

V. Tibet

Status of Negotiations Between the Chinese Government and the Dalai Lama or His Representatives

There has been no formal dialogue between the Dalai Lama's representatives and Chinese Communist Party and government officials since the ninth round of dialogue was held in January 2010.¹ In its 2016 Report on Tibet Negotiations, the U.S. State Department reiterated the long-standing position of the U.S. Government that promoting substantive dialogue between the Chinese government and the Dalai Lama or his representatives is an "important U.S. foreign policy objective" and that "resumption of dialogue and steps to redress Tibetan grievances are critical to reducing the continuing high tensions between Tibetans and Chinese authorities."² On February 3, 2017, the Party-run Global Times reported that Zhu Weiqun, Chairperson of the Ethnic and Religious Affairs Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and a former senior Party official, said the Chinese government would not engage in dialogue with what Zhu referred to as an "illegal group" whose aim is to split China.³

Reincarnation and the 14th Dalai Lama

The Chinese central government maintains that only it has the right to decide the Dalai Lama's successor.⁴ The 14th Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso, who reached the age of 82 in July 2017,⁵ has said "the person who reincarnates has sole legitimate authority over where and how he or she takes rebirth and how that reincarnation is to be recognized."⁶ The issue of the current Dalai Lama's reincarnation garnered substantial attention during this reporting year, prompted in part by the Dalai Lama's travel to two places with significant historical ties to Tibetan Buddhism—Mongolia in November 2016, and Tawang, Arunachal Pradesh, India, in April 2017—and speculation that the Dalai Lama may be exploring possible places for his reincarnation.⁷

While in Tawang, where the Dalai Lama gave teachings to 50,000 people, he said it was "nonsense" for the Chinese government to claim that it has the right to decide his successor.⁸ The Dalai Lama reiterated that whether the institution of the Dalai Lama is still relevant, or if he should be the last Dalai Lama, is something for the Tibetan people to decide.⁹ He said he expects not only Tibetan refugees, but also others across the Himalayan region, including Tawang, to provide input into the decision regarding whether the institution should continue.¹⁰ On August 9, 2017, during a lecture in India, the Dalai Lama said that "[s]ome of the preparation for the future of the Dalai Lama institution will begin in the next one or two years."¹¹ He further stated that people in India and Mongolia "also have . . . responsibility" in this matter.¹²

Chinese authorities continued to expand the public profile of their chosen Panchen Lama, 27-year-old Gyaltzen Norbu, whom Party and government officials selected as the 11th Panchen Lama in 1995, shortly after declaring the Dalai Lama's recognition of then six-year-old Gedun Choekyi Nyima to be "illegal and invalid."¹³ According to observers, Gyaltzen Norbu is likely to play

Tibet

a significant role in the Party and government's selection of their endorsed successor to the 14th Dalai Lama.¹⁴ In August 2016, the *Global Times* stated that as Gyaltzen Norbu becomes more involved in religious, political, and social affairs, he "is expected to mitigate" the influence of the Dalai Lama.¹⁵ Chinese authorities abducted Gedun Choekyi Nyima and his parents on May 17, 1995, three days after the Dalai Lama recognized him as the reincarnation of the 10th Panchen Lama, and have refused to permit an independent expert to visit him.¹⁶ The Panchen Lama and his family's whereabouts remain unknown.¹⁷

In August 2016, for the first time, the U.S. State Department addressed the Dalai Lama's reincarnation in its annual Report on Tibet Negotiations, stating that as a matter of the "universally recognized right of religious freedom," the decision regarding the Dalai Lama's succession or reincarnation "must be reserved to the current Dalai Lama, Tibetan Buddhist leaders, and the Tibetan people."¹⁸

Despite the harsh measures that the Chinese government and Party have taken to try to undermine the stature of the Dalai Lama in the eyes of Tibetans, Tibetan Buddhists continue to revere him as their spiritual leader and take great risks to access his teachings, possess an image of him, or express their devotion in other ways.¹⁹ In December 2016, the Aba Intermediate People's Court in Ma'erkang (Barkham) county, Aba (Ngaba) Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture (T&QAP), Sichuan province, reportedly sentenced at least eight Tibetans in Aba (Ngaba) county, to prison terms ranging from 5 to 14 years for involvement in activities relating to the celebration of the Dalai Lama's 80th birthday in July 2015,²⁰ including 48-year-old Bonkho Kyi, whom authorities sentenced to 7 years in prison reportedly for organizing a public picnic to celebrate the Dalai Lama's birthday.²¹

Security, Surveillance, and Party Policy

The government and Party continued implementing repressive policies in Tibetan autonomous areas²² of China through the use of extensive and intrusive surveillance, stringent measures that restrict Tibetans' fundamental rights, and pervasive displays of police and military force, in what U.K.-based professor Tsering Topgyal has described as the "securitization" of the region, Tibetan Buddhism, and Tibetan culture.²³ Chinese officials in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) announced in November 2016 that they were again extending a grassroots surveillance program, first launched in October 2011, which involves the deployment of tens of thousands of cadres to rural areas to monitor local Tibetans and deepen the Party's penetration into villages, religious institutions, and neighborhood committees, with the aim of preserving "social stability" and fostering support for the Party.²⁴ Officials have also reportedly deployed similar methods in Tibetan areas of Sichuan, Qinghai, and Gansu provinces.²⁵

At various times during the year, the government and Party continued to use large-scale displays of military and security forces throughout Tibetan areas of China, reportedly unlinked to any actual or tangible threat of violence, which international human rights organizations described as an attempt to intimidate Tibet-

ans.²⁶ Authorities intensified the security presence during major religious festivals and “sensitive” dates, including the entire month of March 2017.²⁷

New high-level political appointments in the TAR are unlikely to lead to any changes in current policies or methods of governance.²⁸ In late August 2016, authorities announced that the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee had selected Wu Yingjie—an official linked to previous crackdowns who has spent most of his career in the TAR—to be the new Party Secretary of the TAR.²⁹ In a speech Wu gave the following month, he called for “deepen[ing] the struggle against the Dalai Lama clique,” which he described as “the highest priority” of the Party’s ethnic affairs work.³⁰ In January 2017, Tibetan official Qizhala (Che Dalha), the former Party secretary of Lhasa municipality, TAR, became the governor of the TAR.³¹

Chinese authorities continued to denounce the Dalai Lama as a “splittist”³² or “separatist,”³³ blaming him and “hostile foreign forces” for “inciting separatism” in Tibetan areas of China,³⁴ despite the fact the Dalai Lama has stated repeatedly that he seeks genuine autonomy for Tibet, not independence.³⁵ In May 2017, the secretary of the TAR’s Commission for Discipline Inspection, Wang Yongjun, alleged that some Party officials had donated funds to the Dalai Lama, and thus “severely undermine[d] the Party’s fight against separatism.”³⁶ State media reported in April 2017 that authorities used polygraph tests to assess the capability and “psychological fitness” of 168 leading cadres (*lingdao ganbu*) in Ganzi (Kardze) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP), an area known as a stronghold of Tibetan identity and culture.³⁷ The International Campaign for Tibet described the use of polygraphs to assess the political loyalty of Party officials as indicative of “an escalation of the [Party’s] efforts to assert its dominance” amid “a climate . . . of fear and mistrust” that the Party created.³⁸

Self-Immolations

Self-immolations by Tibetans as a form of protest reportedly focusing on religious and political issues continued during this reporting year.³⁹ As of August 21, 2017, there were 5 known self-immolations in Tibetan autonomous areas of China, 4 of which were confirmed to be fatal, bringing the total number of such self-immolations by Tibetans living in China to 144 since 2009, 127 of which were reportedly fatal.⁴⁰ This extreme form of protest and expression has become less frequent in recent years, as the Chinese government has continued to impose collective punishment on family members and others close to self-immolators in an apparent effort to deter self-immolations.⁴¹ Since 2009, many Tibetan self-immolators have called for the long life of the Dalai Lama, his return from exile, and freedom for Tibet.⁴²

Chinese authorities responded as they have in other self-immolation cases: Officials threatened and detained family members and supporters, attempted to prevent images and videos of the self-immolations from being circulated, and detained those suspected of sharing information.⁴³ As in previous years, self-immolation protesters called for the Dalai Lama’s long life and return, and/or freedom for Tibet.⁴⁴

- On December 8, 2016, 31-year-old father of two **Tashi Rabten** died after self-immolating in Maqu (Machu) county seat, Gannan (Kanlho) TAP, Gansu province.⁴⁵
- **Pema Gyaltzen**, a 24-year-old unmarried farmer from Xinlong (Nyagrong) county, Ganzi (Kardze) TAP, Sichuan province, self-immolated on March 18, 2017, in Ganzi county seat.⁴⁶ Police reportedly took into custody nearly 200 Tibetan bystanders, some of whom had expressed solidarity with Gyaltzen.⁴⁷ Reports following his self-immolation indicated that it was unclear whether he survived.⁴⁸
- **Wangchug Tseten**, a father of four in his 30s, also from Xinlong, self-immolated in the Ganzi county seat on April 15, 2017.⁴⁹ Authorities reportedly detained five Tibetans in connection with the self-immolation, three for apparently being in possession of Wangchug Tseten's mobile phone, and two others for allegedly filming his protest.⁵⁰ Wangchug Tseten later died from his injuries.⁵¹
- **Chagdor Kyab**, a 16-year-old student from Bora township, Gannan, set himself on fire near Bora Monastery on May 2, 2017.⁵² Chinese security forces quickly extinguished the flames and removed Chagdor Kyab from the scene.⁵³ In the aftermath of the self-immolation, authorities briefly detained his parents twice, prevented relatives and friends from visiting the family at their home, and barred monks from performing religious rituals for Chagdor Kyab.⁵⁴ He later died from his injuries.⁵⁵
- **Jamyang Losel**, a monk in his early 20s, set fire to himself in Jianzha (Chentsa) county, Huangnan (Malho) TAP, Qinghai province, on May 19, 2017, and died shortly thereafter.⁵⁶ Authorities refused to return his body to his family.⁵⁷

Religious Freedom for Tibetan Buddhists

The Party and government continued to regulate Tibetan Buddhism and its practices in an effort to strengthen their control over Tibetan Buddhists, with the aim of transforming Tibetan Buddhism, monasteries and nunneries, and monastics into loyal supporters of the Party and country.⁵⁸ One international scholar has described the restrictions and requirements placed on monastics and monasteries as a “pervasive regime of control.”⁵⁹ Among the most significant developments this past year with respect to the right of religious freedom were the demolitions and expulsions at the famous Tibetan Buddhist institutes Larung Gar and Yachen Gar.⁶⁰ [For information on the relevant law relating to religious freedom in China, see Section II—Freedom of Religion—International and Chinese Law on Religious Freedom.]

