Since September 12, 1980, many governments, international bodies and nongovernmental organizations have taken an extreme­ly active interest in the human rights situation in Turkey. That date marked the third time in as many decades that the Turkish military had taken power, this time in the wake of governmental paralysis, political polarization, and an uncontrolled wave of vio­lence and terrorism which even civilian-imposed martial law could not stem. Still in power in 1982, the ruling generals had made it clear that power would not be returned to civilian hands until, in their view, the causes of the previous unrest had been eliminated. Political activities remained restricted, and large numbers of Turkish citizens were in prison awaiting trial on a variety of politically related charges. Allegations of serious human rights abuses were wide­spread. The Commission had been urged by nongovernmental organiza­tions, by Members of Congress, and by parliamentarians in other NATO countries, to investigate the charges of abuse. A staff delegation visited Turkey from August 22-29, 1982, and its report repre­sented one of the first open expressions of concern about the Turkish situation by official representatives of the United States. Since the October 1982 report, the Commission, Members of Con­gress, various international bodies, and a variety of private organi­zations have followed events there with great interest. In the past six years, certain sanctions have been applied by the international community, and have been rescinded as progress was made in im­ proving the human rights situation. In light of its ongoing interest m Turkey, and the concern which private organizations continue to express, the Commission felt it appropriate to visit Turkey again and to assess the situation once more. The Commission believes that, since the previous staff report, Turkey has made impressive strides toward a full restoration of human rights and the democratic process. The past six years have seen a renewal of the national commitment to achieving democrat­ic ideals for all Turkish citizens and patterns of tolerance have emerged. They are being strengthened by institutional reform, a citizenry largely committed to the democratic process, and by the activities of the press and various private organizations. The Commission also believes that certain human rights prob­lems, which often predate the 1980 military takeover, persist in Turkey. The report describes them and certain measures which are being undertaken in order to deal with them. This report by the staff, describing developments since the 1982 report and assessing the current state of affairs, is a product of the Commission's continuing interest in Turkey's progress toward full democratization. The hard-won national independence of 1923 en­ compassed a vision of the future which incorporated a proud histor­ical heritage in a Western framework. The profound changes that followed required great national will and commitment. It is the Commission's hope that the momentum of Turkish human rights improvements will be sustained. Turkey is a geographical and cul­tural bridge between Europe and the Middle East, and the Turkish experience may serve as a lesson for both worlds.

This report results from an investigation directed by the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe into the attempted defection of Miroslav Medvid and other similar incidents of involuntary repatriation of Soviet and Soviet-bloc nationals, with recommendations for any appropriate changes in US law. This investigation began in July 1986, with research into available public source background material. By September 1986, fieldwork commenced, consisting primarily of witness interviews, records reviews, and search for other evidentiary materials. More than 200 interviews and 100 informal contacts were conducted by CSCE investigators. A few investigative initiatives were hampered by foreign government and Executive Branch decisions to deny access to certain witnesses and records. However, the effect of the omissions was minimized by the preponderance of other available evidence on the issues. This report presents a narrative story of The Medvid Incident, followed by the factual and legal issues raised by the events (Part I). The second section examines other incidents of repatriation cases, including case studies and analyses, and a statistical examination of deserting crewmen and apprehensions.

At the initial session of the third CSCE follow-up meeting held in Vienna from November 4 to December 20, 1986, the Soviet Union and a number of its Warsaw Pact allies came under the most concentrated and concerted attack for human rights abuses since the beginning of the Helsinki process in 1975. In some ways the barrage of criticism directed at the East during the implementation phase of the Vienna Conference was more remarkable for the fact that the Soviet Union for the first time offered a series of gestures, promises and public relations maneuvers specifically designed to soften or mute negative Western assessments of its performance. Partly out of underlying distrust for Soviet motives and partly because of Soviet bumbling or callousness in the death of imprisoned Helsinki Monitor Anatoly Marchenko and the agonizingly delayed departure of cancer patient Rimma Bravve, Western as well as neutral and nonaligned (NNa) participants joined together to mount an unprecedented indictment of Soviet and East European violations of the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Final Act. As a result, the calculated Soviet effort under General Secretary Gorbachev to project a new, more open and humane image remained at best open to doubt and at worst suffered a serious loss in credibility.

