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5	SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI,
6	U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
7	WASHINGTON, D.C.
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12	INTERVIEW OF:
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17	Thursday, February 26, 2015
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19	Washington, D.C.
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22	The interview in the above matter was held in HVC-302,
23	Capitol Visitor Center, commencing at 2:20 p.m.
24	Present: Representatives Gowdy, Roby, Westmoreland, and
25	Cummings.

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5		For the SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI:
6		DANA CHIPMAN, CHIEF INVESTIGATIVE COUNSEL
7		SHARON JACKSON, DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL
8		MAC TOLAR, SENIOR COUNSEL
9		CARLTON DAVIS, INVESTIGATOR
10		SARA BERRINEAU, INVESTIGATOR
11		SHERIA CLARKE, COUNSEL
12	24	SUSANNE SACHSMAN GROOMS,
13		MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR/GENERAL COUNSEL
14		PETER KENNY, MINORITY SENIOR COUNSEL
15		
16		For the U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE:
17		AUSTIN EVERS, SENIOR ADVISOR
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1 Ms. Jackson. All right, we'll go back on the record. 2 Again, it is Sharon Jackson. It is 2:20 in the afternoon. 3 We are continuing the interview of Agent And, Agent, welcome back. 4 5 Mr. Thank you. 6 Ms. Jackson. And we have moved into a room, a 7 classified setting now. And so what I suggest that we do is, 8 we know we have this room for the next hour-and-a-half, 9 2 hours. And so I'm going to take about 45 minutes to ask 10 you questions that we discussed earlier that you said might 11 evoke a classified answer, then I'll turn it over to the 12 minority staff for 45 minutes and then we will assess where we are, whether we're done, or whether we need to move into 13 14 another unclassified setting. And is that fine with the minority? 15 16 Ms. Sachsman Grooms. Yes. 17 Ms. Jackson. Okay. 18 Mr. Evers. Sharon, did you want to do the clarification here or do you wanted to wait? 19 20 Ms. Jackson. You know what, we'll start with that. Mr. Evers. Okay. 21 EXAMINATION 22 BY MS. JACKSON: 23 I was informed that there was an 24 Q Agent answer that you gave before that you would like to clarify. 25

1 We can go ahead and do that now. I will ask it again at the 2 very end of the session, as you sit here today, is there any 3 answer that you'd like to elaborate on or clarify, so you'll 4 have yet another opportunity to do so. But go ahead and 5 direct our attention to what you would like to clarify and 6 then how you'd like to expand upon that.

7 A Thank you, ma'am. There was a discussion about the 8 use of Gmail that we went over. One of the things I wanted 9 to clarify is, while in fact we did rely on Gmail for some of 10 our communications, anything that we felt was sensitive was 11 put either on OpenNet or on the classified system. We took 12 great pains to make sure that, you know, we didn't put 13 anything on the Internet that we wouldn't want the general 14 public to know. If it was something like that, it either 15 went on OpenNet or onto the classified system.

16 0 Okay. Thank you very much. That's very helpful. 17 Right before we broke, you were having a discussion about then Ambassador Stevens' request for consideration of 18 19 extending the MSD in Tripoli. Okay. All right. And I 20 believe that you said that the MSD went in Tripoli in about August of '11. Is that correct? 21

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Yes, ma'am.

23 0 Okay. Before the Embassy was reopened in September 24 of 2011?

Correct. Yes. ma'am. 25 A

1 Okay. And then the Exhibit 2 that you were shown, 0 2 let me hand it back to you, talks about the MSD is getting 3 ready to leave. In particular, the second part of that is 4 from John C. Stevens to you. In the second paragraph of his 5 email, he writes, quote, "My understanding is that we are 6 scheduled to reduce to one MSD team on July 12, with the 7 second team staying until August. The second team has been 8 doing the LGF training." End of quote. 9 Do you see that paragraph? Yes, ma'am. 10 A 11 Okay. I believe that you had said that initially 0 12 three MSD teams went into Tripoli? A Yes, ma'am. 13 14 0 Okay. 15 We had two that came in, in the first iteration. Ι A want to say about 2 weeks later, another team, a third team 16 17 came in. 0 And that third team was essentially dedicated to 18 19 training? It was anticipation of training that would be 20 A needed to help the RSO build additional security for the 21 22 Embassy. 23 How long did it take for their training function to Q kick in, if you will, and if you can remember? 24 I want to say it might have been in late fall, 25 А

early winter, somewhere around there, we started to identify
 personnel that were suitable to actually get training.

And, again, this was just for Tripoli?

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A Yes, ma'am.

Q Okay. None of these trained locally employed people were -- they weren't training in Benghazi or for Benghazi security. If you recall.

A I would have to refer to some kind of note. There was some discussion of some of the LES staff from Benghazi coming down, but I can't say for sure. But the general -the focus really, the preponderance of it was on Tripoli.

12 Q So at the time that this email was written in June 13 of 2012 regarding Ambassador Stevens' request that MSD be 14 extended, MSD had been there for almost a year, or at least 15 10 months. Is that correct?