Demolitions and Expulsions at Two Famous Tibetan Buddhist Institutes

Larung Gar

In mid-July 2016, Chinese authorities in Ganzi (Kardze) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP), Sichuan province, began the process of demolishing dwellings and expelling monks and nuns at Larung Gar Buddhist Institute, in Seda (Serthar) county, Ganzi TAP.⁶¹ The Seda county government, reportedly operating under instructions from “higher authorities,” mandated that by September 2017, Larung Gar’s occupancy could not exceed 5,000 residents.⁶²

In June 2017, a senior abbot at Larung Gar told the community that since 2016, Chinese authorities had expelled “more than 4,828 monks and nuns”⁶³ and that “4,725 monastic dwellings” had been demolished.⁶⁴ Before the expulsions began in 2016, estimates suggested that the population of Larung Gar, one of the world’s largest Buddhist institutes, was at least 10,000, if not higher—comprised not only of Tibetan monks and nuns, but also thousands of Han Chinese practitioners, as well as students from India and Western countries.⁶⁵ In March 2017, a senior abbot told the remaining residents: “Those who have left had never wanted to leave. All left against their own wish.”⁶⁶ He also urged them not to protest what he described as the “implementation of Chinese government policy” which he said came from “senior levels of government.”⁶⁷ Sources reported the expulsions and demolitions caused significant distress and despair within the community,⁶⁸ including the suicide of three nuns in protest during the summer of 2016.⁶⁹ In addition, Chinese authorities across the TAR subjected monks and nuns expelled from Larung Gar to periods of “patriotic education” lasting from several weeks to six months upon arrival in their home localities, before officials allowed them to return to their family homes.⁷⁰

Official explanations of the measures taken at Larung Gar included concerns about overcrowding, health and safety, and the desire to make a “‘more orderly, beautiful’ land.”⁷¹ Some observers believe that Chinese authorities’ purpose in reducing the size of Larung Gar was to contain and control its influence, and to further restrict religious freedom.⁷² The popularity of Larung Gar among Han Chinese may also have been a factor.⁷³ According to the International Campaign for Tibet and the Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (TCHRD), the expulsions and demolitions at Larung Gar were also driven by the Chinese government’s plans to increase business and tourism in the area, which would further marginalize the religious community.⁷⁴ A Tibetan monastic instructor told a TCHRD source in late July 2017 that “[m]ost of the people who now come to Larung Gar are tourists rather than people who want to practice Buddhism.”⁷⁵

**Demolitions and Expulsions at Two Famous Tibetan Buddhist
Institutes—Continued**

Yachen Gar

Yachen Gar, located in Beiyu (Pelyul) county, Ganzi (Kardze) TAP, Sichuan, had an estimated population of 10,000, comprised mainly of nuns, before expulsions at Yachen Gar began in April 2016.⁷⁶ By mid-September 2016, authorities at the institute had expelled as many as 1,000 nuns who originally came from the TAR.⁷⁷ Authorities reportedly threatened family members of nuns at Yachen Gar from the TAR with punishment if the nuns did not return to their place of household registration (*hukou*).⁷⁸ The demolition of approximately 200 dwellings to accommodate new curb and sidewalk construction, in addition to other construction projects, indicated that Chinese authorities were preparing Yachen Gar for an influx of tourists.⁷⁹ In August 2017, Radio Free Asia reported that demolitions were continuing at Yachen Gar.⁸⁰ Chinese officials reportedly ordered the expulsion of 2,000 nuns and monks and the demolition of 2,000 houses by the end of 2017.⁸¹

Various human rights are implicated in the Chinese government's demolitions and forced expulsions at the two Buddhist institutes.⁸² Six UN special rapporteurs jointly submitted a letter to the Chinese government in November 2016, in which they wrote that "grave concern is expressed over the serious repression of the Buddhist Tibetans' cultural and religious practices and learning in Larung Gar and Yachen Gar."⁸³ The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom described the destruction at Larung Gar as exemplifying the Chinese government's "desire to eviscerate the teachings and study of Tibetan Buddhism that are integral to the faith."⁸⁴ In addition, by compelling relocation of monks and nuns from Larung Gar and Yachen Gar, Chinese authorities also arguably violated their rights of freedom of residence and movement.⁸⁵

Freedom of Movement

As in previous years, Chinese authorities tightly restricted the freedom of movement of Tibetans, both domestically and internationally, in contravention of international human rights standards.⁸⁶ Chinese authorities continued to restrict access to the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) for Tibetans not from the TAR.⁸⁷ Moreover, in August 2017, the State Council announced that the government would cap the permanent resident population in the central urban areas of Lhasa municipality, TAR, at 500,000 by 2020.⁸⁸ According to Chinese census data, in 2010, there were 559,423 permanent residents in Lhasa.⁸⁹ In April 2017, authorities reportedly required residents of Xinlong (Nyagrong) county, Ganzi (Kardze) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP), Sichuan province, to obtain three different permits—village, township, and county—in order to travel to Ganzi township, the county seat of Ganzi county, Ganzi TAP, after two Tibetans from Xinlong self-immolated there within one month of each other.⁹⁰ [For information on international legal standards regarding freedom of movement, see Section II—Freedom of Residence and Movement—International Travel, Domestic Movement.]

The Chinese government severely restricts the ability of Tibetans to travel abroad.⁹¹ It is very difficult for Tibetans to obtain passports, and even if obtained, Chinese authorities may easily confiscate or cancel them.⁹² Chinese authorities made concerted efforts to prevent an estimated 7,000 Tibetan pilgrims from attending the Kalachakra ceremony⁹³ and teachings given by the Dalai Lama in Bodh Gaya, India,⁹⁴ in January 2017.⁹⁵ The International Campaign for Tibet described these efforts as “the most systematic crackdown so far linked to a Dalai Lama’s teaching in exile.”⁹⁶

In October 2016, Chinese authorities began to confiscate Tibetans’ passports and ordered thousands of Tibetans who had already managed to travel to Nepal and India on pilgrimage to return to China.⁹⁷ In late November, the Dalai Lama granted a special audience and gave teachings in Dharamsala, India, to over 1,000 Tibetans who were ordered to return to China.⁹⁸ Chinese authorities threatened various punishments if pilgrims disobeyed the order to return, including detention and loss of pension and jobs for themselves or their family members; monks were told they would not be permitted to return to their monasteries.⁹⁹

Chinese authorities labeled the Dalai Lama’s Kalachakra “illegal” and reportedly prohibited Tibetans from sharing news or organizing local gatherings related to the teachings.¹⁰⁰ Tibetan sources in Qinghai and Sichuan provinces, nonetheless, told Radio Free Asia that Tibetans were holding small gatherings to pray and to participate in the Kalachakra teachings via the Internet.¹⁰¹

Freedom of Expression

Chinese authorities continued to detain and imprison Tibetans for exercising their rights to freedom of expression and opinion, and for engaging in solo peaceful protests.¹⁰² Several representative cases follow.

- In November 2016, a court in Heishui (Trochu) county, Aba (Ngaba) Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture (T&QAP), Sichuan province, sentenced **Lobsang Sonam**, a 23-year-old monk from Kirti Monastery, to six years in prison for sharing information and images about Tibet with entities outside of China.¹⁰³
- **Sonam Tashi** a 20-year-old resident of Seda (Serthar) county, Ganzi (Kardze) TAP, Sichuan, was detained by police in January 2017 after engaging in a peaceful solo protest during which he called for the long life of the Dalai Lama and freedom for Tibet, while dispersing leaflets as he walked along the street.¹⁰⁴ Police seized him quickly, and his whereabouts are unknown.¹⁰⁵
- On February 25, 2017, public security officials in Aba county, Aba T&QAP, detained **Lobsang Tsultrim**, a young Kirti Monastery monk, following his peaceful solo protest calling for the Dalai Lama’s return and freedom for Tibetans.¹⁰⁶ As of August 2017, his condition and whereabouts were unknown.¹⁰⁷
- Authorities took **Gedun**, a young villager from Shiqu (Sershul) county, Ganzi TAP, into custody in early March 2017, and reportedly severely beat him for sharing photos of the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan national flag, and essays about the

Tibet

preservation of the Tibetan language on the messaging service WeChat.¹⁰⁸

Status of Tibetan Culture

China's 2016–2020 National Human Rights Action Plan (HRAP) provides both that “the cultural rights of ethnic minorities shall be guaranteed” and that “[t]he right of ethnic minorities to learn, use and develop their own spoken and written languages shall be respected and guaranteed,” echoing provisions of China's Constitution, the PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law, and the PRC Education Law.¹⁰⁹ Tibetan culture and language face increasing pressure and marginalization, however, as the Chinese government and Party continue to promote Mandarin Chinese as the main language of instruction in Tibetan areas.¹¹⁰ Given the inextricable link between language, culture, and identity,¹¹¹ and the need for Tibetan language in order to access Buddhist texts,¹¹² Chinese authorities view Tibetan-language instruction as a potential security issue—a force that could fuel “separatism.”¹¹³ Public security officials detained Tibetan language rights advocate and entrepreneur Tashi Wangchug¹¹⁴ in January 2016 in Yushu (Kyebugdo) city, Yushu TAP, Qinghai province, following a November 2015 New York Times report and video of his efforts to advocate for a genuine Tibetan-Mandarin bilingual education system.¹¹⁵ Authorities subsequently indicted Tashi Wangchug for “inciting separatism,” and he remains detained awaiting trial.¹¹⁶

Despite the risks, Tibetans continue to organize Tibetan-language literacy groups,¹¹⁷ and during this past year, several open letters and essays written by Tibetans appeared online expressing concern about the state of “bilingual education.”¹¹⁸ A Washington Post reporter wrote that several Tibetans he spoke with in Lhasa municipality, TAR, in September 2016, expressed unhappiness that young Tibetans study in Mandarin as their primary language of instruction, and study and speak Tibetan as if it were a foreign language.¹¹⁹

Economic Development and Tourism

The Chinese government has long held the view that economic development is the key to solidifying its control in Tibet.¹²⁰ The Commission, however, observed no evidence during its 2002–2017 period of reporting that the Party or government solicited systematic or representative input from the Tibetan population on economic development in autonomous Tibetan areas of China.¹²¹ Much central government investment for development has targeted large-scale infrastructure projects and government administration.¹²² Experts note that Han Chinese have mainly benefited from the job opportunities that these projects have created, because many Tibetans are disadvantaged in competing with Han migrant workers, who generally have higher levels of education as well as requisite Mandarin skills.¹²³ In September 2016, a TAR official told a group of foreign reporters that the Chinese government's goal was to turn Tibet into a “world-class tourism destination.”¹²⁴ Millions of Chinese tourists travel to the TAR each year, and the government is planning to attract more foreign visitors to the TAR.¹²⁵ The pres-

sure placed on Tibetan culture, livelihood, and identity by the influx of Han migrants and tourists is substantial.¹²⁶ In April 2017, reports emerged that the Chinese government is considering making the entire Tibetan plateau into a national park, which will be open mainly to tourists, and will impact many Tibetan residents.¹²⁷ In July 2017, the China Daily reported that the government would build China's first Mars simulation base in the Haixi Mongolian and Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Qinghai province, and that it would "be turned into a cultural and tourist experience base."¹²⁸

Notes to Section V—Tibet

¹U.S. Department of State, “Report on Tibet Negotiations, P.L. 107-228 Section 613(b), of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2003,” attached to letter from Julia Frifield, Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs, U.S. Department of State, to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 19 August 16, 1.

