FOR IMMEDIATE
RELEASE
14 July 2004
Acting
Director of Central Intelligence John E. McLaughlin
Interviewed by Steve Roberts
on National Public Radios Diane Rehm Show, 14 July 2004
(transcript)
For WAMU and NPR in Washington, I'm Steve Roberts, sitting in for Diane
Rehm. On Friday, the bipartisan Senate Intelligence Committee released
its report on the US Intelligence Community's pre-war assessments on
Iraq. In the 511 page report, the committee concluded that intelligence
provided by the CIA about Iraq's weapons programs was either overstated
or was not supported by evidence. The report cited a broken corporate
culture, poor management, and an aversion to risk-taking. On Sunday,
Deputy Director John McLaughlin took over as Acting Director of the
Agency. He joins me in the studio to talk about the report and the
implications for America's intelligence gathering operations. But first,
the news
(break)
Roberts: Thanks for joining us. I'm Steve Roberts, sitting
in today for Diane Rehm. Last Friday, the Senate Intelligence Committee
released a lengthy and very critical report on the intelligence provided
by the CIA before the US decision to invade Iraq. The report details
specific failures that led to false conclusions about Iraq's weapons
capability. On Sunday, former Deputy Director John McLaughlin became
the CIA's acting Director. He joins me in the studio to share his perspective
on the report, the Agency's record, and on the future. Mr. McLaughlin,
welcome to the Diane Rehm Show.
McLaughlin: Thank you, Steve. It's good to be here.
Roberts: You can join our conversation. Please give us a call.
And Mr. McLaughlin can probably join us for only the first half hour.
We'll try to take a couple of calls. You can call at 1-800-433-8850
as always. Let me start with the news. Yesterday you gave an interview
to Reuters in which you said that the threat levels to the United States
are higher than at any time since 9/11. What are you basing that on?
McLaughlin: Well, since 9/11, we've developed much more intelligence
than we had then on al Qaeda and its intentions. Of course, at that
time, as you know, in the summer of 2001, we had ample warning of attack,
but we didn't know anything about specificity: timing, targets, and
so forth. But we did have conviction that something big was coming
at us. We have that same conviction now. And the reason I say that
it is serious is that I think the information I've seen is very, very
solid. We have very little doubt about the information we have in terms
of its sourcing and its authenticity.
Roberts: Anything specific?
McLaughlin: Well, there's always a tension, Steve, between
the public's desire for specificity on this and our first mission, which
is to stop it. One of the tools that terrorists use to gain an advantage
over us is their ability to keep a secret. We don't have a very good
ability to keep a secret these days. But they keep this highly compartmented
so that when we do acquire some understanding of their plans, there
isn't a lot we can say about it, because the information we have is
important to us in seeking to thwart the attack.
Roberts: And there isa lot of our listeners would say,
"Wait. Should I worry? Should I avoid traveling this summer?
Should I avoid going to the Democratic or Republican conventions or
being in the same city where they are being heldin Boston and
New York? What would you say to that?
McLaughlin: I would say no. I would not advise people to think
that way. What I would advise people to do is three things. I would
advise them to have confidence that the government is working this as
hard as they can. I believe our homeland security apparatus is working
well. We had a great exercise back in December at the time we went
to orange, and everyone performed very well during that period. Now,
I don't mean to be overly reassuring here, because, remember, when you're
dealing with terrorists, we can be successful a thousand times; they've
just got to be lucky once. So, I don't mean to be falsely reassuring.
What I would say is that people ought to go on about their business.
And the other thing that I would say to the American people is that
it's very important: they have an important role to play here. And
that is: Be vigilant. To notice things that are suspicious. This,
of course, is preeminently the duty of local law enforcement. But citizens
themselves need to keep their eyes open and be alert.
Roberts: Now you've said to our listeners, to the country,
that we should have confidence in what they're being told. Now our
people say wait: The Agency did not accurately predict 9/11. They
made a lot of mistakes in terms of putting intelligence together before
9/11. The Senate committee has just reported/disclosed deep flaws in
the intelligence which before/leading up to Iraq. Why should we have
confidence in you, given your track record?