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A Yes, ma'am.

Q That was longer than originally anticipated?

A We recognized that things change and that we have to remain some flexibility. But generally it was thought that we would be there from 60 to 120 days.

21 Q Okay. And what changed that required you to be --22 required MSD to be there longer?

A I can't think of anything specific that was a driver that said that we had to stay longer. I think the general, you know, getting personnel identified and

1 high-threat trained agents and so forth takes a bit of time. 2 So it just took longer than you had anticipated to 0 3 replace with high-threat agents? 4 A What I had anticipated, yes. 5 0 Okay. And were you in Tripoli? Yes, ma'am. 6 A 7 0 And when were you in Tripoli? 8 From, I believe it was, late August through A 9 September, and I think I left maybe early October. 10 0 In 2011? 11 In 2011, yes, ma'am. A 12 0 So when the first group went in to assess the security situation to make -- to assist in the determination 13 as to whether Embassy Tripoli was going to reopen? 14 There was a small four-man team that went ahead of 15 A Right behind them, 2 days after them, I believe it was, 16 me. myself and two MSD teams entered. They received us at the 17 18 airport. My advance team received us at the airport, and 19 then we started setting up security for the rest of the 20 Embassy staff to be phased in into Tripoli. 21 0 So then you would have done a 60-day rotation in 22 Tripoli? I think mine was more around 30 this time. So --23 A Did you ever go back to Tripoli after that? 24 0 25 A I did not.

1 Q Okay. So other MSD teams you went back to managing 2 the whole detachment?

A Right.

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Q Okay. At the time, if you know, that you were pulling out the MSD teams in the summer of 2012, what if any understanding did you have about your teams being replaced with high-threat trained agents in Tripoli? Was that happening? Or were you aware if there was any concern over the number of agents they were getting in Tripoli?

10AWell, first, ma'am, I'd like to let you know, in11July I moved from MSD toImage: The second secon

Q Okay.

A So, you know, during that period of time, I don't have as much visibility on the sequencing of personnel, but my recollection was is that we were going to replace MSD teams with high-threat trained agents.

Q Okay. Did you ever learn as to whether that actually happened, whether you learned formally or, you know, informally through the MSD grapevine, the RSO grapevine, if you will?

A I can't say with complete specificity, but my sense of it was is, yes, they were being replaced by high-threat trained agents.

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Q Did you ever hear about any concerns that they

1 didn't have enough Diplomatic Security agents in Tripoli? 2 I saw an email from . I believe, the A 3 RSO that was sent to IP, DS/IP, where I think he had made 4 those assertions, yeah. Did you hear anything similar about Benghazi as to 5 Q 6 whether they had a sufficient number of Diplomatic Security 7 agents in Benghazi, and, again, focusing on the summer of 2012? 8 9 Ma'am, to be quite honest, I was focused on A 10 Tripoli. 11 Q Okay. 12 BY MR. DAVIS: During your time as head of MSD were there other 13 Q TDYs that you undertook? 14 15 A When I was --When you were head of MSD? 16 0 When I was the head of MSD, it was Benghazi and 17 A Tripoli were the two TDYs that I took. 18 19 So your trips to Haiti and your trip to Burundi was Q in a different role? 20 Yes, it was throughout the course of my career. 21 A 22 How long were you head of MSD for in total? 0 23 I believe I got there April 5 and left sometime in A July, so it was about 2 years and maybe a month or two. 24 So in the 24, 25 months as the head of the MSD team 25 Q

1	in DS, you only made two TDY trips, one to Tripoli, one to
2	Benghazi. Is that correct?
3	A Yes.
4	BY MS. JACKSON:
5	Q It is our understanding that there was never an MSD
6	team assigned to Benghazi. Is that correct?
7	A Yes, ma'am.
8	Q Okay. Do you know why that was?
9	A When that mission came up for the Special Envoy,
10	that mission was given to our Dignitary Protection division
11	or office. And what happened was at some point they needed
12	some additional capability, so MSD provided two agents to
13	supplement that Dignitary Protection detail.
14	Q At the time that Benghazi was extended, and I'm
15	specifically focusing on late 2011 into early 2012, when the
16	Benghazi mission was going to last through 2012, was it your
17	understanding that it had switched from Dignitary Protection
18	to DS/IP?
19	Mr. <u>Evers.</u> If you know.
20	Mr. I don't know that for a fact. I don't
21	know when that, you know, took place.
22	BY MS. JACKSON:
23	Q Let me ask it in a slightly different way. Was
24	there any policy or understanding that would prevent an MSD
25	unit from being assigned to something that wasn't an embassy,

a consulate, or official post?