²Ibid. See also “US Committed to Tibetan Issue, Says Tillerson,” Agence France-Presse, reprinted in Zee News, 8 May 17; International Campaign for Tibet, “Secretary Tillerson Says He Is Committed To Promoting Dialogue on Tibet and Receiving the Dalai Lama,” 1 February 17. During his confirmation proceedings in the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (SFRC) in January 2017, Rex Tillerson stated if confirmed as Secretary of State he would continue to encourage dialogue between the Chinese government and the Dalai Lama and/or representatives of Tibet’s “government-in-exile.” International Campaign for Tibet, “Senate Confirms Terry Branstad as U.S. Ambassador to China as He Commits To ‘Urge Chinese Authorities To Engage in Meaningful and Direct Dialogue With the Dalai Lama,’” 22 May 17. During Terry Branstad’s confirmation hearing in the SFRC for the position of U.S. Ambassador to China, he committed to “urge Chinese authorities to engage in meaningful and direct dialogue with the Dalai Lama and his representatives without preconditions to lower tensions and resolve differences.”

³Chu Xiaohui and Li Ruohan, “Courting Dalai Lama Would Hurt US Interest: Official,” Global Times, 3 February 17. For more information on Zhu Weiqun and his role in earlier dialogues with the Dalai Lama’s envoys, see CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6 October 16, 302, endnotes 43–45; CECC, 2015 Annual Report, 8 October 15, 300.

⁴Sui-Lee Wee, “China Sticks to Right To Decide Reincarnation of Dalai Lama,” Reuters, 30 November 15. See also KJM Varma, “Dalai Lama’s Successor Must Have China’s Endorsement,” Press Trust of India, 9 April 17; CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6 October 16, 301–2; CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 189; “Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008–2009,” Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 22 October 09, 38–39.

⁵Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, “A Brief Biography,” last visited 14 May 17. According to biographical information on the Dalai Lama’s official website, he was born on July 6, 1935.

⁶Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, “Reincarnation,” 24 September 11. The statement was published initially with the title, “Statement of His Holiness the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso, on the Issue of His Reincarnation.” See also Melissa Locker, “John Oliver Had an Enlightening Talk With the Dalai Lama on Last Week Tonight,” Time, 5 March 17; “Dalai Lama: Last Week Tonight With John Oliver (HBO)” [Video file], YouTube, 5 March 17, 9 min. 20 sec.; CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6 October 16, 302.

⁷Ellen Barry, “Dalai Lama’s Journey Provokes China, and Hints at His Heir,” New York Times, 6 April 17; Lucy Hornby and Amy Kazmin, “Dalai Lama’s Travel Plans Ignite Reincarnation Row,” Financial Times, 24 March 17; Edward Wong, “Mongolia, With Deep Ties to Dalai Lama, Turns From Him Toward China,” New York Times, Sinosphere (blog), 30 December 16; Joseph Dussault, “Why the Dalai Lama Is No Longer Welcome in Mongolia,” Christian Science Monitor, 26 December 16; “Standardization of Terms Aimed at Reaffirming Sovereignty: Experts,” Global Times, 18 April 17; “A Himalayan Rivalry,” Economist, 19 August 10. As the Economist notes, Tawang is an important center of Tibetan Buddhism and the birthplace of the Sixth Dalai Lama. Tawang is located in the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, which is a disputed territory on the Indo-China border that the Chinese government claims as “South Tibet.”

⁸Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, “His Holiness the Dalai Lama Gives Buddhist Teachings to 50,000 in Tawang,” 8 April 17.

⁹Sunil Kataria, “Dalai Lama Says Tibetan People Should Decide on His Succession,” Reuters, 11 April 17. See also Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, “Reincarnation,” 24 September 11. The statement was published initially with the title, “Statement of His Holiness the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso, on the Issue of His Reincarnation.”

¹⁰Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, “His Holiness the Dalai Lama Gives Buddhist Teachings to 50,000 in Tawang,” 8 April 17.

¹¹“Dalai Lama Suggests Preparations of Finding His Successor Will Begin in Next 1–2 Years” [Video file], India Today Television, 9 August 17.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Guo Xin, “It Is Both Illegal and Invalid for the Dalai Lama To Universally Identify the Reincarnated Soul Boy of the Panchen Lama,” People’s Daily, 1 December 95 (translated in Open Source Center, 1 December 95); “China’s Panchen Lama Calls for Patriotism, Says Greed Taints Tibetan Buddhism,” Reuters, 14 March 17; “Dalai Lama Rejects Communist Party ‘Brazen Meddling’ in Tibetan Buddhist Reincarnation,” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 1, 24 January 12, 3; CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6 October 16, 301. See also Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, “International Religious Freedom Report for 2015—China (Includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau),” 10 August 16, 32. Despite the Chinese government’s denunciation of the Dalai Lama’s selection of Gedun Choekyi Nyima, the “overwhelming majority of Tibetan Buddhists recognize [Gedun Choekyi Nyima] as the 11th Panchen Lama.”

¹⁴“Dalai Lama: Last Week Tonight With John Oliver (HBO)” [Video file], YouTube, 5 March 17, 9 min. 5 sec.; Simon Denyer, “China Prepares for Dalai Lama’s Death by Looking to Its Own Top Tibetan Cleric,” Washington Post, 26 September 16; International Campaign for Tibet, “China Attempts To Legitimize Its Panchen Lama Through a Major Speech as the Real Panchen Lama’s Birthday Approaches,” 21 April 15; John Powers, *The Buddha Party: How the People’s Republic of China Works To Define and Control Tibetan Buddhism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 125. See also CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6 October 16, 301–2. For more information on the Panchen Lama and China’s likely model for selecting the next Dalai Lama, see CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 189.

¹⁵Huang Jingjing, “An Increasingly Active Panchen Lama Is Expected To Mitigate Dalai’s Influence,” *Global Times*, 24 August 16; Simon Denyer, “China Prepares for Dalai Lama’s Death by Looking to Its Own Top Tibetan Cleric,” *Washington Post*, 26 September 16.

¹⁶Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, “International Religious Freedom Report for 2015—China (Includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau),” 10 August 16, 29; International Campaign for Tibet, “China Attempts To Legitimize Its Panchen Lama Through a Major Speech as the Real Panchen Lama’s Birthday Approaches,” 21 April 15; “Dalai Lama Rejects Communist Party ‘Brazen Meddling’ in Tibetan Buddhist Reincarnation,” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 1, 24 January 12, 3; UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations: China (including Hong Kong and Macau Special Administrative Regions), adopted by the Committee at its 1080th Meeting (30 September 2005), CRC/C/CHN/CO/2, 24 November 05, paras. 44–45. The report observed under paragraphs 44 and 45: “The Committee notes the information provided about the Gedhun Choekyi Nyima, but remains concerned that it has not yet been possible to have this information confirmed by an independent expert In particular, the Committee recommends that the State party: . . . e) allow an independent expert to visit and confirm the well-being of Gedhun Choekyi Nyima while respecting his right to privacy, and that of his parents.” CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6 October 16, 301.

¹⁷Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Human Rights Situation in Tibet: Annual Report 2016,” 24 February 17, 35; CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6 October 16, 301. For more information about Gedun Choekyi Nyima, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner database, record 2004-00835.

¹⁸U.S. Department of State, “Report on Tibet Negotiations, P.L. 107-228 Section 613(b), of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2003,” attached to letter from Julia Frifield, Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs, U.S. Department of State, to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 19 August 16, 2. For the full text of the U.S. State Department’s annual reports on Tibet negotiations from previous years, see International Campaign for Tibet, “State Department Annual Reports on Tibet,” last visited 15 July 17.

¹⁹See, e.g., Sarah Cook, Freedom House, “The Battle for China’s Spirit: Religious Revival, Repression, and Resistance Under Xi Jinping,” February 2017, 86–87, 100; “Tibetan Youth Detained, Warned Over Dalai Lama Photo,” *Radio Free Asia*, 15 June 17; International Campaign for Tibet, “Tibetan Pilgrims Compelled To Return From Dalai Lama Teaching to Bodh Gaya, India; China Calls the Teaching ‘Illegal,’” 9 January 17; “Tibetans in China Defy Warnings, Support the Kalachakra,” *Radio Free Asia*, 6 January 17.

²⁰Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “China Jails Tibetans for Celebrating Dalai Lama’s Birthday: Nine Tibetans Get Varying Terms of 5 to 14 Years,” 7 December 16. For more information on eight Tibetans from Aba (Ngaba) county sentenced by the same court and on the same date for celebrating the Dalai Lama’s 80th birthday in 2015, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database records 2008-00632 on Tsultrim, 2011-00422 on Lobsang Khedrub, 2012-00222 on Lodroe, 2012-00261 on Bonkho Kyi, 2016-00212 on Argya Gya, 2017-00026 on Drugdra, 2017-00027 on Lobsang Gephel, and 2017-00028 on Tsultrim.

²¹Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “China Jails Tibetans for Celebrating Dalai Lama’s Birthday: Nine Tibetans Get Varying Terms of 5 to 14 Years,” 7 December 16. For more information on Bonkho Kyi, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2012-00261.

²²For more information on the Tibetan autonomous areas of China, see CECC, “Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008–2009,” 22 October 09, 22–24. In China there is 1 provincial-level area of Tibetan autonomy (Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR)), and there are 10 prefectural-level areas of Tibetan autonomy and 2 county-level areas of Tibetan autonomy. The area of the TAR (approximately 1.2 million square kilometers), the 10 Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures (TAPs) (approximately 1.02 million square kilometers), and the 2 Tibetan Autonomous Counties (TACs) (approximately 0.019 million square kilometers) totals approximately 2.24 million square kilometers. The 10 TAPs make up approximately 46 percent of the TAR/TAP/TAC total area. Steven Marshall and Susette Cooke, *Tibet Outside the TAR: Control, Exploitation and Assimilation: Development With Chinese Characteristics* (Washington, DC: Self-published CD-ROM, 1997), Table 7, citing multiple Chinese sources. Table 7 provides the following information. Tibet Autonomous Region (1.2 million square kilometers, or 463,320 square miles). Qinghai province: Haibei (Tsojiang) TAP (52,000 square kilometers, or 20,077 square miles), Hainan (Tsolho) TAP (41,634 square kilometers, or 16,075 square miles), Haixi (Tsonub) Mongol and Tibetan AP (325,787 square kilometers, or 125,786 square miles), Huangnan (Malho) TAP (17,901 square kilometers, or 6,912 square miles), Guoluo (Golog) TAP (78,444 square kilometers, or 30,287 square miles), and Yushu (Yushu) TAP (197,791 square kilometers, or 76,367 square miles). Gansu province: Gannan (Kanlho) TAP (45,000 square kilometers, or 17,374 square miles) and Tianzhu (Pari) TAC (7,150 square kilometers, or 2,761 square miles). Sichuan province: Ganzi (Kardze) TAP (153,870 square kilometers, or 59,409 square miles), Aba (Ngaba) Tibetan and Qiang AP (86,639 square kilometers, or 33,451 square miles), and Muli (Mili) TAC (11,413 square kilometers, or 4,407 square miles). Yunnan province: Diqing (Dechen) TAP (23,870 square kilometers, or 9,216 square miles). The table provides areas in square kilometers; conversion to square miles uses the formula provided on the website of the U.S. Geological Survey: 1 square kilometer = 0.3861 square mile. For population data, see Tabulation on Nationalities of 2000 Population Census of China [2000 nian renkou pucha zhongguo minzu renkou ziliao], Department of Population, Social, Science and Technology Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics of China, and Department of Economic Development, State Ethnic Affairs Commission (Beijing: Ethnic Publishing House, September 2003), Tables 10–1, 10–4. According to China’s 2010 ethnic census data, the total Tibetan population in China was 6,282,187. The Tibetan population of the TAR (approximately 2.72 million), the 10 TAPs (approximately 2.97 million), and the 2 TACs (approximately 0.096 million) totaled approximately 5.78 million Tibetans living in areas of Tibetan autonomy. Approximately 0.498 million Tibetans lived outside of the areas of Tibetan

