H. Rept. 115-452 - STRENGTHENING OVERSIGHT OF IRAN'S ACCESS TO FINANCE ACT115th Congress (2017-2018)
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115th Congress } { Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
1st Session } { 115-452
======================================================================
STRENGTHENING OVERSIGHT OF IRAN'S ACCESS TO FINANCE ACT
_______
December 7, 2017.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Hensarling, from the Committee on Financial Services, submitted the
following
R E P O R T
together with
MINORITY VIEWS
[To accompany H.R. 4324]
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
The Committee on Financial Services, to whom was referred
the bill (H.R. 4324) to require the Secretary of the Treasury
to make certifications with respect to United States and
foreign financial institutions' aircraft-related transactions
involving Iran, and for other purposes, having considered the
same, report favorably thereon with an amendment and recommend
that the bill as amended do pass.
The amendment is as follows:
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the
following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Strengthening Oversight of Iran's
Access to Finance Act''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
The Congress finds the following:
(1) Under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA),
informally known as the Iran nuclear deal, the Obama
administration agreed to license the sale of commercial
passenger aircraft to Iran, the world's foremost state sponsor
of terrorism and a jurisdiction of primary money laundering
concern.
(2) In April 2015, prior to the adoption of the JCPOA,
Secretary of the Treasury Jacob Lew, in publicly advocating for
its provisions, stated: ``Make no mistake: deal or no deal, we
will continue to use all our available tools, including
sanctions, to counter Iran's menacing behavior. Iran knows that
our host of sanctions focused on its support for terrorism and
its violations of human rights are not, and have never been, up
for discussion.''.
(3) In March 2016 remarks to the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, Secretary Lew, in reference to U.S.
commitments under the JCPOA, stated: ``While we have lifted the
nuclear sanctions, we continue to enforce sanctions directed at
support for terrorism and regional destabilization, and missile
and human rights violations.''.
(4) In an April 2016 forum at the Council on Foreign
Relations, Secretary Lew stated that, under the JCPOA, the U.S.
committed to lifting its nuclear sanctions, ``but the U.S.
financial system is not open to Iran, and that is not something
that is going to change''.
(5) In September 2016, the Department of the Treasury's
Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued licenses
permitting the export of up to 97 aircraft for use by Iran Air,
the Islamic Republic of Iran's flagship state-owned carrier.
These licenses included authorization for U.S. financial
institutions ``to engage in all transactions necessary to
provide financing or other financial services'' in order to
effectuate the sales. In November 2016, OFAC licensed an
additional 106 aircraft for purchase by Iran Air, which are
also eligible for financing authorized by OFAC.
(6) The Department of the Treasury had sanctioned Iran Air in
2011 for its use of commercial passenger aircraft to transport
rockets, missiles, and other military cargo on behalf of the
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Iran's Ministry of
Defense and Armed Forces Logistics, both of which had been
designated under Executive Order 13382 for weapons
proliferation-related activities. In October 2017, the IRGC
went on to be designated under Executive Order 13224 for its
support of the IRGC-Qods Force, which has provided support to
terrorist groups such as Hizballah, Hamas, and the Taliban.
(7) Among Iran Air's sanctionable activities, the airline
delivered missile or rocket components to the Assad government
in Syria, which like Iran is classified as a state sponsor of
terrorism.
(8) The Assad regime is responsible for a civil conflict that
has claimed an estimated 400,000 lives, including through the
government's deployment of chemical weapons and barrel bombs
against unarmed civilians and children.
(9) Despite being delisted in 2016, Iran Air has continued to
fly known weapons resupply routes to government-controlled
areas of Syria. According to research by the Foundation for
Defense of Democracies, between Implementation Day of the JCPOA
on January 16, 2016, and May 4, 2017, Iran Air operated at
least 134 flights to Syria, which included stops in Abadan,
Iran, a suspected IRGC logistical hub for airlifts to the Assad
regime.
(10) In November 2016 correspondence to the Chairman of the
House Committee on Financial Services, the Department of the
Treasury noted that the commitment to delist Iran Air under the
JCPOA ``does not affect our ability to designate, or re-
designate, any Iranian airline that engages in sanctionable
activity. The United States retains the ability to designate
any individual or entity that engages in sanctionable
activities under our authorities targeting conduct outside the
scope of the JCPOA, including Iran's support for terrorism,
human rights abuses, ballistic missile program, and other
destabilizing activities in the region.''.