McLaughlin: Well, this is one of the objections I would have
to the Senate's report. The way it's been presented has allowed take
root a perception out there that because there were perceived shortcoming
in the work on that one specific problem in that one specific time frame
that somehow you can't trust intelligence anymore. There are a multitude
of reasons why the American people should have confidence in their Intelligence
Community and confidence when we say that there is a serious threat.
Let's take those in reverse order. Let's talk about the threat. Before
9/11, we did have warning, and we warned. We didn't have the specificity.
Since 9/11, we have taken downyou've heard this figure beforenearly
2/3 of the leadership that was in place with al Qaeda at that time.
Capturing a terrorist is not an easy thing. We have taken out of place
and rendered to justice the architect of 9/11: Khalid Sheikh Muhammad.
That's one reason why the American public should have confidence when
its Intelligence Community says there's a serious threat. It's not
something we do casually. We do it based on tough, rigorous experience,
particularly since 9/11, when our officers have been risking their lives
around the world, face-to-face with terrorists. Now second, I want
to cover that second point. More broadly, why should people have confidence
with their Intelligence Community. One of the problems that I have
with the Senate reportand let's put that in context. After all,
I did stand up the other day at a press conference to say in three words
"We get it." We understand there were shortcomings. But
one of the problems I have is that report is presented with no context
whatsoever. It is completely without context. After all, what it is,
is a discussion on our work on weapons proliferation. And we'd acknowledge
that there are some shortcomings; I'll be happy to talk about those
as you wish. But if you look at our record across the board on weapons
proliferation, it is extraordinarily strong. The President just the
other day visited Oak Ridge, Tennessee, to look at the haul of weapons
that came out of Libya, including weapons materials associated with
a nuclear weapons program. Libya's WMD was eliminated principally because
British and American intelligence detected accurately what they were
doing in their nuclear program, in their biological and chemical program,
and confronted the Libyans with that knowledge. An understated story
here on the weapons side is the success that the Intelligence Community
has had working across years, across continents, and across disciplines
to take downliterally, take downthe world's most dangerous
proliferation network: the A. Q. Khan network, operating initially out
of Pakistan, but spanning three or four continents. And I could go
on. Look, we are in the classic position now that American intelligence
gets into about every ten years. There's a cycle here, where perceived
shortcomings overshadow dramatically the successes. So I would say
to the American people that they need to have confidence in their Intelligence
Community.
Roberts: You also said those three famous words now: We get
it. What did you get? What were the shortcomings? What changes do
you think are necessary as a result, not only of the Senate's report,
but your own internal assessments of what went wrong?
McLaughlin: You know, I could have said that a little differently.
I could have put it in the past tense. I could have said, "We
got it." Because, in the intelligence business, we have to constantly
be in a learning mode. I'll tell you what we got, but let me frame
it a little bit for you. I said in a speech to the Business Executives
for National Security a couple of weeks ago that however good we are,
there's no perfection in this business. By profession, we must take
risks. Risks. Now people urge us not to be risk-averse. So our officers
risk their lives overseas. And our analysts here risk their reputations
every day by having to take a stand on controversial issues. So, when
you take risks, by definitionlook it up in a dictionarythere's
a possibility of a mistake. So in a risk-taking business, there's a
possibility of a mistake. And, when mistakes are made, the only thing
we can do is stand back and learn from them. Now, in this case, as
soon as conflict ended, the hostilities ended formally and we went into
Iraq, and we did not discover the, particularly the, biological and
chemical weapons that the whole world anticipated would be there, I
might add, we immediately began our own internal investigation of why
that would be so. We looked at our sources, we looked at our assumptions,
we looked at our analytic tradecraft. And, in fact, many of the things
that you find in the Senate report we'd passed to the Senate as we discovered
problems with sources; as we discovered assumptions that we had made
that ought to have been tested more rigorously.
Roberts: This is a very important point, because you said that
you just recently, you've instituted a new system where these National
Intelligence Estimatesthe famous NIEsare now subject to
much more scrutiny in almost a devil's advocate way that people take.
I'm sure that critics say, "wait. Why wasn't this being done earlier?
Why wasn't there much more of an internal, rigorous process of subjecting
these judgments to more thought?
