This is an essential explanation that sets the stage for telling
the story of Corona as it occurred during the Cold War. Hall describes
how strategic reconnaissance evolved out of attempts to acquire
intelligence in response to national security fears and crises.
In his article we see the impact of President Eisenhower's leadership
and legacy for American, national-level strategic reconnaissance.
The
Beginning of Space Reconnaissance
This section
has three articles that outline the performance characteristics
of the earliest imaging reconnaissance satellites. The article
on Corona, Argon, and Lanyard explains what these first US reconnaissance
satellites were and how they performed operationally. The article
by Frederic Oder and Martin Belles offers an explanation of Corona's
development from a programmatic perspective, while Peter Gorin
explains the Soviet Union's imaging reconnaissance program that
paralleled these early US accomplishments.
Gorin's insight into the Soviet's Zenit satellite is important
if we are to know the complete story of early Cold War space reconnaissance.
From him, we learn about what the Soviets were doing in the development
of their counterpart to Corona. His article makes it clear that
the appetite for information in the USSR was as strong as it was
in the US. More importantly, Zenit--just as Corona--provided policy
leaders with information that was essential to build confidence
levels that were necessary to maintain peace during the Cold War.
The
Technology Behind the Pictures
The third
section discusses the technology of the camera and spacecraft.
Dow Smith, from his own experience, offers insight into the technical
aspects of Corona's optics. He explains how experiences from the
high-altitude balloon reconnaissance era and the technological
culture of the time were able to be adapted to the complex challenge
of space imaging. Bob Powell draws from his first-hand observations
to explain the evolution of the Agena vehicle, the spacecraft
that carried the Corona camera into orbit. Powell also talks about
the recovery sequence for getting the film back to Earth. His
explanations demonstrate the tremendous complexity of the Corona
endeavor: from launching the vehicle, to operating it in space,
and recovering the film payload.
The
People and Their Organizations
Probably the
most important part of the Corona story is the people and organizations
that made it happen--without their dedicated efforts there would
have been no Corona. This section features four articles that
recognize the contributions of those who made Corona possible.
For 20 to 30 years they had to remain anonymous because of the
classification and security measures that were required throughout
the life of the Corona program and many years afterward.
Two individuals were driving forces behind the decision to build
a photoreconnaissance satellite for the US. They were James Killian,
Jr., president of MIT, and Edwin Land of the Polaroid Corporation.
Killian chaired a committee that was established to examine the
threat of a surprise attack on the United States. Land chaired
a panel that was responsible for finding approaches to monitor
the military capabilities of the USSR (Deutch, 1995). Their names
come up in a number of the articles in the monograph. A third
name, related to implementing the decision, also appears often
in Corona's story--Richard Bissell. He was a visionary of the
1950s who saw that the assessment of international tensions during
in the Cold War--with its nuclear weapons threat--required more
than simply accurate political intelligence, but also accurate
factual information to determine the practical effects of tactical
and strategic political moves. Bissell saw that the way to collect
this kind of information was by applying technology to intelligence
problems (Ranelagh, 1987). As a CIA program manager in the U-2
and Corona era, he brought technology to bear on the decisions
associated with creating a national-level strategic reconnaissance
capability for the US.
Donald Welzenbach opens his article with the influence of Edwin
Land in the development of the U-2 reconnaissance aircraft and
Bissell's role in implementing the program. Welzenbach goes on
to discuss the involvement of many other government and contractor
personnel who were associated with the early development of strategic
reconnaissance in the US. He makes it clear that these individuals
laid the foundation for Corona, with many of them continuing to
be affiliated with the Corona program. What at first might seem
to be independent programs is actually a continuum of technological
development.
The Corona program depended heavily on the technological and management
experience of the earlier airborne strategic reconnaissance programs.
Corona's managers reached out and found the best technology and
expertise that was available in government and private industry.
They organized a talented team that came together with an ability
to foster innovation. In a collegial way they turned concepts
into reality--and did that in a relatively short time (Deutch,
1995). These early Corona pioneers--those who built, launched,
and operated Corona--were honored at CIA headquarters as part
of the 35th Anniversary Commemoration of the program in 1995.