(11) In April 2017, Iran announced a deal for Aseman Airlines
to purchase up to 60 commercial aircraft, a transaction that
would require authorization by OFAC. Aseman Airlines' chief
executive officer, Hossein Alaei, has for decades served as a
senior member of the IRGC.
SEC. 3. CERTIFICATIONS FOR AIRCRAFT-RELATED TRANSACTIONS BY UNITED
STATES AND FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.
(a) In General.--Not later than 30 days after authorizing a
transaction by a United States or foreign financial institution in
connection with the export or re-export of a commercial passenger
aircraft to Iran (or, for an authorization made after January 16, 2016,
but before the date of the enactment of this Act, not later than 60
days after such date of enactment), and every 180 days thereafter for
the duration of the authorization, the Secretary of the Treasury shall
submit the report described under subsection (b) to the appropriate
congressional committees.
(b) Report With Respect to Financial Institutions' Iran-related
Transactions and Due Diligence.--With respect to a financial
institution and a transaction described under subsection (a), a report
is described under this subsection if it contains--
(1) a list of financial institutions that, since January 16,
2016, have conducted transactions authorized by the Secretary
in connection with the export or re-export of commercial
passenger aircraft to Iran;
(2) either--
(A) a certification that--
(i) the transaction does not pose a
significant money laundering or terrorism
financing risk to the United States financial
system;
(ii) the transaction will not benefit an
Iranian person that, since the date that is one
year preceding the date of the certification--
(I) has knowingly transported items
used for the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction, including systems
designed in whole or in part for the
delivery of such weapons; or
(II) has knowingly provided
transportation services or material
support for, or on behalf of, any
person designated under Executive
Orders 13224, 13382, or 13572; and
(iii) any financial institution described
under subsection (b)(1) has had since the date
such authorization was made, or, if the
authorization is no longer in effect, had for
the duration of such authorization, appropriate
policies, procedures, and processes in place to
avoid engaging in sanctionable activities that
may result from the financial institutions'
exposure to Iran; or
(B) a statement that the Secretary is unable to make
the certification described under subparagraph (A) and
a notice that the Secretary will, not later than 60
days after the date the determination is submitted to
the appropriate congressional committees, issue a
report on non-certification described under subsection
(c) to the appropriate congressional committees.
(c) Report on Non-certification.--With respect to a financial
institution and a transaction described under subsection (a), a report
on non-certification is described under this subsection if it
contains--
(1) a detailed explanation for why the Secretary is unable to
make the certification described under subsection (b)(2);
(2) a notification of whether the Secretary will--
(A) not amend the authorization of the transaction
with respect to a financial institution,
notwithstanding such non-certification;
(B) suspend the authorization until the Secretary is
able to make such certification;
(C) revoke the authorization; or
(D) otherwise amend the authorization; and
(3) an explanation of the reasons for any action to be taken
described under paragraph (2).
(d) Waiver.--The President may waive, on a case-by-case basis, the
provisions of this Act for up to one year at a time upon certifying to
the appropriate congressional committees that--
(1) the Government of Iran has--
(A) made substantial progress towards combating money
laundering and terrorism financing risk emanating from
Iran; or
(B) has significantly reduced Iran's--
(i) destabilizing activities in the region;
or
(ii) material support for terrorist groups;
or
(2) such waiver is important to the national security
interests of the United States, with an explanation of the
reasons therefor.
(e) Termination.--This section shall cease to be effective on the
date that is 30 days after the date on which the President certifies to
the appropriate congressional committees that--
(1)(A) the Secretary does not find, under section 5318A of
title 31, United States Code, that reasonable grounds exist for
concluding that Iran is a jurisdiction of primary money
laundering concern; and
(B) Iran has ceased providing support for acts of
international terrorism; or
(2) terminating the provisions of this section is vital to
the national security interests of the United States, with an
explanation of the reasons therefor.
(f) Definitions.--For purposes of this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means the committees
on Financial Services and Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives and the committees on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs and Foreign Relations of the Senate.