autonomy. Tabulation on Nationalities of 2010 Population Census of China, Volume 1 [Zhongguo 2010 nian renkou pucha fen minzu renkou ziliao shang], Department of Population and Employment Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics of China, and Department of Economic Development, State Ethnic Affairs Commission (Beijing: Ethnic Publishing House, July 2013), Table 10–2. When the Chinese government, Party officials, and state-run media refer to “Tibet,” they generally refer to the area of what is today the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). See, e.g., Anne-Marie Blondeau and Katia Buffetrille, eds. *Authenticating Tibet: Answers to China’s 100 Questions* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 71; Andrew Martin Fischer, *The Disempowered Development of Tibet in China* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2014), xix. Fischer explains that he, among others (including the “Tibetan Exile Government”) use “Tibet” to refer to the TAR and the Tibetan areas incorporated into Sichuan, Qinghai, Gansu, and Yunnan provinces: “Often known as ‘greater Tibet,’ ‘cultural Tibet,’ or ‘ethnographic Tibet,’ this region is about the size of western Europe or about one quarter of China.” See also CECC, “Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008–2009,” 22 October 09, 87, endnote 1.

²³Tsering Topgyal, “The Securitisation of Tibetan Buddhism in Communist China,” *Politics and Religion in Contemporary China*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (2012), 232–33, 238–41; International Campaign for Tibet, “The Teeth of the Storm: Lack of Freedom of Expression and Cultural Resilience in Tibet,” 14 June 15 (referring to the “hyper-securitization” of Tibet); International Campaign for Tibet, “ICT Inside Tibet: The Four Loves and the Enemy Within: New Ideological Campaign in Tibet Reflects Heightened Agenda of Control in 19th Party Congress Year,” 20 April 17; Human Rights Watch, “World Report 2017,” 2017, 195; Yeshe Dorje, “China Vows ‘Strike’ Against Dalai Lama as Tibetans Mark Uprising,” *Voice of America*, 10 March 17; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “China Extends Tibet Surveillance Program for Sixth Year in Row,” 30 November 16. See also John Powers, *The Buddha Party: How the People’s Republic of China Works To Define and Control Tibetan Buddhism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 24; Ben Hillman, “Unrest in Tibet and the Limits of Regional Autonomy,” in Ben Hillman and Gray Tuttle, eds., *Ethnic Conflict and Protest in Tibet and Xinjiang: Unrest in China’s West* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016), 22, 35, endnote 10. Hillman writes, “As a major source of Tibetan cultural identity, as a competing source of legitimacy and authority, and as an occasional vehicle for political mobilization, organized Tibetan Buddhism is widely perceived as the greatest potential threat to Communist Party rule in Tibetan areas.”

²⁴Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “China Extends Tibet Surveillance Program for Sixth Year in Row,” 30 November 16; Ma Jing, “Tibet’s Sixth Batch of Village-Based Cadre Teams Set Off for the Grassroots” [Xizang di liu pi zhucun gongzuodui chufa qu jiceng], *China Tibet Net*, 26 November 16; International Campaign for Tibet and International Federation for Human Rights, “China’s New Counter-Terrorism Law: Implications and Dangers for Tibetans and Uyghurs,” November 2016, 31–33, 53; Human Rights Watch, “China: No End to Tibet Surveillance Program,” 18 January 16. In urban areas, authorities continue to implement the “grid management” surveillance system. See Ben Hillman, “Unrest in Tibet: Interpreting the Post-2008 Wave of Protest and Conflict,” *Dalny Vychod [Far East]* Vol. 4, Issue 1 (2014), 7. Hillman notes that, “In urban areas local authorities have divided neighborhoods into grids, appointing staff to monitor each grid and to report suspicious activities to the district administration or police.” See also Human Rights Watch, “Relentless: Detention and Prosecution of Tibetans Under China’s ‘Stability Maintenance’ Campaign,” May 2016, 18–20.

²⁵International Campaign for Tibet, “Tightening of an Invisible Net: New Security Measures in Eastern Tibet Heighten Surveillance, Control,” 16 February 16.

²⁶Human Rights Watch, “China: Cease Intimidation on Tibetan Anniversary,” 9 March 17; Sophie Richardson, Human Rights Watch, “Dispatches: Intimidation as Governance in Tibet,” 25 November 16; International Campaign for Tibet, “ICT Inside Tibet: Tibetan New Year Marked by Security Agenda; Mass Deployment of Troops for Prayer Festival,” 7 March 17; “Chinese Security Forces Swarm Festival at Tibetan Monastery,” *Radio Free Asia*, 13 February 17; International Campaign for Tibet (ICT) and International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), “China’s New Counter-Terrorism Law: Implications and Dangers for Tibetans and Uyghurs,” November 2016, 10. As ICT and FIDH write in their joint report on China’s new counter-terrorism law, “Despite the absence of any violent insurgency in Tibet, an aggressive ‘counter-terrorism’ drive in Tibet with a strongly political dimension has involved an expansion of militarization across the plateau. China’s new counter-terrorism law introduces further extra-judicial measures, reinforcing the powers of local police and Party officials to impose restrictive measures and use violence against individuals with impunity. It also involves further controls over telecommunications, internet and media.”

²⁷Sophie Richardson, Human Rights Watch, “Dispatches: Intimidation as Governance in Tibet,” 25 November 16 (large-scale military displays carried out across the plateau in November 2016); “Chinese Security Forces Swarm Festival at Tibetan Monastery,” *Radio Free Asia*, 13 February 17; International Campaign for Tibet, “ICT Inside Tibet: Tibetan New Year Marked by Security Agenda; Mass Deployment of Troops for Prayer Festival,” 7 March 17 (security forces present in large numbers during a major religious festival at Kumbum monastery in Qinghai province in February 2017); International Campaign for Tibet, “ICT Inside Tibet: The Four Loves and the Enemy Within: New Ideological Campaign in Tibet Reflects Heightened Agenda of Control in 19th Party Congress Year,” 20 April 17 (describing a military drill in Naqu (Nagchu) prefecture, TAR, on March 6, 2017, reportedly involving more than 200 paramilitary police and soldiers and a wide range of “advanced military vehicles”); Tenzin Monlam, “Rebkong Under Heavy Security Since Tibetan Uprising Anniversary,” *Phayul*, 15 March 17; “During the Sensitive Period in March, Multiple Places in Tibetan Areas Under Strict Control and Surveillance” [Sanyue min’ganqi zangqu duodi bei yanguan yankong], *Radio Free Asia*, 14 March 17 (during the “sensitive month” of March, Chinese authorities employed heightened security measures in Tibetan areas that had experienced the largest number of self-immolations and protests). Several important and “sensitive” dates and anniversaries occur in March. These include March 10, which marks both the 1959 “Tibetan People’s Uprising” in Lhasa and the start of widespread

Tibetan protests in 2008, as well as March 28, the official “Serfs Emancipation Day,” which marks the 1959 dissolution of the former Tibetan government in Lhasa—a holiday that many Tibetans seek to avoid. Annual intensified security clampdowns often begin at some point in February to include Losar, the Tibetan New Year. “Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008–2009,” Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 22 October 09, 56–65. March also contains “sensitive” anniversaries specific to certain locations. For example, on March 16, 2008, a peaceful protest that began at Kirti Monastery in Aba (Ngaba) county, Ngaba (Aba) Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan province, ended in bloodshed after Chinese security forces opened fire, reportedly killing at least 15 Tibetans, and injuring hundreds of others. Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Solitary Tibetan Protests Continue in Ngaba To Commemorate ‘16 March Massacre,’” 21 March 17.

²⁸International Campaign for Tibet, “New Party Boss in Tibet Autonomous Region Associated With Hardline Campaigns, Anti-Dalai Lama Struggle,” 2 September 16; Yeshe Choesang, “New TAR Party Chief Calls for Deeper Criticism of Spiritual Leader in Tibet,” Tibet Post International, 3 September 16.

²⁹“Wu Yingjie Appointed Party Secretary of the Tibet Autonomous Region” [Wu yingjie ren xizang zizhiqiang dangwei shujil], China Tibet News Net, 29 August 16; Jayadeva Ranada, “Extensive Profile on China’s New Tibet Party Secretary: Wu Yingjie,” reprinted in MikelDunham (blog), 24 October 16; International Campaign for Tibet, “New Party Boss in Tibet Autonomous Region Associated With Hardline Campaigns, Anti-Dalai Lama Struggle,” 2 September 16; Tshering Chonzom Bhutia, “Does Tibet’s New Governor Signal Change?” The Diplomat, 19 January 17; Yeshe Choesang, “New TAR Party Chief Calls for Deeper Criticism of Spiritual Leader in Tibet,” Tibet Post International, 3 September 16.

³⁰“China Says Countering Dalai Lama Is Top Ethnic Priority in Tibet,” Reuters, 30 September 16.

³¹Tshering Chonzom Bhutia, “Does Tibet’s New Governor Signal Change?” The Diplomat, 19 January 17. For more background on Qizhala, see International Campaign for Tibet (ICT), “Tibetan Becomes New Lhasa Party Secretary; Updates on Leadership in Tibetan Areas and the Current Climate in Lhasa,” 13 December 2011. ICT notes that prior to Qizhala becoming the Lhasa Party Secretary in November 2011—with the exception of a brief stint as head of the TAR United Front Work Department immediately preceding his being named Lhasa Party Secretary—Qizhala had spent his whole career in Diqing (Dechen) TAP, Yunnan province. As head of Diqing TAP, Qizhala was reportedly “well-regarded” by the local Tibetans.

³²“China Calls Dalai Lama’s Kalachakra ‘Illegal,’ Threatens Punishment for Those Taking Part,” Radio Free Asia, 5 January 17; “China Warns India Over Invite to Dalai Lama to Buddhist Meet,” Press Trust of India (PTI), reprinted in Economic Times, 20 March 17.