2 A I'm sorry, ma'am, could you --3 Was there any internal policy or directives that 0 4 discouraged MSD from going to locations that were not an 5 official embassy, an official post, or an official consulate? 6 A No. ma'am. 7 Okay. You talked before we broke for lunch 0 8 regarding the process that would result in MSD being deployed 9 somewhere and that the post would make a request to DS/IP and 10 then a tasking would go to MSD to fulfill that request. Am I correct in that, the general understanding of how that 11 12 worked? A Yes, ma'am. 13 14 Okay. Do you know would the post be required to 0 15 make that request formally through a cable to DS? 16 Generally, yes, ma'am. A Okay. So the Embassy or the consulate would issue 17 0 18 a formal cable requesting MSD assets? 19 Yes, ma'am. A 20 Q Okay. Were those decisions generally discussed behind the scenes before those cables went out? 21 22 I would say that that would be likely. Α Sort of like what Ambassador Stevens did in June 23 0 of '12, where I believe you described it as he was trying to 24 see the realm of possibilities out there? 25

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2 Q Okay. And if --

Yes.

- 3 A If I can further elaborate?
 - Q Yes, please elaborate.

5 A In that particular case he's contacting somebody 6 that we had not only a professional, but we also had a 7 personal relationship. Generally speaking, that type of 8 request would be from post to IP.

Q Okay.

A But because he knew me, and I think what he was doing was trying, again, to get a sense of is there a realm of possibility or is there something that he could point to, to further his request.

Q You also in your response to Ambassador Stevens talked about the two emerging requirements that MSD had that was going to prevent you from fulfilling his request to you. Could you please explain what those two emerging requirements were?

19	A As I recall, at that time the two requirements
20	
21	is my
22	recollection of what those two emerging missions were.
23	Q Okay. Where else was MSD at the time around the
24	world?
25	A I believe at that time we were in Yemen and

I Tripoli, and there may have been some other posts that we 2 went to during that period of time. What I can say is over 3 the Arab spring the posts that we did provide assets to was 4 Yemen, Cairo, I believe Tunis, of course, Libya, and we had 5 some other issues down in Mexico at that time that we had to go down and help train some of our personnel to protect 6 themselves. And we also around that time I believe we had an 7 8 issue in Cote d'Ivoire.

9 Q During the little over 2 years that you were head 10 of MSD, do you recall any instance where there was a formal 11 request through a cable that was denied?

A Again, ma'am, I have got to be careful on that, because I may not have known. If posts went to IP, and as IP managed it, if it were denied, they wouldn't call me and say, this mission has been denied. I don't know if that helps or makes sense. But --

17 Q Okay.

A So I can't say with certainty.

19 Q Okay.

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A I do know -- I do know, especially during that period of time, ma'am, the Bureau was doing everything it could to keep pace with the emerging threats and incidences that our folks faced, you know, throughout the Middle East, and at the same time there's things popping up like in Mexico, you know, that needs to be addressed. And they

1 utilized MSD. We essentially utilized MSD to the fullest 2 extent that we could reasonably use them to try to help these 3 posts that were just being faced with all sorts of unrest and 4 things of that nature.

Q Sort of along the same lines, was there ever a time when MSD was tasked by IP to go someplace where you as head of MSD said, I don't have enough people, we can't do that, or at least it has to be delayed for a while.

9 A Well, what I can say is, one of the primary 10 missions of MSD is to conduct training. All of those during 11 the Arab spring, you know, unless it was like in Mexico where 12 there was an operational incident at post that required that 13 we get down there and train folks up to protect themselves, 14 all of those training missions were pretty much put on hold 15 during that period of time. So that's kind of the issue.

16 As far as out and out saying I don't have enough people, 17 I can't recall one. But I will tell you is that we stretched 18 as much as we could to help these posts in crisis. Because 19 the reality of it is, is those RSOs, they're our brothers, 20 they're our friends, they're guys that we serve with. And so 21 all of the Bureau takes that responsibility to back them up 22 seriously and to do whatever we can to support them, especially in a time of crisis. 23

Q Okay. Agent I want to take a step back to when you first went into Benghazi in early May of 2011, when

1 you went in to replace

You told us earlier that the DART mission was canceled, that that component of it was canceled. Do you know why it was canceled?

as the agent in charge.

A I believe at the time the area that they were going into, there was still active fighting going on between Qadhafi's forces and the rebel forces, and the decision was made is that it was just too unstable to take them and put them into that particular location.

10 Q Okay. Now, I believe you said there was the 11 possibility of one DART person that was there to be on ground 12 to assess the situation, or at least to be the eyes and ears. 13 Do I recall that correctly?

14

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A In Benghazi?

Q Yes.

A To my recollection, there were occasions where a
 DART, someone from DART with USAID was with us in Benghazi.

Q Okay. Did they ever have, while you were there,
 did they ever have a presence that lasted for weeks on end?

A There were constraints on the number of people that could go into Benghazi. There was a ceiling. And so what would be done is people would come in for a period of days, do what they needed to do, and then rotate out, and basically do a contact relief where the next person comes in, takes care of their program. But that was all contingent upon this 1 ceiling.

2 Q Okay. That'ss sort of a "tag, you're it" type 3 thing?

A Well, what it was designed to do is to make sure
that we didn't go over our ceiling.

Q Do you know who within the State Department imposed7 that ceiling?

A I don't know specifically who had the overall
9 authority to impose that.

 10
 Mr. Westmoreland.
 Sharon? What was the ceiling?

 11
 Mr. Sir, I believe it was in the low 20s. I

 12
 had 13.