(2) Financial institution.--The term ``financial
institution'' means a United States financial institution or a
foreign financial institution.
(3) Foreign financial institution.--The term ``foreign
financial institution'' has the meaning given that term under
section 561.308 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations.
(4) Knowingly.--The term ``knowingly'', with respect to
conduct, a circumstance, or a result, means that a person has
actual knowledge, or should have known, of the conduct, the
circumstance, or the result.
(5) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary of
the Treasury.
(6) United states financial institution.--The term ``United
States financial institution'' has the meaning given the term
``U.S. financial institution'' under section 561.309 of title
31, Code of Federal Regulations.
PURPOSE AND SUMMARY
On November 9, 2017, Representative Roger Williams
introduced H.R. 4324, the ``Strengthening Oversight of Iran's
Access to Finance Act''. H.R. 4324 requires the Secretary of
the Treasury to provide Congress with a report on transactions
authorized for financial institutions related to the export or
re-export of aircraft to Iran.
The legislation would also require that the report certify
that authorized transactions would not benefit Iranian persons
that have transported items for the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction (WMD), or provided transportation services or
material support for, or on behalf of, any person sanctioned
for terrorism, WMD proliferation, or human rights abuses in
Syria. The report would also certify that financial
institutions that engage in aircraft finance for Iran have
appropriate due diligence measures in place to avoid
sanctionable activities.
If the report cannot include these certifications, the
legislation requires the Secretary of the Treasury to explain
the reasons for non-certification, and notify Congress of
changes, if any, that will be made to financial institutions'
authorizations.
H.R. 4324 further includes Presidential waiver authority to
incentivize behavioral change in Iran, and to provide the
administration with significant flexibility in order to
safeguard U.S. national security.
BACKGROUND AND NEED FOR LEGISLATION
Under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the
Obama administration agreed to license the export of commercial
passenger planes to Iran, though nearly all other existing
trade restrictions with the country remain in place. When
licensing the export of these aircraft, the U.S. Department of
the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) may
include authorization for U.S. financial institutions to
undertake transactions necessary to effectuate the aircraft
sales. Such authorizations could expose U.S. banks to Iran,
which the U.S. Department of State has classified as the
world's foremost state sponsor of terrorism.
In 2016, OFAC licensed the export of more than 200 planes
to Iran Air, the country's leading state-owned carrier. In
2011, The Treasury Department sanctioned Iran Air for using its
commercial passenger planes to transport rockets, missiles, and
other military cargo on behalf of the Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps (IRGC) and Iran's Ministry of Defense and Armed
Forces Logistics. The Treasury Department determined that Iran
Air's illicit activities included transporting weapons and
related components to Syria, another state sponsor of terrorism
and the site of a civil conflict that has claimed an estimated
400,000 lives.
In accordance with the JCPOA, the Obama administration
lifted sanctions on Iran Air in January 2016; however, there is
evidence that the carrier has continued its illicit behavior.
According to April 2017 testimony before the Committee by Dr.
Emanuele Ottolenghi, a senior fellow at the Foundation for
Defense of Democracies, Iran Air operated at least 114 flights
to Syria between January 16, 2016 (Implementation Day of the
JCPOA) and March 30, 2017. These flights used known weapons
resupply routes, including stopovers in Abadan, Iran, a
suspected IRGC logistical hub that supports airlifts to the
Assad regime. In communications with the Committee, Dr.
Ottolenghi later confirmed that Iran Air had flown at least 134
such flights between Implementation Day and May 4, 2017.
As Dr. Ottolenghi stated during his testimony on April 4,
2017:
``Based on publicly available open source
information, it is extremely likely that Iran Air is
still an active participant in the airlifts. This
conclusion is based on the following:
There is no justification for frequent
commercial flights to Damascus; Syria is a war zone
with little tourism or commerce, yet it is served by an
average of 11 flights a week.
Iran Air operates flight number 697 from
Tehran to Damascus twice a week. The flight cannot be
purchased on Iran Air's booking website or through
travel agencies, and the booking website does not
include Damascus among its destinations from Tehran's
international airport, where the flights originate.
Iran Air flight 697 occasionally makes a
stopover in Abadan, a logistical hub for the Syria
airlifts regularly used by other airlines. This
diversion is inconsistent with international civil
aviation regulations and suggests that the airline is
trying to disguise its flight path.''