The article on these pioneers offers a brief outline of who they
were and the contributions they made.
Corona's success was not only a result of those who built and
operated the satellite system, but also of those who found ways
to exploit and use Corona's imagery to extract intelligence information.
Ronald J. Ondrejka's article identifies another group of pioneers
who were members of the American Society of Photogrammetry and
Remote Sensing (ASPRS) and who focused on the exploitation of
what was a new reconnaissance capability. He writes from the perspective
of a long-time ASPRS member and his personal involvement in the
Corona program at Itek Corporation. He makes the point that these
ASPRS members, both corporate and individual, were "invisible
Corona partners" from the Society. They were invisible to
the public and others in the professional world of remote sensing
because of the inherent secrecy of the Corona program. Through
these partners, ASPRS provided the Corona program with a source
of knowledge about photogrammetry and remote sensing that had
been a part of the Society's professional tradition.
That tradition of imagery exploitation can be personified in Arthur
C. Lundahl who was the Society's president in 1954. A Washington
Post obituary for Lundahl described him as "a pioneer in
photographic intelligence and the art of photographic interpretation"
(Barnes, 1992). Lundahl was widely known for his work with U-2
imagery, but he also was a major player in the use and exploitation
of Corona imagery. He founded the National Photographic Interpretation
Center (NPIC), which became the Director of Central Intelligence's
center for the analysis of Corona imagery. It was Lundahl's years
of experience in photographic interpretation of airborne imagery
that enabled NPIC to make its contributions to national security
during the Corona era. Dino A. Brugioni's and Frederick J. Doyle's
article provides a biographical overview of Lundahl's life and
his contributions to the fields of photointerpretation and national
security. The article puts the exploitation of Corona imagery
in the context of a life experience.
Declassification
and Opening Secrets to the Public (top)
When the president
declassified Corona imagery in February 1995, 23 years after Corona's
final mission, it breathed new life into Corona. The four articles
in this section discuss the decision to declassify and the actions
to make Corona available to the public. The article on the declassification
decision explains the nature of the Talent-Keyhole Control system
that President Eisenhower directed for the protection of satellite
imagery and the gradual evolution of removing its security constraints.
Also reported is the background for Vice President Gore's announcement
of the decision at CIA Headquarters.
The next two articles in this section are more technical than
descriptive. The article by J. Michael Selander offers insight
into how the declassified satellite reconnaissance imagery was
prepared for transfer from the Intelligence Community holdings
to the public archives. Specifically, he explains the mathematical
camera models that were developed so that the transferred imagery
would be more useful to the public. The article by Jon C. Leachtenauer
and his colleagues offers a technical analysis of the benefits
of digitizing Corona imagery, which was acquired before the era
of imagery digitization.
The full Intelligence Community archive of Corona, Argon, and
Lanyard imagery now has been transferred to the public archive
at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) and
the Earth Resources Observation Systems (EROS) Data Center. Donna
K. Scholz's article provides some background on the transfer of
the imagery and explains how the public can gain access to the
imagery.
The
Impact of Space Reconnaissance (top)
Corona's technological
potential became apparent after recovering pictures of its first
intelligence target--the Soviet military airfield near Mys Schmidta
on the Chukchi Sea. Along with Argon and Lanyard, Corona imagery
would go on to have major national security and cartographic impact
in the worlds of foreign intelligence and map-making. The three
articles in this section focus on these impacts. In his article,
Robert A. McDonald cites specific examples of how, in a revolutionary
way, Corona contributed to exposing the missile gap, monitoring
arms control, detecting nuclear proliferation, and monitoring
the Soviet threat. Roland S. Inlow analyzes how the Intelligence
Community used Corona as a unique tool to respond to the foreign
intelligence challenges of the Cold War. He offers his analysis
from the perspective of a former intelligence analyst and senior
manager for the collection and exploitation of satellite reconnaissance
imagery.
