Mr. Speaker, the ongoing re-registration campaign for religious organizations conducted by the State Committee for Relations with Religious Organizations, headed by Chairman Rafik Aliev potentially violates Azerbaijan’s commitments to religious freedom as a participating State in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Azerbaijan must take steps commensurate with its commitments under the Helsinki Final Act and subsequent OSCE documents to ensure the freedom of the individual to profess and practice their religion or belief, alone or in community with others. The State Committee, created last year to replace the Religious Affairs Directorate, has broad administrative powers, which Chairman Aliev seems willing to utilize in an attempt to ban minority religious communities through denial of legal registration. Recent reports indicate that of the 407 religious groups previously registered, only approximately 150 are currently under consideration for re-registration by the State Committee. An additional 200 organizations were unsuccessful in their initial application due to technical errors and were asked to resubmit these requests. While I am pleased that 80 groups have been approved, reportedly most are Muslim, I hope that the State Committee is not specifically discriminating against minority faiths or religious groups. Despite the extension of the re-registration deadline to the end of March, there is legitimate concern that groups will be arbitrarily denied registration, and thereby legal status, despite fulfilling all requirements. In addition, although this is the third registration campaign since 1991, reportedly about 2,000 more religious groups remain unregistered. Recently, a senior official at the State Committee declared unregistered groups will be closed down. The fear that the State Committee will refuse to register religious groups for arbitrary reasons is supported by several statements from Chairman Aliev himself. For instance, he declared the State Committee hoped to introduce more stringent regulations to govern both religious organizations and individuals. He also said the State Committee can request a court to suspend activities of any religious organization conducting activities deemed illegal or found to undermine national security. The State Committee has also limited the ability for religious communities to import religious material. Reportedly, Chairman Aliev also stated “religious organizations must be controlled� and that “religion is dangerous.� This flies in the face of President Heydar Aliyev’s November 1999 public statements supporting religious freedom in Azerbaijan. Also of concern are the heavy-handed actions against religious groups by Azeri Government officials and police officers. For example, on January 18, 2002, National Security Ministry officers raided an unregistered Protestant church, Living Stones, which was meeting in a private apartment. The police and security officers searched the residence and seized religious literature. Ten individuals who were attending the meeting were taken into custody, transferred to a police station and interrogated. While eight individuals were released, two church leaders, Yusuf Farkhadov and Kasym Kasymov, were given two-week prison sentences for violating Article 310 of the Administrative Code, which addresses “petty hooliganism.� The reported justification for the raid was that the church is not registered. However, Living Stones had attempted to register with the government, but only after one and a half years of waiting did the government decide their application contained errors and must be resubmitted. In addition, the church is listed as a branch of the Nehemiah Protestant Church, which is registered. Many other religious communities are also concerned. It is feared the Ashkenzai Jewish community will not be successful in registering, because the State Committee is favoring a separate Jewish group. The liquidation suit brought by Chairman Aliev against the Love Baptist Church in the Narimanov district court continues to drag on. Liquidating the church due to alleged statements by its pastor is a disproportionate penalty and contravenes OSCE commitments. Illegal closures of churches by local officials, as in the case of the Gyanja Adventist Church on February 24, 2002, have not been halted by the State Committee. The closure of mosques under the pretext of state security is also a concern, as the government could ban unpopular groups, despite no proof of illegal activity. The Helsinki Final Act commits that “the participating States will recognize and respect the freedom of the individual to profess and practice, alone or in community with others, religion or belief acting in accordance with the dictates of his own conscience.� Mr. Speaker, I urge President Aliyev to ensure that the re-registration process is accomplished in accordance with Azerbaijan’s OSCE commitments. In light of statements by Chairman Aliev, it is apparent the State Committee is perverting the re-registration process to arbitrarily deny legal registration to selected religious communities. The government must take the necessary steps to protect the right of individuals to profess and practice their faith by registering religious organizations, in keeping with Azerbaijan’s commitments as a participating OSCE State. In closing, Mr. Speaker, I am greatly alarmed by the re-registration campaign in Azerbaijan. This being the third time in a decade the government has required registration, it would seem Azerbaijan will continually “sift� minority religious groups until all are made illegal. Therefore, it is my hope that the Azeri Government will choose to honor its OSCE commitments and allow religious communities to register without harassment or bureaucratic roadblocks. Members of Congress will be watching to see if groups highlighted in this statement are harassed because of their mention.