Mr. <u>Westmoreland</u>. Is that just the Embassy, or does
 that include OGA?

Mr. Mr. No, sir, this was just our State
 Department component under the Special Envoy.

Mr. <u>Westmoreland</u>. You did say that the member that was
 part of the DART team actually worked for USAID?

Mr. Yes, sir, they come from USAID.
Mr. Westmoreland. So did they furnish people on the
DART team?

22 Mr. Yes, sir, my understanding is, is that 23 they're USAID employees that work in the section called 24 Disaster Assistance. So they're USAID employees.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q We talked earlier today about any specialized weapons or specialized equipment that you and others took in when you went into Benghazi, and we reserved your answer for this setting. And so could you elaborate on any specialized weapons or personal protective equipment that you or others had when you first went into Benghazi?

Yes, ma'am. I can't recall all of it, but what we 8 A 9 did have were M4 rifles. We had pistols. I believe we may have had a light machine gun. It's been a while, so it's 10 11 hard for me to recall. And of course we had tactical radios. 12 Those tactical radios were used to speak to AFRICOM. And then of course, you know, we had our own body armor and 13 equipment like the personal locaters that I was referring to 14 15 and some of that kind of emerging technology to help us 16 through the mission.

Q Is that the usual amount of stuff that MSD would take into any high-threat post or was any part of that extra for Benghazi?

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
A We're talking about Benghazi?

21 Q Well, you just described equipment that you had in 22 Benghazi.

23 A Yes, ma'am.

Q Okay. Would that -- is the light machine gun, the M4s and the like, all the items that you just described, is

1	that something
2	that you were given for Benghazi that
3	was over and above what you would normally have?
4	A Okay. Just for clarity, ma'am, what we provided in
5	Benghazi MSD was me as an agent in charge and two
6	individuals, one that had a little extra medical training and
7	an individual that was very comfortable dealing with the
8	tactical radios. So I just want to make sure that there is a
9	distinction there that that mission, while supplemented by
10	people from the Office of Mobile Security Deployments, it was
11	a DP mission.
12	But to answer your question, the weapon, the special
13	equipment
14	
15	Q Okay.
16	BY MR. DAVIS:
17	Q What about the equipment, the other equipment that
18	the DP team brought into Benghazi, were you privy to the
19	equipment that they had?
20	A Yes.
21	Q
22	
23	A In what context?
24	Q The type of the equipment, the amount of weapons
25	that was brought,



1	A To be quite honest with you, ma'am, I don't know
2	exactly what their activities were.
3	
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5	
6	So those types of things,
7	from my perspective as the agent in charge, those things were
8	coordinated and we were collaborative on those kind of
9	security-related issues as opposed to
10	Q And was that cooperation set up before you got
11	there? Did you inherit it from
12	A I did.
13	Q from ?
14	A Yes, I did.
15	Q Okay. To your knowledge, was that set up before
16	the Envoy's mission went into Benghazi?
17	A I have no knowledge, ma'am.
18	Q Okay. I believe you described just generally
19	earlier that the Envoy would have meetings
20	Is that correct?
21	A Yes, ma'am.
22	Q Would you be present for those meetings?
23	A I would.
24	Q Okay. What was discussed at those meetings?
25	A Oh, I'm sorry, ma'am, I misspoke. I wouldn't sit

in on those meetings unless it had to do with something that
 was threat related or impacted our security operations
 directly. The Envoy would go in and meet with his, you know,
 personnel, and they would have their discussions. I, as the
 agent in charge, wouldn't sit in there and listen to --

Q Of the meetings that you did attend when they were
 threat related, what were those meetings about?

8 A Just what would happen is, on one occasion I can 9 remember is that the Envoy and I went

if that makes sense.

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Q And what were the threats that were facing you at that time?

17 At that time, one of the bigger concerns was, is A 18 where the battle lines were shifting to, to the south and east of us -- or to the south and west of us -- because there 19 20 were Qadhafi forces clashing with rebels and those lines 21 tended to shift. And it was important for us to recognize 22 what the status was in order for us to make informed 23 decisions as to our security posture or any adjustments that we had to make. 24

Q Okay. And were there any other threats that were

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shared with you regarding your, meaning the State Department's, security while you were in Benghazi?

A One of the things that everybody was attuned to and wanted to track as closely as we can was Al Qaeda threats at that time, Al Qaeda and their possible operations in Libya. And so we would constantly, you know, talk about are there any threats at that time relevant to Al Qaeda.

8

Q And were there?

9 A The way I understood it is, is that at the time no, 10 that the bigger threat at that time was Qadhafi forces maybe 11 doing a breakthrough of the lines down there. But everyone 12 recognized that there is always the potential that, given the 13 fact that the TNC was a nascent organization and didn't have 14 complete control over the situation there, that Al Qaeda 15 could use that uncertainty to come and set up operations, 16 whether it was in search of weapons or to stay and to work other issues. 17

18 Q Okay. We talked earlier about the June 1 incident 19 where the car bomb occurred at the Tibesti --

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Mr. Westmoreland.