Not only was Corona the beginning of a revolution in the way intelligence
was gathered and reported to senior national security decision
makers, but it also became the foundation for a revolution in
map-making. Joseph A. Baclawski discusses that aspect of Corona's
impact on national security. He points out how the mapping of
the Soviet landmass was probably one of the most technologically
challenging tasks for those who used Corona materials. Baclawski
makes it clear that Corona imagery provided the key to break through
the obstacles of the Soviet Cartographic Iron Curtain.
The
Future (top)
The four articles
in the last section of this monograph link Corona's past with
the future. Robert McDonald's article on potential new applications
for Corona imagery addresses how this 20- to 30-year-old satellite
reconnaissance imagery has the capability to contribute to the
analysis of a variety of current and future remote sensing and
scientific problems. Not only can it be useful for a retrospective
analysis of environmental problems, but it also can be used to
deal with resource management and archaeological problems.
Corona not only offers something for the future through the exploitation
of its 30-year-old imagery, but there are policy lessons that
can be learned from the Intelligence Community's experience with
it. Corona's experience demonstrates that technology can be a
force multiplier for intelligence, and it is necessary to understand
existing technologies if we are to apply them to the problems
at hand. "At the right time, taking advantage of an advance
in technology can revolutionize the business of intelligence"
(Deutch, 1995). The article on policy lessons briefly outlines
the range of these lessons that includes needing a strong industrial
base to be able to take advantage of technology, needing good
intelligence in an uncertain world, using the benefits of our
national security investments in nondefense areas, and finding
value in innovative approaches for management and teamwork when
dealing with complex problems that have short deadlines.
Richard Bissell made it clear that developing Corona, ``... was
a most heartbreaking business...[Y]ou fire the damn thing off
and you've got some telemetry, and you never get it back... So
you have to infer from telemetry what went wrong. Then you make
a fix, and if it fails again you know you've inferred wrong. In
the case of Corona, it went on and on" (Bissell quoted in
Mosley, Dulles quoted in Ranelagh). The development of Corona
broke new ground. It was a solution-oriented approach. Unique
managerial concepts were developed. Corona set the stage for a
fundamental new way to do things for its day, as well as for the
future. Sam Araki's article discusses the legacy of these inventive
technical practices and innovative management approaches that
Corona offers the aerospace industry for the next millennium.
Jeffrey K. Harris's final article in the monograph looks back
to Corona's heritage and forward to the challenges of the information
era. He reviews Corona's story as a backdrop for space and the
information age of the future.
Conclusion
(top)
Wasserman
(1976), in his preface to Man of La Mancha, repeated a quote he
found long ago in Unamuno, "Only he who attempts the absurd
is capable of achieving the impossible." And that is what
the Corona pioneers did. They attempted the absurd, sent a camera
into space, took pictures from 100 nautical miles, ejected the
film and snatched it by an aircraft in midair--absurd! But it
worked, and they accomplished the impossible! US intelligence
analysts and senior national security policymakers were able to
analyze pictures of the Soviet threat.
For the 1960s, Corona was a technologically remarkable program.
Not only was it the first photoreconnaissance satellite, but during
its initial missions it acquired images at a resolution of 8 meters.
And that quickly improved to 2 meters. An extraordinary achievement
in that when France launched its first commercial remote sensing
system, SPOTI--over 25 years later--it was only providing 10-meter
imagery! Even by Corona's thirty-fifth anniversary, commercial
space images generally were available at something worse than
2 meters (e.g., Landsat Thematic Mapper at 30m; the Japanese Earth
Resources Satellite, JERS, at about 18m; and the French SPOT satellite
still at 10m). Even the Russian KFA-1000 imagery generally was
offering no better than 2.5-meter imagery (Doyle, 1991).
In reflecting
on Corona, Director of Central Intelligence John Deutch (1995)
observed that it "... profoundly altered the course of the
Cold War and was probably instrumental in keeping us back from
the nuclear threshold." Project Corona was the US Cold War
intelligence project that prevented the Iron Curtain from denying
the US a view into the Communist Bloc and provided the US Government
with much-needed reconnaissance-derived intelligence.
