Hearings
Hearing Type:
Open
Date & Time:
Thursday, February 12, 2009 - 2:30pm
Location:
Hart 216
Witnesses
Full Transcript
[Senate Hearing 111-62]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-62
CURRENT AND PROJECTED NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 12, 2009
__________
Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
senate
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
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SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.]
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri, Vice Chairman
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah
Virginia OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
RON WYDEN, Oregon SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
EVAN BAYH, Indiana RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
BILL NELSON, Florida
SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island
HARRY REID, Nevada, Ex Officio
MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Ex Officio
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Ex Officio
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David Grannis, Staff Director
Louis B. Tucker, Minority Staff Director
Kathleen P. McGhee, Chief Clerk
CONTENTS
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FEBRUARY 12, 2009
OPENING STATEMENTS
Opening Statement of Hon. Dianne Feinstein, Chairman, a U.S.
Senator from California........................................ 1
Bond, Hon. Christopher S., Vice Chairman, a U.S. Senator from
Missouri....................................................... 2
WITNESS
Admiral Dennis C. Blair, USN (Ret.), Director of National
Intelligence................................................... 4
SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD
Prepared Statement of Admiral Dennis C. Blair.................... 10
Kathleen Turner, Director of Legislative Affairs, Office of the
Director of National Intelligence, letter transmitting
responses to questions from Committee Members, April 24, 2009.. 80
CURRENT AND PROJECTED NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES
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THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 12, 2009
U.S. Senate,
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:35 p.m., in
Room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, the Honorable Dianne
Feinstein (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members Present: Senators Feinstein, Rockefeller,
Wyden, Bayh, Mikulski, Feingold, Nelson of Florida, Whitehouse,
Bond, Hatch, Snowe, Chambliss, and Risch.
Chairman Feinstein. The hearing will come to order.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, CHAIRMAN, A U.S.
SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA
Our hearing today is the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence's 15th annual Worldwide Threat hearing. Today
we're going to hear testimony from Director Dennis Blair, the
Director of the national intelligence community. This will be
his first testimony to us since assuming his new position, so
congratulations, Director, and welcome.
As the DNI, Mr. Blair is in charge of the 16 agencies that
comprise the intelligence community. Since he is the manager of
the entire IC, Director Blair has requested that he be the sole
witness at the table, and the Committee has agreed to his
request. It should be said, however, that his testimony and
responses today reflect the analytical judgments of all of the
intelligence agencies.
Director Blair, we understand you've been on the job for
two weeks and should not be expected to know every nuance of
every judgment held by tens of thousands of intelligence
analysts. We expect that you will turn, if you need to, to
other experts behind you to provide more detailed responses to
Members' questions. That's up to you.
At times the intelligence community speaks with one voice.
At other times there are differing views held by one or more
agencies on a topic of vital interest to our national security.
I think we believe that this is not a shortcoming; it is a
strength. We should view the free and open exchanges of the
intelligence community to be a strength.
The President and his advisers, our leaders in the military
and diplomatic corps, and Members of Congress need to know all
the perspectives and all the threats to better set the policies
to protect our union, and that is the point of this.
So, it is with a great deal of pleasure that I welcome you
to your first public World Threat hearing. And I will now turn
to the distinguished Vice Chairman for his remarks, and then we
will have seven-minute rounds based on the early bird rule.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, VICE CHAIRMAN, A U.S.
SENATOR FROM MISSOURI
Vice Chairman Bond. Thank you very much, Madam Chair, and I
join with her in welcoming the new Director, Director Blair,
before the Committee--your first time as the DNI.
And we would note, as we've discussed before, that the
intelligence community has significantly improved its
capabilities and performance since 2004 when we passed the
reorganization. But work remains to be done. We look forward to
working with you in this Congress to help where we need to in
legislation.
Today you're going to discuss current and projected
threats, and our nation's senior leaders depend upon good
information from the intelligence community. Most Americans
never know the sacrifices made by, or the tremendous debt we
owe, the brave men and women who are the front lines facing
threats we are about to discuss, and in many areas do work that
the public will never know about.
It's our responsibility on the Committee to ensure that the
agencies have the resources, capabilities and authorities, and
to do so we need to be kept informed of the threats, issues and
regional developments so we know how to best provide for them.
At times it seems to me that people tend to forget the direct
assault on this country on September 11th, over seven years
ago, the lessons we learned from that day, and those who were
responsible have vowed to inflict more harm upon us.
We went into Afghanistan, deposed the Taliban, removed the
threat to the United States from al-Qa'ida sanctuaries there.
And we went into and removed the base operations of al-Qa'ida
in Iraq. But we still have not been able to eliminate the al-
Qa'ida and the Taliban insurgencies emanating from the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas in Pakistan, which fuel the
Afghan insurgency and allow al-Qa'ida to organize, train and
plan operations. And we look forward to working with you on
formulating a good policy.
The continued existence and operations of al-Qa'ida with
global outreach continue to be of concern. While we focus our
efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, al-Qa'ida operatives
in Algeria, the Sahel, Yemen, the Horn of Africa are able to
train, rest and prepare for attacks in the region and against
the U.S. or our allies. We have to pay attention to al-Qa'ida
wherever it operates and we look forward to getting information
from you on that.
I'm also very much concerned about the motives of Iranian
leaders who continue to provide overt support, training,
weapons and assistance to militants in Iraq and Afghanistan, as
well as to organizations like Hezbollah, Hamas and the
Palestinian Islamic Jihad. The intelligence community told us
in late 1907 that we did not know Iran's intentions, but we
knew it was pursing a weapons capability in the nuclear field
until at least 2003. Additionally, we now see Tehran making
significant advancements in its civilian nuclear program, which
could give Iran the technical capability necessary to produce
highly-enriched uranium, which requires very careful attention.
And we constantly hear a litany of other threats that face
the United States, including the intensification of
disagreements with Russia, the possibility of an outbreak of
hostilities between India and Pakistan, Chinese-Taiwan
confrontation, the North Korean nuclear program, continued
proliferations of missiles and weapons of mass destruction, as
well as any number of foreign intelligence organizations that
seek to spy on and weaken the U.S.
Other threats are out there. One year ago your predecessor,
Mike McConnell, presciently warned us about the increasing
threat in the cyber realm. He said, ``The U.S. information
technology infrastructure, which includes telecommunications,
computer networks and systems, and the data that reside on
those systems is critical to virtually every aspect of our
modern life. On threats to our IT infrastructure, an important
focus of this community, we assess that nations, including
Russia and China, have long had the technical capabilities to
target U.S. information systems for intelligence collection.''
``The worrisome part,'' he said last year, ``is today they
could also target information infrastructure systems for
degradation or destruction.'' And I'd like to hear your
thoughts on that.
Additionally, I think we've become aware that energy, and
its control, in many nations which are not friendly to us
allows them to have a very large and potentially harmful impact
on international security and international relations. We have
seen what they have been able to do with cutting off of
supplies, what some of our major energy producers have been
able to accomplish in the foreign policy realms by cutting off
energy supplies and threatening to do so.
My personal belief is that our inability to get the most
effective pressure on Iran that we could pose, from an economic
standpoint, is our inability to cut off the supply of refined
petroleum to Iran. And it is my strong suspicion that the
energy supply lines have influenced, and perhaps kept, some of
our allies who should be as concerned as we are about Iran,
from utilizing that very, very important economic and
diplomatic weapon. We need to do a better job on that, as we've
discussed with you. We are sadly lacking in energy intelligence
from hostile nations.
Finally, one of the biggest threats we face, as always, is
what we haven't uncovered yet--the unknown threat that falls
outside our spheres of collection, flies under the radar and is
not recognizable as a threat to any of our sources. The
intelligence community has to see beyond traditional security
models, break down old threat paradigms and create new
methodologies and tradecraft for recognizing the threats we
haven't seen before.
This means we have to recognize that we don't always know
what we don't know, and find a way to discover it anyway. My
primary concern, as ever, is being able to prevent attacks on
the U.S. and to guarantee the continued safety of the American
people. I'd look to you now to help us to find what those
threats may be.
Thank you, Madam Chair. And, again, welcome Mr. Director.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Vice Chairman.
And we'll now proceed to you, Mr. Director. I wonder if I
might ask that you confine your remarks to 15 minutes, if
that's convenient. If it isn't, just ask for more time so that
we have ample time to ask questions.
Thank you.
OPENING STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL DENNIS BLAIR, USN (RET.), DIRECTOR
OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
Director Blair. Yes, Madam Chair. Fifteen minutes should be
plenty adequate.
And I would like to thank the Committee for confirming me
since we last met. After two weeks on the job, I can tell you
it's a tremendously patriotic, highly-skilled and brave
workforce that I have the pleasure to lead. And in the
preparation for this testimony this afternoon, and other
editions of it that that will come later, we had a lively
exchange; everybody participated.
I'm happy to say that we do share the facts in the
intelligence community quite widely, but we often have
different opinions. And, as the Chairman said, I think that's a
healthy way to do it, and I heard a lot of that debate as I was
preparing to speak to you this afternoon.
I'd like to begin my remarks--and my remarks are not just
looking at threats but also looking at opportunities and
looking at the security landscape that we face. I think at the
beginning of a new administration, at the beginning of a new
Congress, it's a good time to take stock and see where the
United States needs to go to protect its interests in a major
way before we get into all of the details of having to go
operational as we must, and it's in that spirit that I offer my
remarks.
I'd like to begin with the global economic crisis because
it already looms as the most serious one in decades, if not in
centuries. Since September, 2008, 10 nations have committed to
new IMF programs. Unlike the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis,
countries will not be able to export their way out of this one
because of the global nature.
Chairman Feinstein. The mics are difficult, and you have to
speak--pull it as close to you as you can, and you have to
speak unidirectionally into it.
Director Blair. All right, I will try to keep my head
still. Thank you.
Chairman Feinstein. Thanks.