Mr. Speaker, on November 5, parliamentary elections were held in Azerbaijan. In anticipation of those elections, the Helsinki Commission, which I chair, held hearings in May, at which representatives of the government and opposition leaders testified. While the former pledged that Baku would conduct a democratic contest, in accordance with OSCE standards, the latter warned that Azerbaijan's past record of holding seriously flawed elections required the strictest vigilance from the international community and pressure from Western capitals and the Council of Europe, to which Azerbaijan has applied for membership. Subsequently, I introduced a resolution, H. Con. Res. 382, which called on the Government of Azerbaijan to hold free and fair elections and to accept the recommended amendments by the OSCE's Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) to the law on elections.   From the start, there was pressure to withdraw the resolution from the Azerbaijani government and others. They argued that President Aliev had made, or would make, the necessary changes to ensure that the election met international standards, claiming to render the resolution either irrelevant or out of date. That pressure intensified as the election drew near; in fact, the resolution never came to a vote before Congress went out of session in early November.   It is worth recalling this brief history in light of what actually happened during Azerbaijan's pre-election period and on November 5. With respect to the election law, one of ODIHR's concerns was ultimately addressed by a decision of Azerbaijan's constitutional court, but on other important issues, Baku rejected any concessions and refused to incorporate ODIHR's suggested changes. From the beginning, therefore, the election could not have met OSCE standards, as ODIHR made plain in several statements. During the registration period, the Central Election Commission (CEC) rejected several leading opposition parties. Claiming that government experts could tell which signatures were forged, fraudulent or otherwise invalid merely on the basis of a visual examination, the CEC maintained the Musavat and the Azerbaijan Democratic Party had failed to get 50,000 valid signatures. The same thing happened to Musavat in the 1995 parliamentary election. At that time, the OSCE/UN observation mission emphasized the need to amend or get rid of this obviously flawed method of determining the validity of signatures, but Azerbaijan's authorities did not heed that advice. The exclusion of leading opposition parties drew strong criticism, both inside and outside the country, including the OSCE and the U.S. Government.   In early October, in apparent reaction to international concern, President Aliev “appealedâ€? to the CEC to find some way of registering excluded opposition parties. Some CEC members objected, arguing there was no constitutional basis for such a presidential appeal or a changed CEC ruling, but the Commission moved to include opposition parties. Though their participation certainly broadened the choice available to voters, the manner of their inclusion demonstrated conclusively that President Aliev controlled the entire election process. ODIHR welcomed the decision by the CEC and urged a reconsideration of the exclusion of over 400 individual candidates, about half of those who tried to run in single-mandate districts. But the CEC did not do so, and only in very few cases were previously excluded candidates allowed to run. As 100 of parliament's 125 seats were determined in single mandate districts, where local authorities exercise considerable power, the rejection of over 400 candidates signaled the government's determination to decide the outcome of the vote.   Though coverage of the campaign on state media favored the ruling party, opposition leaders were able to address voters on television. They used the opportunity, which they had not enjoyed for years, to criticize President Aliev and offer an alternative vision of governing the country. Their equal access to the media marked progress with respect to previous elections, as noted in the ODIHR's election report.   