Ms. <u>Jackson.</u> Sure, yes.

 23
 Mr. Westmoreland. I believe it was in June of '11 that

 24
 there was a memo sent

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Did they ever make you knowledgeable

1 about something like that, that they may have seen from your 2 headquarters, or from their headquarters? Did they ever 3 share that? 4 Mr. That we, the Special Envoy mission, was on 5 our own, or that they were on their own? 6 Mr. Westmoreland. That they were on their own. 7 Mr. No, sir. Mr. Westmoreland. They never shared that? 8 9 Mr. No, sir. In relation to --10 Mr. Westmoreland. I don't have a copy of it. Did 11 the gist of 12 which indicated you're on your own concerning security in the 13 timeframe of 2011? 14 Mr. No, sir. 15 Mr. Westmoreland. I had to get a lawyer to write it for 16 me. I'm not an attorney. Okay. BY MS. JACKSON: 17 18 The June 1 car bomb explosion in front of the 0 19 Tibesti Hotel, I believe you stated earlier that the initial 20 thought was that Qadhafi loyalists had set off the car bomb. 21 Is that correct? After the fact. I did meet with members of the 22 A 23 Transitional National Council, and that was their assertion, 24 that they believed that it could be Qadhafi loyalists that still had a presence in Benghazi. 25

 1
 Q
 Okay. Did you receive any other type of

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 3
 Brigade or any other source in or around Benghazi that

 4
 someone else or some other group was responsible for it or it

 5
 was playing with dynamite?

6 To answer your question directly, no, ma'am, I A didn't get anything else that would either confirm or deny 7 8 that it may have been Qadhafi loyalists. But you indicated 9 something that, you know, somebody playing with dynamite 10 would be a possibility. I'm not discounting it in that it wasn't unusual for people to put dynamite into cars, and it 11 12 could have been an incident where it was an accident or 13 something that there was dynamite in this car and it 14 exploded. But the thinking at the time was is that it was 15 most likely Qadhafi's loyalists.

16 Q To your knowledge, were any individuals arrested or 17 taken into custody as suspects or perpetrators of the 18 incident?

A Post-blast, in my meetings with a representative from the TNC, he indicated that one person was arrested. But I have no proof of that. I have nothing to corroborate that, just that they had arrested somebody. And we never found out was that person tried and convicted or we just never knew.

Q Okay. Approximately 10 days later, on or about June 10, while you were there, a credible threat came in that

1	caused you to leave the Tibesti Hotel
2	Is that correct?
3	A Yes, ma'am.
4	Q Okay. Tell us about that.
5	A Well, we were approached
6	and he let myself and the Envoy know that he had this threat,
7	that he considered it, you know, credible, and that
8	collectively, you know, we agreed that it would be better,
9	rather than stay in the hotel, to take everybody and move
10	, given the fact that
11.	Q Was it directed at U.S. personnel, or at the hotel,
12	or both?
13	A I believe it was at the hotel, directly against the
14	hotel, specifically. To be quite honest, I would like to see
15	the document again to refresh my memory, but that was my
16	sense of it. And given the things that we talked about,
17	ma'am, about the physical security and the access control,
18	the Envoy control of the set of
19	better to just go ahead and move in with them until the
20	threat could be further evaluated and additional decisions
21	could be made.
22	Q Did you ever go back to the Tibesti Hotel?
23	A No, ma'am.
24	Q Okay. What was the
25	that made it so much superior to the hotel? What did they

have that the hotel did not have?

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2 Well, first and foremost, ma'am, A 3 That way we could share resources, if you understand what I'm saying, they had their resources, we had 4 5 our resources, so collectively we were more robust. 6 What it also had was access control. The Tibesti Hotel. to be quite honest with you, we never knew who was going in 7 8 there day in, day out. And so by mere virtue 9 , we always knew who was coming in and out of that particular compound. 10 11 Q Was it a villa? 12 A Yes. 13 0 A walled compound? 14 It was a walled compound. Yes, ma'am. A 15 Do you know approximately how large it was, like 0 the size of a football field, smaller than a baseball field? 16 17 А I would say it was probably the size of a soccer field, if that would help. Some of the other things that 18 that brought to us was hardened buildings. In other words, 19 there was a lot of stray rounds flying around. Some of it 20 21 was celebratory, some of it was ill-disciplined personnel 22 pulling the trigger. And at the hotel, you had a lot of that 23 going on, whereas , we also were in buildings that were hardened. In other words, they probably 24 would sustain rounds dropping from the sky, or depending on 25

1 the trajectory, the mason area that was involved in those 2 particular villas, to use that word, provided an added layer of protection for our personnel. 3 4 0 So from the time that you moved there on or about 5 June 10, did you stay there, did you personally stay there 6 through the rest of your tour? 7 A Yes. Okay. Do you know whether the group stayed, the 8 0 9 State Department officials stayed after you departed? Yes. 10 A 11 Okay. And what was the timeframe that they were 0 2 12 there I can't say for sure, ma'am, but it was several 13 A 14 days, a couple days. 15 Q After you left? 16 A Yes. 17 0 Okay. And then where were they going? 18 We had identified a villa, or a walled compound to A 19 use your term, that we would be allowed to set up our operations in. The added strain on the infrastructure 20 21 was significant in terms of electricity load, in terms 22 of, you know, just facilities and things of that nature. So 23 not too far away from there we identified a place that we could lease and set up operations. 24 25 Q Okay. Was departure ever considered when this

1 credible threat came in, in June, or after the car bomb on 2 the 1st?