Director Blair. The stakes in this are high. Mexico, with
its close trade links to the United States, is vulnerable to a
prolonged U.S. recession. Europe and the former Soviet Union
have experienced anti-state demonstrations. Much of the former
Soviet Union, Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa lack sufficient
cash reserves and access to international aid. Economic crises
increase the risk of regime-threatening instability if they are
prolonged for a one- to two-year period, and instability can
loosen the fragile hold that many developing countries have on
law and order, which can spill out in dangerous ways into the
international community.
There are some silver linings. With low oil prices,
Venezuela will face financial constraints this year. Iran's
president faces less-than-certain prospects for reelection in
June. However, a serious energy supply crunch may happen in the
longer-term future if sustained low prices lead to the deferral
or the canceling of energy infrastructure projects in the near
term. So it's a confluence of events there.
This crisis presents challenges for the United States.
We're generally held to be responsible for it. The November G-
20 summit has brought the influence of emerging market nations
into the larger group, but the U.S. also has opportunities to
demonstrate increased leadership. Our openness, developed
skills and workforce mobility put us in a better position to
reinvent ourselves. Moreover, Washington will have the
opportunity to fashion new global structures that can benefit
all.
Moving now to terrorism, we have seen progress in Muslim
opinion turning against terrorist groups. Over the last 18
months al-Qa'ida has faced public criticism from prominent
religious leaders and even from fellow extremists. In 2008,
these terrorists did not achieve their goal of conducting
another major attack on the U.S., and no major country is at
immediate risk of collapse from extremist terrorist groups.
Replacing the loss of key leaders since 2008 in Pakistan's
Federal Administered Tribal Areas has proved difficult for al-
Qa'ida. Al-Qa'ida in Iraq has been squeezed. Saudi Arabia's
aggressive counterterrorism efforts have rendered the Kingdom a
harsh operating environment for al-Qa'ida. But despite these
setbacks, al-Qa'ida remains dangerous. Yemen is reemerging as a
jihadist battleground. The capabilities of terrorist groups in
East Africa will increase in the next year, and we remain
concerned about the potential for homegrown American extremists
inspired by al-Qa'ida's militant ideology to plan attacks
within the United States.
There are many challenges in that region that stretches
from the Middle East to South Asia, despite this progress
against countering violent extremism that I recounted. The U.S.
has strong tools, from military force to diplomacy. We have
good relations with the vast majority of states in the region,
and we will need all of these tools in order to help forge a
durable structure of peace and renewed prosperity in the
region. The revival of Iran as a regional power, the deepening
of ethnic, sectarian and economic divisions across most of the
region, the looming leadership succession among U.S. allies are
all reshaping this landscape.
Hezbollah and Hamas, with support from Persian Iran, have
successfully seized the mantle of resistance to Israel from
moderate secular Arab regimes. Battle lines are increasingly
drawn, not between Israel and Arab countries, but also between
secular Arab nationalists and ascendant Islamic nationalist
movements inside the Arab states.
The Iranian regime views the United States as its principal
enemy and also as a threat to them. A more assertive regional
Iranian foreign policy, coupled with its dogged development of
a deliverable nuclear weapon, alarms most of the governments
from Riyadh to Tel Aviv. The Levant is the key focal area for
these strategic shifts. Recent fighting between Israel and
Hamas in the Gaza Strip has deepened Palestinian political
divisions. It has also widened the rift between regional
moderates--led by Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan--and
hardliners, including Iran, Hezbollah and Syria.
With Hamas controlling Gaza and Hezbollah growing stronger
in Lebanon, progress on a Palestinian-Israeli accord is going
to be more difficult. With Iran developing a nuclear weapon
capability and with Israel determined not to allow it, there is
potential for an Iran-Israeli confrontation or crisis. Moderate
Arab states fear a nuclear-armed Iran, but without progress on
the Palestine settlement, they're harder put to defend their
ties to the United States.
In Iraq, coalition and Iraqi operations and dwindling
popular tolerance for violence are sidelining the extremists.
Fewer Iraqis are dying at the hands of their countrymen than at
any time in the past two years. Nevertheless, disputed internal
boundaries, Sunni perceptions of government repression, or
increased foreign support to insurgent or militia groups could
reverse political and security process, and Baghdad will also
be coping with declining oil revenues, its primary source of
government budgets.
In Afghanistan, the Taliban-dominated insurgency forces
have demonstrated greater aggressiveness in recent months.
Improved governance and extended developments were hampered in
2008 by a lack of security. Afghan leaders must tackle endemic
corruption and an extensive drug trade. Progress has been made
in expanding and fielding the Afghan National Army, but many
factors hamper efforts to make these units capable of
independent action. The upcoming 2009 presidential election
will present a greater security challenge than did that in
2004, and insurgents probably will make a concerted effort to
disrupt it.
And no improvement is possible in Afghanistan without
Pakistan taking control of its border areas, improving
governance and creating economic and educational opportunities
throughout the country. In 2008, Islamabad intensified its
counterinsurgency efforts, but its record in dealing with
militants has been mixed, as it balances conflicting internal
and counterterrorist priorities. The government is losing
authority in the north and the west. And even in the more
developed areas of the country, mounting economic hardships and
frustration over poor governance have given rise to greater
radicalization.
The time when only a few states had access to the most
dangerous technologies is long over. Often dual use, they
circulate easily in our globalized economy, as does the
scientific expertise to put them together into weapons. It's
difficult for the United States and its partners to track
efforts to acquire components and production technologies.
They're widely available. Traditional deterrence and diplomacy
constraints may not prevent terrorist groups from using mass-
effect weapons. So, one of the most important security
challenges facing the United States is fashioning a more
effective nonproliferation strategy with our partners in this
effort.
The assessment that was in our 2007 National Intelligence
Estimate about Iran's nuclear weapons programs are generally
still valid today. Tehran, at a minimum, is keeping open the
option to develop deliverable nuclear weapons. The halt in the
recent past in some aspects of the program was primarily in
response to increasing international scrutiny and pressure.
Some combination of threats--threats of intensified
international scrutiny and pressures, along with opportunities
for Iran to achieve its security goals--might prompt Tehran to
extend the halt to some nuclear weapons-related activities.
Turning to Asia, rapidly becoming a long-term locus of
power in the world, Japan remains the second-largest economy
and a strong ally, but the global downturn is also exacting a
heavy toll on Japan's economy. To realize its aspirations to
play a stronger regional and even global role will require
political leadership and some difficult decisions. The rising
giants, China and India, are playing increasing regional roles
economically, politically and militarily. China tries to secure
access to markets, commodities and energy supplies needed to
sustain domestic economic growth, and their diplomacy seeks
favorable relations with other powers, especially the United
States, in order to facilitate it. The global economic slowdown
threatens China's domestic stability and China's leaders are
taking both economic and security actions to deal with it.
Taiwan, as an area of tension in U.S.-China relations, has
substantially relaxed. The Taiwan President Ma, inaugurated in
May, has resumed dialogue with Beijing, and leaders on both
sides of the straits are cautiously optimistic about less-
confrontational relations. But preparations for a possible
Taiwan conflict nevertheless drive modernization goals for the
People's Liberation Army, and China's security interests are
broadening beyond Taiwan. A full civilian and military space
capability and formidable capabilities in cyberspace are being
rapidly developed. China will attempt to develop at least a
limited naval power projection capability, which is already
reflected in anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia.
Like China, India's expanding economy will lead New Delhi
to pursue new trade partners, gain access to vital energy
markets and generate other resources that sustain rapid growth.
India's growth rate will slow this coming year, but ample
reserves and a sound banking system will help ensure relative
stability.
Determined efforts by Indian and Pakistan leaders to
improve relations could unravel unless Islamabad, for its part,
takes meaningful steps to cut support to anti-Indian militant
groups and New Delhi, for its part, makes credible efforts to
allay Pakistan's security concerns. The increase in violent
attacks within India is a cause of great concern to its
government, as is instability in neighboring countries in South
Asia.
On the global stage, Indian leaders will continue to follow
an independent course. That we are both democracies does not
guarantee a congruence of interests. Nonetheless, good
relations with the United States will be essential for India to
realize its global ambitions.
Although the Middle East and Asia have the highest call on
our attention, our concerns are broader. Russia is actively
cultivating relations with regional powers, including China,
Iran, Venezuela. Moscow also is trying to maintain control over
energy networks to Europe and East Asia. Russian leaders have
recently spoken positively about the possibilities for change
in the U.S.-Russian dynamic but NATO enlargement, the conflict
over Georgia's separatist regions, and missile defense will all
pose difficulties.
In Latin America, populist, often autocratic regimes pose
challenges to the region's longer-term success. Basic law and
order issues, including rising violent crime and powerful drug-
trafficking organizations confront the key hemispheric nations,
as do uneven governance and institution-building efforts in
combating chronic corruption. The corruptive influence and
increasing violence of Mexican drug cartels impedes Mexico
City's ability to govern parts of its country. Unless the
United States is able to deliver market access on a permanent
basis, its traditionally privileged position in the region
could erode with an concomitant decline in political influence.
Africa has made substantial economic and political progress
over the last decade. The level of open warfare has declined
significantly, especially in Liberia, Sierra Leone and the
Ivory Coast. But the drop in commodity prices and the global
recession will test the durability of the region's recent
positive growth trend.
Even before the current crisis, the six percent GDP growth
rate of the continent, though impressive, could not bring about
the necessary structural reforms to reduce poverty, and a
number of intractable conflicts persist in the Democratic
Republic of Congo, Nigeria, Sudan, and Somalia. In Darfur, U.N.
peace talks remain stymied and a larger peacekeeping force is
slow to deploy.
Let me finish with the long-term challenge of environmental
security and the threats to our information technology
infrastructure. Adding more than a billion people to the
world's population by 2025 will put pressure on clean energy
sources and food and water supplies. Most of the world's
population will move from rural areas to urban areas seeking
greater opportunity. Many, particularly in Asia, will achieve
more advanced lifestyles with a greater per capita consumption
and greater per capita generation of pollution.