However, this voting and vote count on election day itself, according to the ODIHR's election, would be bad enough, considering that the election was the fourth since 1995 that failed to meet OSCE standards, even if some progress was registered in opposition participation and representation in the CEC. Much more interesting and disturbing, however, were the words used in a post-election press conference by two key international observers: Gerard Stoudman, the Director of ODIHR, who generally employs measured, diplomatic language, said he had not expected to witness “a crash course in various types of manipulation,â€? and actually used the phrase “primitive falsificationâ€? to describe what he had seen. Andreas Gross, the head of the observer delegation of the Council of Europe, an organization to which Azerbaijan has applied for membership and which is not particularly known for hard-hitting assessments of election shenanigans, amplified: “Despite the positive changes observed in Azerbaijan in recent years, the scale of the infringements doesn't fit into any framework. We've never seen anything like it.â€?   Mr. Speaker, in the context of international election observation, such a brutally candid assessment is simply stunning. As far as I know, representatives of ODIHR or the Council of Europe have never expressed themselves in such terms about an election that they decided to monitor. One senses that the harshness of their judgment is related to their disappointment: Azerbaijan's authorities had promised to conduct free and fair elections and had long negotiated with the ODIHR and the Council of Europe about the legal framework and administrative modalities but, in the end, held an election that can only be described as an embarrassment to all concerned. According to Azerbaijan's CEC, in the party list voting, only four parties passed the six-percent threshold for parliamentary representation: President Aliev's governing party, the New Azerbaijan Party; the Communist Party; and two opposition parties, the Popular Front (Reformers) and Civil Solidarity. Other important opposition parties allegedly failed to break the barrier and apart from a few single mandate seats won no representation in parliament. In the aftermath of the election and the assessments of the OSCE/ODIHR and the Council of Europe, the international legitimacy of Azerbaijan's legislature is severely undermined. Within Azerbaijan, the ramifications are no better.   All the leading opposition parties have accused the authorities of massive vote fraud, denounced the election results, and have refused to take the few seats in parliament they were given. Though some governing party representatives have claimed that opposition representation is not necessary for the parliament to function normally, others, perhaps including President Aliev, understand that a parliament without opposition members is ruinous for Azerbaijan's image. New elections are slated in 11 districts, and perhaps President Aliev is hoping to tempt some opposition parties to abandon their boycott by offering a few more seats. Whether opposition parties, which are bitterly divided, will participate or eventually agree to take up their deputies' mandates remains to be seen. What is clearer from the conduct of the election and its outcome is that President Aliev, who is preparing the succession of his son as Azerbaijan's next president, was determined to keep opposition leaders out of parliament and ensure that the body as a whole is supportive of his heir. If the only way to guarantee the desired outcome was wholesale vote fraud, so be it.   Prognoses of possible accommodation with the opposition, or possibly even some power sharing arrangements, to facilitate a smooth and peaceful transfer of power, have proved unfounded. Indeed, President Aliev reportedly has told the new UK Ambassador to Baku that Azerbaijan does not need to join the Council of Europe, indicating that he is not prepared to make any concessions when it comes to maintaining his grip on power and passing it on to his chosen heir, whatever the international community thinks. Even more worrisome is that by depriving the opposition of the possibility to contend for power through parliamentary means, Aliev has seriously reduced the chances of a “soft landingâ€? in Azerbaijan. When he eventually leaves the scene, anything could happen. This is not only a frightening prospect for the citizens of Azerbaijan, its neighbors and hopes for resolving regional disputes, especially the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, it is a scenario that should alarm policymakers in Washington as well.   Mr. Speaker, it is not my intention to say “I told you soâ€? to those colleagues who argued against my resolution. I would much have preferred to make a statement congratulating Azerbaijan on having held exemplary elections and making substantial steps towards democratization. Alas, I cannot do so, which should sadden and concern all of us. But I fear the consequences will be far more serious for the citizens of Azerbaijan.