In addition to Iran Air's suspected support for sanctioned
entities and continued atrocities in Syria, Iran generally
suffers from profound deficiencies in combatting money
laundering and terrorist financing, which has led the Treasury
Department to designate it a ``jurisdiction of primary money
laundering concern,'' and the Financial Action Task Force to
label it a ``high-risk and non-cooperative jurisdiction.''
H.R. 4324 provides Congress with greater oversight over
financial transactions that the Treasury Department authorizes
with Iran. Given the risks that doing business with Iran poses,
such oversight will help detail those risks for Congress and
ensure that financial institutions are aware of the heightened
due diligence they should exercise with respect to Iran.
H.R. 4324 includes waiver and sunset provisions in order to
give significant flexibility to the President to pursue U.S.
foreign policy goals, and incentivizes Iran to rein in its
support for terrorism, weapons proliferation, and regional
destabilization.
This legislation does not re-impose sanctions lifted under
the JCPOA.
HEARINGS
The Subcommittee on Monetary Policy and Trade held a
hearing titled ``Increasing the Effectiveness of Non-Nuclear
Sanctions against Iran'' on April 4, 2017, which examined
matters relating to H.R. 4324.
COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION
The Committee on Financial Services met in open session on
November 14, 2017, and ordered H.R. 4324 to be reported
favorably to the House without amendment by a recorded vote of
38 yeas to 21 nays (record vote no. FC-97), a quorum being
present.
COMMITTEE VOTES
Clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of
Representatives requires the Committee to list the record votes
on the motion to report legislation and amendments thereto. The
sole recorded vote was on a motion by Chairman Hensarling to
report the bill favorably to the House without amendment. The
motion was agreed to by a recorded vote of 38 yeas to 21 nays
(Record vote no. FC-97), a quorum being present.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
COMMITTEE OVERSIGHT FINDINGS
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the findings and recommendations of
the Committee based on oversight activities under clause
2(b)(1) of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives,
are incorporated in the descriptive portions of this report.
PERFORMANCE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES
With respect to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, the Committee advises that the
bill contains no measure that authorizes funding, so no
statement of general performance goals and objectives for which
any measure authorizes funding is required.
NEW BUDGET AUTHORITY, ENTITLEMENT AUTHORITY, AND TAX EXPENDITURES
In compliance with clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules
of the House of Representatives, the Committee adopts as its
own the estimate of new budget authority, entitlement
authority, or tax expenditures or revenues contained in the
cost estimate prepared by the Director of the Congressional
Budget Office pursuant to section 402 of the Congressional
Budget Act of 1974.
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE ESTIMATES
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the following is the cost estimate
provided by the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section
402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974:
U.S. Congress,
Congressional Budget Office,
Washington, DC, December 4, 2017.
Hon. Jeb Hensarling,
Chairman, Committee on Financial Services,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 4324,
Strengthening Oversight of Iran's Access to Finance Act.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Matthew
Pickford.
Sincerely,
Keith Hall,
Director.
Enclosure.
H.R. 4324--Strengthening Oversight of Iran's Access to Finance Act
H.R. 4324 would amend current law to require the Department
of the Treasury to report to the Congress on the financing of
aircraft purchases by the Republic of Iran. The bill would
direct the Secretary of the Treasury to certify whether or not
financial transactions to facilitate the export of aircraft to
Iran involve activities that could be sanctioned under current
law.
If sufficient information is available to make that
certification, CBO estimates that implementing H.R. 4324 would
have no significant cost to the federal government because it
would not amend existing sanctions. However, CBO cannot
determine whether the department would be able to make the
required certification.
Enacting the H.R. 4324 would not affect direct spending and
revenues; therefore, pay-as-you-go procedures do not apply.
CBO estimates that enacting H.R. 4324 would not increase
net direct spending or on-budget deficits in any of the four
consecutive 10-year periods beginning in 2028.
H.R. 4324 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector
mandates as defined in Unfunded Mandates Reform Act.
The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Matthew
Pickford. This estimate was approved by H. Samuel Papenfuss,
Deputy Assistant Director for Budget Analysis.
