Corruption and Weak Property Protections Fuel Protests in Rural China: The Case of Wukan Village

May 31, 2017

Official corruption and malfeasance in land expropriations lay at the heart of unrest in Wukan, a village in Guangdong province, which garnered international attention in 2011 when villagers protested against corruption and subsequently secured direct elections of local-level officials. In June 2016, protests began when authorities detained Wukan village committee Communist Party Secretary Lin Zulian under bribery allegations reportedly for advocating government land returns. For almost three months, Wukan residents assembled for protests calling for Lin’s release and the return of village land, until authorities mobilized riot police and public security forces to crackdown on villagers. The latest developments in Wukan illustrate the lack of effective redress mechanisms for villagers involved in land-related disputes, a main source of unrest in rural China. Furthermore, the government’s focus on “stability maintenance” in Wukan and their response to the protests have dampened hopes for grassroots democratic reform in China.

Authorities Enforce “Coercive Measures” Against Wukan Village Chief Who Challenged Corruption

On June 17, 2016, local authorities imposed “coercive measures” against Lin Zulian, the elected Communist Party Secretary of Wukan, on suspicion of “accepting bribes.”[1] Lin, an advocate for the return of land to villagers, was elected to the village committee in 2012 in a special election[2] and reelected in 2015.[3] Authorities detained Lin after he announced plans to launch a new campaign for the return of village land.[4] On June 21, Chinese state-run media aired a prerecorded confession of Lin admitting to taking bribes.[5] The Chinese government has employed televised confessions in many high-profile cases in recent years from the arrest of human rights lawyers to the abductions of Hong Kong booksellers.[6]  The increased use of televised confessions contravenes article 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which protects the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.[7] Authorities formally arrested Lin on July 21[8] and on September 8, the Chancheng District People’s Court in Foshan municipality, Guangdong province, sentenced him to three years and one month in prison and a fine of 200,000 yuan (approximately US$29,000) for bribery-related charges.[9] Lin appealed the sentence,[10] denying the bribery charge that he previously admitted to,[11] but the Foshan Municipality Intermediate People’s Court upheld his original sentence.[12]

Land Expropriation Issues Fuel Tensions in “Democracy Village”

The arrest and sentencing of Lin Zulian is the latest in a series of efforts to crackdown on land return advocates in Wukan. Land expropriation issues are a recurring source of unrest since 2011 when major protests caused village Party and government officials to flee the area.[13] In a move widely applauded as a step toward grassroots democracy, provincial-level authorities allowed a village committee election in March 2012 where protests leaders, including Lin Zulian, were elected.[14] Despite promises made to the villagers that land expropriation issues would be addressed, the failure to return land in subsequent years led to additional protests in 2014, where authorities detained two Wukan elected officials, Yang Semao and Hong Ruichao.[15] Lin Zulian’s arrest, and the crackdown on villagers who staged protests, is the latest in a series of officials’ efforts to clamp down on Wukan villagers’ efforts to seek redress.[16]

Local-level Corruption Rampant in Many Parts of China 

Local-level corruption related to the use of land remains rampant in rural China, including in Wukan, despite President Xi Jinping’s large-scale anticorruption campaign.[17] Village officials reportedly engaged in embezzlement,[18] land expropriation,[19] and forced demolition of homes.[20] Some officials reportedly had ties to gangs that used intimidation and violence to extort villagers.[21] In January 2017, at separate high-level national meetings for their respective agencies, Wang Qishan,[22] the Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, and Cao Jianming,[23] the Procurator-General of Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP), acknowledged the problem and indicated plans to tackle the issue of corruption among village officials and related gang activities. The SPP subsequently issued an official directive instructing lower level prosecutors to work with other government agencies and Party organizations to enforce efforts targeting so-called “village tyrants”—officials who are involved in corruption and violence against villagers.[24]