According to the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change, physical effects of climate change will worsen
in coming years. Multilateral policymaking on climate change is
likely to be substantial and a growing priority within
traditional security affairs. The world sees the United States
in a pivotal leadership role. As effects of climate change
mount, the U.S. will come under increasing pressure to help the
international community set goals for emission reductions and
to help others through technical progress.
And finally, threats to our information technology
infrastructure are an important IC focus, as they were last
year, as the Vice Chairman mentioned. Our information
infrastructure is both becoming indispensable to the
functioning of our society and it's becoming vulnerable to
catastrophic disruption in a way that the old analog
decentralized systems were not. Cyber systems are being
targeted for exploitation and potential for disruption or
destruction by a growing array of both state and non-state
actors.
If I could have two more minutes, Madam Chairman, I think I
can finish up. Thank you.
Network defense technologies exist. They're widely
available but they often are not uniformly adopted within our
networks. A number of nations, including Russia and China, can
disrupt elements of the U.S. information infrastructure. We
must take proactive measures to detect and prevent intrusions
before they do significant damage.
We must recognize that cyber defense is not a one-time fix.
It requires continual involvement in hardware, in software, in
cyber defenses, and in personnel. The international security
environment we face is complex. The global financial crisis has
exacerbated what was already a growing set of political and
economic uncertainties. We're nevertheless in a strong position
to shape a world reflecting universal aspirations and values
that have motivated Americans since 1776--human rights, the
rule of law, liberal market economics, social justice.
Whether we can succeed will depend in part on the actions
we take here at home--restoring strong economic growth,
maintaining the scientific and technological edge, defending
ourselves at reasonable cost while preserving our civil
liberties. It will also depend on our actions abroad, not only
in how we deal with regions, regimes, and individual crises,
but also in developing new cooperative multilateral approaches,
whether they're formal or informal, for effective international
cooperation in areas like trade and finance, in neutralizing
extremist groups using terrorism, in controlling the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, in developing
codes of conduct in defenses in cyberspace and in real space,
and in mitigating and slowing the effects of global climate
change.
Madam Chairman, thank you very much. I'm ready to turn this
into a discussion.
Chairman Feinstein. You have said what you want to say?
Director Blair. I have. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Director Blair follows:]
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Chairman Feinstein. Good. Good. Let me begin.
I'm looking at a National Public Radio release dated
February 3rd of this year and it begins, ``CIA-directed air
strikes against al-Qa'ida leaders and facilities in Pakistan
over the past six to nine months have been so successful,
according to senior U.S. officials, that it is now possible to
foresee a `complete al-Qa'ida defeat' in the mountainous region
along the border with Afghanistan.''
Do you agree with this statement? Has, in fact, al-Qa'ida
leadership been decimated? Is it close to defeat? If not,
please explain why you disagree. If this is not the case, why
then are senior U.S. officials discussing this with the press?
Director Blair. Madam Chairman, I think that senior al-
Qa'ida leadership is considerably less powerful, able to
communicate with its forces, able to plan and conduct attacks
than it was a year ago, two years ago. I would not share
whoever it was who talked to that radio station's judgment that
we are within sight of victory or that it is giving up on its
aspirations both against the United States as partners and
against the countries in the region. I have no idea why people
would talk in those terms when the facts as I know them are not
that optimistic.
Chairman Feinstein. I don't know whether you'd care to
comment on this, but I also notice that Mr. Holbrooke in
Pakistan ran into considerable concern about the use of the
Predator strikes in the FATA area of Pakistan, and yet, as I
understand it, these are flown out of a Pakistani base.
The question I have is how do you view this situation? If
the Pakistanis won't go in and decimate the terrorist
leadership, and the terrorist leadership is allowed to grow,
it's going to impact Pakistan negatively, perhaps even to the
extent of one day hopefully not but possibly taking down its
government. How do we develop the kind of nexus we should have
with the government of Pakistan to really have an effective
attack on people who are major national security threats both
to Pakistan, to Afghanistan, and to our own country?
Director Blair. Madam Chairman, I think you put your finger
on the key to dealing with the terrorists and extremist groups
in that area. It does depend on Pakistan's effort, with our
assistance. I think that Pakistan is sorting out some of those
questions itself internally because the relationship between
groups and tribes and the government and the security services
and the armed forces has been very complicated in Pakistan in
the past and there are a lot of different agendas being played
out within those circles.
I think for our part we have to give it intense and
persistent leadership. We have to let the Pakistanis know that
we're there working with them for the long haul against these
common threats, and that they need to come to the realization
with the point that you basically expressed, that these are as
much a threat to Pakistan as they are to others and they really
need to put their shoulder to the wheel in a way that benefits
all of us. I'm not sure that all of Pakistan is quite there yet
and that's really our challenge.
Chairman Feinstein. Let me, if I might, change to
Hezbollah. Director Tenet used to tell us that Hezbollah was
really far more sophisticated than most other groups of its
type. In the wake of the 2006 war with Israel, has Hezbollah's
position strengthened or weakened?
Director Blair. Strengthened.
Chairman Feinstein. And you believe that today, then, it is
a stronger threat to the United States or a stronger threat to
Israel? How is it in effect a stronger threat today?
Director Blair. I think it's a stronger threat today
because it has rebuilt the weapon stocks that it used up in the
2006 war. It has learned lessons from that war which it has
applied to its capability in the future, and so it is better
prepared for future conflict. As to what it will actually do,
that's a harder question. It certainly believes that Israel is
the enemy and the Israelis believe that Hezbollah is the enemy
so there's a confrontation there that will go on for some time.
The attitude towards the United States, I think, is
influenced by Iranian relations with the United States and
Iranian calculations of what the effect of violence would be.
So I think that it's really at least a three-sided game--United
States, Israel, Iran, Hezbollah--four-sided. Syria is a fifth
part of that calculation but your fundamental question about
the capability, I think they are stronger than they were
before.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you. Now, I wanted to get in one
more question and tap your experience as CINCPAC and your
knowledge of the Chinese-Taiwanese situation. I've read all
your writings on the subject and I basically agree with your
comments and I think they're very perceptive and astute.
The relationship has a very difficult dynamic to it--all
the missiles on the coast of China faced at Taiwan, our defense
sales to Taiwan which then irritate the Chinese, and yet the
Chinese now beginning to take action to sort of soothe the
waters.
The latest, I guess, is the head of the big, beautiful
museum in Taipei going to Beijing to facilitate some sharing of
art, which is also a small, but nonetheless welcome sign.
How do you view, in this new dynamic, the China-Taiwan
relationship? What should we be aware of and what should we
look out for?
Director Blair. I think, Madam Chairman, that the
developments since President Ma was elected are the most
positive that we've seen in recent years. And the steps that
are being taken between his government and China are very
encouraging in terms of working on practical problems like
travel, bank transfers, art and so on.
I think that developing some momentum in terms of things
that can be done for the benefit of both sides are important
and I applaud both sides for taking those steps.
I think that as far as what we can do, a key part of it is
making sure that military measures are unattractive to all
sides, to both sides in that confrontation. And that means
maintaining the balance, which is really what the Taiwan
Relations Act calls for. So clearly, on the one hand, Taiwan
should not be so defenseless that it feels that it has to do
everything that China says. On the other hand, China cannot be
so overwhelming that it can bully Taiwan.
On the other hand, Taiwan has to realize that its long-term
security lies in some sort of an arrangement with China. It
does not lie in military defenses. So if we can keep that
balance correct, then all of the incentives are toward solving
the problems in political and people-to-people ways. And I
think they can, over time. I think there are arrangements that
could be made that would give Taiwan the international space
that they feel they deserve and give China the reassurance that
one China is a realistic policy.
And so we just have to encourage the events and make sure
that military adventures are unattractive.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you. My time is up.
Vice Chairman.
Vice Chairman Bond. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Mr. Director, many of us on this Committee criticized the
way the 2007 NIE on Iran was drafted, which in the key
unclassified judgments left the impression in the public that
intelligence community was not concerned about Iran's nuclear
efforts.
Indeed, today's article in The Los Angeles Times notes
statements by the President and Mr. Panetta, when he was before
us for confirmation, about the intent of Iran to seek nuclear
capability. And they go onto say, ``This language reflects the
extent to which senior U.S. officials now discount an NIE
issued in November 2007 that was instrumental in derailing U.S.
and European efforts to pressure Iran to shut down its nuclear
program.''
In light of that, do you believe that the release of
intelligence community judgments, and NIEs themselves, can be
damaging to our national security interests?
Director Blair. Mr. Vice Chairman, I agree that we can
cause as much harm as good by releasing many of these NIEs on
very difficult subjects in which a great deal of secret
intelligence--which the taxpayers have paid an awful lot of
money for us to use to collect secrets--are put forth in the
wrong way. And I think it's something we have to think
carefully about.
Frankly, when I was here for confirmation hearings, I was a
little less aware of how difficult this question is than I am
in the couple of weeks since I've been on the job. The
preparing of these remarks was not easy, in trying to figure
out what to say in unclassified settings and classified
settings. So it's something that I think can cause us problems
if not handled very well.
Vice Chairman Bond. Well, I would agree with you. I'm a
great believer that experience is what you get when you
expected to get something else. And I hope the intelligence
community learned something from it. I would hope that you
would be producing an update of the Iran nuclear NIE.
And do you--for the record, at this point--have any
assessment of the likelihood that Iran would forgo the
development of nuclear weapons? Is there anything that you
could say publicly that would indicate they are looking at
forgoing this capability that most of us think they are
pursuing?
Director Blair. I can say in this forum that Iran is
clearly developing all the components of a deliverable nuclear
weapons program--fissionable material, nuclear weaponizing
capability and the means to deliver it. Whether they take it
all the way to nuclear weapons and become a nuclear power I
think will depend a great deal on their own internal decisions.
But I do think that the international community--no one in
the international community wants a nuclear-armed Iran either.
The question is, what are you going to do about it? And if the
international community can put together the right package of
sticks and potential reassurances that will meet some of these
security concerns that Iran feels, then there's a chance.
There's a chance that they will choose another course. Other
nations have.