What kind of conclusions can we draw? Looking across the articles
in this monograph, we clearly can see that Corona's development
resulted in at least four revolutions (the word "revolution"
consistently is used throughout the monograph). There was a revolution
in the way intelligence was collected--the availability of concrete
intelligence, hard evidence and tangible information that could
be seen and used by policymakers to develop a rational national
security strategy. There was a revolution in map-making--a new
source of data could be used to produce thousands of reliable
maps of large geographic areas previously inaccessible for data
collection. There was a revolution in aerospace technology--a
new capability for launching, maneuvering, and recovering spacecraft.
Finally, there was a revolution in how to manage a complex program--focus
on the goal, with an environment of commitment, empowerment, risk-taking,
cooperation, and teamwork.
After you learn about the Corona story, you come to know what
Corona is all about. It was an impossible dream that came true
after 13 unsuccessful attempts. It was risk-taking by pioneers
in space flight and intelligence operations. It was those who
were on a quest and followed the Corona star of strategic reconnaissance
that became a basis for national security during the second half
of the twentieth century. It was a look into the Communist world
that could not be blocked out by the eclipse of the Iron Curtain.
The fundamental contribution of Corona was keeping the Cold War
cold. US policymakers were able to acquire information, learn
from it, gain insight, share knowledge, and make the right decisions
without overreacting. They could see reality through the hard
evidence of Corona's photographs. Perhaps the final conclusion
is that Corona played a major role in determining how we would
think about national security strategy during the second half
of the twentieth century and then set the stage for how we are
going to confront information in the domains of foreign intelligence
and remote sensing in the next millennium.
References
(top)
- Barnes,
B. "Arthur C. Lundahl, 77, Dies; Photo Interpreter for
CIA." The Washington Post 25 June 1992: D4.
- Deutch,
J. Remarks. Corona and the Revolution in Intelligence. CIA Headquarters,
Langley, VA, 23 May 1995.
- Doyle,
F. J. "Comparison of Civil Remote Sensing Capabilities
of the USA, France, USSR, and Others." In R. A. McDonald,
ed., Space Imagery and News Gathering for the 1990s:
- So What?"
Proceedings of Symposium on Foreign Policy and Remote Sensing,
24-25 Feb. 1989.
- The Patterson
School of Diplomacy and International Commerce, U of Kentucky,
Lexington, KY. Bethesda, MD:
- American
Society for Photogrammetry and Remote Sensing, 1991.
- Helms,
R. Quoted in J. Ranelagh. The Agency: The Rise and Decline of
the CIA. New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1987:327.
- Leigh,
M. Man of La Mancha. Dale Wasserman, lyrics by Joe Darion, music
by Mitch Leigh. New York: Random House, 1966.
- Ranelagh,
J. The Agency. The Rise and Decline of the CIA. New York: Simon
& Schuster, Inc., 1987.
- Richards,
S., ed. Great Musicals of the American Theatre, Vol 2.
- Radnor,
PA: Chilton Book Company, 1976.
- "Veil
of Secrecy Lifted on Corona Imaging Reconnaissance Satellite:
Missiles & Space Program Spanned 13 Years, 145 Launches."
The Star 2 June 1995, 40, 11:1.
- Studeman,
W. O. "Praise for the Corona Pioneers." Ceremony Honoring
Pioneers of the Corona Satellite Program, CIA Headquarters,
Wash., DC, May 1995.
- Wasserman,
D. Man of La Mancha. Lyrics by Joe Darion, music by Mitch Leigh.
In S. Richards, ed., Great Musicals of the American Theatre,
Vol 2. Radnor, PA: Chilton Book Company, 1976.
Reproduced
with permission, the American Society for Photogrammetry and Remote
Sensing. Dr. Robert A. McDonald, Corona
Between the Sun and the Earth:The First NRO Reconnaissance Eye
in Space, 1997.
Abstracts
of Chapters (top)
1.The Prelude
to Space Reconnaissance
Tension
& Triumph: Civilian and Military Relations and the Birth of
the U-2 Program
Jonathan E. Lewis
Directed by
Richard M. Bissell Jr., the rapid development and deployment of
the U-2 spy plane was one of the great triumphs of the Cold War.