McLaughlin: Well, it's a very interesting question. Here what
I would assure the American public here, is that devil's advocacy, if
we all understand what that means: it means challenging the assumption
that's before you. It means taking a set of facts and trying to arrive
at a different conclusion quite deliberately to see if they stand up.
This is woven into the fabric of our business. It's something people
don't understand.
Roberts: It doesn't seem to happen
McLaughlin: I think it happens in many cases. Let me give
you a couple of examples. The Iraq problem was unique in many respects,
absolutely. Normally, our job
Take a case like North Korea's
weapons programs. Highly secretive, closed state. Not a lot is known.
Quite a bit is known, but our job in a case like that is to penetrate
and discover what the world does not know. In the case of Iraq, our
job was a little different, if you think about it. For us to have performed
differently in Iraq, we would have had to overturn beliefs that were
held by the entire world. And that's one of the very few instances
that I can think of in my 30 year career of that's where the bar was
for the Intelligence Community. Let's turn to our devil's advocacy
for a moment, because one of the things that devil's advocacy often
involves is reaching outside the Intelligence Community for external
experts. For people to come in and tell you what they think, without
any of the preconceptions that might exist from intelligence data.
You know, ironically, had we done that on Iraq, our projections about
their weapons programs might have been even stronger than they were.
Because most of the external experts believed more strongly than we
did in many cases that those weapons existed. I'd like to read you
a statement
Roberts: What about this notion of group think? It's a phrase
that's received a lot of currency. And it charges this basic assumption
that you've describedin fairness, that was shared by other intelligence
services. Just this morning, there's a report issued in Britain which
made very similar criticisms of the British system as with the American
system. And there was, and clearly the Clinton Administration also
shared some of these assumptions. President Clinton has said this.
Hilary Clinton has said this. But, do you agree that there was a failure
to challenge that assumption that turned out to be so flawed?
McLaughlin: Actually, I disagree. I think, again, you know,
Director Tenet made a speech at Georgetown back in February which had
a lot of this in it. The theme of it was "Were not all right,
and we're not all wrong." In this case, we were wrong about some
things, some important things. But I don't think we were a victim of
what I would call group think. One of the things that's not well understood
about this National Intelligence Estimateand that's essentially
what the Senate spent a year studyingis that it is filled with
argument. When you get past the first five pages there is a lot of
argument laid out in that estimate. Now, I don't know how many people
in Congress read it. I literally don't know. But, had they read the
entire document, and not just the first few pages, where we mistakenlythis
is a lessons learnedwe mistakenly did not express as fully as
we should have some of the uncertainties because technically, in our
first couple of pagesthis is an art form issuewe try to
sum up what we really think. If you go into the document itself, you'll
find that there were strong dissents established.
Roberts: But those didn't come through.
McLaughlin: Well, they certainly were made available to people
in Congress.
Roberts: And to the White House?
McLaughlin: Absolutely. And if you look at, for example, the
issue of nuclear weapons, one of the things that people forget, is that
we did not say "he had nuclear weapons." And the issue of
reconstitution was strongly objected to by the State Department. This
was laid out in the document. And the whole issue of these famous aluminum
tubes was also objected to in three pages.
Roberts: John McLaughlin. He's the acting Director of the
CIA. We're going to be right back with a couple of your calls and questions,
so stay with us.
Roberts: Welcome back. I'm Steve Roberts. I'm sitting in
today for Diane Rehm. My guest this hour is John McLaughlin, the acting
Director of the CIA. He was formerly the Deputy Director. And as he
was pointing out to me, acting Director, Mr. McLaughlin, does not mean
part time Director.
McLaughlin: Not at all.
Roberts: It's an 18-hour job.
McLaughlin: Not at all. I was amused by a piece in one of
the newspapers yesterday that suggested our halls were empty and that
we were all staring our shoes. But in fact the place is bustling, and
I'm not part time. I'm acting with full energy and commitment every
single day.
Roberts: Now, of course, you have been a CIA professional
and you're not a political appointee. But, inevitably, the CIA has
become a major factor in the political campaign. And let me quote to
you a headline from the front page of the New York Times over the weekend
after Senators Kerry and Edwards made partially critical remarks about
both the Agency and the Bush Administration. "Bad Iraq Intelligence
Cost Lives, Democrats Say." What was your reaction when you saw
that headline?