A It was considered, but I think the assessment was is that we needed a better understanding of what the threat was, and to mitigate anything that we needed to do during that period of time.

Q Okay.

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8 A So that period of time allowed us to further assess 9 whether we should stay or go.

10 Q Okay. Were there any other threats or security 11 incidents that occurred while you were there?

A To be honest, ma'am, directed against us, nothing that I remember, you know, like have a focus on. Then again, I'm talking about directed against the Envoy or the personnel supporting that mission.

16 Q Anything come to mind regarding any other Western 17 officials there, the U.K., the Italians, the French?

A I don't recall, no, ma'am.

19 0 Okay. I'm going to switch gears on you. We talked 20 just a little while ago about there was some sort of ceiling 21 set on the number of State officials that could be in 22 Benghazi at any given time, and I asked you if you know who 23 had set that ceiling and you did not know that answer. Do you know what office or bureau or directorate would be the 24 25 decision maker?

I think it would have been -- it would have been in 1 A 2 collaboration with DS and the NEA Bureau. 3 0 The two of them together? 4 A Right. 5 Okay. And who do both of those Bureaus report to, 0 . which undersecretary? 6 7 The NEA under secretary for political and DS would A 8 be management. 9 I see it is 3 o'clock. I have a few other areas to 0 go in, but I believe those would be all unclassified 10 questions, so I'm going to stop and turn it over to our 11 12 colleagues on the minority to ask questions. 13 Mr. Kenny. Go off the record. 14 [Recess.] 15 EXAMINATION 16 BY MR. KENNY: Go back on the record. It is 3:08. And we're 17 0 18 still in the classified session here. We appreciate your 19 patience today, sir. Just ask some followup questions, 20 picking up where we left off in the last hour. I will try to 21 do my best to kind of move in a chronological fashion to help 22 and organize in order our discussion. But I would like to return to the June 1 explosion that occurred outside of the 23 24 Tibesti Hotel, and maybe begin there and ask in followup whether you and the Special Envoy had any specific 25

discussions about your security posture at the hotel
 following that incident.

3 A Yes, we did. At that time, there was some 4 discussion of enhancing our security posture at the hotel, 5 and then there was also a thought that we would be able to 6 find a more suitable place to operate out of. And so at that 7 time we did discuss the fact that, you know, the fact that we 8 had that incident at the hotel, that points us more towards 9 finding another location that doesn't have the same constraints and vulnerabilities that the hotel had. 10

11 Q Okay. And so just to be clear, so the discussion 12 immediately turned to what the response should be, and it 13 sounds like there were two options under consideration. One, 14 that you would bolster the physical security at the hotel, 15 the other, that you'd seek some sort of alternate or 16 alternative compound elsewhere in the city?

A

17

That's fair.

18 Q Okay. And were both of those tracks pursued 19 simultaneously, you know, considering whether to do the 20 upgrades versus seeking out and signing a contract?

A They were both options that were being explored.
 Q Okay. Do you recall if any upgrades were actually
 made to the hotel?

A I don't think there was anything substantive that was made.

1 Did you participate in any site security reviews of 0 2 the hotel to identify specific places where you could harden 3 their defenses? 4 Yes. A 5 0 And did you generate a list of options then for the 6 hotel to consider, for the State Department to consider? 7 A Well, those were separate options to be considered. 8 As far as conducting a survey, a survey of the hotel was 9 done. It was sent back with some recommendations on what 10 could be done if the decision was made that we remain in the 11 hotel. 12 Okay. And did you prepare that proposal? 0 I did it in collaboration with He's 13 A 14 the physical security specialist who was out in Benghazi. Okay. And was he there before this bombing 15 0 occurred? 16 A Was he there before? 17 18 0 Or was he sent somehow in response to the --19 No, he was there before. A 20 He was there before. Okay. And what was the 0 21 purpose of his presence? 22 A To provide expertise on physical security measures that could be employed to better our position at the hotel. 23 24 Did you get any sense of a potential response from 0 25 the Department? Did you ever hear back on that proposal when

1 it went back?

A The proposal went back and if I recall correctly it was under consideration by the Department relative to if we stay in the hotel.

5 Q Sure. Did the Department seem receptive to the 6 proposal? Did they seem supportive of at least if a decision 7 were made to pursue that angle?

8 A There were things that the Department thought were 9 viable, if we enacted certain measures at the hotel that they 10 considered viable.

11 Q Do you recall if any money was made available for 12 physical security upgrades to the hotel?

A I don't know that I received -- that anybody
received an actual allotment of funds. But I have no doubt
that the funding would be made available.