This article will explore the management techniques Bissell used
to build the U-2 project organization, coordinate a confederation
of civilian and military interests, and overcome repeated Air
Force attempts to gain control of the program, Bissell's choice
and development of the organization's structure, culture, and
personnel will be examined in the context of his broad mission
not only to deploy the plane, but to build a photo interpretation
capability, and produce an intelligence product that satisfied
consumer needs.
Post War
Strategic Reconnaissance and the Genesis of Project Corona
R. Cargill Hall
Strategic
reconnaissance and peacetime overflight were new concepts in the
post World War II period. The Soviet Union's detonation of nuclear
devices, Communist victory in China, and war in Korea stimulated
development of a strategic reconnaissance capability. The early
pioneers in strategic reconnaissance came out of industry, the
military, academia. During this early period, the US and Britain
would conduct reconnaissance overflights of portions of the USSR
using converted bombers (e.g., RB-47s and RB-45s). These aircraft
were vulnerable to Soviet attack. The Eisenhower administration
determined to develop high altitude reconnaissance aircraft and
ultimately reconnaissance satellites.
2.The Beginning
of Space Reconnaissance
Corona,
Argon, and Lanyard: A Revolution for US Overhead Reconnaissance
Robert A. McDonald
Corona, Argon,
and Lanyard were the first three US operational imaging satellite
reconnaissance systems. They were developed during the Cold War
as highly-classified programs, and all three were film return
systems. Corona was the most indispensable from a national security
perspective. It initially operated under the unclassified Discoverer
Program, which had its first successful mission on August12, 1960,
when an experimental recovery bucket was retrieved from space
with an American flag in it. August 18, 1960, marked the first
successful mission that returned film from space. The quality
of Corona's reconnaissance imagery improved over the life of the
program from about 40 ft. for the original KH-1 camera to somewhat
better than 6 ft. for the final KH-4B camera. The final Corona
mission was flown on May 24, 1972.
Corona: A Programmatic Perspective
Frederic C.E. Oder and Martin Belles
The Corona
program grew out of US Air Force Project Weapon System II7L (WS-117L),
for which Lockheed was the prime contractor. Lockheed went on
to serve as technical adviser and integrator of all Corona equipment
other than the Thor booster. It developed the orbiting Agena upperstage
and integrated and led the testing, launching, and on-orbit control
operations. The initial Corona vehicles were launched under the
cover of the Discoverer series. The earliest missions experienced
difficulties, and it was not until Discoverer XIV that reconnaissance
imagery was first collected. The Corona program provided a legacy
for the US to become a space leader.
ZENIT:
Corona's Soviet Counterpart
Peter A. Gorin
This article
describes the development of the first two types of the Soviet
photoreconnaissance satellites, Zenit-2 and Zenit-4. Apart from
the satellites themselves, the political background and development
of the Soviet space reconnaissance infrastructure are discussed.
The article provides a short comparison of the Soviet Zenit and
the US Corona programs. This article represents the author's personal
opinion based on available sources.
3.The Technology
Behind the Pictures
The Design
and Engineering of Corona's Optics F. Dow Smith
The Corona camera and its optics grew out of the technological
state-of-the-art of the post World War II period; the geopolitical
events of the period led to a decision in the late 1950s to fund
the Corona program. Work at the Boston University Physical Research
Laboratory was critical to the Corona camera, which was subsequently
developed at the newly-founded Itek Corporation. The camera was
a classic panoramic type that used a Petzval lens configuration.
There was an atmosphere of teamwork that was critical to the development
of the camera.
Evolution
of Standard Agena: Corona's Spacecraft
Robert M. Powell
Between February
1959 and February 1987, 362 Agenas were launched. This is the
spacecraft that was used to fly the Corona photoreconnaissance
satellite. Three basic Agena configurations were developed: A,
B, and D. Only 19 were flown in the A configuration; the rest,
Bs and Ds. The Bs and Ds were longer (20 ft. 8 in. vs. 14 ft.
