

111<sup>TH</sup> CONGRESS  
2<sup>D</sup> SESSION

# S. 3197

To require a plan for the safe, orderly, and expeditious redeployment of  
United States Armed Forces from Afghanistan.

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IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

APRIL 14, 2010

Mr. FEINGOLD introduced the following bill; which was read twice and  
referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

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## A BILL

To require a plan for the safe, orderly, and expeditious  
redemption of United States Armed Forces from Af-  
ghanistan.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*  
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. FINDINGS.**

4 Congress makes the following findings:

5 (1) Military operations in Afghanistan have cost  
6 American taxpayers more than \$200,000,000,000 in  
7 deficit spending since 2001.

8 (2) Particularly given current record deficits,  
9 high unemployment, and proposed reductions in do-  
10 mestic spending, the United States should ensure fu-

1       ture war expenditures in Afghanistan do not add to  
2       the deficit and ensure that resources are not squan-  
3       dered on waste, fraud, abuse, or corruption in Af-  
4       ghanistan.

5               (3) United States military and nonmilitary op-  
6       erations in Afghanistan, including those conducted  
7       by contractors, must be subject to the highest stand-  
8       ards of transparency and accountability, and subject  
9       to the review of appropriate inspectors general.

10              (4) According to the most recent Army Mental  
11       Health Advisory Team Assessment, one in five sol-  
12       diers surveyed in Afghanistan reports having psycho-  
13       logical problems.

14              (5) The United States needs a comprehensive  
15       strategy to counter the global threat posed by al  
16       Qaeda and its affiliates in Pakistan, Somalia,  
17       Yemen, North Africa, and elsewhere around the  
18       world.

19              (6) A massive, open-ended United States mili-  
20       tary presence in Afghanistan is unlikely to advance,  
21       and may undermine, United States efforts to elimi-  
22       nate the safe haven for al Qaeda in Pakistan and  
23       combat al Qaeda globally.

24              (7) Rather than engaging in a nation-building  
25       effort in Afghanistan, the United States should

1 begin reducing troop levels in Afghanistan and tran-  
2 sition to a sustainable counterterrorism policy.

3 (8) President Obama announced on December  
4 1, 2009, that United States troops would begin to  
5 be withdrawn from Afghanistan in July 2011.

6 (9) The United States remains committed to  
7 providing long-term economic, diplomatic, and polit-  
8 ical support to the people of Afghanistan, and to  
9 supporting the emergence of a legitimate, effective  
10 government in Afghanistan.

11 (10) The United States will continue to provide  
12 economic, development, and political support for  
13 women’s rights, education, and leadership in Af-  
14 ghanistan.

15 (11) The August 20, 2009, presidential election  
16 in Afghanistan was characterized by widespread  
17 fraud, and there are credible reports of widespread  
18 corruption.

19 (12) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,  
20 Admiral Michael Mullen, has acknowledged that the  
21 greatest threat in Afghanistan today is the “lack of  
22 legitimacy in the government—at all levels” and that  
23 the United States Armed Forces cannot solve the le-  
24 gitimacy problem.

1           (13) General McChrystal has acknowledged that  
2           United States partnerships with “polarizing and  
3           predatory” powerbrokers, including in the Afghan  
4           National Security Forces, compromise the ability of  
5           the United States to address the lack of legitimacy  
6           in the Afghanistan Government.

7   **SEC. 2. PLAN FOR THE SAFE, ORDERLY, AND EXPEDITIOUS**  
8                           **REDEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES ARMED**  
9                           **FORCES FROM AFGHANISTAN.**

10           (a) **PLAN WITH TIMETABLE REQUIRED.**—Not later  
11           than January 1, 2011, or 90 days after the date of enact-  
12           ment of this Act, whichever is earlier, the President shall  
13           submit to Congress a plan for the safe, orderly, and expe-  
14           ditious redeployment of United States Armed Forces from  
15           Afghanistan, including military and security-related con-  
16           tractors, together with a timetable for the completion of  
17           that redeployment and information regarding variables  
18           that could alter that timetable.

19           (b) **STATUS UPDATES.**—Not later than 90 days after  
20           the date of the submittal of the plan required by sub-  
21           section (a), and every 90 days thereafter, the President  
22           shall submit to the Congress a report setting forth the  
23           current status of the plan for redeploying United States  
24           Armed Forces from Afghanistan.

1 (c) RECOMMENDATIONS ON CONTRACTOR OVER-  
2 SIGHT.—

3 (1) RECOMMENDATIONS REQUIRED.—Not later  
4 than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this  
5 Act, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan  
6 Reconstruction shall, in consultation with the In-  
7 spector General of the Department of Defense and  
8 the Inspector General of the Department of State—

9 (A) issue recommendations on measures to  
10 increase oversight of contractors engaged in ac-  
11 tivities relating to Afghanistan that have a  
12 record of engaging in waste, fraud, or abuse;  
13 and

14 (B) report on the status of efforts of the  
15 Department of Defense and the Department of  
16 State to implement existing recommendations  
17 regarding oversight of such contractors.

18 (2) ELEMENTS OF RECOMMENDATIONS.—The  
19 recommendations issued under paragraph (1)(A)  
20 shall include recommendations for reducing the reli-  
21 ance of the United States on security contractors or  
22 subcontractors responsible for the deaths of Afghan  
23 civilians and on Afghan militias, contractors, sub-

1 contractors, or other armed groups that are not part  
2 of the Afghan National Security Forces.

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