Weak Property Protections a Main Cause of Corruption and Public Protests

Villagers in rural China face land expropriation by local governments who dispossess villagers of property and land use in order to resell to developers and businesses. Local governments seek revenue by forcibly or arbitrarily depriving villagers of property,[25] including through forced demolitions, threats, coercion, and violence.[26] The Chinese government’s arbitrary seizure of private property contravenes provisions in the PRC Constitution[27] and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.[28] Government compensation to villagers whose land is expropriated is often low,[29] leaving villagers “worse off” financially with losses in areas such as crops, equipment, buildings, and businesses.[30] One study found that local governments receive 10 to 40 times more for expropriated land at $190,000 to $740,000 per acre compared to the amount provided to farmers at $17,800 per acre.[31] Legal reparation mechanisms for displaced residents are reportedly inadequate,[32] and villagers seeking redress often face violence from hired gangs or local police.[33] Villagers victimized by local land grabs have turned to the petitioning system (xinfang)[34 to present their grievances to authorities in higher government offices, which has often landed petitioners in “black jails” and detention, and, in some cases, faced with criminal charges.[35] According to official news media China Daily, a 2014 Chinese Academy of Social Sciences study found that, land acquisitions and forced demolitions were among the top causes of “mass incidents” in China.[36] One expert on Chinese governance observed that the lack of private property rights in China, in addition to the lack of judicial independence in Chinese courts, limits the effectiveness of the Party and central government’s anticorruption campaign—including at the county level.[37]

Crackdowns on Village Protests Diminish Hopes for Replicating “Wukan Model” of Grassroots Democracy

Hopes for grassroots democratic reform in China, based on the “Wukan model,” further diminished after officials used heavy-handed tactics to suppress demonstrators.[38 On and around September 13, 2016, international news media reported that security forces used tear gas and rubber bullets against demonstrators, a move reportedly ordered by the Guangdong province Communist Party Secretary Hu Chunhua[39] that resulted in serious injuries to villagers.[40] Police forces interrogated and expelled foreign reporters from the village,[41] blockaded access to the village,[42] and detained villagers and Internet users.[43] A Chinese party-run news media characterized international reporting on events in Wukan as “foreign forces” conducting “public opinion warfare,”[44] while other provincial media published alternative narratives on events in Wukan that downplayed the violence and unrest.[45] In December 2016, the Haifeng County People’s Court tried and convicted[46] nine Wukan residents for their participation in the protest and sentenced them to prison.[47] According to a March 2017 media report, Wukan residents continue to be under surveillance by authorities and are fearful to speak to outsiders.[48]

Wukan Villagers Charged and Sentenced[49]
Name and Political Prisoner Database Record No.
Charges
Sentence (Years)
Accused of Violence Against Authorities (V)
Wei Yonghan[50]
2017-00104
  • "Gathering a crowd to disturb social order"
  • Iillegal assembly, procession, or demonstration"
  • "Obstructing official business"
10.5
     V
Hong Yongzhong[51]
2017-00100
  • "Gathering a crowd to disturb social order"
  • "Illegal assembly, procession, or demonstration"
6.5
 
Yang Jinzhen[52]
2017-00107
  • "Gathering a crowd to disturb social order"
  • "Illegal assembly, procession, or demonstration"
6
 
Wu Fang[53]
2017-00101
  • "Gathering a crowd to disturb social order"
  • "Illegal assembly, procession, or demonstration"
5
 
Cai Jialin[54]
2017-00102
  • "Illegal assembly, procession, or demonstration"
  • "Gathering a crowd to disrupt traffic"
3
 
Zhuang Songkun[55]
2016-00463
  • "Illegal assembly, procession, or demonstration"
  • "Gathering a crowd to disrupt traffic"
3
 
Li Chulu[56]
2017-00103
  • "Illegal assembly, procession, or demonstration"
  • "Obstructing official business"
3
     V
Chen Suzhuan[57]
2017-00105
  • "Illegal assembly, procession, or demonstration"
3
 
Zhang Bingchai[58]
2017-00106
  • "Intentionally disseminating fabricated information"
2
 

For more information on the 2016 protests in Wukan village, see “A New Round of Protests in Wukan Village” Textbox in Section III—Institutions of Democratic Governance in the CECC 2016 Annual Report, p. 240.

 


[1] Lufeng City Public Security Bureau, “Lufeng City Public Security Bureau Open Letter to All of the Villagers of Wukan Village” [Lufeng shi gong’anju zhi wukan cun guangda cunmin de gongkai xin], 17 June 16, reprinted in Lufeng City Public Security Bureau (Ping’an lufeng), Weibo post, 18 June 16, 5:12 a.m. (weibo.com/1765354884/DAKv8ypHB?type=comment#_rnd1467322816213); James Pomfret, “China ‘Democracy’ Village Chief Arrested for Graft, Riot Police Deployed,” Reuters, 18 June 16 (https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-wukan-idUSKCN0Z405O); “Protests Enter Fifth Day in China’s Rebel Village of Wukan,” Radio Free Asia, 23 June 16 (https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/china-wukan-06232016141937.html).