McLaughlin: Well, my reaction when I saw that headline was
to say to myself that I think it is wrong. The implication that has
come out of all of this discussion is that somehow decisions to go to
war were based on this document that was studied for a year overstates
the role of this document. Couple of thoughts on that. I mean, had
that been the basis for going to war, more would have been made in the
debates about the fact that we said that Saddam didn't have nuclear
weapons. More would have been made in the debates about the fact that
we said that he was not enriching uranium. More would have been made
in the debates about the fact that we had serious differences on a number
of issues that we were talking about just before the break. More would
have been made about the fact that we expressed low confidence in our
understanding of when and whether he reviews these weapons. So I think
that there was more involved in this debate. Look, I can't say why
anyone chose their view or their (inaudible) or how they chose to go,
to come down on this question. Everyone has to say that for themselves.
But there were, as I said earlierone of the things missing from
this whole discussion was context. And, you go into the context here.
(inaudible) This was, after all, not Switzerland we were writing about.
If you read the report, it would sound as though we were wrong to even
suspect that weapons existed. This is a country that we'd been in conflict
with one way or another for 12 years. A country where the system of
containment arguably was breaking down, whether it was limiting finances
or sanctions or influence of military materiel. This was a country
where given every chance to account for his weapons, Saddam continued
to deceive. This was a country where we were, after all, flying in
no-fly zones, north and south, every day. This was a country which
since the war, since the end of hostilities, has been shown through
the work of the Iraq Survey Group to be in material breach of Resolution
1441. So, you know, when I saw that headline, I
Obviously, as
an American, I've been in the military, I've served in uniform, I've
been under attack in a war zone. I know what it's like and anyone who,
you know, contemplates the situation regrets the loss of life. But
I think it is oversimplifying the situation here to say that this is
all because of this estimate that's been studied for a year.
Roberts: You've pointed out several times that your professional
analysts made many qualifications and many caveats in their reports
and analysis. And yet, your predecessor, Director George Tenet, if
Bob Woodward's book is to be believed, said to the President of the
United States, "It is a slam dunk," quote, that these weapons
would be found and these weapons were present. Now that doesn't sound
like there are a lot of caveats in that statement.
McLaughlin: Well, one thing I don't comment on is anything
that happens in the Oval Office. And I certainly am not going to comment
on what the Director is alleged to have said. What I would tell you,
though, is that however that alleged statement is interpreted, I know
George Tenet well. And I know what his thinking was, was that there
was a lot of evidence that he had weapons. You know, he uses colorful
language. And I think it's been overinterpreted, overemphasized. But
I just am not going to discuss what goes on in the Oval Office.
Roberts: Well let me ask you this. Since you made the point
that these caveats were contained in the information that was sent to
the Senate oversight committees as well as to the White House. And
that there are well-documented statements over and over again by Vice
President Cheney, by the President himself and others, talking about
their surety, their confidence, their absolute conviction that these
weapons existed, are you saying that the information was taken from,
that the qualifications, the caveats that the Agency presented then
got lost in translation and that the White House overinterpreted what
you said?
McLaughlin: I'm not going to try to make judgments about statements
by people in the Administration, because I think that my job is just
to interpret the intelligence, get it down in black and white, make
sure of that. And that's what we have to stand on. But I would say,
policy makers, unlike intelligence analysts, make their statements and
their judgments on a broad range of issues. Sherman Kent, one of the
forerunners of intelligence analysis, who is quoted, actually, in the
Senate report, said once, that the average policy maker makes a decision
on the basis of about a dozen different indicators, not just intelligence.
So we have to calculate, among other things, what is the level of risk
you're willing to take in the post-9/11 environment? That's not an
intelligence judgment. Intelligence doesn't make policy. And they
also read the raw reporting. And they're entitled to their own views.
They don't have to just parrot.
Roberts: Are you comfortable that the intelligence estimates
were interpreted accurately by the White House? When you heard these
statements that were full of conviction when you, in the material coming
out of CIA was full of caveats, was there a disconnect there?