Mr. Speaker, today I introduce a resolution calling on the Government of Azerbaijan to hold free and fair parliamentary elections this November. After a series of elections marred by irregularities, the upcoming election will help define the country's political orientation and its international reputation. Is Azerbaijan developing towards Western-style electoral democracy or mired in the Soviet pattern of controlled voting results? The answer to that question is important for the United States, which has significant strategic and economic interests in Azerbaijan.   At age 77, Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliev is the most experienced politician in the former Soviet space. Since returning to power in 1993, he has created a semi-authoritarian political system that features highly centralized, hands-on presidential rule, with constant positive coverage in the state-run media. President Aliev controls all branches of government and the state's instruments of coercion. His implicit bargain with Azerbaijan's citizens offers stability in return for unquestioned predominance. While Azerbaijan's constitution enshrines separation of powers, neither the legislature, judiciary, press, nor opposition parties may challenge President Aliev's hold on power. Indeed, in an interview published in last Sunday's New York Times, he openly said, `I will always be president here.' Opposition parties function, publish newspapers and have some representation in parliament. But they have no access to state media, which portray them negatively, and their opportunities to influence the political process, let alone actual decision-making, are carefully restricted.   With respect to elections, Azerbaijan's record has been poor. The OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) monitored the 1995 and 1998 parliamentary and presidential elections, and concluded that they did not meet OSCE standards. Council of Europe observers harshly criticized the first round of the local elections in December 1999, though they noted some improvements in the second round. These flawed elections have exacerbated the deep distrust between the government and opposition parties.   On May 25, the Helsinki Commission, which I chair, held hearings on the upcoming election, in which Azerbaijani Government representatives and opposition leaders participated. At that time, the main bone of contention between them was the composition of the Central Election Commission. During the hearing, a government spokesman announced that Baku was prepared to let government and opposition members veto the other side's nominees for the Commission posts set aside for independents, a major step forward. In fact, that assurance subsequently turned out to be not entirely reliable when the hard bargaining began in Baku, with the mediation of the ODIHR. Nevertheless, the agreement eventually reached did give opposition parties an opportunity to block decisions taken by the pro-presidential majority and was acclaimed by ODIHR as a fair and necessary compromise.   Since then, unfortunately, the process has collapsed. Azerbaijan's parliament passed an election law on July 5 that did not include amendments recommended by the ODIHR to bring the legislation into accord with OSCE standards. The law excludes an opposition party registered in February 2000 from fielding a party list; other problematic aspects include territorial and local election commissions which are effectively under government control, the restriction of voters' rights to sign petitions nominating more than one candidate or party, and the right of domestic observers to monitor the election. President Aliev claims that he proposed modifications to the election law but parliament refused to accept them. This assertion, considering his hold on the legislature, where a loyal, pro-presidential party controls over 80 percent of the seats, is simply not plausible. In any case, if he did not approve of the law, he could have vetoed it. Instead, he signed it.   On July 7, the ODIHR issued a press release `deploring' shortcomings in the election law. Opposition parties refused to participate in the work of the Central Election Commission unless the law is changed. In response, parliament amended the Central Election Commission law, depriving the opposition of the ability to block decisions. On July 20, 12 political parties, among them the leading opposition parties, warned that if parliament refuses to amend the election law, they will boycott the November ballot. Most recently, the State Department issued a statement on July 24, regretting the recent actions of Azerbaijan's parliament and urging the government and parliament in Baku to work with ODIHR, the opposition and non-governmental organizations to amend the election law in accordance with OSCE standards. Mr. Speaker, this turn of events is extremely disappointing. The last thing Azerbaijan needs is another election boycott by opposition parties. The consequences would include a parliament of dubious legitimacy, deepened distrust and societal polarization, and a movement away from electoral politics to street politics, which could threaten the country's stability.   November's election offers a historic opportunity to consolidate Azerbaijani society. It is essential for the future development of Azerbaijan's democracy and for the legitimacy of its leadership that the election be free and fair and the results be accepted by society as a whole. This resolution calls on the Administration to remind President Aliev of the pledge he made in August 1997 to hold free and fair elections, and urges Azerbaijan's Government and parliament to accept ODIHR's recommendations on the election law, so that it will meet international standards. I hope my colleagues will join me, Mr. Hoyer, Mr. Pitts and Mr. Cardin in this effort, and we welcome their support.