[2] “China’s Wukan Village Elects Protest Leaders To Run Council,” Bloomberg, 4 March 12 (https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-03-04/china-s-wukan-villagers-elect-new-leaders-after-december-s-land-protests); “China’s Wukan Continues To Elect Village Leaders,” Xinhua, 4 March 12 (https://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-03/04/c_131445391.htm); James Pomfret, “China ‘Democracy’ Village Chief Arrested for Graft, Riot Police Deployed,” Reuters, 18 June 16 (https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-wukan-idUSKCN0Z405O).

[3] Luigi Tomba, “What Does Wukan Have To Do With Democracy?” Chinoiresie, 2 February 17 (https://www.chinoiresie.info/what-does-wukan-have-to-do-with-democracy/).

[4] “Grassroots Democracy: Unwanted Model,” Economist, 23 June 16 (https://www.economist.com/news/china/21701164-village-famed-its-struggle-democracy-once-again-turmoil-unwanted-model).

[5] Chun Han Wong, “Skepticism in China After Wukan Confession,” Wall Street Journal, China Real Time Report (blog), 22 June 16 (https://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2016/06/22/skepticism-in-china-after-wukan-confession/).

[6] Eva Pils, “The Rise of Rule by Fear,” University of Nottingham, China Policy Institute: Analysis (blog), 15 February 16 (https://cpianalysis.org/2016/02/15/rule-of-law-vs-rule-by-fear/); Steven Jiang, “Trial By Media? Confessions Go Prime Time in China,” CNN, 26 January 16 (https://www.cnn.com/2016/01/26/asia/china-television-confessions/).

[7] Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, art. 11 (https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/index.html).

[8] “Former Wukan, Guangdong, Village Committee Chief Lin Zulian Arrested on Suspicion of Taking Bribes” [Guangdong wukan yuan cun weihui zhuren lin zulian shexian shouhui zui bei daibu], China News Service, 22 July 16 (https://www.chinanews.com/gn/2016/07-22/7947749.shtml).

[9] Chancheng District People’s Court, “Lin Zulian Bribery Case Trial of First Instance Verdict” [Lin zulian shouhuian yishen xuanpan], 8 September 16 (ccfy.gov.cn/bydt/7210.htm); Cao Siqi, “Wukan Chief Jailed 3 Years for Bribery,” Global Times, 9 September 16 (www.globaltimes.cn/content/1005502.shtml); “China’s Rebel Village Protests Jailing of Its Former Leader for ‘Bribery,’” Radio Free Asia, 8 September 16 (https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/jailing-09082016115940.html).

[10] Chancheng District People’s Court, “Lin Zulian Appeals After Trial of First Instance Verdict” [Lin zulian yishen hou tiqi shangsu], 24 September 16 (https://ccfy.gov.cn/bydt/7376.htm).

[11] “Guangdong’s Wukan Village Chief Lin Zulian Loses His Appeal” [Guangdong wukan weiquan lingxiu lin zulian shangsu zao bohui], Voice of America, 21 October 16 (https://www.voachinese.com/a/Guangdong-right-village-chief-lost-appeal-20161021/3560494.html).

[12] Foshan Intermediate People’s Court, “Lin Zulian Bribery Case Trial of Second Instance Verdict” [Lin zulian shouhuian ershen xuanpan], 20 October 16 (www.fszjfy.gov.cn/pub/court_7/gongzuodongtai/fayuanyaowen/zhongyuanyaowen/201610/t20161020_25186.htm).

[13] Thomas Lum, Congressional Research Service, “Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 113th Congress,” 19 June 13, 5 (www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43000.pdf); “Wukan: After the Uprising,” Al Jazeera, 26 June 13 (https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/specialseries/2013/06/2013626153044866869.html). See also James Promfret, “Special Report: Freedom Fizzles Out in China’s Rebel Town of Wukan,” Reuters, 28 February 13 (https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-wukan-idUSBRE91R1J020130228); Zhuang Liehong, “Open Letter to the Chinese Government and the World Media About the Suppression of Wukan,” China Change, 23 November 16 (https://chinachange.org/2016/11/23/open-letter-to-the-chinese-government-and-the-world-media-about-the-suppression-of-wukan/).