FEDERAL MANDATES STATEMENT
This information is provided in accordance with section 423
of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995.
The Committee has determined that the bill does not contain
Federal mandates on the private sector. The Committee has
determined that the bill does not impose a Federal
intergovernmental mandate on State, local, or tribal
governments.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE STATEMENT
No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b)
of the Federal Advisory Committee Act were created by this
legislation.
APPLICABILITY TO LEGISLATIVE BRANCH
The Committee finds that the legislation does not relate to
the terms and conditions of employment or access to public
services or accommodations within the meaning of the section
102(b)(3) of the Congressional Accountability Act.
EARMARK IDENTIFICATION
With respect to clause 9 of rule XXI of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the Committee has carefully reviewed
the provisions of the bill and states that the provisions of
the bill do not contain any congressional earmarks, limited tax
benefits, or limited tariff benefits within the meaning of the
rule.
DUPLICATION OF FEDERAL PROGRAMS
In compliance with clause 3(c)(5) of rule XIII of the Rules
of the House of Representatives, the Committee states that no
provision of the bill establishes or reauthorizes: (1) a
program of the Federal Government known to be duplicative of
another Federal program; (2) a program included in any report
from the Government Accountability Office to Congress pursuant
to section 21 of Public Law 111-139; or (3) a program related
to a program identified in the most recent Catalog of Federal
Domestic Assistance, published pursuant to the Federal Program
Information Act (Pub. L. No. 95-220, as amended by Pub. L. No.
98-169).
DISCLOSURE OF DIRECTED RULEMAKING
Pursuant to section 3(i) of H. Res. 5, (115th Congress),
the following statement is made concerning directed rule
makings: The Committee estimates that the bill requires no
directed rule makings within the meaning of such section.
SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS OF THE LEGISLATION
Section 1. Short title
This Section cites H.R. 4324 as the ``Strengthening
Oversight of Iran's Access to Finance Act.''
Section 2. Findings
Congressional findings make note of Iran's designation as
the world's leading state sponsor of terrorism and a
jurisdiction of primary money laundering concern. The section
also documents the Obama administration's multiple reassurances
that, under the Iran nuclear deal, the U.S. would continue to
hold the country accountable for illicit non-nuclear
activities, including support for terrorism, weapons
proliferation, and regional destabilization. In addition, the
findings underscore Iran Air's previous blacklisting for its
support of the IRGC and Iranian defense ministry, as well as
its continued flights to Syria using known weapons resupply
routes.
Section 3. Certifications for aircraft-related transactions by United
States and Foreign Financial Institutions
Not later than 30 days after authorizing a transaction by
U.S. or foreign financial institutions in connection with the
export or re-export of commercial aircraft to Iran, and every
180 days thereafter, the Treasury Secretary shall report to the
appropriate congressional committees (the Committees on
Financial Services and Foreign Affairs of the House, and the
Committees on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and Foreign
Relations of the Senate) the following:
A list of financial institutions that have
conducted such transactions since January 16, 2016; and
A certification that
The authorized transaction does not pose a
significant money laundering or terrorism
financing risk to the U.S. financial system;
The authorized transaction does not benefit
an Iranian person that, in the year preceding
the certification, has knowingly transported
items used for the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction, or has knowingly provided
transportation services or material support
for, or on behalf of, any person designated
under Executive Orders 13224 (relating to
support for terrorism), 13382 (relating to
weapons proliferation), or 13572 (relating to
human rights abuses and repression in Syria);
and
Any financial institution that has
conducted an authorized transaction has, for
the duration of the authorization, appropriate
policies and procedures in place to avoid
engaging in sanctionable activities that may
result from its exposure to Iran.
For authorizations made between January 16, 2016 and
enactment of this Act, the Secretary would have 60 days
following enactment to submit a report, with subsequent reports
issued every 180 days thereafter.
Should the Secretary notify Congress that the certification
described above cannot be made, the Secretary would have 60
days to submit a report that includes:
A detailed explanation for the Secretary's
inability to make the certification; and
A notification as to whether the Secretary
will:
Not amend the authorization, despite the
non-certification;
Suspend the authorization until the
Secretary can make the authorization;
Revoke the authorization; or
Otherwise amend the authorization.