³³“China Calls Dalai Lama a ‘Separatist,’ Says He Flew After Failed Armed Rebellion,” Press Trust of India (PTI), reprinted in Hindustan Times, 8 April 17. See also “China Calls Dalai Lama’s Kalachakra ‘Illegal,’ Threatens Punishment for Those Taking Part,” Radio Free Asia, 5 January 17. The Commission has observed that the Chinese government appears to use the English terms “splittist” and “separatist” interchangeably as translations of the Chinese term *fenlie fenzi* when referring to the Dalai Lama.

³⁴International Campaign for Tibet, “ICT Inside Tibet: Tibetan New Year Marked by Security Agenda; Mass Deployment of Troops for Prayer Festival,” 7 March 17; Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Department of State, “International Religious Freedom Report for 2015—China (Includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau),” 10 August 16, 36; Chu Xiaohui and Li Ruohan, “Courting Dalai Lama Would Hurt US Interest: Official,” Global Times, 3 February 17; Shubhajit Roy, “My Reincarnation Can’t Be Born in Place With No Freedom: The Dalai Lama,” Indian Express, 26 May 17; Ben Hillman, “Unrest in Tibet and the Limits of Regional Autonomy,” in *Ethnic Conflict and Protest in Tibet and Xinjiang: Unrest in China’s West*, Ben Hillman and Gray Tuttle, eds. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016), 24, 34. See also Ben Hillman, “Introduction: Understanding the Current Wave of Conflict and Protest in Tibet and Xinjiang,” in *Ethnic Conflict and Protest in Tibet and Xinjiang: Unrest in China’s West*, Ben Hillman and Gray Tuttle, eds. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016), 3. According to Hillman, “[t]he Chinese government blames all of the unrest and violence in Tibet and Xinjiang on separatists determined to weaken and split China by fomenting instability.”

³⁵See, e.g., Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, “His Holiness’s Middle Way Approach for Resolving the Issue of Tibet,” last visited 11 June 17; Tenzin Dharpo, “Genuine Autonomy for Tibet, Reiterates Dalai Lama in Arunachal Pradesh,” Phayul, 5 April 17; Shubhajit Roy, “My Reincarnation Can’t Be Born in Place With No Freedom: The Dalai Lama,” Indian Express, 26 May 17. See also “Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008–2009,” Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 22 October 09, 7–8.

³⁶“Some CPC Members Funding Dalai Lama: Official,” Global Times, 1 May 17; “Leadership Biographies—Wang Yongjun” [Lingdao jianli—wang yongjun], TAR Commission for Discipline Inspection Net, 1 December 16; International Campaign for Tibet, “ICT Inside Tibet: Use of ‘Lie-Detector’ To Test Communist Party Members Indicates Escalation of Control in Tibet,” 15 May 17; CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6 October 16, 302–3.

³⁷Song Zhiyong, “[Ganzi] TAP Assessed the Capability and Psychological Fitness of 168 Leading Cadres” [Wozhou ceping 168 ming lingdao ganbu nengli he xinli suzhi], Ganzi Daily, 7 April 17; International Campaign for Tibet, “ICT Inside Tibet: Use of ‘Lie-Detector’ To Test Communist Party Members Indicates Escalation of Control in Tibet,” 15 May 17; International Campaign for Tibet, “Tibetan Nun Self-Immolates in Kardze: Continued Resistance Despite Chinese Crackdown,” 4 November 11 (describing Kardze, in the Tibetan area of Kham, Sichuan province, as a place “where Tibetans have a strong sense of Tibetan identity and resilient, nationalist spirit”). See also Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Tibetans Protest in Kardze During the Tibetan New Year,” 8 March 09; Hannah Beech, “Burning Desire for Freedom,” Time, 14 November 11; “Chinese Authorities Arrest a Young Monk in Tibet for Unknown Reason,” Tibet Post International, 17 May 16.

³⁸International Campaign for Tibet, “ICT Inside Tibet: Use of ‘Lie-Detector’ To Test Communist Party Members Indicates Escalation of Control in Tibet,” 15 May 17.

³⁹Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Human Rights Situation in Tibet: Annual Report 2016,” 24 February 17, 13–15; Sarah Cook, Freedom House, “The Battle for China’s Spirit: Religious Revival, Repression, and Resistance Under Xi Jinping,” February 2017, 100. For information in recent Commission annual reports on Tibetan self-immolation, see CECC, 2015 Annual Report, 8 October 15, 300–4; CECC, 2014 Annual Report, 9 October 14, 172–75; CECC, 2013 Annual Report, 10 October 13, 172–81; and CECC, 2012 Annual Report, 10 October 12, 156–60. See also “CECC Update: Tibetan Self-Immolations,” Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 10 January 17. The Commission has posted on its website (www.cecc.gov), under Resources, Special Topics, a series of lists relating to Tibetan self-immolations focusing on political and religious issues.

⁴⁰This self-immolation total (144), as of August 21, 2017, does not include the following six self-immolations/burnings (two of which were possibly not self-immolations but deaths resulting from an accidental house fire): Qinghai province property protests by females Dekyi Choezom and Pasang Lhamo on June 27 and September 13, 2012, respectively, and Konchog Tsono in March 2013; by female Tashi Kyi in Gansu province on August 28, 2015; and the April 6, 2012, deaths of a Tibetan Buddhist abbot, Athub, and a nun, Atse, in a Sichuan house fire initially reported as accidental and later as self-immolation. The Commission continues to monitor reports on their deaths. “CECC Update: Tibetan Self-Immolations,” Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 10 January 17; CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6 October 16, 298, 311, endnote 5. The self-immolation total includes the five known self-immolations that occurred during this reporting year and are discussed in the text: Tashi Rabten (December 8, 2016), Pema Gyaltzen (March 18, 2017), Wangchug Tseten (April 15, 2017), Chagdor Kyab (May 2, 2017), and Jamyang Losel (May 19, 2017). “Tibetan Cuts Own Throat in Lhasa Freedom Protest,” Radio Free Asia, 23 June 17. On June 23, 2017, a Tibetan man in Lhasa municipality, Tibet Autonomous Region, slit his throat outside the Jokhang Temple, in a solo protest during which he called for freedom for Tibet. A local Tibetan source told RFA that he thought the man was “unlikely to have survived.”

⁴¹Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Human Rights Situation in Tibet: Annual Report 2016,” 24 February 17, 14–15; Sarah Cook, Freedom House, “The Battle for China’s Spirit: Religious Revival, Repression, and Resistance Under Xi Jinping,” February 2017, 100; Tsering Shakya, “Transforming the Language of Protest,” Self-Immolation as Protest in Tibet Series, Hot Spots, Cultural Anthropology website, 8 April 12; CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6 October 16, 298–99; CECC, 2014 Annual Report, 9 October 14, 172–78. Self-immolators who survived have also faced punishment. On May 10, 2017, Lobsang Gyatso, a 19-year-old monk from Kirti Monastery, was released from Deyang prison in Deyang municipality, Sichuan province, after serving five years on an unknown charge following his self-immolation in 2012 in Aba (Ngaba) county, Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan. For more information on Lobsang Gyatso, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2017-00234.

⁴²Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Human Rights Situation in Tibet: Annual Report 2016,” 24 February 17, 14; “Nearly Two Hundred Detained Following Self-Immolation in Kardze,” Radio Free Asia, 20 March 17; “Special Report: Tibetan Self-Immolation—Rising Frequency, Wider Spread, Greater Diversity,” Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 22 August 12, 4, endnote 18; CECC, 2015 Annual Report, 8 October 15, 302.

⁴³Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Human Rights Situation in Tibet: Annual Report 2016,” 24 February 17, 14–15; “Tibetan Self-Immolator’s Family Harassed, Visitors Restricted,” Radio Free Asia, 10 May 17; “Tibetan Monk Detained on Suspicion of ‘Passing Information’ Outside Protest Area,” Radio Free Asia, 8 May 17; “Tibetan Social Media Draw Chinese Police Attention After Self-Immolations,” Radio Free Asia, 30 May 17.

⁴⁴See, e.g., Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Human Rights Situation in Tibet: Annual Report 2016,” 24 February 17, 14 (Tashi Rabten reportedly called for the Dalai Lama’s long life and that he be allowed to return); “Young Farmer Stages First Tibetan Self-Immolation of 2017,” Radio Free Asia, 19 March 17 (Pema Gyaltzen reportedly decried the absence of freedom in Tibet and called for the Dalai Lama’s return); Yeshe Choesang, “Yet Another Layman Sets Himself on Fire in Tibet To Protest China’s Rule,” Tibet Post International, 17 April 17 (Wangchug Tseten reportedly protested “China’s repressive rule in Tibet”); “Tibetan Teenager Stages Self-Immolation Protest in Gansu,” Radio Free Asia, 7 May 17 (Chagdor Kyab reportedly shouted “Tibet wants freedom” and “Let His Holiness the Dalai Lama come back to Tibet”); “Tibetan Monk Dies After Self-Immolation To Protest China’s Rule in Tibet,” Tibet Post International, 19 May 17 (Jamyang Losel reportedly shouted for the Dalai Lama’s return and protested Chinese rule. The report also notes that most of the self-immolations (since 2009) have involved calls “for the return of the Dalai Lama and freedom for the Tibetan people.”); CECC, 2015 Annual Report, 8 October 15, 302.

⁴⁵Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Human Rights Situation in Tibet: Annual Report 2016,” 24 February 17, 14; “CECC Update: Tibetan Self-Immolations,” Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 10 January 17.

⁴⁶“Young Farmer Stages First Tibetan Self-Immolation of 2017,” Radio Free Asia, 19 March 17; “Nearly Two Hundred Detained Following Self-Immolation in Kardze,” Radio Free Asia, 20 March 17.

⁴⁷“Nearly Two Hundred Detained Following Self-Immolation in Kardze,” Radio Free Asia, 20 March 17; International Campaign for Tibet, “Security Crackdown Follows First Tibetan Self-Immolation in 2017,” 28 March 17.

⁴⁸International Campaign for Tibet, “Security Crackdown Follows First Tibetan Self-Immolation in 2017,” 28 March 17; “Young Farmer Stages First Tibetan Self-Immolation of 2017,” Radio Free Asia, 19 March 17.

⁴⁹“Local Tibetans Summoned After Latest Self-Immolation,” Voice of America, 18 April 17; Yangchen Dolma, “Man Who Set Himself on Fire in Kardze County of Eastern Tibet Dies,” Tibet

Post International, 24 April 17; “Five Detained Following Self-Immolation in Kardze Town,” Radio Free Asia, 19 April 17.

⁵⁰“Five Detained Following Self-Immolation in Kardze Town,” Radio Free Asia, 19 April 17. For more information on the Tibetans detained in connection with the self-immolation of Wangchug Tseten, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database records 2017-00303 on Nyima Tsering, 2017-00304 on Konchog Gyaltzen, and 2017-00305 on Tsering Gyatso.

⁵¹Yangchen Dolma, “Man Who Set Himself on Fire in Kardze County of Eastern Tibet Dies,” Tibet Post International, 24 April 17.

⁵²“Tibetan Teenager Stages Self-Immolation Protest in Gansu,” Radio Free Asia, 7 May 17.

⁵³Ibid.