[14] “China’s Wukan Village Elects Protest Leaders To Run Council,” Bloomberg, 4 March 12 (www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-04/china-s-wukan-villagers-elect-new-leaders-after-december-s-land-protests.html); “China’s Wukan Continues To Elect Village Leaders,” Xinhua, 4 March 12 (https://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-03/04/c_131445391.htm);  China Digital Times, “A Violent End to Wukan’s Democratic Experiment,” 21 September 16 (https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2016/09/chinas-wukan-democracy-experiment-comes-violent-end/); “Chinese Riot Police Crush Wukan’s Democracy Experiment, Ending Headache for Xi,” Reuters, 14 September 16 (https://www.cnbc.com/2016/09/14/chinese-riot-police-crush-wukans-democracy-experiment-ending-headache-for-xi.html).

[15] Dan Levin, “Years After Revolt, Chinese Village Glumly Returns to Polls,” New York Times, 1 April 17 (https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/01/world/asia/years-after-revolt-chinese-village-glumly-returns-to-polls.html?_r=0); Teddy Ng, “Suspicion Clouds Wukan Leader’s ‘Bribery’ Arrest,” South China Morning Post, 20 March 14 (www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1452702/suspicion-clouds-wukan-leaders-bribery-arrest); “Chinese Village Official’s Detention Sparks Fears of Poll Rigging,” Radio Free Asia, 17 March 14 (www.rfa.org/english/news/china/wukan-03172014155810.html); “Second Wukan Leader Held Ahead of Closed-Door Elections,” Radio Free Asia, 20 March 14 (https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/held-03202014151815.html).

[16] Zhuang Liehong, “Open Letter to the Chinese Government and the World Media About the Suppression of Wukan,” China Change, 23 November 16 (https://chinachange.org/2016/11/23/open-letter-to-the-chinese-government-and-the-world-media-about-the-suppression-of-wukan/). See also CECC, 2014 Annual Report, 9 October 14, 142-43.

[17] Luigi Tomba, “What Does Wukan Have To Do With Democracy?” Chinoiresie, 2 February 17 (www.chinoiresie.info/what-does-wukan-have-to-do-with-democracy/); GAN Integrity Inc., “China Corruption Report,” November 2016 (https://www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/china).

[18] See, e.g., Zhou Pinglang, “Politics and Fraud Level Town’s Flood Defenses,” Sixth Tone, 17 January 17 (https://cms.sixthtone.com/news/politics-and-fraud-level-town%E2%80%99s-flood-defenses); “Xinjiang’s Yili Villagers’ Legal Rights Representative Talks About Local Government Corruption Issues” [Xinjiang yili cunmin weiquan daibiao tan difang zhengfu guanyuan tanfu wenti (jiu)], Radio Free Asia, 4 October 16 (www.rfa.org/mandarin/zhuanlan/laogongtongxun/hdf-10042016163123.html). 

[19] See, e.g., Zhou Pinglang, “Corruption Runs Through Flood-Ravaged Yangtze Village,” Sixth Tone, 11 January 17 (www.sixthtone.com/news/flood-petty-corruption-pushes-paizhou-farmers-protest); Hai Yan, “Large-scale Clash Between Police and Nearly Ten Thousand Guangdong Villagers Protesting Against Corrupt Officials” [Guangdong jin wan cunmin kangyi tanguan jingmin daguimo chongtu], Voice of America, 3 April 15 (https://www.voachinese.com/a/armed-police-crack-down-on-residents-in-pujing-in-guangzhou-20150403/2705271.html). 

[20] See e.g., Rights Defense Network, “Wuxi Resident Xu Haifeng Levies Complaint Against Public Security, Procuratorial, and Court Officials to Departments of Wuxi Municipality, Jiangsu Province, and the Central Government for the Framing and Imprisonment of 77-Year-Old Mother Wang Jindi” [Wuxi xu haifeng jin xiang wuxi shi, jiangsu sheng, zhongyang ge zhineng bumen konggao gouxian ziji nian yi 77 sui muqin wang jindi zuolao de gongjianfa zerenren], 8 October 16 (wqw2010.blogspot.com/2016/10/blog-post_43.html). For more information on Wang Jindi, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2016-00037.