I don't think it's a done deal either way, but I think it's
going to be a difficult task for the international community
both because it's split, and because of the advantages that
many Iranians clearly feel would be served by having nuclear
weapons. So I would not rule it out, but it's not something
that's going to fall off--it's not like falling off a log.
Vice Chairman Bond. Turning to an area where you have
special expertise and I have a great deal of interest, I
noticed that an Indonesian court recently handed out 15-year
sentences to Jemaah Islamiyah leaders Abu Dujana and Zarkasih
in April of 1908 and they've not conducted a large-scale anti-
Western attack since the Bali bombing in October 2005.
How would you characterize the relationship we have with
Indonesia on counterterrorism and intelligence issues? And how
much do you think they have degraded the capabilities of JI,
which I regard as a serious terrorist organization?
Director Blair. Mr. Vice Chairman, as you say, we've
discussed Indonesia and I think we agree that Indonesia has
made great strides against JI. Once the Bali bombing really
jolted them into realizing what a threat it was to Indonesia,
they took very aggressive action.
We assisted them in certain ways, but the primary drive and
the primary actions were taken by Indonesia--as they were by
other Southeast Asian nations who took on this task, Malaysia,
Singapore in particular, in addition to Indonesia.
So think JI is much weaker than it was. It's not entirely
eliminated, but I think Indonesia's done a good job of bringing
it under control.
Vice Chairman Bond. I agree also with your suggestion in
your statement that current low prices for energy, along with
the possibility that much higher prices will come when we
recover from this economic downturn, which I think is going to
happen if we can take the toxic assets out of the financial
system, that we face very high fuel prices, with all of the
problems that causes. And I know the International Energy
Agency has concluded that, just to replace the accelerating
depletion and maintain current oil levels through 2030, we'll
have to find the equivalent production of four-and-a-half Saudi
Arabias.
Do you think that we can expect that magnitude of
production, given constraints on North American exploration and
production, as well as the fact that national oil companies
like Venezuela's dominate 80 percent of the world's oil
reserves? And do you believe this energy security problem
presents a serious threat to our national interest?
Director Blair. Yes, sir. I agree completely that it
presents a very serious threat. And I also agree with your
analysis that if we go on doing as we did before--more
nationalized oil companies that are not investing in their
infrastructure, low prices currently knocking out oil
projects--and then we resume growth, all of the tight supply-
demand that we've seen in the last couple of years will be
there, with the transportation structure stretched to the
limit, small interruptions having huge spikes in prices, the
consequence economic disruption.
We have got to change that. We have got to change that
balance or else we are storing up great trouble for the United
States, friends and many others in the world.
So it's got to be a multipronged approach of working on
both production and alternatives and conservation in order to
get off of this oil supply that is strung tight as a wire
throughout the world.
Vice Chairman Bond. Thank you for a very thoughtful answer.
Madam Chair.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Vice Chairman.
Senator Wyden.
Senator Wyden. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. And
Director Blair, thank you for your courtesy and responsiveness
to me over these last few months.
A number of Senators on both sides of the aisle are very
concerned about cyber terror, and you've referred to it;
colleagues have referred to it. And I want to start my
questioning in this area by your assessment of how vulnerable
is the U.S. power grid to cyber attack.
Director Blair. I think a lot of things have been done in
the power grid recently with the realization of its
vulnerability. A couple of years ago I'd say it was a piece of
cake to people even with quite low skills. Because of the
emphasis on it, it's not down at that level; however, a very
skilled attack by a group that really knew what it was doing
could cause us some problems. So there's a great deal more work
that has to be done there.
Senator Wyden. I'm also concerned that the development of
the smart grid could create more potential vectors for cyber
attack. Do you share that view?
Director Blair. I think in building a smart grid, Senator,
we have to take security into account right from the beginning.
As you know, anytime you centralize and make efficient and cut
your margins, you open up vulnerabilities not only to just
stuff happening but also to malicious attack like cyber. So I
don't know the technical details of the SCADA systems and
interconnections of the smart grid, but if we don't build in a
more robust cyber defense from the very first building block,
we're leaving ourselves wide open.
Senator Wyden. In your view, Director, are there any
terrorist groups capable of mounting a significant cyber attack
on our country today?
Director Blair. When I think of the things that terrorist
groups can do to us, Senator Wyden, the cyber capability is not
the one in which I feel they have the greatest skills for the
greatest destruction. I think that they have other terrible
things they can do to us that they are working on harder,
they're better able to do, and they seem to be more motivated
to do. So it's possible, but I don't think the combination of
terror and cyber is the nexus that we are most worried about.
Senator Wyden. Let me turn to another subject, if I could.
I've been very concerned about the potential for violence
against Iraqi translators that are currently working for our
military. It's been important that these individuals'
identities be kept secret so they aren't subject to reprisals
and retribution from anti-American groups inside the country.
I've worked with the Defense Department in this regard to try
to protect these translators with masks. DOD has tried to work
with our office.
But I'm also concerned about the possibility that anti-
American elements of Iraqi government ministries might seek to
uncover these translators' identities by accessing tax records
or other government information. How would you assess right now
the seriousness of this, and particularly, can you tell us
anything about ministries or other elements of the Iraqi
government that the translators ought to be concerned about?
Director Blair. Senator Wyden, I know the threat to
translators is real. I have friends from the armed forces who
personally took steps to get translators out of Iraq because it
was so dangerous to them. The overall situation is much better
now.
I was not aware of the particular problem of Iraqi
government records being a potential source to identify them,
which could be used as the basis for making attacks on them.
I'll have to take a look into that and get back to you. But the
general principle of making sure that those who helped us
through providing translating services is the right one, and we
need to help them.
Senator Wyden. I'd appreciate a prompt answer on that,
Director, because I am concerned about the possibility of these
anti-American elements looking at yet other strategies to make
life difficult for our translators.
Director Blair. Right.
Senator Wyden. These translators are performing a great
service in terms of advancing American security in a very
difficult arena, and I appreciate your interest.
Let me ask you a question, if I could, now about Iran.
Obviously members of this Committee are following the Iranian
presidential election, and it's certainly my hope, I'm sure
shared, that President Ahmadi-nejad gets replaced by a more
stable and more rational individual. But of course in Iran, the
president is not the commander in chief, and his influence over
foreign policy is more limited than perhaps many political
systems.
Is it your view that a change in president would result in
a significant shift in Iranian foreign policy? And let's start
particularly with the prospect that a replacement of President
Ahmadi-nejad would result in a shift in nuclear policy.
Director Blair. Senator, I don't believe that a change of a
single individual as president would change in and of itself a
fundamental Iranian policy like development of nuclear weapons.
I think that those decisions are taken by the groups around the
Supreme Leader, which is more than one person. So I think that
we can't put our hopes in Iran on great changes to their policy
towards the United States based on the presidential election
itself.
Senator Wyden. I think you've touched on this, but what can
you say in a public setting with respect to Iran's current
support for Hamas and Hezbollah? And what does Iran get out of
providing this support, in your judgment?
Director Blair. I would say there are at least two
motivations for Iran's support of these groups. One of them is
to seize control of the resistance narrative within the Middle
East as opposed to the peace narrative, which is what we and
many others favor. Iran seeks to associate itself, even though
it's Persian, with the Arab cause against Israel. It feels that
will benefit its power in the region.
And the second one is, fundamentally I think they don't
like Israel, and anything that they can do to help somebody
that's going against Israel is sort of good in their mind. So I
would say those two things motivate them.
Senator Wyden. I share your view.
Madam Chair, thank you.
Chairman Feinstein. Senator Rockefeller.
Senator Rockefeller. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Two questions on China: When President Clinton was
President, they obviously had the missile fire-over, and it
turned out in fact that the missiles were empty. But that
certainly didn't make any difference as far as the
international community to find that out. One of the things
I've always worried about--I've always been worried about is
the fact that in the PLA, that these more senior generals, the
ones who would have been responsible for what went on at that
time, for example, are not being followed in their relative
moderation by the younger PLA officers coming up--that they
tend to be more nationalistic, more willing to take risks. And
I'm interested in your view on that.
Director Blair. I think that most of our evidence on that,
Senator Rockefeller, is pretty incomplete and somewhat
anecdotal. My personal experiences with--when I think of my
personal experiences with junior officers and when I think of
my discussions in China, I think that in general junior
officers tend to be more aggressive and swashbuckling. They are
definitely told to be ready to attack Taiwan, to fulfill the
historic destiny of China, and when you train junior officers
to go do a military job, they become enthusiastic about it.
They put their heart into it. They want to do it.
You know the saying that war is old men sending young men
out to die, and the older men often, I think, tend to be a
little more aware of the penalties and the dangers and perhaps
are a bit conservative.
So it's hard to say what will happen when these junior
officers become more senior officers--get a little more
seasoning, get the real responsibility, have to look the issues
in the eye if you unloose the hordes.
China is not a combat service. If you look at the junior
officers in the United States armed forces, they know what war
is. They've been out there. They've seen their buddies and
their men die. They know that things happen that you're not
planning on. The PLA officers don't see that. They do war
games; they do exercises. Nobody bleeds and dies in exercises.
So I think you have a valid concern that the younger
generation of the PLA may not have as careful an appreciation
of war as their senior officers.
That being said, I do think that the overall leadership of
China is a fairly careful, conservative group who recognize
that China's primary problems are internal--social change,
achieving enough economic prosperity that they can take care of
their population and raise the standard of living. And I think
they also think that you can't believe everything you hear from
the armed forces, and if you have a more careful way, it's
probably worth taking it.
So I think within the leadership that actually makes
decisions in China, there's a certain amount of care and
caution, but I would not discount your observation about some
of the junior military officers.
Senator Rockefeller. The senior leader in China is not of
the military.
Director Blair. Is not what, sir?
Senator Rockefeller. Is not of the military.
Director Blair. Right.
Senator Rockefeller. And that adds, I think, to the
equation. I'm not quite sure how.