On October 24, 1985, Soviet Seaman Miroslav Medvid jumped from the Marshal Konev (a Soviet grain freighter) while it was docked in New Orleans, LA, and reportedly attempted to request political asylum in the United States. He was interviewed by U.S. Border Patrol agents on that same night and then ordered returned to his ship. U.S. officials from the INS and State Department subsequently boarded the ship, obtained an agreement from Soviet officials that Medvid would be re-interviewed concerning his desire for political asylum, and proceeded to question him over a period of 2 days. Mr. Medvid consistently held that he did not want political asylum during this second interview process, and was finally returned to his ship on October 29, 1985.  The Medvid case has raised many questions concerning the manner in which U.S. Government officials handled the incident and concerning U.S. asylum policy toward Communist-bloc nations in general. The Senate Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy held a series of hearings and conducted a staff investigation on the matter. This report addresses the facts developed through that hearing and investigation process. This report is divided into 6 sections: (1) a brief summary of the events from the time of Medvid's desertion to his final return to the Soviet ship; (2) a summary of the hearings that the immigration subcommittee held on November 5, 1985, November 7, 1985, February 5, 1986, and March 7, 1986; (3) a review and discussion of the major issues and points of controversy concerning the incident; (4) a description of the roles played by the individuals who had the most contact with Medvid, and their perspectives on the case; (5) a review of the adequacy. of present INS asylum procedures; and (6) conclusions drawn by the subcommittee based on the hearing and investigation process.

This report, including its findings and recommendations, is based upon material compiled during the Commission's continuing study of Final Act implementation -- with special emphasis on the period since the last report in August 1980. The Commission has focused its attention in this report primarily on the compliance records of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies where, with rare exceptions, the level of implementation in many areas continues to be appallingly low. Given the continued armed occupation of Afghanistan by Soviet forces; the imposition, under heavy Soviet pressures, of martial law in Poland; and the radically increased repression of all forms of dissent in the Soviet Union and many other Warsaw Pact countries, it is clear that compliance with the Final Act has seriously regressed. The Western CSCE states, on the other hand, generally have maintained relatively high standards of implementation in all areas of the Final Act, specifically, in those areas such as human rights where the Eastern record has been a cause of dismay. The Commission, therefore, has directed the bulk of its research to those nations whose records under the Helsinki Accords display the greatest need for improvement. For the CSCE review conference in Madrid, this report will serve as an overview of compliance of the two-year period since the Commission undertook its review in the fall of 1980. For the American public, whose support is essential to continued U.S. participation in the CSCE process, the report provides a current picture of major implementation achievements and shortcomings in the most critical areas - the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. 

The documents in this publication reflect the efforts of Czechoslovak citizens to express their opinions on issues of importance to them and on rights guaranteed to them under Czechoslovak law, the Helsinki Final Act, and other international agreements. In Principle VII of the Helsinki Final Act, the participating States confirmed the "right of the individual to know and act upon his rights." They also agreed to "promote and encourage the effective exercise of civil, political, economic, social, cultural and other rights and freedoms all of which derive from the inherent dignity of the human person..." The signatories further pledged to "recognize and respect the freedom of the individual to profess and practice, alone or in community with others, religion or belief acting in accordance with the dictates of his own conscience." Sadly, these noble words ring hollow in Czechoslovakia, one of the 35 signatories to the Helsinki Final Act. In an effort to improve their country's adherence to the principles and spirit of the Helsinki document during the last five years -- over 1,000 czechoslovak citizens -- workers, scholars, clergymen, professionais, students, government employees, scientists and others -- have affixed their names to the manifesto of human rights known as Charter 77. Many have also worked actively with VONS -- the Committee for the Defense of the Unjustly Persecuted -- to report and document violations of basic human freedoms. While in most signatory countries these efforts on behalf of human rights would be applauded and rewarded, in Czechoslovakia both signers of Charter 77 and members of VONS have fallen victim to unrelenting government repression. Charter 77 clearly emphasizes that its aim is not to change the existing sociai system, but simply to demonstrate the need for "observance of laws" -- both domestic and international -- by the Czechoslovak authorities. As an example of this committment to international law and other agreements, Charter 77 called upon the Czechosiovak delegation to the Madrid Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to honor its word and implement all the provisions of the helsinki Final Act, including Principle ViI. The constant surveillance, house searches, detentions, arrests, beatings and terms of imprisonment to which these courageous men and women are subjected are difficult to reconcile with the statements attesting to full implementation presented by the Czechoslovak delegations to both the Belgrade and Madrid review meetings.

The Commission has three main purposes in preparing this report. First, it hopes to demonstrate the good faith of the U.S. in assessing its Helsinki implementation record in light of criticisms from other CSCE countries and domestic critics. Second, the Commission hopes to stimulate honest implementation evaluations by other CSCE states and thus to lay the groundwork for real progress prior to the next review meeting at Madrid in 1980. Finally, the Commission hopes to encourage improved compliance by the United States. Although the Commission agrees with President Carter that the U.S. record is very good, additional discussion and interaction between responsible government agencies and interested private organizations in a necessary prerequisite to greater progress. This report follows the structures of the Final Act by discussing, in order, each major section or "basket" of the Act. Basket I deals with questions relating to security in Europe which includes Human Rights; Basket II, economic and scientific cooperation; Basket III, cooperation in humanitarian and other fields.