McLaughlin: I did not at any point feel that there was a major
disconnect. And, again, that's just not an area where we get into.
If there is a major error in a statement by a public figure, as George
Tenet has said a number of times, we would quietly say to them, "I
wouldn't go quite that far. I would do it a little differently."
But again, policy makers are free in interpret intelligence as they
wish. And I would remind you again, and remind people that before the
war, most of the experts had fewer qualifiers than the Intelligence
Community. And our Administration figures were free to call upon those
experts as well as us. Just to quote some things from testimony that
was given prior to the war, back in September 2002. You know, David
Kay, for example, said this. He was our chief weapons inspector. He
was a friend of mine, who did wonderful work for us after the war as
one of our advisors. You know, David said, what's clear is that unless
we take immediate steps to address the issue of removing Saddam's regime
from power in Iraq, we will soon face a nuclear-armed and emboldened
Saddam. It discusses the obstructions that Saddam was putting up, and
says this removes all doubt about his aim to acquire and enlarge his
nuclear and biological and chemical weapons stockpiles. And, if you
looked at other articles that were written by various people, you will
see that experts, including UN experts, were cited as having a far more
robust opinion than we did about his uranium. For example, Ken Pollak's
article in the Atlantic Monthly in January and February of 2003 looked
back at what he heard from UN inspectors in 2001 when he asked 20 of
them if Saddam was enriching uranium. They all put up their hands and
said, "Yes. Yes." That's more than what the Intelligence
Community said. So our policy makers are reading all of this stuff,
too, and they've got to decide, "well, the external experts are
saying that, there's the Intelligence Community that's saying this",
they've got to take a position. And that's among the dozen things that
they refer to.
Roberts: One of our callers wanted to talk to you. And if
you'll put on your headphones, we'll go, we'll try to get through a
couple of these quickly. Connie in Rome, New York, welcome to the Diane
Rehm Show, Connie.
Caller: Thank you. Longtime listener, first time caller.
I just wanted to assure Director McLaughlin that not every citizen in
the United States is really down on the CIA or the FBI. We realize
that they go through major upheavals frequently. And we remember the
'70s. (sentence inaudible) And clearly Congress didn't let them do
what they needed to do. So, I just wanted him to know that there are
people out there that know that they're doing a good job. That's it.
McLaughlin: Thank you, Connie.
Roberts: Thank you, Connie. Let's talk to Miles in Cleveland,
Ohio. Welcome to the Diane Rehm Show, Miles.
Caller: Good morning. Thank you for taking my call. First
of all, I'd like to thank Mr. McLaughlin for his many years of service
to the people of this country. So often, I would imagine, you don't
get individual things like that. My question is, and the last caller
just somewhat briefly touched on it, since 9/11 and the war in Iraq,
we've heard a lot of blame being put on systemic problems in the Agency
that date back to the Church hearings in the mid-'70s, in particular,
that those impacted the Agency's ability to have assets on the ground
in other countries. And, I would like you to address that in the context
that if in fact there were restrictions created by those hearings, which
I do not believe to be the case, because I do recall them, what's different
now? What are you going to be allowed to do now in order to have such
assets, which are obviously so important, in place.
Roberts: Thank you. Thanks, Miles. A very important question.
McLaughlin: Yes, it is. And I'm happy to have it, because we have
been in the process, Miles, of rebuilding our, what we call our Clandestine
Service for a number of years now. I will tell you that when George
Tenet became Director of CIA back in 1997, shockingly, at that point,
as a result of resource cuts in the '90s, we had only about two dozen
officers in training for that service, which is basically the nation's
spy service. I will tell you that since then, and I give the Congress
and the Administration credit for understanding that we need more resources,
we have hired large numbers of people. We are now graduating the largest
Clandestine Service classes in our history. The CIA gets about 6,000
resumes a week from people who want to work for us. And we're in much
better shape. Are we perfect yet? Are we where we need to be? No.
We have a ways to go, because the world has changed dramatically in
the last ten years. The need for intelligence is greater. But we'll
get there. We have some years to go before where we need to be to serve
the nation properly.
Roberts: I'm Steve Roberts, and you're listening to the Diane
Rehm Show. I've talked to a number of people who like to follow up
that question in terms of the recruitment of Muslims and of Arabic speakers.