Let me skip to India. It's amazing to me to read the book,
written in 1947, ``Freedom at Midnight,'' and compare that to
what's happening today and to look at the dynamics between
India and Pakistan, Kashmir, the rest of it, at that time and
the situation today. And I'm an optimist--I have to be an
optimist. We all have to be optimists because we have to search
for solutions. But it's really quite difficult, absent what we
focus on, and that is, is India going to send a nuclear bomb
towards Pakistan and Pakistan towards India? Maybe there will
be military clashes. There have been for years in the Kashmir
area.
What it is in the makeup of those two countries that
actually wants to find resolution, that wants to get along, I'm
not sure where that is. Where do you see that? Is it because of
the nuclear power thing? Does it go beyond that?
Director Blair. I think there are a number of factors,
Senator Rockefeller, that would perhaps change the attitude
that was there in 1947. One certainly is the nuclear--
possession of nuclear weapons by both sides. There is no doubt
that senior Pakistanis and Indians feel that a war between them
that got out of hand and would result in tremendous devastation
for both sides, far more than the issues in general in Kashmir
that they're confronting over.
I think also the violent extremism in the region of South
Asia is changing attitudes, perhaps slowly, in Pakistan and in
India. We talked a little bit about that earlier in this
session and how Pakistan is realizing that this violent
extremism can be a threat to them. The Indians too are becoming
concerned about----
Senator Rockefeller. Let me interrupt you because of my
time problem. If you look at virtually all of these countries
across the world, outside of Europe and us perhaps, the thing
that strikes you more than anything else is that over 50
percent of all of the populations are 25 or below, 20 or below,
14 or below, and therefore have neither any sense of history,
any sort of sense of the future, any sense of a coherent
pattern within their own lives, and that is a destabilizing
factor. Now, that doesn't just apply to Pakistan and India, but
I wonder if you would comment just on the age factor and the
future of radicalism in really the world.
Director Blair. I've looked at some of the academic
research on it, and, Senator, there are far more questions than
there are answers, and it would not be useful for me to talk
about it at that time. But it's sort of one of those--it's
something big out there; we just don't know which way it's
going to cut, and we ought to be working on it and thinking
about it some more.
Senator Rockefeller. I'll be back in a second round. Thank
you, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator. Senator
Bayh?
Senator Bayh. Thank you, Chairman, and thank you, Director.
I'm going to try and move fairly quickly. I had several
questions I wanted to ask in a limited amount of time.
You're fresh to the job, two weeks, as you mentioned, and
sometimes first impressions can offer some insights--someone
coming into an organization new--a new set of eyes to some
problems, so I'm going to ask you three quick questions about
this. And since this is an open hearing, we're essentially
talking to the American people.
I've been struck since my service on this Committee by how
much we don't know about some of the major challenges to our
national security. And that puts leaders like the President and
yourself in positions of making life-and-death decisions on the
basis of imperfect knowledge or gaps in the knowledge. So I'm
interested in your initial impression after the first two weeks
about just how much we know about the threats to our national
security. I would put it to you this way. On a scale of one to
100, with 100 being perfect clairvoyance and one being
cluelessness, how would you rate our capacity to assess the
threats that we face?
Director Blair. Senator, based on 10 days of hard work and
a little bit of thought around the edges, I'm pretty confident
that we have a general idea of what threats, opportunities and
trends are. What we can only do, in a prioritized and spotty
way, is really drill down into that issue to get the real
tactical-level details----
Senator Bayh. So your answer is, it's pretty good.
Director Blair. I'd say in general it's pretty good.
Senator Bayh. Where would the most significant gaps be?
Director Blair. I'd say the most significant gaps are in
the areas that are not traditional state threats, that we have
not figured out the right way to collect information and we
have not grown the analysts to do it. I'm thinking of Senator
Bond's energy security. We understand a lot of it, but we don't
understand the detail that we should in order to be able to
make very precise recommendations. I'm thinking of things like
some of the----
Senator Bayh. So we're better with nation states, with the
possible exception of North Korea and some aspects of Iran.
We're not as good with non-state actors.
Director Blair. We can take a nation state apart if we put
the resources on it.
Senator Bayh. What's your initial assessment of the
structure that was adopted in the wake of 9/11? You've been
there 10 days; it may be too soon, but I'm interested in your
first impression. You know, we created the directorship. The
CIA Director is now different. Is it your initial impression
that that is a useful structure? Should we contemplate
combining those two missions going forward? I mean, do we have
more coordination, or have we added another level of
bureaucracy or some of each? How would you net that out so far?
Director Blair. I think we have more coordination, Senator,
with more to go. It still requires top-down pressure to achieve
integrated operation in many areas. It doesn't come naturally
to some of the----
Senator Bayh. So your initial impression is the new
structure has been a positive.
Director Blair. Has been a positive.
Senator Bayh. Now, some people suggest possibly combining
the two functions in one human being, but your initial
impression is that the division is, on a net basis, a better
structure.
Director Blair. You mean go back to the old Director of CIA
as Director of Central Intelligence, that one?
Senator Bayh. And it also has the coordinating function
with a little more heft than was previously the case.
Director Blair. It's interesting; I talked to a previous
Director who had both jobs, when it was, and he said, I don't
know how I did them both. They're two separate jobs. They
should be done separately. And my first impression is I tend to
agree with him, but I'll be talking about that.
Senator Bayh. Do you get along pretty well with Secretary
Gates?
Director Blair. Yes, sir.
Senator Bayh. My impression is a lot of this has to do with
who the personalities are and how well they get along, as much
as it does with the structure.
Well, thank you for your initial impressions. Just a couple
more things. There are published reports from time to time
about the timeline for when Iran would have a weapon
capability. To the extent you're allowed to talk about such
things--and the Israelis seem to have a little more aggressive
timeline than has been published with regard to us--can you
give the American people any indication about what timeframe
we're looking at here, with having to confront that event?
Director Blair. Yes, sir, I could say that if Iran pursued
its centrifuge uranium technology, they could have a weapon as
early as 2010, but it might take them until 2015.
Senator Bayh. So that's next year--possibly as soon as next
year.
Director Blair. It's possibly as soon as next year.
Senator Bayh. And they just launched a satellite, if I'm
not incorrect, so they're clearly working on their missile
capabilities.
Director Blair. There's a missile that will carry it, and
you don't need a missile to carry it.
Senator Bayh. So in your opinion, Director, any combination
of carrots and sticks we could use to dissuade them from
seeking a military capability, or is that just a strategic
decision they've made that they're going to pursue?
Director Blair. We have seen in the past that international
scrutiny and sticks have made changes in their behavior, in
pieces of it. They have not----
Senator Bayh. Has the lower price of oil made them more
vulnerable at this moment, so possibly sticks might be have a
little bit more impact?
Director Blair. I think that the lower price of oil has an
effect. I think it has to be more comprehensive, though. The
economic penalty that they would pay would have to be more
comprehensive in order to really be a stick that would have an
effect.
Senator Bayh. Well, they are somewhat vulnerable to imports
of energy.
My last question--I've got about a minute left here--there
was a published report in the last couple of days to the effect
that the Pakistani government has been more cooperative in
dealing with al-Qa'ida in the tribal areas. They view them as
foreigners that are disruptive. They've not been as cooperative
with regard to rooting out the Taliban, particularly in the
city of Quetta--I hope I pronounced that correctly--because
they know that we're going to be leaving Afghanistan at some
point in time and they view the Taliban as not only some
leverage within Afghanistan but also possibly as a
counterbalance to India.
Is that your initial impression as well, that they have not
been cooperative in dealing with Taliban, particularly the
leaders who possibly are headquartered in the Pakistani city I
just mentioned?
Director Blair. I'd rather go into specifics in closed
session, Senator, but the overall idea of the unevenness of
Pakistani cooperation is correct.
Senator Bayh. Director, thank you.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator Bayh.
Senator Hatch is not here. Senator Mikulski is here.
Senator Mikulski. Director Blair, first of all, welcome.
We're very pleased regarding your confirmation. I think we're
very fortunate that you've chosen to come back to government
service. And I think we share with you your compliments to the
men and women who work in our intelligence services, both
abroad and also here within our own country. The fact that we
haven't had an attack in seven-and-a-half years is a tribute to
them.
Let me go right to my questions. One goes to Iran. Like
Senator Bayh, I'll do some quick ones.
On February 3rd, Iran used its own rocket to launch a small
communications satellite in orbit. They began this satellite
some years ago, but they're only the ninth country in the world
to have that ability, to put a rocket up--a satellite into
space. The State Department calls it worrisome. What is your
assessment of what that means, and do you believe that we need
to, in addition to their nuclear capability, additionally be
worried about their growing scientific and technical
capability?
Director Blair. Senator Mikulski, I think Iran's space
launch demonstrated that they are mastering multistage missile
technology, and that technology can be used for peaceful
pursuits and it can be used for military pursuits. They have
some smart scientists and good engineers. If they put resources
on it, they can make a serious missile force.
Senator Mikulski. Thank you. I also have another question
about Egypt and the tunnels into Gaza, but I would like to keep
that for a closed session.
I'd like to go to the cyber threat, essentially which I
think is a transnational threat. In your testimony, on page 38,
you talk about how because our technology, our infotech
technology is now increasingly designed and manufactured
overseas, this in and of itself can present a threat. Could you
elaborate on that?
Director Blair. The the operating systems of virtually all
equipment, whether it be communications or also military
equipment, is partly embedded in the chips that are built into
the system, and then it's partly the software that is handled
through computers. And if you know where a particular chip is
going and what it's going to be used for, and you have control
of it for a while, you can doctor it for purposes that--you can
help make it go stupid; you can destroy it.
And so, clever adversaries, if they can get into that
supply chain at various points, can affect the equipment that
we use in our communications systems, in our military weapons
systems, and elsewhere. So we just have to figure out ways to
protect this all the way.
Senator Mikulski. Well then, based on that, would you say
that in terms of the cyber threat, where we often think a
state-supported threat, a big country with big technology
capability could target us, but are you saying that because of
that--and also, further on in your testimony--that both
organized crime and then individual kind of hackers for hire
could pose threats to our critical infrastructure in some way
or other?