Q So we have talked about the physical security upgrades. We'll talk about consideration of other potential sites to which to relocate. Before we get to that, I would just like to ask, there has been some discussion of tripwires today, and I was wondering if we could just maybe start with you explaining to us what your understanding of what a tripwire is and how it's intended to be used?

A Yeah, tripwires are a means to make an assessment. A Yeah, tripwires are a means to make an assessment. A s to what incidences -- to anticipate incidences and what the effect would be on the mission, and any actions that would be prudent to take if that tripwire were realized.

1

Q Okay. And just generically speaking, if a tripwire were to be crossed, does that automatically mean that all mission personnel cease operations and withdraw from a country?

6 A It depends on how you approach that particular 7 problem. You know, it could, if that is the case, or it 8 could just simply trigger another review of the assumptions 9 and an assessment of our posture relative to that particular 10 event.

11 Q And in this instance when this explosion occurred 12 at the hotel, the June 1 explosion, was there discussion 13 about whether that event crossed any tripwires?

14 A I have to put it in context a little bit. First of 15 all, the damage that was done to the hotel was minimal, I 16 guess is the word I would use. We had no casualties or no 17 loss of life in that particular event. So all of that has to 18 be taken into account when you consider whether to invoke 19 some kind of major change in our security posture. All those 20 things have to be taken into account as well as the incident itself. 21

Q Were you aware if other foreign missions or media who were present at the hotel, did they make a decision to withdraw from Libya on account of the June 1 incident? A No. To my knowledge, I'm not aware of any personnel shutting down their operations as a result of that
 particular incident.

Q Okay. To your recollection, did you consult written tripwires about this event or was this more just based on your experience on events, conditions that might cause a reassessment?

A To be quite honest with you, given that so many
years have passed, I would need to see what the tripwires
were established.

10 Q

11

25

A And then I could tell you.

Sure.

12 Q Do you recall if there were tripwires in place? 13 A I believe there were tripwires. Some of the ones I 14 remember was, as I spoke to earlier, should Qadhafi forces 15 break through the lines and move on Benghazi, incidents like 16 that, I recall were tripwires either discussed or actually 17 written down.

Q Okay. So we talked about some of the security responses. We'll come back to looking at other sites. But based on your assessment that there was minimal damage done and wanting to reassess the security environment, can you help us understand why a decision wasn't made to evacuate immediately then, at that moment?

24 A To where?

Q And what I mean evacuate, I mean withdraw from

Libya, cease all operations.

•	Lingu, couse are operations.
2	A I'm sorry, sir, why a decision to evacuate
3	completely was not made?
4	Q Yes.
5	A It was our assessment that that incident did not
6	call for the actual closing of our mission in Benghazi.
7	Q And when you say our assessment, would that include
8	the Special Envoy?
9	A Yes.
10	Q Special Envoy Stevens?
11	A Yes.
12	Q Okay. And would that include you, yourself, your
13	security team, your senior security?
14	A Yeah, yeah.
15	Q Okay. Who else might be included in that
16	discussion?
17	A It was really pretty much the Special Envoy and
18	myself who ultimately had the, I would say, the
19	responsibility for making that decision.
20	Q Okay. Did then Envoy Chris Stevens, did he share
21	with you his feelings whether he had a desire to remain in
22	Benghazi during this period?
23	A I think as we discussed the event, he was of the
24	mind that that particular incident was not taking us to a
25	point where we needed to shut down the whole mission. Now,

1 what I do know is, is that he was in direct contact with the 2 Department, providing them updates as to what was transpiring 3 in Benghazi at that time.

Q Okay. Just as a general question, were you ever specifically told by the Department that the Special Envoy was to remain in Benghazi regardless of how bad the security conditions got there?

A No.

8

25

9 Q Okay. Just taking a step back here, can you, given 10 your experience and given the unique perspective you had on 11 the ground, can you just give us a sense of your 12 understanding of the environment in Benghazi at that time? 13 Was there a great deal of optimism? Was it a tenuous place? 14 Can you just help us understand what Benghazi was like in 15 early or mid-2011?

16 It was an environment that we were operating in A where the fact that we were Americans alone gave us -- was 17 18 recognized as the populous was very supportive of the U.S.' 19 role in the no-fly zone. That being said, things were 20 chaotic. So there was celebratory gunfire that took place 21 quite often. There were pro-TNC rallies, a large number of 22 rallies that took place almost on a daily basis. There were 23 checkpoints set up in the city manned by militia members that 24 needed to be negotiated.

But there was a certain cache of good will that existed

1 in the early days of Benghazi that we were able to capitalize 2 on to move throughout the city to accomplish the missions that we had to do. 3

4

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0 Okay. Do you have any specific examples of that? 5 Well, it would not be unusual clearing a checkpoint A 6 is, when they saw who we were, even though we tried to keep 7 our profile as low as possible, we got a lot of the thumbs up. When they would have rallies there were a lot of 8 9 American flags waving in the crowds. And generally speaking, 10 when they realized that you were an American, they would come up and thank you for assisting them in their struggle.