⁵⁴“Tibetan Self-Immolator’s Family Harassed, Visitors Restricted,” Radio Free Asia, 10 May 17; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “China Suspected of Using Torture on Self-Immolator’s Sister as Tibetan Monk Dies of Self-Immolation,” 20 May 17.

⁵⁵Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “China Suspected of Using Torture on Self-Immolator’s Sister as Tibetan Monk Dies of Self-Immolation,” 20 May 17.

⁵⁶Ibid.; International Campaign for Tibet, “Young Tibetan Monk Becomes the 150th Self-Immolator in Tibet,” 23 May 17.

⁵⁷International Campaign for Tibet, “Young Tibetan Monk Becomes the 150th Self-Immolator in Tibet,” 23 May 17; “Tibetan Monk Dies After Self-Immolation To Protest China’s Rule in Tibet,” Tibet Post International, 19 May 17.

⁵⁸Sarah Cook, Freedom House, “The Battle for China’s Spirit: Religious Revival, Repression, and Resistance Under Xi Jinping,” February 2017, 86–101; Elson Tong, “Beijing’s Panchen Lama Tells Monks To Love the Party, Decries Commercialisation of Buddhism,” Hong Kong Free Press, 13 March 17; John Powers, *The Buddha Party: How the People’s Republic of China Works To Define and Control Tibetan Buddhism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 13, 14; CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6 October 16, 300–4.

⁵⁹John Powers, *The Buddha Party: How the People’s Republic of China Works To Define and Control Tibetan Buddhism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 160.

⁶⁰See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, “China: Major Tibetan Buddhist Institution Faces Further Demolitions,” 29 March 17; “China Steps Up Demolition, Evictions at Larung Gar Buddhist Center,” Radio Free Asia, 19 September 16; Edward Wong, “China Takes a Chain Saw to a Center of Tibetan Buddhism,” New York Times, 28 November 16; International Campaign for Tibet, “Shadow of Dust Across the Sun: How Tourism Is Used To Counter Tibetan Cultural Resilience,” 13 March 17, 2–5; Edward Wong, “U.N. Human Rights Experts Unite To Condemn China Over Expulsions of Tibetans,” 27 February 17; Letter to the Ambassador and Permanent Office Representative, Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations Office at Geneva, from Six Special Rapporteurs (each covering a separate area of human rights): the Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights; the Special Rapporteur on the issue of human rights obligations relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment; the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association; the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard of living, and on the right to non-discrimination in this context; the Special Rapporteur on minority issues; and the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, AL CHN 10/2016, 7 November 16.

⁶¹International Campaign for Tibet, “Demolitions Begin at Larung Gar, ‘A Monastery for the World,’ as Religious Teachers Urge Calm,” 25 July 16.

⁶²Human Rights Watch, “China: Major Tibetan Buddhist Institution Faces Further Demolitions,” 29 March 17; “Larung Gar Expulsions Now Complete: Local Source,” Radio Free Asia, 7 April 17. According to RFA, the order apparently came from the central government. The Sichuan provincial governor, Yin Li, and other Chinese officials visited Larung Gar on March 30, 2017, and during a meeting with the management committee of the institute, reminded them that “higher authorities” had ordered the expulsions and demolitions. See also “China Steps Up Demolition, Evictions at Larung Gar Buddhist Center,” Radio Free Asia, 19 September 16; “Destruction at Larung Gar Greater Than Earlier Reported,” Radio Free Asia, 22 June 17. Chinese authorities had ordered Larung Gar to reduce its numbers in an earlier campaign in 2001. In total, since 2001, more than 7,000 monastic dwellings have been destroyed at Larung Gar.

⁶³“Destruction at Larung Gar Greater Than Earlier Reported,” Radio Free Asia, 22 June 17; “Larung Gar Removals ‘Almost Complete,’ Senior Abbot Says,” Radio Free Asia, 23 March 17; “China Steps Up Demolition, Evictions at Larung Gar Buddhist Center,” Radio Free Asia, 19 September 16; Edward Wong, “China Takes a Chain Saw to a Center of Tibetan Buddhism,” New York Times, 28 November 16; “China Reduces Number of Larung Gar Dwellings Marked for Destruction,” Radio Free Asia, 17 March 17. A senior abbot said that the expulsions reportedly began in 2014, when 600 monks and nuns were removed; in 2015, an additional 1,600 monks and nuns were forced out. It is unclear who ordered the earlier expulsions. The mandated ceiling of 5,000 monks and nuns at Larung Gar by September 30, 2017, was contained in the Seda (Serta) county order issued in June 2016. Human Rights Watch, “Serta County Order on Larung Gar Monastery,” 9 June 16. See also CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6 October 16, 303–4.

⁶⁴“Destruction at Larung Gar Greater Than Earlier Reported,” Radio Free Asia, 22 June 17; International Campaign for Tibet, “Shadow of Dust Across the Sun: How Tourism Is Used To Counter Tibetan Cultural Resilience,” 13 March 17, 3; “Larung Gar Removals ‘Almost Complete,’ Senior Abbot Says,” Radio Free Asia, 23 March 17; International Campaign for Tibet, “Security Crackdown Follows First Tibetan Self-Immolation in 2017,” 28 March 17; “China Reduces Number of Larung Gar Dwellings Marked for Destruction,” Radio Free Asia, 17 March 17. Initially Chinese officials had targeted 4,320 dwellings for demolition, but the management committee of the institute had appealed to authorities for fewer demolitions, and the target was subse-

quently reduced by more than 1,000 homes. However, according to the June 22, 2017, report from Radio Free Asia, Chinese authorities had demolished 4,725 homes since 2016.

⁶⁵International Campaign for Tibet, “Shadow of Dust Across the Sun: How Tourism Is Used To Counter Tibetan Cultural Resilience,” 13 March 17, 1; International Campaign for Tibet, “Demolitions Begin at Larung Gar, ‘A Monastery for the World,’ as Religious Teachers Urge Calm,” 25 July 16; Human Rights Watch, “China: Major Tibetan Buddhist Institution Faces Further Demolitions,” 29 March 17; Edward Wong, “China Takes a Chain Saw to a Center of Tibetan Buddhism,” *New York Times*, 28 November 16.

⁶⁶“Larung Gar Removals ‘Almost Complete,’ Senior Abbot Says,” *Radio Free Asia*, 23 March 17.

⁶⁷*Ibid.*; Human Rights Watch, “China: Major Tibetan Buddhist Institution Faces Further Demolitions,” 29 March 17.

⁶⁸International Campaign for Tibet, “Shadow of Dust Across the Sun: How Tourism Is Used To Counter Tibetan Cultural Resilience,” 13 March 17, 3–5.

⁶⁹Free Tibet, “Note Left by Larung Gar Nun Confirms Suicide,” 14 August 17; “Tibetan Nun Commits Suicide at Buddhist Complex in China’s Sichuan Province,” *Radio Free Asia*, 8 August 16; “More Suicides Reported in Protest of Destruction at Sichuan’s Larung Gar,” *Radio Free Asia*, 29 August 16; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Nuns Continue Suicide Protest Against Demolition of Buddhist Institute,” 1 September 16; Human Rights Watch, “China: 1,000 Evictions from Tibetan Buddhist Centers,” 14 September 16.

⁷⁰International Campaign for Tibet, “Shadow of Dust Across the Sun: How Tourism Is Used To Counter Tibetan Cultural Resilience,” 13 March 17, 4; “China Reduces Number of Larung Gar Dwellings Marked for Destruction,” *Radio Free Asia*, 17 March 17; “Larung Gar Evictees Forced To Attend Political Classes Back Home,” *Radio Free Asia*, 4 November 16. For more information on “patriotic education,” which entails studying and expressing support for the Party and its policies, denouncing the Dalai Lama, and recognizing the Chinese-appointed Panchen Lama, see John Powers, *The Buddha Party: How the People’s Republic of China Works To Define and Control Tibetan Buddhism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 88 (exiled monastics he has interviewed “overwhelmingly cite patriotic education as the most aversive aspect of PRC rule”); Tsering Shakya, “Transforming the Language of Protest,” *Self-Immolation as Protest in Tibet* series, Cultural Anthropology website, 8 April 12; Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Department of State, *International Religious Freedom Report for 2015—China (Includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau)*, 10 August 16, 36; Sarah Cook, *Freedom House, “The Battle for China’s Spirit: Religious Revival, Repression, and Resistance Under Xi Jinping,”* February 2017, 95–96. See also “Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008–2009,” *Congressional-Executive Commission on China*, 22 October 09, 33–36.

⁷¹International Campaign for Tibet, “Demolitions Begin at Larung Gar, ‘Monastery for the World,’ as Religious Teachers Urge Calm,” 25 July 16; Human Rights Watch, “China: 1,000 Evictions From Tibetan Buddhist Centers,” 14 September 16; International Campaign for Tibet, “Shadow of Dust Across the Sun: How Tourism Is Used To Counter Tibetan Cultural Resilience,” 13 March 17, 12; Edward Wong, “China Takes a Chain Saw to a Center of Tibetan Buddhism,” *New York Times*, 28 November 16; CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6 October 16, 303–4.

⁷²“More Punishment for Tibetan Buddhists,” *New York Times*, 5 December 16; Edward Wong, “China Takes a Chain Saw to a Center of Tibetan Buddhism,” *New York Times*, 28 November 16; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Undercover in Larung Gar: A Year After Demolition, World’s Largest Tibetan Buddhist Institute Sliced Like a Melon,” 11 August 17; International Campaign for Tibet, “Shadow of Dust Across the Sun: How Tourism Is Used To Counter Tibetan Cultural Resilience,” 13 March 17, 1, 12–13. The *New York Times* Editorial Board wrote, “The effort to destroy Larung Gar is further evidence of the government’s insecurity and its fear of any movement, religious or social, that it can’t fully control.” See also Tibet: Freedom of Religion, Hearing of the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission, 12 July 17, Testimony of Tenzin Dorjee, Commissioner, U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, 4. Commissioner Dorjee stated, “Rigorous study and practice are very important to the Nalanda Tradition of Tibetan Buddhism. The Chinese government seeks to strike at the heart of Tibetan Buddhism by attacking the Tibetan religious and educational institute of Larung Gar, . . .”

⁷³Sarah Cook, *Freedom House, “The Battle for China’s Spirit: Religious Revival, Repression, and Resistance Under Xi Jinping,”* February 2017, 89–90. An estimated several million Han Chinese have reportedly become followers of Tibetan Buddhism over the past decade, and an estimated 10,000 Han Chinese are believed to have completed studies at Larung Gar since its founding in 1980. See also Tsering Topgyal, “The Securitisation of Tibetan Buddhism in Communist China,” *Politics and Religion in Contemporary China*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (2012), 234–35. Earlier, in 2001, officials from Beijing ordered a reduction in the number of monks and nuns at Larung Gar (also referred to as Serta Institute), resulting in the demolition of approximately 2,000 homes. Authorities also ordered reductions at Yachen Gar. At the time, Larung Gar had 1,000 mainland and overseas Chinese among the 9,300 residents at the institute. A middle-aged Han medical doctor said that Chinese authorities told teachers from Larung Gar and Yachen Gar not to teach Han Chinese Tibetan Buddhism, and that Chinese were “forbidden to follow or receive Buddhist talks from Tibetan lamas. So many Chinese are coming to these areas where Tibetans usually live, but really the authorities don’t want us to have connections with any lamas here.”