Director Blair. As far as technical capabilities go, I
think either one of those groups could pose threats. In terms
of motivation and why they do it, I think there are probably
different factors at work. Criminals obviously have great
incentive to go after financial networks and just earn money.
Hackers seem to take a joy in strange ways--watching lights go
out, funny things on screens. They seem to do it for reasons
that are hard to figure out. I think the technical fixes and
the sort of cooperation are sort of similar to stop all those
kinds of threats.
Senator Mikulski. Well, as I understand it, General Jones
at the National Security Council has asked Melissa Hathaway to
do a 60-day review of our cyber security situation. And I know
the Chairwoman has delayed our hearing on cyber security, our
classified one. And we hope to really probe into this because I
think this is one of these threats that is an invisible threat,
and then, wham, it could have serious consequences.
Let me get into one other area, though, before my time is
up, and it goes to the Bayh question, what did you find in your
first 10 days? What I see--and I wanted your reaction--is in
this year's threat, world threat assessment, there is a growing
emphasis once again on narcotics. Narcotics seem to be an
insidious evil that has many tentacles that could undermine the
United States of America or our efforts. Look at Mexico. We all
know of the terrible death of a general in Cancun. Cancun is
now being guarded. Afghanistan--corruption seems to go up to
the highest levels, and we're going to be asked to send troops
essentially to defend their corrupt situation.
Is it one of your surprises in your return to government in
the 10 days the growing issues around narcotics, and do you see
kind of expanding our counternarcotics effort because it has
such an insidious and undermining effect on us?
Director Blair. I think it's gotten worse in the time that
I've been out of government, and the effect on--I mean, we all
know the human tragedy of drugs within the country--blasted
lives and crime and so on. The international effects of it,
though, I think have been worse in the last dozen years in the
areas that you mention. So it is one of the things that I think
has gone the wrong direction.
Senator Mikulski. Thank you. Thank you very much.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator. Senator
Chambliss is not here. Senator Nelson is not here.
Senator Whitehouse?
Senator Whitehouse. Thank you, Chairman. Welcome back,
Admiral. It doesn't seem like very long since you were last
here. We don't let you get away far.
You note in your testimony the importance of keeping up
pressure on al-Qa'ida in the Federal Administered Tribal Areas.
Not too long ago Senator Snowe and I traveled to Eastern
Afghanistan, right adjacent to the FATA, and over and over
again in the different briefings we received, the problem of
the border came up. To the Talibani syndicates operating in
that area and to al-Qa'ida, it matters not at all. It does not
enter their calculations. It is a zero factor. But for us and
for the legitimate governments on either side, it is a
considerable impediment to working in a concerted way to
address that problem.
I was briefed by our military commanders about the
establishment of the border coordination centers, which would
be trilateral--U.S., Afghan and Pakistan. Only one is up. We
didn't have the chance to have a look at it and see how
effective it is. Others are under way.
It strikes me that, given the importance of this threat in
that area, given the significance of the disability that the
border presents to our efforts, that these border coordination
centers should be a very high matter of national priority. Now,
I understand that they raise a whole variety of issues,
including how do you make sure that the Afghan and Pakistani
participation in those coordination centers is secure and
doesn't compromise important information? And that's a
difficult problem, but it doesn't seem to me that it's an
insoluble problem.
I'd like to hear how high a priority you think those are
and what you think we can do to accelerate that strategy,
because in theory we should be able to be operating in real
syncopation on one side and the other, driving them over the
border and catching them on the other side, and that capability
doesn't really seem to be established yet.
Director Blair. Senator, I agree with you. In theory, we
ought to be able to run a seamless operation. The trouble is
that our partners on those two sides of the borders have quite
different capabilities, motivations and willingness to work
with us. So in fact what you find is you have to deal
differently with your partners on one side of the border from
that on the other.
There's no doubt that the solution to the area has got to
be something that goes across borders. Afghanistan can never be
secure if the Pakistan FATA area is not. And an international
effort beefed up in Afghanistan is not going to be successful
unless there's addressal from Pakistan. And in fact the
Administration review that's going on now is an Afghanistan-
Pakistan review and, as you know, Special Representative
Holbrooke's responsibility goes across both areas.
We talked about those border posts. I'm certainly for them
in theory. I just haven't had time to see whether from a
practical point of view they are fulfilling the potential that
we both think they should have. And if we don't do it that way,
we've got to do it some way in order to use our intelligence
capabilities to have the Pakistanis enforcing law and order on
their side of the border and dealing with the insurgents on the
Taliban side too. So we'll continue to push it.
Senator Whitehouse. To the extent that if we don't do it
that way, we have to do it some way, to paraphrase what you
said, I'm not aware of any other some way, which is one of the
reasons I'm focusing on these particular centers. If you can
say it in an open session like that, do you have something else
in mind when you're----
Director Blair. Well, if we could get a----
Senator Whitehouse. Do you have to do it some way other
than this?
Director Blair. If we could get a full-up intelligence-
sharing arrangement with the Pakistan armed forces that would
sort of work through the Pakistani army from the center out,
that would be another way to do it rather than putting our
effort on the border in the local situation. We could empower
Pakistan units in the counterinsurgency operations that they
are conducting. That's really what I had in mind in terms of
the alternative.
Senator Whitehouse. Yes. I agree with you. I think it's
actually not necessary to be physically located there, so long
as the goals of trilateral participation and quick response and
ability to effectively marshal our assets on both sides of the
border are met.
Director Blair. Right. And not allowing the bad guys to go
over an artificial line and thumb their noses at us because
nothing will happen on the other side of the line.
Senator Whitehouse. Yes.
Director Blair. That's the objective. Yes, sir.
Senator Whitehouse. Precisely.
This is almost a philosophical question, and it touches on
what America is and what it should be and all of that. But if,
hypothetically, Americans had done something that was truly
horrible and was classified deeply secret and you were faced
with the choice of whether to, to some extent, confess it in
order to correct it versus keeping it deeply classified in
order to avoid the reputational harm that might ensue, how
would you analyze that question, and what are the principles or
the priorities that you would bring to bear on it?
Director Blair. I believe in my bones that the United
States acts lawfully and legally when it does it right. I think
that the combination of the laws that are passed, the training
of the people we have in the executive branch--we have a solid
legal and moral foundation for what we do, even in areas that
involve killing people like the armed forces and the things
that we do in the intelligence services. Therefore, I believe
that if something terrible were done, it would be done by
somebody who had broken the laws and the procedures and the
training that we'd given them, and that person should be held
to account for it.
Senator Whitehouse. My time has expired. Thank you,
Admiral.
Thank you, Chairman.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Snowe is not here. Senator Feingold, you're next.
Senator Feingold. I thank the Chair.
Thank you, sir. In your opening statement you stated that
terrorist threats to U.S. interests in the Horn of Africa are
increasing. And you also indicated that U.S. counterterrorism
efforts there will be challenged by the ``high profile U.S.
role in the region and the perception that this constitutes
foreign intervention in Somalia.'' But the problem, as I've
long seen it, is that the U.S. role is not that it's too high
profile; in most respects, I think our engagement has been
really grossly insufficient. But to the extent there is a
perception that we support foreign intervention, isn't that
based in part on our association with Ethiopia's actual
intervention?
Director Blair. Certainly the Ethiopians weren't very
popular in Somalia, and the perception that anybody was helping
them wasn't popular there. Yes, sir, that's true.
I think my remarks were referring more to the--you're more
familiar than I am with the legacy in Africa, and the
experience with the attempt to establish Africa Command I think
was instructive in that regard. I think most American military
people thought that was a helpful thing and most African--many
African countries of course thought that this was a secret plan
for a military-dominated policy in ways that had hurt them
before. So I think that we don't always take our actions in a
way that makes them achieve their goals.
Senator Feingold. Okay. But specifically on this issue of
Somalia and Ethiopia, I take it you're indicating that the
perception would certainly be by many in Somalia that we were
pretty deeply associated with the Ethiopian intervention. Is
that correct?
Director Blair. As I'm thinking about that question, I'm
not sure I know enough to answer that correctly. I think our
policy in Somalia was not very coherent in the past few years
with all of the turmoil and the warlord fighting.
Senator Feingold. Well, that's for sure. That's a given. My
question is, what is the perception of what our role was vis-a-
vis Ethiopia's intervention. My guess is and belief is that
they think it was--what the facts are is one thing----
Director Blair. Oh, I see. Right.
Senator Feingold [continuing]. But the perception is that
we were deeply involved. Is that something that you would agree
with?
Director Blair. I don't know. I don't know. I'd have to get
back to you.
Senator Feingold. Okay. We'll move on.
If we're to overcome these challenges to our
counterterrorism efforts, doesn't it make sense--and you're
alluding to this already--to develop a strategy that
strengthens diplomatic, humanitarian and other aspects of our
policies that are not perceived as foreign intervention?
Director Blair. Yes.
Senator Feingold. And I'd like to repeat that really almost
stunning sentence with which you opened your statement. You
said, ``The primary near-term security concern of the United
States is the global economic crisis and its geopolitical
implication.'' And then you went on to describe how the crisis
is already destabilizing some countries, with more to come.
So do you think we're well positioned right now to monitor
around the world the effects of this crisis and the ways it
will damage our national security? Is the intelligence
community positioned to anticipate, for example, when a
government's going to fall, when a government's going to turn
against us, or that it would in some cases simply lack the
resources needed to work with us on issues of mutual concern?
Director Blair. Senator, I think we'll be able to have some
warning of these economic difficulties turning into real
political difficulties.
I think my placement of the economic crisis at the head of
the list is formed by my thinking that in recent years it seems
that we've had more security problems from failed states, from
states that have been in trouble, than we have from strong
states that have been an adversary to us in the traditional
way. It seems that when you have states that are on the feather
edge of being able to get a grip on law and order and economic
development and so on, if that is knocked off course by
economic difficulties, by the ethnic/sectarian/tribal rivalries
takeover--and I just think if you look at the numbers, there
are a lot of states who were barely keeping up with the sort of
six percent growth in Africa, with the overall couple of
percent growth in the world, and when those growth rates go
down, my gut tells me that there are going to be problems
coming out of that. And we are looking for that to see what it
will be, and it seems that those areas are what have caused us
the most problems in recent years.