3 in.) and heavier (14,100 lbs. vs. 8210 lbs. at launch) than
the As. All were 5 ft. in diameter. The Agena consisted of three
basic subsystems: Propulsion, which consisted of nested tanks
for fuel and oxidizer, and a gimbaled engine that used UDMH for
fuel and IRFNA as oxidizer; Guidance and control, which consisted
of sequence timers, an inertial reference package, infrared horizon
sensors, a velocity meter, and cold gas thrusters for pitch, roll,
and yaw control; and communication and control, which consisted
of telemetry, radar tracking beacon/command receiving transponder,
and an orbital sequence of events programmer adjustable by ground
command. Agena was Thor-boosted from the Pacific Missile Range
and its recovery vehicle recovered in mid-air over the Pacific
or from the ocean as back-up.
4.The People
and Their Organizations
From the
U-2 to Corona and Those Who Searched for Invisibility
Donald E. Welzenbach
This article
reviews the involvement of government and contractor personnel
who were associated with the development of the U-2, SR-71, and
ultimately Corona. Edwin Land and James Killian were very active
among an elite group of scientists who advised President Eisenhower,
as well as the CIA leadership during the 1950s. Richard Bissell,
Jr., initially chief of CIA's special projects element, was a
major CIA player during this period. Bissell brought Richard S.
Leghorn and personnel of the Boston University's Optical/Physical
Research Laboratories (BUORL) into the projects. Contractors,
such as Lockheed, Perkin-Elmer Corporation, Fairchild Camera Company,
and Itek Corporation became involved in the history of these reconnaissance
programs. By the time Corona was being developed, RAND personnel
such as Amrom Katz and Merton Davies became involved in the camera
aspects of the reconnaissance challenge. The serendipity of the
various developments at the time provided Dick Bissell the best
of all possible worlds to bring together resources to meet Eisenhower's
challenge of the time to meet the threat of surprise attack.
Corona's
Pioneers
Robert A. McDonald
Pioneers in
the scientific and intelligence world took the intellectual, scientific,
and political risks to create the US Government's first imaging
reconnaissance satellite, Corona. They came from government and
industry, and there were thousands over the life of the program.
Forty-eight pioneers were selected from the early years of the
program and were honored during the Thirty-Fifth Anniversary Commemoration
of the Corona program on May 24,1995. This article outlines a
brief summary of their contributions to the success of the program.
Corona's Invisible ASPRS Partners
Ronald J. Ondrejka
Without the
American Society of Photogrammetry (ASP)-- now known as the American
Society for Photogrammetry and Remote Sensing (ASPRS)--during
the years centered on 1960, the Corona program would not have
readily located and accessed the resources of responsive technologies
that were needed to expedite the acquisition and exploitation
of Corona satellite reconnaissance imagery. Both individual and
corporate sustaining members of the Society contributed to the
program's success. The technologies necessary for creating and
using Corona imagery--technologies that included photo-optical
sciences and engineering, photointerpretation, photogrammetry,
geodesy, and cartography--describe the professional ASP membership
in 1960. The contributions of the many individual and corporate
members at that time helped Corona meet its goals. The achievements
of these members are reflected in the health and professional
influences of ASPRS today.
Arthur C. Lundahl: Founder of the Image Exploitation Discipline
Dino A. Brugioni and Frederick J. Doyle
Art Lundahl,
as the founder of the image exploitation discipline, was a major
player in the interpretation and use of Corona imagery. During
World War II Lundahl encountered aerial imagery by interpreting
photographs of enemy targets in the Pacific Theater. He started
his civilian career with the Naval Photographic Interpretation
Center in 1946. In 1953, Lundahl became the first chief of the
Central Intelligence Agency's Photographic Intelligence Division,
which later became the National Photographic Interpretation Center
(NPIC). As the NPIC director, Lundahl was responsible for the
analysis of U-2 photography, and then after 1960, imagery acquired
by the Corona reconnaissance satellite. Lundahl enjoyed the confidence
of four US Presidents and briefed many other high-ranking officials
from around the world. During his career, he received many awards
for his work in photointerpretation and was universally admired
by his colleagues in the intelligence and remote sensing communities.