[21] Jie Wenjin et al., “Emphasize Striking Against ‘Protective Umbrella’ for Occupational Crimes—Focus on Addressing ‘Village Tyrants’ and Clan-Related Criminal Gang Activities Nationwide” [Tuchu daji chongdang “baohusan” de zhiwu fanzui—jujiao quanguo zhengzhi “cunba” he zongzu eshili xingdong], Xinhua, 12 February 17 (https://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2017-02/12/c_1120452373.htm); Zhao Fuduo, “Procuratorate Office To Vigorously Address ‘Village Tyrants,’ Severely Punish Rural Village-Level Corruption” [Jiancha jiguan jiang dali zhengzhi “cunba” yancheng nongcun jiceng fubai], Caixin, 15 January 17 (https://china.caixin.com/2017-01-15/101044176.html).

[22] “To Promote Comprehensive and Rigorous Development of Party Governance, and Welcome the Grand Opening of the Nineteenth Party Congress With Exceptional Performance—Work Report from the Chinese Communist Party’s Eighteenth Central Commission on Discipline Inspection’s Seventh Plenary Session” [Tuidong quanmian congyan zhidang xiang zongshen fazhan yi youyi chengji yingjie dang de shijiuda zhaokai—zai zhongguo gongchandang di shiba jie zhongyang jilu jiancha weiyuanhui diqi ci quanti huiyi shang de gongzuo baogao], Xinhua, 19 January 17, sec. 3(5) (https://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2017-01/19/c_1120345740.htm).

[23] Wang Zhiguo et al., “Cao Jianming: Create A Safe and Stable Social Environment for the Successful Convening of the Party’s Nineteenth Party Congress” [Cao jianming: wei dang de shijiu da shengli zhaokai yingzao anquan wending shehui huanjing], Procuratorate Daily, reprinted in Supreme People’s Procuratorate, 15 January 17 (https://www.spp.gov.cn/tt/201701/t20170115_178564.shtml); Li Rongde, “China’s Top Prosecutor Takes Aim at Corrupt Village Officials Over Rural Land Grabs,” Caixin, 16 January 17 (www.caixinglobal.com/2017-01-16/101044470.html).

[24] Supreme People’s Procuratorate, “Supreme People’s Procuratorate Releases Opinion, Stresses Striking Against Occupational Crimes that Serve as ‘Protective Umbrellas’ for ‘Village Tyrants,’” 3 February 17 (https://www.spp.gov.cn/xwfbh/wsfbt/201702/t20170203_179882.shtml).

[25] Lucy Hornby, “China Land: Losing the Plot,” Financial Times, 4 July 16 (https://www.ft.com/content/42eca2b6-3d4d-11e6-8716-a4a71e8140b0); Kristen Looney and Meg Rithmire, “Urbanization with Chinese Characteristics? China’s Gamble for Modernization,” Harvard Business School, Working Paper 16-083, January 2016, 3, 9 (https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/UrbanizationChina_RithmireLooney_notes_055bd268-913f-4c1c-8bb0-8c14c8855b83.pdf); Hiroki Takeuchi, “Fiscal Starvation: The Unintended Consequences of Xi Jinping’s Anti-Corruption Campaign,” University of Nottingham China Policy Institute: Analysis (blog), 23 February 17 (https://cpianalysis.org/2017/02/23/fiscal-starvation-the-unintended-consequences-of-xi-jinpings-anti-corruption-campaign/).

[26] For examples of local government’s forced demolitions, threats, coercion, and violence against villagers, see Jun Mai, “China’s ‘Nail-Gun Murderer’: What Drove My Brother To Kill A Village Official,” South China Morning Post, 20 November 16 (https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/2047402/chinas-nail-gun-murderer-what-drove-my-brother-kill-village); Jun Mai, “11 Detained After Woman, 60, Died in Forced Demolition of Her Home,” South China Morning Post, 13 June 16 (https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/1989313/11-detained-after-woman-60-died-forced-demolition-her-home).

[27] PRC Constitution, issued 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 29 March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, art. 13. See also Laney Zhang, Law Library of Congress, “China: Real Property Law,” Library of Congress, March 2015 (https://www.loc.gov/law/help/real-property-law/china.php).

[28] Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, art. 17 (www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/).