Senator Feingold. I understand you've already indicated
this in response to some questions from Senator Bayh, and all I
can say is I couldn't agree with you more. This is absolutely
an essential understanding of what the threats are, is that
these are the places where we really, really are going to have
problems if we don't anticipate it. So I thank you for
reiterating that.
I think part of the lesson here is that we have to be
prepared to anticipate the crises before they happen and not
constantly being in a reactive mode. And Mr. Panetta testified
at his confirmation hearing that he was concerned that we
aren't allocating enough resources to the countries and regions
that the intelligence community has already assessed or where
our ``primary near-term security concern'' is taking place.
Mr. Panetta also committed to conducting a review of CIA
operations and resources to make sure that we have a global
focus and are considering long-term and emerging threats. As
DNI, will you commit to undertaking an intelligence community-
wide review along these lines?
Director Blair. I think that's a very good idea to do that,
Yes, sir.
Senator Feingold. Another lesson is that anticipating and
tracking complex, multi-faceted issues--like the impact of
economic crises and instability--and the likelihood of a
particular region of the world becoming a terrorist safehaven
requires a combination of clandestine collection and diplomatic
and other overt reporting.
Director Blair, do you agree? And, if so, how do we go
about prepositioning all of our government's eyes and ears,
both clandestine and overt, so that we're not being caught
flat-footed?
Director Blair. I think that the clandestine side of it
probably is the more difficult. There are a great number of
sensors out there in nongovernmental organizations, travelers,
businessmen in the open-source intelligence. So, we can get, I
think, a good general idea of what's going on in troubled areas
without having agents there.
But then, to get behind that, into the motivations of the
criminal leaders and other leaders who are taking advantage of
the situation for their own things, I find that that's where
the open- source intelligence stops. That's where you have to
get people on the ground; you have to bring signals
intelligence to bear.
And then, frankly, one of our collection difficulties is
trying to move that spotlight around so it is on the right
places. We can't cover everything to the depth that we would
like and we need to make good choices.
Senator Feingold. And then even when we are able to cover
things, somehow we have to put together the clandestine and
overt information in a coordinated way. And in this regard, I
mentioned to you before, this Committee passed legislation last
Congress creating an independent commission to study this
problem and make recommendations. So, I hope you'll work with
me in getting this commission in place, because the sooner we
do it, the better we'll be able to get ahead of these crises.
My time's up. I apologize.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator.
We could have a brief second round, if that's agreeable to
you.
Director Blair. Sure. Yes, ma'am.
Chairman Feinstein. The country that hasn't been discussed,
that I think is a very important fulcrum in all of this, is
Russia--Russia under Medvedev and Russia under Putin; and where
is that country going; and can it become a dependable partner
for the United States?
It seems to me that there's a situation where virtually
anything that happens seems to rub Russia the wrong way. And
yet what we need is a real partner in nuclear nonproliferation,
in counterterrorism. How do you see this relationship at the
present time, and what would you advise American policy be to
improve it?
Director Blair. I think the economic crisis is probably
causing Russia to do some reconsidering. They've been on a roll
for the past 10 years or so, with oil revenues and other
revenues. That, combined with a, sort of, reassertion of Russia
prerogatives in the world has made the government enormously
popular and given them a free hand to continue that.
But the social contract they struck was continued economic
prosperity and a good strong Russia, in return for pretty sharp
limitations on personal freedom. That contract is fraying now,
I think, with the global economic prices--the price of oil
going down; we've already seen demonstrations in Russia.
I don't think their regime is threatening right now, but
they show popular discontent being right under surface if the
Russian government can't deliver the economic goods that have
been a strong basis of their popularity. So, I think Russian
has to rethink what it's doing.
As far as its overseas policy goes, I think that Russia
has--a certain self-image it's projecting. But, I also think
that they have specific interests that they view, and that
there may be areas--and I would advise this to policymakers--
that we can find a match between what Russia wants and what the
United States wants.
I'm disappointed, frankly, in the Russian role in the Manas
base negotiations in Kyrgyzstan. It appears that Russia is not
playing a helpful role, even though, in general, Russia
believes that the United States' role in Afghanistan and in
dealing with the terrorism in the country is to their good too,
because they face, of course, Sunni violent extremism in their
Southern areas.
So Russia has a certain amount of ambivalence. They don't
mind poking a stick in our eye if they can, but they do, I
think, recognize that there are some things that we see
together. On Iran, Russia does not want a nuclear-armed Iran,
but it also would like some other things from Iran.
So you see this ambivalence in Russian approaches to
individual issues. And where there's ambivalence, perhaps
there's a chance to work out some deals. So, I think we have to
explore that.
Chairman Feinstein. As I look at it, if you look at just
the geopolitics of the big, large powerful nations--Russia,
China, India, the United States, the European community--it
seems to me that the asymmetric nations of the world, and the
potential threat from this asymmetric nature of the world today
should bring those big nations together.
Instead, we always get tripped up. There was the Georgia
escapade--and I don't know if you've had a chance to look at
that as to if there is blame, where that blame rests, in terms
of beginning that; and what are the chain of dominos, if any,
that it has unleashed. Would you care to comment on that part
of the equation?
Director Blair. I haven't had a chance yet, Madam Chairman,
to sort of go back over how that crisis came off. But, I agree
with you that there are many areas in which the interests of
the large countries run very much together.
And I think, to the extent that they feel that those are
really strong interests that really threaten them, you get a
higher level of cooperation than when they think that they can
be, sort of, played also to gain some advantage, at the same
time you're getting enough protection for yourself that you're
satisfying national needs.
But, I think we should probe that with Russia, as we should
with the other countries that you mentioned, and keep our
hedges up so that if things turn out badly we can cover our own
interests, but look for these areas.
Chairman Feinstein. Would you care to put on the record
where the main cyber threats to the United States--what two
countries they are coming from?
Director Blair. I can tell you, in terms of capability,
that Russia and China--and I'm talking both military and
civilian hackers who may be hired by crime or may be
motivated--they're right up there at top of the list.
Chairman Feinstein. Do you see any nexus between the
Russian organized crime, cyber networks, and the government?
Director Blair. I'd rather not answer that in this session,
Madam Chairman.
Chairman Feinstein. Okay, fair enough.
It would be fair to say, then, that the great bulk of the
cyber intrusions are coming either from China or from Russia?
Director Blair. They're coming from Internet Protocol
addresses in those countries. As you know, you can bounce
around to disguise where you're coming from, but a large
portion of them are coming out of IP addresses in China and in
Russia.
Chairman Feinstein. Well, where I'm going with this is, we
know that we are going to be looking at cyber in some detail on
this Committee----
Director Blair. Right.
Chairman Feinstein [continuing]. And yet it seems to me
that, other than the intelligence world, there is a very real
policy gap out here where the diplomatic world needs to step
in. And when things happen, countries need to get demarched, as
opposed to keeping all of this under wraps so that all one does
is build one's own technology to get closer and closer to cyber
warfare.
Candidly, I am not interested in doing that. I am
interested in holding countries responsible for the behavior of
their entities. And I think it's a much more responsible course
in the long-run if you have American policymakers heavily
engaged with their counterparts in other countries, driving
toward international treaties and agreements which prevent
cyber intrusions which could result one day, if left
unaddressed, in a cyber war.
Director Blair. I agree that if we could develop some sort
of a code of conduct and approach that the major nations agreed
on to cyber space, the fact that we have--although somewhat
imperfectly--in the high seas maritime regime, we have a little
bit of in the space regime in which everybody recognizes that
if we turn the offense loose in these areas, it's to all of our
disadvantage, that would be in the interest of all of us. And
it would apply some regulation to these activities more at the
source than having to deal with it the way we do now.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much.
Mr. Vice Chairman.
Vice Chairman Bond. Mr. Director, I want to go back to that
in just a moment, but some of the questions that have been
raised brings me back to the statement for the record, which
began: ``The primary near-term security concern of the United
States is the global economic crisis, regime-threatening
instability, increased nationalism, Caribbean refuge flows'',
and certainly, I'm very much concerned about protectionist
policies, Asian refugees, instability and other things.
And I believe we have to get the toxic debt out of the
credit markets to solve that, but when it comes to the focus of
the intelligence community, we've got threats from terrorism,
the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the threat posed by Iran's
pursuit of nuclear capability, and the Middle East crisis.
Now, I hope you don't mean by that that the primary focus
of the intelligence community is going to be on finding out
what you recently described as readily observable and open-
source information on the conditions of the country.
The primary emphasis of the IC, I would think--from the
great bulk of questions and answers here--has got to be on
these current threats that we face, does it not?
Director Blair. Mr. Vice Chairman, I was not making a
statement about what we would turn our collection
capabilities--which are designed for various purposes--to. My
intent in drawing attention to the economic crisis was more to
inform policy of the things that could really cause real
problems for the United States if they developed a certain way.
But I won't be turning satellites to look at GDP accounts.
Vice Chairman Bond. Well, I think a number of people had a
concern about that, because what the intelligence community--
and we discussed the long-term concerns about getting adequate
energy intelligence, something that I think the IC is uniquely
capable of doing, which is not available in open source. But I
wanted to make sure the emphasis was going to continue to be on
these threats that I think most of us have described.
Director Blair. Yes, sir. And I was trying to act as your
intelligence officer for the Senate, not necessarily in the
Intelligence Committee, but as members of the body that has to
make big decisions for American policy in the future. And I
just think that what the Senate ought to be worrying about is
the economic crisis.
Vice Chairman Bond. That's something we need to get right
and I'll have some comments on TARP later.
Director Blair. Yes, sir.
Vice Chairman Bond. You've mentioned the problem dealing
with cyber attacks from major state actors. And I think the
Chair has rightly pointed out that this needs to be a higher-
level executive, diplomatic exchange.
How are we able--or are we able--to prosecute suspected
espionage cases or attacks? Do we have any ability to go after
those who perpetrate cyber invasions either for the purpose of
acquiring information or for the purpose of degrading or
destroying our system? Do we have any means of going after
those?