⁷⁴International Campaign for Tibet, “Shadow of Dust Across the Sun: How Tourism Is Used To Counter Tibetan Cultural Resilience,” 13 March 17, 1, 5–7, 11, 12–13; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Undercover in Larung Gar: A Year After Demolition, World’s Largest Tibetan Buddhist Institute Sliced Like a Melon,” 11 August 17. A Western researcher quoted in ICT’s report who recently traveled to the area said that many of the local Tibetans he spoke with “believe that behind the evictions and destruction is an interest in transforming the now world-famous Buddhist institutes into a tourist destination, which will further dilute the authentic culture.” See also Steve Shaw, “China Tears Down the Tibetan City in the Sky,”

The Diplomat, 3 August 17; “Tibetans Forced From Their Land in Town Near Larung Gar,” Radio Free Asia, 16 August 16.

⁷⁵Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Undercover in Larung Gar: A Year After Demolition, World’s Largest Tibetan Buddhist Institute Sliced Like a Melon,” 11 August 17.

⁷⁶Human Rights Watch, “China: 1,000 Evictions From Tibetan Buddhist Centers,” 14 September 16.

⁷⁷Ibid.

⁷⁸Ibid.; International Campaign for Tibet, “Shadow of Dust Across the Sun: How Tourism Is Used To Counter Tibetan Cultural Resilience,” 13 March 17, 4–5.

⁷⁹International Campaign for Tibet, “Shadow of Dust Across the Sun: How Tourism Is Used To Counter Tibetan Cultural Resilience,” 13 March 17, 1, 8, 11, 13. See also Human Rights Watch, “China: 1,000 Evictions From Tibetan Buddhist Centers,” 14 September 16.

⁸⁰“Demolition of Tibetan Residences Underway at Sichuan’s Yachen Gar Buddhist Center,” Radio Free Asia, 15 August 17.

⁸¹Ibid.

⁸²Human Rights Watch, “China: 1,000 Evictions From Tibetan Buddhist Centers,” 14 September 16; Letter to the Ambassador and Permanent Representative, Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations Office at Geneva, from Six Special Rapporteurs (each covering a separate area of human rights): the Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights; the Special Rapporteur on the issue of human rights obligations relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment; the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association; the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard of living, and on the right to non-discrimination in this context; the Special Rapporteur on minority issues; and the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, AL CHN 10/2016, 7 November 16.

⁸³Letter to the Ambassador and Permanent Representative, Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations Office at Geneva, from Six Special Rapporteurs (each covering a separate area of human rights): the Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights; the Special Rapporteur on the issue of human rights obligations relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment; the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association; the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard of living, and on the right to non-discrimination in this context; the Special Rapporteur on minority issues; and the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, AL CHN 10/2016, 7 November 16, 3; Edward Wong, “U.N. Human Rights Experts Unite To Condemn China Over Expulsions of Tibetans,” New York Times, 27 February 17.

⁸⁴U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, “2017 Annual Report—China,” April 2017, 35.

⁸⁵See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force, 23 March 76, arts. 2(1), 12(1), 26; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, arts. 2, 13(1); Human Rights Watch, “China: 1,000 Evictions From Tibetan Buddhist Centers,” 14 September 16. See also “Former Larung Gar Monks Ordered Out of New Homes,” Radio Free Asia, 26 April 17. Authorities in Daofu (Tawu) county, Ganzi (Kardze) TAP, subsequently ordered nearly 300 displaced monks from Larung Gar who had moved to a retreat center in Daofu county to leave the center.

⁸⁶See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force, 23 March 76, arts. 2(1), 12(1), 12(2), 26; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, arts. 2, 13(1), 13(2); Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016—China (Includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau),” 3 March 17, 90–91; Sarah Cook, Freedom House, “The Battle for China’s Spirit: Religious Revival, Repression, and Resistance Under Xi Jinping,” February 2017, 96; Ben Hillman, “Unrest in Tibet: Interpreting the Post-2008 Wave of Protest and Conflict,” *Dalny Vychod [Far East]*, Vol. 4, Issue 1 (2014), 10, 12; Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, “International Religious Freedom Report for 2015—China (Includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau),” 10 August 16, 34; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Human Rights Situation in Tibet: Annual Report 2016,” 24 February 17, 5 (describing the myriad rules and restrictions on movement both within Tibetan areas of China and travel outside of China as having turned Tibet into a “giant open prison”).

⁸⁷Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, “International Religious Freedom Report for 2015—China (Includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau),” 10 August 16, 34. Ben Hillman, “Unrest in Tibet and the Limits of Regional Autonomy,” in *Ethnic Conflict and Protest in Tibet and Xinjiang: Unrest in China’s West*, Ben Hillman and Gray Tuttle, eds. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016), 30, 37–38, endnote 31. Hillman refers to the TAR travel ban as an “unwritten rule” and a “divide-and-rule tactic” seen elsewhere in China, which highlights the Party’s “zero tolerance for associations that unite and coordinate people from different localities.”

⁸⁸“State Council Reply Regarding the Overall Urban Plan for Lhasa Municipality” [Guowuyuan guanyu lasa shi chengshi zongti jihua de pifu], issued 30 July 17; “State Council Approves City Plan for Lhasa,” 8 August 17; “China To Limit Lhasa Population to 500k by 2020,” *Global Times*, 8 August 17.

⁸⁹Tabulation on Nationalities of 2010 Population Census of China, Volume 1 [Zhongguo 2010 nian renkou pucha fen minzu renkou ziliao shang], Department of Population and Employment Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics of China, and Department of Economic Development,

State Ethnic Affairs Commission (Beijing: Ethnic Publishing House, July 2013), Table 10–1, 975; “China To Limit Lhasa Population to 500k by 2020,” *Global Times*, 8 August 17.

⁹⁰“Local Tibetans Summoned After Latest Self-Immolation,” *Voice of America*, 18 April 17; “Young Farmer Stages First Tibetan Self-Immolation of 2017,” *Radio Free Asia*, 19 March 17.

⁹¹Human Rights Watch, “One Passport, Two Systems: China’s Restrictions on Foreign Travel by Tibetans and Others,” July 2015, 2, 15–17, 21; Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, “International Religious Freedom Report for 2015—China (Includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau),” 10 August 16, 34–35.

⁹²International Campaign for Tibet, “Shadow of Dust Across the Sun: How Tourism Is Used To Counter Tibetan Cultural Resilience,” 13 March 17, 18; Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016—China (Includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau),” 3 March 17, 91; Human Rights Watch, “One Passport, Two Systems: China’s Restrictions on Foreign Travel by Tibetans and Others,” July 2015, 2, 15–17, 21.

⁹³“China Calls Dalai Lama’s Kalachakra ‘Illegal,’ Threatens Punishment for Those Taking Part,” *Radio Free Asia*, 5 January 17. The Kalachakra, or “Wheel of Time,” is “a ritual that prepares devotees to be reborn in Shambhala, a celestial kingdom which, it is said, will vanquish the forces of evil in a future cosmic battle.”

⁹⁴*Ibid.* Bodh Gaya, India is believed to be the site where the Buddha achieved enlightenment.

⁹⁵Annie Gowen, “Hundreds of Tibetans Defy China, Gather at Birthplace of Buddhism in India,” *Washington Post*, 13 January 17; International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) and International Campaign for Tibet (ICT), “Tibet Locked Down and Travellers Banned During Sensitive Anniversary: Joint Statement by FIDH and ICT,” 27 January 17; International Campaign for Tibet, “Shadow of Dust Across the Sun: How Tourism Is Used To Counter Tibetan Cultural Resilience,” 13 March 17, 18. The *Washington Post* reported that in 2012, when the last Kalachakra was held in Bodh Gaya, after an estimated 10,000 Tibetans traveled to India to attend, Chinese officials declared the Kalachakra “illegal,” and detained many Tibetans for re-education after they returned to China. See also Human Rights Watch, “One Passport, Two Systems: China’s Restrictions on Foreign Travel by Tibetans and Others,” July 2015, 16.

⁹⁶International Campaign for Tibet, “Tibetan Pilgrims Compelled To Return From Dalai Lama Teaching in Bodh Gaya, India; China Calls the Teaching ‘Illegal,’” 9 January 17.

⁹⁷*Ibid.*; “China Seizes Tibetans’ Passports in a Bid To Block Travel,” *Radio Free Asia*, 14 November 16; “Tibetans Ordered Home by China Are Questioned by Police, Lose Their Passports,” *Radio Free Asia*, 23 January 17; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Human Rights Situation in Tibet: Annual Report 2016,” 24 February 17, 64–68; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (TCHRD), “China Restricts Freedom of Movement of Tibetans Ahead of Dalai Lama’s Teachings,” 24 November 16. TCHRD reported on 39 Tibetan pilgrims traveling from China with Chinese passports who were detained by Nepal police at the Nepal-India border for apparently not having visas to travel to India. They had reportedly decided against applying for Indian visas “for fear of reprisals from the Chinese government,” because if Chinese authorities saw Indian visas in their passports, they could end up jailed after their return to China.

⁹⁸“Dalai Lama Receives Tibetans Ordered Home by China,” *Radio Free Asia*, 2 December 16.

⁹⁹International Campaign for Tibet, “Tibetan Pilgrims Compelled To Return From Dalai Lama Teaching in Bodh Gaya, India; China Calls the Teaching ‘Illegal,’” 9 January 17; “Dalai Lama Receives Tibetans Ordered Home by China,” *Radio Free Asia*, 2 December 16; “Tibetans Ordered Home by China Are Questioned by Police, Lose Their Passports,” *Radio Free Asia*, 23 January 17; Annie Gowen, “Hundreds of Tibetans Defy China, Gather at Birthplace of Buddhism in India,” *Washington Post*, 13 January 17; International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) and International Campaign for Tibet (ICT), “Tibet Locked Down and Travellers Banned During Sensitive Anniversary: Joint Statement by FIDH and ICT,” 27 January 17; “Tibetan Pilgrims See Passports Destroyed on Their Return,” *Radio Free Asia*, 31 January 17.

¹⁰⁰“Tibetans in China Defy Warnings, Support the Kalachakra,” *Radio Free Asia*, 6 January 17; “China Calls Dalai Lama’s Kalachakra ‘Illegal,’ Threatens Punishment for Those Taking Part,” *Radio Free Asia*, 5 January 17; Masashi Crete-Nishihata, Jeffrey Knockel, and Lotus Ruan, “Tibetans Blocked From Kalachakra at Borders and on WeChat,” *University of Toronto, Munk School of Global Affairs, Citizen Lab*, 10 January 17.