[29] Zhu Keliang and Roy Prosterman, “Land Reform Efforts in China,” U.S.-China Business Council, China Business Review, 1 October 12 (https://www.chinabusinessreview.com/land-reform-efforts-in-china/); Justin Jin, “The Human Impact of China’s New Urbanisation,” Post Magazine, 8 April 16 (https://www.scmp.com/magazines/post-magazine/article/1934172/photographs-human-impacts-chinas-new-urbanisation); Kristen Looney and Meg Rithmire, “Urbanization with Chinese Characteristics? China’s Gamble for Modernization,” Harvard Business School, Working Paper 16-083, January 2016, 9 (https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/UrbanizationChina_RithmireLooney_notes_055bd268-913f-4c1c-8bb0-8c14c8855b83.pdf).

[30] Zhu Keliang and Roy Prosterman, “Land Reform Efforts in China,” U.S.-China Business Council, China Business Review, 1 October 12 (https://www.chinabusinessreview.com/land-reform-efforts-in-china/); Sally Sargeson, “Violence as Development: Land Expropriation and China’s Urbanization,” Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol. 40, No. 6 (2013), 1069. 

[31] Zhu Keliang and Roy Prosterman, “Land Reform Efforts in China,” U.S.-China Business Council, China Business Review, 1 October 12 (https://www.chinabusinessreview.com/land-reform-efforts-in-china/).

[32] Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015: China (Includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau),” 13 April 16, 22; Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2016—China,” last visited 24 February 17 (https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2016/china). See also Matt Sheehan, “In China, Only Leaders Are Allowed To Battle Corruption,” Huffington Post, 12 March 15 (https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/03/12/china-leaders-corruption_n_6852596.html).

[33]Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2016—China,” last visited 24 February 17 (https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2016/china); Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015: China (Includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau),” 13 April 16, 22. See also Jun Mai, “China’s ‘Nail-Gun Murderer’: What Drove My Brother To Kill A Village Official,” South China Morning Post, 20 November 16 (https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/2047402/chinas-nail-gun-murderer-what-drove-my-brother-kill-village).

[34] Lucy Hornby, “China’s Modern Take on an Ancient Petition System,” Financial Times, 28 November 13 (https://www.ft.com/content/ebab4304-580c-11e3-a2ed-00144feabdc0); CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6 October 16, 270-71.

[35] See, e.g., Yaxue Cao, “A Chinese Petitioner and Her 12-Year Quest for Justice,” China Change, 2 July 13 (https://chinachange.org/2013/07/02/a-chinese-petitioner-and-her-12-year-quest-for-justice/); Rights Defense Network, “Wuxi Resident Xu Haifeng Levies Complaint Against Public Security, Procuratorial, and Court Officials to Departments of Wuxi Municipality, Jiangsu Province, and the Central Government for the Framing and Imprisonment of 77-Year-Old Mother Wang Jindi” [Wuxi xu haifeng jin xiang wuxi shi, jiangsu sheng, zhongyang ge zhineng bumen konggao gouxian ziji nian yi 77 sui muqin wang jindi zuolao de gongjianfa zerenren], 8 October 16 (https://wqw2010.blogspot.com/2016/10/blog-post_43.html); “Chinese County’s Rare Disclosure Sheds Light on Plight of Nation’s Petitioners,” Reuters, reprinted in South China Morning Post, 3 March 17 (https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2075779/chinese-countys-rare-disclosure-sheds-light-plight).

[36] Hou Liqiang, “Report Identifies Sources of Mass Protests,” China Daily, 9 April 14 (www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-04/09/content_17415767.htm).

[37] Minxin Pei, “Without An Independent Judiciary, China Cannot Win Its War on Corruption,” Huffington Post, 10 February 17 (https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/china-war-on-corruption-judiciary_us_589b5cf0e4b04061313adfeb).

[38] China Digital Times, “A Violent End to Wukan’s Democratic Experiment,” 21 September 16 (https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2016/09/chinas-wukan-democracy-experiment-comes-violent-end/); “Chinese Riot Police Crush Wukan’s Democracy Experiment, Ending Headache for Xi,” Reuters, 14 September 16 (https://www.cnbc.com/2016/09/14/chinese-riot-police-crush-wukans-democracy-experiment-ending-headache-for-xi.html).

[39] James Pomfret and Benjamin Kang Lim, “Exclusive: Provincial Boss Ordered Crackdown on China’s ‘Democracy Village’ With Eye on National Power,” Reuters, 23 September 16 (www.reuters.com/article/us-china-wukan-idUSKCN11T0J1?il=0). See also Zhuang Liehong, “Open Letter to the Chinese Government and the World Media About the Suppression of Wukan,” China Change, 23 November 16 (https://chinachange.org/2016/11/23/open-letter-to-the-chinese-government-and-the-world-media-about-the-suppression-of-wukan/).