Director Blair. This is such a new area that I'd really
like to have most of the discussion in closed session. There
are some things we can talk about----
Vice Chairman Bond. All right.
Director Blair. About how you--there have been things in
this country--finding a hacker, being able to zero in on a
person and determine who it is. When you get into more
sophisticated attacks that are across continents and through
firewalls and so on, you get into some pretty fancy----
Vice Chairman Bond. It's very difficult, in other words.
Director Blair. Technically and legally and I'd rather
discuss those with you in a closed session, if I could, Mr.
Vice Chairman.
Vice Chairman Bond. One of the questions about China, we
all know that it reportedly spent $59 billion in 2008 on its
military forces--a significant increase.
What impact, if any, does this have on our strategic
relationship with Taiwan? And do you see a long-term threat to
the United States from this increased budget by China?
Director Blair. As China does increase its military
expenditure, it does pose a greater threat to Taiwan, Mr. Vice
Chairman. And unless Taiwan does something about it--and we're
really the only other country helping them do it--that means
we're going to have to help them some more in order to maintain
a balance so that China's military might won't turn into
coercive capability or military capability. So it does have an
effect.
As far as an effect on the United States, it really depends
on how China uses that military power. Right now they've sent a
couple of ships to participate in piracy patrols off Somalia.
That's a good thing. More is better of that kind of thing.
If they turn extended naval power into trying to coerce
other small countries in that area of the world, that's a bad
thing and we would take an entirely different thing to it. So
it kind of depends.
Vice Chairman Bond. Let me jump just very quickly to
another areas. Recent reports describe several Yemeni Gitmo
detainees who have been released from Saudi rehabilitation who
returned to terrorism. What is your assessment of threat to
U.S. interests from al-Qa'ida and affiliated groups in Yemen?
And what is the recidivism rate for released Gitmo detainees?
Director Blair. I'm hesitating because I can't remember
what the classification level is.
There is a recidivism rate of the entire Saudi program.
There is a somewhat higher recidivism rate of those from
Guantanamo who've been brought back. And the Saudis are
increasing their efforts, because they see the same problem
that we do. I can give you the number in closed session, but it
is not a 100 percent foolproof program, although we give high
marks to the Saudis in general for the efforts they are making
in reeducation and in taking--not only punitive, but also these
rehabilitation efforts. It's making a difference.
Vice Chairman Bond. Thank you, Mr. Director.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you, Mr. Vice Chairman.
Senator Rockefeller.
Senator Rockefeller. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
I'm going to ask you a very different kind of question, but
one which I think has enormous consequences both in this
country and across the world--or you may disagree.
At last year's global threats hearing, I asked General
Hayden a question about the Army Field Manual standards for
interrogation. And in the course of the discussion that
followed, he revealed publicly that we've waterboarded three
al-Qa'ida terrorists.
For too many people in our government, and in my judgment
in our country, there's a mistaken impression that
waterboarding is what has to be done to get actionable
intelligence to keep America safe. It's not. It's torture. And
the great majority of the interrogation community believes
that's not the best way to get actionable intelligence in the
first place.
It's already done great damage to our national security,
both as a poor interrogation tool and as a boon to terrorist
recruitment worldwide. So I want to ask you about the threat
that this misunderstanding poses to our national security.
Two years ago, Brigadier General Patrick Finnegan, the dean
of West Point, took several military and FBI interrogators to
try to convince the producers of this TV show ``24'' not to
glorify torture, because it was having a toxic effect on
cadets' training and ethics.
So my questions are as follows: How does this
misunderstanding about torture affect our most valuable
national security resources--the young men and women who
volunteer to service in the military or the intelligence
agencies? Do they believe that Jack Bauer is what a good
intelligence agent is supposed to act like?
I'll ask a few more: The Hollywood producer of ``24,'' one
Joel Surnow, is celebrated in some circles--most circles--for
the show's depiction of the tough choices that have to be made
in the war on terrorism. Justice Scalia has cited Jack Bauer's
torture of terrorist suspects, and our former Secretary of
Homeland Security, Michael Chertoff, said of the show,
``Frankly, it reflects real life.'' In your decades of service
to our nation's security, would you say that this TV show
reflects real life?
Director Blair. I've never seen an episode of that show,
Senator, so I can't help you.
Senator Rockefeller. That's a copout. That's a copout.
Director Blair. It happens to be true.
Senator Rockefeller. I understand that.
Director Blair. But on the general point, no. We don't want
to--I mean, I can tell you my leadership and the leadership
that I admire in the armed forces and the intelligence services
does not believe that you have to be tough and mean to do a
good job for your country. You have to be following the
traditions of your service. You have to follow America's ideals
while you're getting the job done. You have to act lawfully.
Those are the leaders that most of us admire, and that's my
experience of what most of the leaders are. We don't glorify
torture and killing, and there won't be torture on my watch.
Senator Rockefeller. And I understand that. But on their
watch, they have it regularly, and it's the most popular TV
show in America.
I simply raise that as a question of how what's going on
can be used for money-making purposes, and in the process not
only affect young people in our country and how they approach,
potentially, public service in the intelligence community or
elsewhere, as well as the Muslim world. It worries me greatly.
It's one television show, and it worries me greatly.
Director Blair. American popular culture is sometimes our
worst enemy overseas, isn't it, Senator Rockefeller?
I have traveled, and everybody thinks that America is about
some of these shows that are made as violent and as lurid as
they can be so that they will up their ratings. I don't think
that reflects the real America. I don't think that's who we
are. I don't think that's who we want to be, and I think it's a
bad reflection of what this country is really about.
Senator Rockefeller. I'll send you a copy.
Director Blair. All right.
Senator Rockefeller. Thank you, sir.
Vice Chairman Bond. [Presiding] Thank you, Senator
Rockefeller.
Senator Whitehouse.
Senator Whitehouse. Thank you, Vice Chairman.
There have been a great number of questions this afternoon
about our cyber security probelms.
Director Blair. Good. Good.
Senator Whitehouse. Those have been pursued--there have
been some very deeply classified elements to the way in which
we have begun to address the cyber security problem. It also
raises issues about privacy. It raises issues about civil
liberties. It raises issues about domestic wiretapping and so
forth.
And it strikes me that in order to address those issues and
enjoy public confidence that those issues have been adequately
addressed, then very significant aspects of the way in which we
address cyber terrorism have to be brought out from behind the
dark screen of classification. We have to have some public
debate and discussion over these issues. We have to open up the
scope of people who are given access to some of the classified
functions.
And I'm wondering if you have given any thought to how one
might go about doing that. It's almost unfair to ask you, if
you've been in office all of two weeks, but it strikes me that
this is an issue that it's worth starting to grapple with,
particularly if, as the current plan proceeds, it passes
decision points that should be informed by that kind of a
discussion.
Director Blair. I've given thought to that, Senator
Whitehouse, and in fact those exact concerns are central in
this review we're conducting. I'm not sure that the technical
answers for privacy will be much different from what we know
now. But if we are to be able to apply these technical answers
in this complex, interrelated infospace that is the reality of
modern communications, the American people have to have
confidence that they are being applied in a way that respects
privacy and civil liberties.
I think just a couple of points that will be an advantage.
Number one, since all these things have to be done at cyber
speed--blocking attacks, cleansing places--the algorithms to do
that have to be written ahead of time and be in place. So in
the writing of the algorithms, you can take into account the
sorts of concerns that we're talking about and they can be
reviewed by civil liberties experts; they can be shown to
Congress.
They can be talked about, I think, in concept if not in
particular so that people know that these are being set up in
the right way. Then oversight is key--the monitoring of these
so that you all and everyone else has confidence that if
somehow some of these procedures break down or go wrong, there
are ways to deal with it, they're fixed, and they're done in a
way.
So I think that we have to build these sorts of
considerations into the structure of the equipment, and I think
we can talk about that in a procedural and unclass way as long
as we don't get into the code which detects a particular piece
of malware so that somebody can design one that's better.
So I think it's a challenge to us, especially because we're
spies. You know, people don't trust us in general, so we have a
further distance to go if the expertise that's developed for
espionage that is used for these purposes. So we recognize that
burden, and I think it's incumbent on us to do it that way.
Senator Whitehouse. Well, given the brevity of your tenure
and the complexity of the situation, I certainly do not
begrudge you the 60 days. I'm delighted to hear that this is a
part of that analysis that's taking place in that 60 days, and
I look forward to being in touch with you again at the
conclusion of your process. I appreciate it very much. Thank
you, sir.
Director Blair. Yes, sir.
Vice Chairman Bond. Further questions from you, Senator
Whitehouse, or Senator Rockefeller? [No response.]
Vice Chairman Bond. I was just going to ask one last
question. At last year's threat hearing, Director Hayden was
asked about restricting governmental interrogations to those
outlined in the Army Field Manual. He responded there is a
universe of lawful interrogations that we have a right to use,
and the Army Field Manual listing is only a subset but do not
consist of all lawful interrogation tools. Have you had the
opportunity to review that question and determine whether there
is an area to use techniques beyond the Army Field Manual and
whether that might be necessary for high value detainees?
Director Blair. We are, Senator Bond--and I remember you
and I had this conversation in the confirmation hearing and
all--and the task forces which have been set up by the
executive orders that we discussed are now in existence. And we
are not only looking at that exact universe of interrogation
techniques. we are trying to bring in some more science and
research in that area so we can determine what is the best and
most effective way to get the information that we need.
So we are looking at it with a pretty open aperture, but
the principles that we discussed of having a single manual, but
not one which is a training manual for our adversaries, are
very much in our mind also. So we're started down that road,
and everything you and I discussed is still in play.
Vice Chairman Bond. Well, we'll look forward to hearing
your conclusions, Mr. Director.
I'm sure I could ask you a lot more questions, but I
appreciate your participation in the hearing, and I think it's
about that time.
On behalf of the Chair, this hearing is adjourned. Thank
you.
[Whereupon, at 4:35 p.m., the Committee adjourned.]