¹⁰¹“Tibetans in China Defy Warnings, Support the Kalachakra,” *Radio Free Asia*, 6 January 17. A source in Qinghai told RFA, “In my own village, people are engaged in virtuous activities such as fasting, performing prostrations, and setting animals free . . . The same things are happening in other places, too . . . Families are hosting gatherings to recite mantras and other prayers, and this is being done in secret as the monasteries and communities are being careful not to do anything more openly.” “Support for the Kalachakra Spreads Among Tibetans Living in China,” *Radio Free Asia*, 9 January 17. A Tibetan source in Sichuan said that local Tibetans had shared the Dalai Lama’s teachings on social media, and provided translation into the local dialect. The source also said that “several hundred elders” gathered to recite mantras and pray.

¹⁰²Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Human Rights Situation in Tibet: Annual Report 2016,” 24 February 17, 12–20; Sarah Cook, *Freedom House*, “The Battle for China’s Spirit: Religious Revival, Repression, and Resistance Under Xi Jinping,” February 2017, 100.

¹⁰³Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Human Rights Situation in Tibet: Annual Report 2016,” 24 February 17, 13, 27; Yeshe Choesang, “Another Tibetan Monk Jailed Over Allegedly Sharing Information on Tibet,” *Tibet Post International*, 9 December 16. For more information on Lobsang Sonam, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2017-00009.

¹⁰⁴“Tibetan Protestor Detained, Missing in Serthar,” *Radio Free Asia*, 16 February 17. For more information on Sonam Tashi, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2017-00132.

¹⁰⁵“Tibetan Protestor Detained, Missing in Serthar,” *Radio Free Asia*, 16 February 17.

¹⁰⁶“Tibetan Monk Detained in First Ngaba Protest This Year,” Radio Free Asia, 27 February 17. For more information on Lobsang Tsultrim, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2017-00233.

¹⁰⁷“Tibetan Monk Detained in First Ngaba Protest This Year,” Radio Free Asia, 27 February 17.

¹⁰⁸“Tibetan in Shiqu County, Gengdun (Gedun), Detained and Beaten” [Shiqu xian zangren gengdun bei bu shou ou], Radio Free Asia, 7 March 17; Free Tibet, “Tibetan Man Arrested for Sharing Pictures of the Dalai Lama and Tibetan Flag,” 9 March 17; Tenzin Dharpo, “Tibetan Man Detained for Storing Photos of Dalai Lama, Tibetan Flag on WeChat,” Phayul, 8 March 17. For more information on Gedun, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2017-00174.

¹⁰⁹State Council Information Office, “National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2016–2020),” August 2016, reprinted in Xinhua, 29 September 16, sec. IV; Clemence Henry, “The Chinese Education System as a Source of Conflict in Tibetan Areas,” in *Ethnic Conflict and Protest in Tibet and Xinjiang: Unrest in China’s West*, Ben Hillman and Gray Tuttle, eds. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016), 100; PRC Constitution, issued 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 29 March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, arts. 4, 121; PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo minzu quyü zizhifa], issued 31 May 84, effective 1 October 84, amended and effective 28 February 01, arts. 10, 21, 37; State Council, Certain Provisions on Implementing the PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law [Guowuyuan shishi “zhonghua renmin gongheguo minzu quyü zizhifa” ruogan guiding], issued 19 May 05, effective 31 May 05, art. 22. China’s Constitution and the PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law provide nominal protection for the use of minority languages. The State Council Provisions on Implementing the PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law affirm the freedom to use and develop minority languages, but also place emphasis on the use of Mandarin by promoting “bilingual” education and bilingual teaching staff.

¹¹⁰Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Bilingual Education Policy in Tibet: The Systematic Replacement of Tibetan Language With Mandarin Chinese,” 14 April 17, 5–12; Tenzin Monlam, “PEN International Calls Replacement of Tibetan Language With Mandarin ‘Absurd,’” Phayul, 5 May 17; Free Tibet, “Tibetan Languages Face Heavy Government Pressure Whilst Modernity Threatens Neglected Dialects,” Hong Kong Free Press, 5 March 17; Gray Tuttle, “China’s Race Problem: How Beijing Represses Minorities,” Foreign Policy, May/June 2015; Edward Wong, “China Charges Tibetan Education Advocate With Inciting Separatism,” New York Times, 30 March 16.

¹¹¹Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Bilingual Education Policy in Tibet: The Systematic Replacement of Tibetan Language With Mandarin Chinese,” April 2017, 4; Khenpo Tsultrim Lodoe, “An Urgent Call for the Protection and Preservation of Tibetan,” translated in High Peaks Pure Earth, 15 September 14. Abbot of Larung Gar Khenpo Tsultrim Lodoe wrote of the importance of the Tibetan language, “Language is the fundamental lifeline of a culture. It is the reservoir of identity and the most precious gem of a nationality—of a people.”

¹¹²Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Bilingual Education Policy in Tibet: The Systematic Replacement of Tibetan Language With Mandarin Chinese,” April 2017, 3–4, 28–29, 84, 88.

¹¹³Tsering Topgyal, “The Securitisation of Tibetan Buddhism in Communist China,” *Politics and Religion in Contemporary China*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (2012), 238–40; International Campaign for Tibet, “Shadow of Dust Across the Sun: How Tourism Is Used To Counter Tibetan Cultural Resilience,” 13 March 17, 16–17.

¹¹⁴Tashi Wangchug’s name also appears as Tashi Wangchuk in English language reports on his case. See, e.g., Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016—China (Includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau),” 3 March 17, 83; Edward Wong, “Rights Groups Ask China To Free Tibet Education Advocate,” New York Times, 18 January 17; Human Rights Watch, “China: Drop Charges Against Tibet Education Activist,” 15 January 17.

¹¹⁵Edward Wong, “China Charges Tibetan Education Advocate With Inciting Separatism,” New York Times, 30 March 16; Edward Wong, “Rights Groups Ask China To Free Tibet Education Advocate,” New York Times, 18 January 17.

¹¹⁶Ibid.
¹¹⁷Alak Dorshi, “I Too Can Speak About Education,” translated in High Peaks Pure Earth, 14 April 17.

¹¹⁸“Tibetans in Chengdu Call for Bilingual Education for Their Children,” Radio Free Asia, 19 January 17. In January 2017, a Chengdu-based Tibetan professor at Sichuan Normal University, and a member of the regional Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, submitted a proposal to that body urging the creation of a bilingual education system. She wrote that an estimated 100,000 Tibetans live in Chengdu, including reportedly 2,000 school-age children, and there are no schools that teach in the Tibetan language. “An Open Letter to Zhang Wenkui, Party Secretary of Tsolho Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, From Tsering Kyi,” translated by High Peaks Pure Earth, 11 April 17; Alak Dorshi, “I Too Can Speak About Education,” translated in High Peaks Pure Earth, 14 April 17.

¹¹⁹Simon Denyer, “Tibet Is Harder To Visit Than North Korea. But I Got In and Streamed Live on Facebook,” Washington Post, 16 September 16.

¹²⁰Gray Tuttle, “China’s Race Problem: How Beijing Represses Minorities,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2015; International Campaign for Tibet and International Federation for Human Rights, “China’s New Counter-Terrorism Law: Implications and Dangers for Tibetans and Uyghurs,” November 2016, 53. See also Simon Denyer, “China Says Tourism Is Tibet’s Best Hope. But Can Its Culture Survive the Onslaught?” Washington Post, 6 October 16; Dexter Roberts, “Tibet Can’t Kick Its Subsidy Habit,” Bloomberg Businessweek, 16 December 15.

¹²¹See, e.g., Rinzin Dojree, “China’s Urbancide in Tibet,” The Diplomat, 17 March 17; Andrew Martin Fischer, *The Disempowered Development of Tibet in China* (Lanham: Lexington Books,

2014), xxx (noting that Tibetans “have had little or no control over the main policy levers driving economic development, the development of urban areas and of infrastructure”). For information in recent Commission annual reports on the Chinese Communist Party and government approach to economic development in Tibetan autonomous areas of China, see CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6 October 16, 305–8; CECC, 2015 Annual Report, 8 October 15, 298–300; CECC, 2014 Annual Report, 9 October 14, 182–83; CECC, 2013 Annual Report, 10 October 13, 184; CECC, 2012 Annual Report, 10 October 12, 165–66; CECC, 2011 Annual Report, 10 October 11, 216–19; and CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 222–24.

¹²²Gray Tuttle, “China’s Race Problem—How Beijing Represses Minorities,” *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2015; Ben Hillman, “Unrest in Tibet and the Limits of Regional Autonomy,” in *Ethnic Conflict and Protest in Tibet and Xinjiang: Unrest in China’s West*, Ben Hillman and Gray Tuttle, eds. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016), 32. See, e.g., Stephen Chen, “China Plans World’s Biggest National Park on Tibetan Plateau,” *South China Morning Post*, 22 April 17; Rinzin Dojree, “China’s Urbancide in Tibet,” *The Diplomat*, 17 March 17; Dexter Roberts, “Tibet Can’t Kick Its Subsidy Habit,” *Bloomberg Businessweek*, 16 December 15; “Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008–2009,” Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 22 October 09, 41–43.

¹²³Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016—China (Includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau),” 3 March 17, 95; Andrew Martin Fischer, *The Disempowered Development of Tibet in China* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2014), 31; Gray Tuttle, “China’s Race Problem—How Beijing Represses Minorities,” *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2015; Ben Hillman, “Unrest in Tibet and the Limits of Regional Autonomy,” in *Ethnic Conflict and Protest in Tibet and Xinjiang: Unrest in China’s West*, Ben Hillman and Gray Tuttle, eds. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016), 26; “China Defends Tibetan Development Plan,” *Voice of America*, 18 May 11; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Bilingual Education Policy in Tibet: The Systematic Replacement of Tibetan Language With Mandarin Chinese,” 14 April 17, 12–13. See, e.g., Simon Denyer, “China Says Tourism Is Tibet’s Best Hope. But Can Its Culture Survive the Onslaught?” *Washington Post*, 6 October 16.

¹²⁴Simon Denyer, “China Says Tourism Is Tibet’s Best Hope. But Can Its Culture Survive the Onslaught?” *Washington Post*, 6 October 16.

¹²⁵*Ibid.* See also Stephen Chen, “China Plans World’s Biggest National Park on Tibetan Plateau,” *South China Morning Post*, 22 April 17.

¹²⁶Simon Denyer, “China Says Tourism Is Tibet’s Best Hope. But Can Its Culture Survive the Onslaught?” *Washington Post*, 6 October 16; Simon Denyer, “China’s Tibet Tourism Statistics Just Don’t Add Up,” *Washington Post*, 6 October 16; CECC, 2016 Annual Report, 6 October 16, 305–6.

¹²⁷Stephen Chen, “China Plans World’s Biggest National Park on Tibetan Plateau,” *South China Morning Post*, 22 April 17; International Campaign for Tibet, “Nomads in ‘No-Man’s Land’: China’s Nomination for UNESCO World Heritage Risks Imperilling Tibetans and Wildlife,” 30 June 17, 2, 13–14; Leng Shumei, “National Park To Be Built on Qinghai-Tibet Plateau,” *Global Times*, 24 April 17.

¹²⁸Wu Yan, “First Mars Simulation Base To Be Built in Northwest China,” *China Daily*, 26 July 17.