Congress would be provided an explanation for any course of
action the Secretary chooses to take.
Waiver
The President may waive the Act's provisions for up to one
year at a time upon certifying that the Government of Iran has:
Made substantial progress towards combating
money laundering and terrorism financing risk emanating
from Iran; or
Has significantly reduced Iran's
destabilizing activities in the region, or its material
support for terrorist groups.
The President may also issue a waiver upon certifying to
the appropriate congressional committees that it is important
to the national security interests of the United States, with
an explanation of the reasons therefor.
Termination
Section 3 would cease to have effect 30 days after the
President certifies that Iran is no longer a jurisdiction of
primary money laundering concern and has ceased its support for
international terrorism. Alternatively, the President could
terminate this section's provisions by reporting to the
appropriate congressional committees that a termination is
vital to U.S. national security interests, with an explanation
of the reasons therefor.
Section 3 includes definitions for terms that are
consistent with Iran-related sanctions language.
CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED
H.R. 4324 does not repeal or amend any section of a
statute. Therefore, the Office of Legislative Counsel did not
prepare the report contemplated by Clause 3(e)(1)(B) of rule
XIII of the House of Representatives.
MINORITY VIEWS
Last month, President Trump--whose enmity for the Iran
nuclear deal is well documented--refused to certify the
national security value of the Iran accord, which then put it
into the hands of Congress to fatally undermine the agreement
by reintroducing some or all of the suspended sanctions, if it
chose to do so within 60 days.
H.R. 4324 would entangle the Administration with a new,
unilateral certification requirement in order to carry out
current U.S. obligations related to the sale and financing of
commercial aircraft under the JCPOA, but then leave it up to
the Administration to decide whether or not to pull the trigger
on the nuclear deal if this certification cannot be made. This
could set in motion a dynamic that causes the JCPOA to unravel
because it would likely lead Iran to resume its nuclear
activities just at a time when the U.S. already has its hands
full with North Korea.
Under the JCPOA, the United States is broadly committed to
``allow for the sale of commercial passenger aircraft and
related parts and services to Iran.'' This involves not just
licensing the sale of aircraft and related parts and services
to Iran, but also those activities necessary to facilitate such
sales, including the financing for such sales.
The U.S. commitment is conditioned on ``licensed items and
services [being] used exclusively for commercial passenger
aviation.'' And yet, H.R. 4324 would impose extra conditions on
the licensed sale of aircraft to Iran, including, for instance,
the condition that the recipient airline has not used non-
licensed aircraft for purposes other than commercial passenger
aviation. That is, the Administration would have to certify
that Iran is not engaged in certain activity unrelated to
Iran's nuclear conduct or to the use of licensed aircraft
themselves. If the Secretary is unable to make such
certification, then the Secretary must report to Congress to
whether he intends to suspend, revoke, amend, or approve
(``notwithstanding such non-certification'') any license
facilitating the sale of commercial aircraft to Iran.
As we have now seen, President Trump objects to the fact
that his Administration has to take affirmative steps to keep
the deal in place, and refused to do so in the case of the last
recurring 90-day Congressional certification requirement.
Proponents of this bill undoubtedly expect Trump will react the
same way to these additional requirements, and block (by
omission of action) the sale of commercial aircraft that is a
key element of the deal.
The sale of safe commercial planes to Iranian airlines
allowed under the terms of the JCPOA will not appreciably
increase Iran's military capability--meanwhile, it's clear that
these sales get Iran to spend tens of billions of dollars on
Western commercial aircraft and not missile development,
militant salaries, and weapons. Directing Iran's spending away
from these things is a plus for U.S. national security, as
hawks who worried very much about an Iranian ``windfall''
should recognize.
By seeking to render impermissible that which is expressly
permitted pursuant to the JCPOA, the legislation would place in
peril the U.S. commitment to permit the sale of commercial
passenger aircraft to Iran, thereby placing the U.S. in non-
compliance with its obligations under the nuclear deal. We
strongly oppose this legislation.
Maxine Waters (CA).
Michael E. Capuano.
Stephen F. Lynch.
Al Green (TX).
Wm. Lacy Clay.
Joyce Beatty.
Daniel T. Kildee.
Keith Ellison.
Gregory W. Meeks.
[all]