There's been a lot of talk about the lack of assets on the ground in
this community. That this recruitment has been badly hampered by the
way Muslims have been treated at airports, (inaudible) and that this
has been a
I've talked to some in the FBI, not in the CIA. They've
said this is an enormous obstacle to recruiting just these types of
people you need.
McLaughlin: Steve, I don't have at my fingertips the data that
I would need to give you a factual answer on how many people of Muslim
background we have recruited recently. I know that we've had a major
recruitment drive in that community, because we do need Arabic speakers.
It's a myth that we don't have Arabic speakers. We have a lot of Arabic
speakers. But it is not a myth that we don't have enough. I mean,
if you consider the demands on us in the war on terrorism and in Iraq
right now, if you speak Arabic, every chance there is that you're going
to be working on one of those two problems. What I would say is, since
I have a chance to talk to the American public here, if you are of Muslim
background, and if you, particularly if you speak Arabic, and you want
to work for the CIA, we want to talk to you.
Roberts: OK. Is there a website? Or a place people can consult
if they want to?
McLaughlin: cia.gov Download the application, and fill it
out in Arabic.
Roberts: OK. Thank you. Let's talk to Scott in Dallas, Texas.
Thanks for joining us on the Diane Rehm Show, Scott.
Caller: I want to focus on terrorism. Did you all (inaudible)
that resolving the Israeli-Palestine conflict would be the (inaudible)
would resolve it. David Robarge, in a State Department hearing said
that Israel was responsible for initiating the '67 war, contrary to
all the rhetoric and propaganda otherwise.
We have allowed that fact to continue, (inaudible) and encouraged it.
And are now (inaudible) buying it and making it permanent with the wall.
If this isn't an unwanted incitement. Why aren't we talking about that?
McLaughlin: Well, I know that our government is committed to
making progress in that area. I'm not a policy maker. So I can't comment
on the policy itself. People can argue one way or another about the
degree to which the Arab-Israeli conflict fuels terrorism. What I would
tell you is this. At the time of 9/112001the Arab-Israeli
conflict was less than it is now. In fact, in the period between roughly
1996-1997 and 2001, my Agency was involved in helping to ease that conflict,
in many cases, through the direct, effective work of George Tenet working
to increase the effectiveness of the Palestinian security services.
My point here is simply this: The Arab-Israeli conflict was at a low
ebb then, and they still attacked the United States. So, to me, this
is an excuse that terrorists use to justify their murderous acts.
Roberts: Let me ask you another question. The Senate Committee
very specifically dealt with only one issue, which was the quality of
the intelligence produced by the professional agencies. It very specifically,
in part, for political reasons, did not deal with the second question,
which was: how was this intelligence used by the Administration. There
was an arrangement, between the Democrats and Republicans, to put that
report off. It will come. Maybe not till after the election. But
from everything you know, what will that report say? What's your view
of how the intelligence that you provide
You say that you know
the policymaker. But how was the intelligence your Agency provided
used by the White House, fairly or unfairly, accurately or inaccurately?
McLaughlin: Well, that's one of those questions that I think
I'm going to leave to the Senate committee. You know, if they did not
feel qualified to wrestle with that now, as an intelligence professional,
who really tries to stay out of politics, it's very importantit's
very, very importantto keep this nation's intelligence services
out of politics. I'm going to let them sort that out. What I know
here is that the President made a strategic decision to change the geographic
scope of terrorism in the Middle East and given that the Iraq was a
state sponsor of terrorism. And people can debate that. But I think
I'm going to let the Senate sort out those issues.
Roberts: Very quick final question: What's the mood in Langley
today? Some people have raised the possibility of demoralization, given
all the criticism.
McLaughlin: Well, you know, people in the Intelligence Community
have to be very resilient. I mean, they're out there on the front lines,
fighting terrorists. I had a colleague say to me the other day, "the
correct response to the Senate committee is to go out and penetrate
another proliferation network, recruit another terrorist, take another
one off the streets, because that's what we have to do for the American
people."
Roberts: John McLaughlin, acting Director of the CIA. Thanks
very much for being with us on the Diane Rehm Show.
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