(Original Signature of Member)
116TH CONGRESS H.R.
To direct the Director of National Intelligence to submit to Congress a report on efforts by the People's Republic of China to exploit the COVID-19 pandemic to advance the national security and foreign policy interests of China.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Ms. Kendra S. Horn of Oklahoma introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on
A BILL
To direct the Director of National Intelligence to submit to Congress a report on efforts by the People's Republic of China to exploit the COVID-19 pandemic to advance the national security and foreign policy interests of China.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-

This Act may be cited as the "Preventing China from

tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

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SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

5 Exploiting COVID-19 Act".

1	SEC. 2. REPORT ON EFFORTS BY CHINA TO EXPLOIT
2	COVID-19 PANDEMIC TO ADVANCE NATIONAL
3	SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS
4	OF CHINA.
5	(a) Report.—Not later than 90 days after the date
6	of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National In-
7	telligence, in coordination with the Secretary of State, the
8	Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Homeland Se-
9	curity, shall submit to the appropriate congressional com-
10	mittees, and make publicly available on the internet
11	website of the Director, a report on efforts by the People's
12	Republic of China to exploit the COVID-19 pandemic to
13	advance the national security and foreign policy interests
14	of China in ways that undermine the interests of the
15	United States, allies and partners of the United States,
16	and the rules-based international order.
17	(b) Elements.—The report under subsection (a)
18	shall include the following:
19	(1) An assessment of—
20	(A) the tactics and techniques used by
21	China to obstruct or retaliate against countries,
22	such as Australia, that have sought a full and
23	fair inquiry into the role of China in the emer-
24	gence and spread of COVID-19; and
25	(B) the motivations of China for under-
26	taking such obstruction or retaliation.

1	(2) A description of activities undertaken by
2	China, including with respect to cyber-theft, in-
3	tended to licitly or illicitly acquire information and
4	intellectual property in the possession of non-Chi-
5	nese governments and businesses relating to
6	COVID-19 testing, treatment, and vaccines.
7	(3) An assessment of whether the activities de-
8	scribed under paragraph (2) violate the commitment
9	of China under the cybersecurity agreement entered
10	into by China and the United States in 2015 to re-
11	frain from conducting or supporting cyber-enabled
12	economic espionage.
13	(4) An assessment of the manner by which
14	China seeks to advance the foreign policy interests
15	of China by providing economic aid or medical
16	equipment to countries adversely affected by
17	COVID-19 and a discussion of the degree to which
18	such aid renders recipient countries more likely to
19	adopt positions favorable to the interests of China or
20	detrimental to the interests of the United States.
21	(5) An assessment of—
22	(A) the effects of the pledged economic
23	support by China to international organizations,
24	such as the World Health Organization: and

1	(B) whether, and in what manner, China
2	uses such support to induce such organizations
3	to take actions favorable to the interests of
4	China or detrimental to the interests of the
5	United States.
6	(6) An identification of the different ways in
7	which China is using, or may be planning to use, the
8	global disruption and distraction associated with the
9	COVID-19 pandemic as an opportunity to more ag-
10	gressively pursue longstanding domestic and foreign
11	policy objectives, including the objectives of China
12	with respect to Hong Kong, Taiwan, Xinjiang, and
13	territorial disputes.
14	(7) An assessment of—
15	(A) the means and methods by which
16	China disseminates misinformation, whether
17	overtly or covertly, about COVID-19, including
18	on United States-based social media platforms
19	or through other English language-based media;
20	and
21	(B) the motivations of China for dissemi-
22	nating such misinformation and a description of
23	how the departments and agencies of the Fed-
24	eral Government are collaborating to track,
25	analyze, and respond to such dissemination.

1	(8) An overarching assessment of—
2	(A) how the activities of China described in
3	this subsection collectively further the national
4	interests of China; and
5	(B) the extent to which such activities con-
6	stitute a continuation of the longstanding prac-
7	tices of China or are an evolution of the foreign
8	policy behavior of China.
9	(c) FORM.—The report under subsection (a) shall be
10	submitted in unclassified form without any designation re-
11	lating to dissemination control, but the report submitted
12	to the appropriate congressional committees may include
13	a classified annex.
14	(d) Appropriate Congressional Committees
15	DEFINED.—In this section, the term "appropriate con-
16	gressional committees" means the following:
17	(1) the Committee on Appropriations, the Com-
18	mittee on Armed Services, the Committee on For-
19	eign Affairs, the Committee on Homeland Security,
20	and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
21	of the House of Representatives; and
22	(6) the Committee on Appropriations, the Com-
23	mittee on Armed Services, the Committee on For-
24	eign Relations, the Committee on Homeland Secu-

- 1 rity and Governmental Affairs, and the Select Com-
- 2 mittee on Intelligence of the Senate.