[40] “Wukan China Unrest: ‘A Village Under Siege,’” BBC, 14 September 16 (https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-37366955); Javier C. Hernandez, “Wukan, A Chinese Village, Erupts in Unrest Over Activists’ Arrests,” New York Times, 13 September 16 (https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/14/world/asia/wukan-china-land-use-protests.html?_r=0); “Wukan Erupted Again With Severe Conflict, Several Dozens of People Were Injured by Tear Gas and Rubber Bullets” [Wukan zaibao yanzhong chongtu shushi ren bei cuileidan, xiangjiao zidan suo shang], Radio Free Asia, 13 September 16 (https://www.rfa.org/cantonese/news/clash-09132016085014.html); James Pomfret, “Chinese Villagers Describe Police Beatings in ‘Wild Crackdown’ on Protest,” Reuters, 14 September 16 (https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-wukan-protests-idUSKCN11J0C0); Zhuang Liehong, “Open Letter to the Chinese Government and the World Media About the Suppression of Wukan,” China Change, 23 November 16 (https://chinachange.org/2016/11/23/open-letter-to-the-chinese-government-and-the-world-media-about-the-suppression-of-wukan/).

[41] “Wukan China Unrest: ‘A Village Under Siege,’” BBC, 14 September 16 (https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-37366955); “Reporters Detained, Beaten by Chinese Police in Rebel Village of Wukan,” Radio Free Asia, 15 September 16 (www.rfa.org/english/news/china/wukan-journalists-09152016125448.html); Zheping Huang, “Chinese Authorities Are Offering a $3,000 Bounty to Wukan Villagers Who Turn in Foreign Journalists,” Quartz, 15 September 16 (https://qz.com/781989/foreign-journalists-are-wanted-for-3000-by-chinese-authorities-for-inciting-unrest-in-a-village/).

[42] “[Short Video] Wukan Villagers Continue Protests for 85 Days To Support Lin Zulian, Public Security Detained 13 People in Middle of Night” [“Duanpian” wukan cunmin chixu youxing 85 ri ting lin zulian gong’an banye rucun ju 13 ren], Ming Pao, 12 September 16 (news.mingpao.com/ins/instantnews/web_tc/article/20160913/s00004/1473727978588).

[43] Lufeng City Public Security Bureau (Ping’an lufeng), “Wukan Villagers Cai Jialin, Zhang Xiangkeng, Yang Jinzhen, and Others With Criminal Suspicion Detained” [Wukan cunmin cai jialin zhang xiangkeng yang Jinzhen deng ren shexian fanzui bei jina gui’an], Weibo post, 13 September 16, 6:03 a.m. (https://weibo.com/p/23041869392d840102wnux?mod=zwenzhang); Zhan Yijia and Ye Qian, “13 Villagers in Wukan, Guangdong Suspected of Gathering a Crowd To Disturb Public Order Detained by Public Security Bureau” [Guangdong wukan 13 min cunmin yin shexian juzhong raoluan gonggong zhixu deng bei gong’an jiguan ji’na], Xinhua, 13 September 16 (news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2016-09/13/c_1119558191.htm); “[Short Video] Wukan Villagers Continue Protests for 85 Days To Support Lin Zulian, Public Security Detained 13 People in Middle of Night” [“Duanpian” wukan cunmin chixu youxing 85 ri ting lin zulian gong’an banye rucun ju 13 ren], Ming Pao, 12 September 16 (https://news.mingpao.com/ins/instantnews/web_tc/article/20160913/s00004/1473727978588); Zheping Huang, “Chinese Citizens Are Being Arrested for Sharing News About the Wukan Village Rebellion Online,” Quartz, 16 September 16 (https://qz.com/783026/china-censorship-chinese-citizens-are-being-arrested-for-sharing-news-about-the-wukan-village-rebellion-online/).

[44] Shui Mei, “Foreign Media Fails To Trick Wukan Villagers on Rumor,” Global Times, 15 September 16 (https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1006411.shtml); Shan Renping, “Western Media Uses Wukan Vigil As Public Opinion Warfare To Stoke Unrest,” Global Times, 20 September 16 (https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1007303.shtml).