5. Declassification
and Opening Secrets to the Public
The Declassification Decision: Opening the Cold War Sky to
the Public
Robert A. McDonald
Executive
Order 12951 declassified Corona, Argon, and Lanyard satellite
reconnaissance imagery. This action was the result of a long history
of studying the question and relaxing security controls. Vice
President Gore announced the signing of the order in a ceremony
at CIA on February 24, 1995. The more general executive order
on protecting national security information (E.O.
12958, April 1995) also directs declassification of information
that may include additional satellite reconnaissance imagery.
Continued national security concerns may require the continued
classification of more recent imagery. After the Corona program's
national security sensitivity question was resolved, former Director
of Central Intelligence Woolsey declassified and authorized transfer
of a Corona camera artifact to the Smithsonian. Gore symbolically
gave the camera to the Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution
during the February 1995 ceremony. The camera was displayed at
the Air and Space Museum during the 35th Anniversary Commemoration
of the Corona Program, and is to become a part of the museum's
collection.
Image Coverage Models for Declassified Corona, Argon, and Lanyard
Satellite Photography--A Technical Explanation
J. Michael Selander
This article
describes the construction of mathematical camera models for the
Corona, Argon, and Lanyard United States photoreconnaissance satellite
imagery systems. Imagery acquired by these systems from 1960 to
1972--approximately 860,000 frames total--is being declassified
and made available to the public through the United States Geological
Survey (USGS) and the National Archives and Records Administration
(NARA). The camera models described in this article were used
to augment a legacy database of image coverage coordinates. This
database is used by the Global Land Information System (GLIS)
at the EROS Data Center (EDC) to allow users to interactively
locate images of interest.
Digitizing
Corona Imagery: Quality vs. Cost
Jon C. Leachtenauer, Kenneth Daniel, and Thomas P. Vogl
Corona, Argon,
and Lanyard imagery, unlike more recent satellite imagery, was
collected on film. For many potential applications in fields that
include environmental research, archaeology, and history, it would
be desirable to convert the data into a digital format. The National
Exploitation Laboratory at the former National Imagery Interpretation
Center of the CIA conducted a 1995 study that was designed to
determine the impact of digitizing resolution on the information
content of converted digitized products. As part of the study,
the investigators used a sample of digitizers (at various digitizing
spot sizes) to digitize images that were on a sample of duplicate
positive film. They displayed the digitized data in softcopy format,
and imagery analysts compared the digitized softcopy images with
the original hardcopy film products. They measured information
loss by using the National Imagery Interpretability Scale (NIIRS).
The results of the study provide a basis for selecting digitizer
resolution as a function of information/bandwidth trade offs.
Declassified
Intelligence Satellite Photographs Available from the US Geological
Survey
Donna K. Scholz
An Executive
Order, signed by President Clinton on February 22, 1995, authorized
the declassification of satellite photographs collected by the
US intelligence community during the 1960s and early 1970s. Products
from this collection include film negatives, positives, and paper
prints, which are available to the public at the cost of reproduction.
Photographs are available from the US Geological Survey's National
Satellite Land Remote Sensing Data Archive and the National Archives
Record Administration. The images were declassified incrementally,
and the first ones made available for public purchase on March
1, 1996. All images were made available by September 1996. An
online catalog and browse images for the entire collection are
accessible at no charge on the USGS's Global LIS [Land Information
System].
6. The Impact of Space Reconnaissance
Corona's
Imagery: A Revolution in Intelligence and Buckets of Gold for
National Security
Robert A. McDonald
It was difficult
for the US intelligence community to acquire information about
the denied areas of the USSR and its communist satellites during
the early days of the Cold War. Corona's satellite reconnaissance
spacecraft opened a new view into the communist bloc for both
intelligence analysts and US policymakers. Corona contributed
to exposing the myth of a "missile gap," built confidence
in monitoring arms control, helped detect nuclear proliferation,
and supported the SS-9 Debate during the 1960s.
How the Cold War and its Intelligence Problems Influenced Corona
Operations
Roland S. Inlow
Corona was
introduced into the Cold War at a time when there were many gaps
in intelligence, and US/Soviet nuclear capabilities were increasing
dramatically. It took several years for Corona to provide the
initial imagery needed to "search" the Soviet land-mass.