This volume is the third compilation of selected documents emerging from the Helsinki accord monitoring groups in the Soviet Union published by the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. In a sampling of reports written between late 1976 and the summer of 1978, it is intended, as in the previous compilations, to illustrate the broad range of human rights concerns of the various monitoring groups whose common goal is the furthering of Final Act implementation in their own country. Efforts to promote CSCE compliance in the Soviet Union began in May of 1976 when 11 human rights activists in Moscow, led by Yuri Orlov, formed the first Public Group to Promote Observance of the Helsinki Agreements. Inspired by its example, other Helsinki groups were formed in Kiev, Vilnius, Yerevan and Tbilisi. Additional independent organizations with more narrowly defined focus, such as the Christian Committee for the Defense of Believers' Rights and the Working Commission on the Abuse of Psychiatry for Political Purposes, also emerged. Today, more than 50 group members, representing a broad spectrum of religious, ethnic and professional affiliations, are actively documenting human rights violations and engaged in promoting implementation of the Helsinki accord. While maintaining their individual identities, Soviet monitoring groups have frequently collaborated in their efforts to promote human rights. When the Lithuanian and Ukrainian groups were formed, for example, the Moscow group sponsored a joint news conference to publicize their creation. The Christian Committee, composed of four members of the Russian Orthodox Church, has written appeals on behalf of Adventists, Jews and Baptists. On occasion, two or more groups have issued joint declarations and other documents. Ordinary Soviet citizens, learning of the Helsinki groups via Western radio broadcasts, have traveled thousands of miles from remote regions in order to present documented evidence on human rights violations. Similarly, monitoring group members have journeyed great distances to conduct interviews and related research. Representatives of the Moscow group, for example, were sent to the northern Caucasus and to distant Nakhodka to visit Pentecostal communities desiring to emigrate. The representative documents of the Soviet Helsinki monitoring groups reproduced here address a wide range of human rights concerns: repressions of group members, violations of the rights of ethnic minorities, difficulties of emigration from the USSR, problems of religious believers and difficulties of current and former political prisoners. Economic concerns are also treated in several documents in the compilation. The Soviet monitoring groups carry out their work in an extremely repressive environment. Although 20 members of these organizations have been arrested and imprisoned, many new members have joined. Frequently, documents have been confiscated by the KGB. During a search of Orlov's apartment in Moscow, for example, material documenting persecution of parents advocating religious practices for their children was removed. In another case, Aleksandr Ginzburg's residence was searched and information on the health of seriously ill political prisoners was seized. The documents of the Soviet Helsinki monitors are truly a testament to their strength, courage and dedication. Their long-range goal -- the achievement of a humane society based on respect for law -- has yet to be realized. But already they have attained a moral victory in gaining the attention and respect of private and governmental groups throughout the world.

For some 5 months -- between October 4, 1977, and March 9, 1978 -- delegates of the 35 nations that signed the 1975 Helsinki accord met in Belgrade to determine how well the commitments set out in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe had been kept. From their work, a new ingredient in East-West diplomacy emerged: The recognition of human rights as an integral aspect of detente. This is an important step on the road toward making Europe a place where human rights are universally respected in all countries, even though it carries no guarantees of speedy remedies for existing abuses. Although the Belgrade meeting examined new proposals, drafted a concluding document and scheduled the next review meeting, the main work of the Belgrade meeting was a line-by-line review of the Final Act. This complex document contained provisions for regulating the political relations between the states of Europe, for easing military tensions among them, and for improving trade, commerce and the flow of people and ideas between East and West. But the elements that caught the imaginations and enthusiasm of ordinary citizens were those guaranteeing human rights and fundamental freedoms and promoting policies among governments which would enhance their consistent observance. To understand the advance made at Belgrade and the limits on it, it is necessary to remember that CSCE decisions of the 35 countries can only be arrived at unanimously; each nation can reject any proposal or document by merely denying consensus. Moreover, the discussions at Belgrade were closed to the public and not transcribed, except for 2 weeks of formal, on-the-record speeches at the start and end of the meeting. Given these circumstances, Belgrade was more what therapists would call an "encounter session" than what jurists would regard as a tribunal. It was better suited for exchanges of views and arguments than for the issuance of formal findings or decrees. The United States and its allies-along with many of the neutral and nonalined countries-sought to make the review of Final Act implementation the touchstone of the Belgrade meeting. For the United States, the most urgent and important matters centered on questions of human rights, for it was here that performance was most glaringly deficient. The working sessions at Belgrade demonstrated the determination of Western and neutral signatories to record specific criticisms of Eastern implementation of the Helsinki Final Act.