[45] David Bandurski, “In Wukan, A Clean Sweep,” University of Hong Kong, China Media Project, 22 September 16 (https://cmp.hku.hk/2016/09/22/in-wukan-making-a-clean-sweep/).

[46] Haifeng County People’s Court, “Haifeng County People’s Court Publicly Issues Verdicts in Trial of First Instance for Case Involving Wei Yonghan, Zhang Bingchai, and Others for Gathering a Crowd to Disturb Social Order; Illegal Assembly, Procession, or Demonstration; Gathering a Crowd to Disturb Traffic Order; Obstructing Official Business; and Intentionally Disseminating Fabricated Information” [Haifeng xian renmin fayuan yishen gongkai xuanpan wei yonghan, zhang bingchai deng 9 ren juzhong raoluan shehui zhixu, feifa jihui, youxing, shiwei, juzhong raoluan jiaotong zhixu, fanghai gongwu, guyi chuanbo xujia xinxi an haifeng yishen xuanpan], 26 December 16 (www.hffy.gov.cn/nzcms_show_news.asp?id=8033); Zhuang Liehong, “How Nine Wukan Villagers Were Illegally Tried and Sentenced in December 2016,” China Change, 5 January 17 (https://chinachange.org/2017/01/05/how-nine-wukan-villagers-were-illegally-tried-and-sentenced-in-december-2016/).

[47] Haifeng County People’s Court, “Haifeng County People’s Court Publicly Issues Verdicts in Trial of First Instance for Case Involving Wei Yonghan, Zhang Bingchai, and Others for Gathering a Crowd to Disturb Social Order; Illegal Assembly, Procession, or Demonstration, Gathering a Crowd to Disturb Traffic Order, Obstructing Official Business, and Intentionally Disseminating Fabricated Information” [Haifeng xian renmin fayuan yishen gongkai xuanpan wei yonghan, zhang bingchai deng 9 ren juzhong raoluan shehui zhixu, feifa jihui, youxing, shiwei, juzhong raoluan jiaotong zhixu, fanghai gongwu, guyi chuanbo xujia xinxi an haifeng yishen xuanpan], 26 December 16 (www.hffy.gov.cn/nzcms_show_news.asp?id=8033).

[48] “Wukan Activist’s Mother Interrogated, Intimidated After Incognito Visit,” Radio Free Asia, 20 March 17 (www.rfa.org/english/news/china/mother-03202017131533.html).

[49]  Haifeng County People’s Court, “Haifeng County People’s Court Publicly Issues Verdicts in Trial of First Instance for Case Involving Wei Yonghan, Zhang Bingchai, and Others for Gathering a Crowd to Disturb Social Order; Illegal Assembly, Procession, or Demonstration; Gathering a Crowd to Disturb Traffic Order; Obstructing Official Business; and Intentionally Disseminating Fabricated Information” [Haifeng xian renmin fayuan yishen gongkai xuanpan wei yonghan, zhang bingchai deng 9 ren juzhong raoluan shehui zhixu, feifa jihui, youxing, shiwei, juzhong raoluan jiaotong zhixu, fanghai gongwu, guyi chuanbo xujia xinxi an haifeng yishen xuanpan], 26 December 16 (www.hffy.gov.cn/nzcms_show_news.asp?id=8033).

[50] For more information on Wei Yonghan, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2017-00104.

[51] For more information on Hong Yongzhong, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2017-00100.

[52] For more information on Yang Jinzhen, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2017-00107.

[53] For more information on Wu Fang, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2017-00101.

[54] For more information on Cai Jialin, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2017-00102.

[55] “Chinese Protest Leader Seeks Asylum in US, Say Reports,” Agence France-Presse, reprinted in Guardian, 26 March 14 (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/26/chinese-wukan-protest-zhuang-liehong-asylum-us); “Chinese Police Press Father in Effort To Silence Exiled Wukan Activist Son,” Radio Free Asia, 27 September 16 (https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/wukan-zhuang-09272016164719.html). Zhuang Songkun is the father of exiled Wukan activist Zhuang Liehong. For more information on Zhuang Songkun, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2016-00463.

[56] For more information on Li Chulu, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2017-00103.

[57] For more information on Chen Suzhuan, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2017-00105.

[58] For more information on Zhang Bingchai, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2017-00106.