The process involved two functions: (1) finding and cataloguing
all significant activities; and, (2) confirming the absence of
activity when that was the case. Corona has made a lasting contribution,
and by any criterion, the Corona program was an outstanding intelligence
success in a time of great national need.
Corona:
The Foundation for a Mapmaking Revolution
Joseph A. Baclawski
The materials
collected by the formerly classified Corona intelligence satellite
program became an important resource for US mapping applications
on a worldwide basis. The 1995 declassification of the Corona
program permits an analysis of how its photographs and ephemeris
data were used in two drastically different mapping situations--one
on the USSR area where the available mapping data base was poor,
and the second on the US area where the existing mapping data
were better but needed major updating.
Mapping the Soviet landmass was undoubtedly the most technologically
challenging task to which the Corona and the associated Argon
materials were applied. Achieving success required development
of various types of foreign area mapping specialists, and massive
investments in research and development of unique production equipment,
all supported by complex computer programs. US mapping organizations
overcame these obstacles to map over one-sixth of the Earth's
land surface at a medium scale in just over a decade.
7. The Future
Potential
New Applications for Declassified Early Satellite Reconnaissance
Imagery
Robert A. McDonald
Imagery experts
in the intelligence community have suggested that declassified
satellite reconnaissance imagery can answer remote sensing questions
that go beyond national security problems. The superior spatial
resolution of Corona imagery, when compared with the civil remote
sensing systems of the 1970s and 1980s, can be used to complement
information that was obtained earlier by the civil systems of
the time. Corona imagery can significantly extend environmental
timelines and fill gaps in civil records. It has the potential
to meet Vice President Al Gore's objectives to recognize, measure,
and assess global changes. Corona imagery also can be employed
to address traditional remote sensing problems, such as resource
management, agriculture, forestry, and archaeology. It also can
find applications in the social sciences. Corona imagery, a valuable
intelligence source during the early Cold War, now has the potential
for making significant contributions to the civilian community.
Lessons and Benefits from Corona's Development
Robert A. McDonald
Experience
with the Corona program suggests five lessons with policy implications
for the future and benefits for today: (1) a strong industrial
base is a key to technological success; (2) innovative management
is fundamental to organizational success; (3) security may be
necessary for success in an intelligence activity; (4) reliable
intelligence is an integral part of developing sound national
security policy; and, (5) national security investments provides
dual-use opportunities. We need to consider these lessons as we
move through the transition of the post-Cold War period into the
Third Millennium.
Corona's Legacy for the New Millennium
Sam Araki with Robert A. McDonald
The development
of the Corona imaging reconnaissance satellite was a challenge
during an era of limited knowledge about space physics and limited
experience in space operations. The Corona engineers met the challenges
and left us with a legacy of space technology and program management
concepts for future aerospace development. When the Corona legacy
meets the modern challenges of the information revolution, there
are new, unknown opportunities to explore.
A Look
Back to Corona and a Look Forward to the Information Era
Jeffrey K. Harris
The information
era can be seen as an opportunity to build on the technological
heritage that Corona forged in the 1960s. Corona grew out of the
necessity to acquire information about the Soviet Union during
the Cold War, and it achieved a number of firsts in space helping
set the technological standard for future US space programs. Corona
offers a lesson that a small group of empowered people can explore
options and, with risks, achieve their goal. At the same time,
Corona left a technological and information legacy that presents
new opportunities for the information era. Information technology
is evolving at an ever faster rate, and the US begins the information
era with a distinct advantage. In this age of the ever-increasing
use of technology we need to recognize that some amount of system
failure may be inherent because of the complexity of the technological
systems. Tomorrow's future is bright, and knowledge from our technological
heritage can be the catalyst.
Reproduced
with permission, the American Society for Photogrammetry and Remote
Sensing. Dr. Robert A. McDonald, Corona
Between the Sun and the Earth:The First NRO Photoreconnaissance
Eye in Space, 1997.
|