12 One of the things that, to put it in context, despite 13 all the chaos and friction that surrounded us, one good example of what happened to us is, is that we had a national 14 15 that wanted to have -- there was a holiday in Libya during that time. They wanted to have a dinner for us. The only 16 17 place that we could have that dinner was in the hotel.

And so his wife made this dinner for us, homemade 18 19 dinner, brought it to the hotel, and she wanted to say a few words before we started dinner. And at that time she got up, 20 21 she was this very articulate English-speaking wife and 22 mother, I believe, and she wanted to welcome us to this dinner. And at that time, as she got up to speak, you could 23 24 tell that she was very touched as tears were welling in her 25 eyes. In a very halting voice she was trying to express to

us her thanks because she was saying how scared she was
 before the no-fly zone went up and that she knew that it was
 America that was the reason that they had been able to
 survive the push of Qadhafi on Benghazi.

I won't deny that it was a touching moment, and it does make you proud to be an American sometimes when you are put in a situation like that and you realize the importance of what you're doing. And that was not uncommon, that people would come up to us during that period of time and thank us for everything that we have done for Libya.

Q Okay. Thank you. That's very helpful.

I'd like to talk before we shift into discussion of the alternative sites and talk a little bit about evacuation planning. You mentioned, I believe at the beginning of our session today, that you had worked in special plans and evacuation?

17

18

11

A Uh-huh.

Q Is that right?

19 A At one point, yes.

Q Okay. And I would just like to ask, there has been some discussion today about whether a decision was made to evacuate and to pull out. Had that decision been made, was there a plan in place that you were aware of, that you recall?

25 A Yes.

- 1QOkay. Was it one plan? Was it many plans2depending on maybe different circumstances?
- 3

A It was one plan.

4 Q Okay.

A To my knowledge.

6 Q And what was your understanding of what that plan 7 was?

8 A That there were assets that were put on standby to 9 help us should we have to make an in extremis evacuation. 10 But I do want to -- I have to raise one point too. When we 11 talked about evacuation during that period of time, one of 12 the things that we had available to us was an airplane that I 13 think, you know, was chalked in Malta. That would be the 14 most likely course of action that we would have taken to 15 evacuate from post.

As a backup to that, there was U.S. military assets that were identified to come and assist us should we need them. We had all the grid coordinates, the LZs, and all the coordination was done between us and AFRICOM to effect an evacuation if we had to. And, again, I want to emphasize that that would have been a military-assisted evacuation.

22 Q So you felt there was some support there for you if 23 you needed it at that time?

24 A Yes.

Q Okay. I would like to actually maybe, if we could,

1 unpack some of that. So you're referring to there was a 2 plane in Malta. Was that a State Department asset? 3 A Yes. 4 0 Okay. And so if you had needed that in an in 5 extremis-type circumstance how would you have gone about 6 requesting it? 7 A Through what we call M, Management. 8 Okay. And what was your understanding of the 0 9 response time for that asset? 10 Well, you know, it would have been within hours. A 11 Okay. And then it sounds like you were also 0 12 describing that there was some U.S. military assistance was provided? 13 There was a plan to, if needed, evacuate with the 14 A 15 assistance of the U.S. military. 16 0 Okay. And just to clarify, because I think a 17 moment ago you said there was only one plan, but it sounds 18 like there may have been a State Department plan, using State 19 Department assets, but also an in extremis response using 20 U.S. military assets. Is that right? A Yes, I think so. 21 22 0 Okay. At this time did you have armored vehicles 23 in Benghazi? 24 A Yes. 25 0 Okay. Was there any discussion about whether those

could be used to aid or assist in an evacuation, maybe using -- perhaps using an overland route out of the country?

A There might have been some discussion out of that, regarding that, but I can tell you, I would be very hesitant to try to pull that off.

6

Q Okay. And why is that?

A It's an extremely long drive to the Egyptian border. And, you know, there is a lot of friction that surrounds trying to make that kind of move. Was it an option? Yeah, it was an option. But it was probably one of the least preferred options that we would have had.

12 Q Focusing on the military plan specifically, you 13 mentioned that there had been some helicopter landing zones 14 at least that had been scoped out. Were those identified 15 before you arrived in Benghazi?

Okay. Do you know who prepared those?

A Yes.

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1 Mr. Mr. I don't know specifically who prepared 2 them?

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BY MR. KENNY:

Q But when you arrived in early May of 2011, those sites had already been identified and had been coordinated with AFRICOM. Is that right?

A That's correct.

8 Q Okay. Were you aware of which specific military 9 force would have evacuated you at that point in time? Do you 10 recall?

A My recollection was is that the TRAP platoon from
 the MEU may have had the primary mission to come get us.

Q Okay. And do you recall -- and, again, I am asking
you for specifics on events long ago -- but do you recall
about how long the response time would have been?

A I guess that would be contingent upon where they were at that particular time. I want to say at that time, early in my time there, I want to say 2-1/2 hours, 3 hours. I can't remember precisely.

20 Q Okay. And during this point in time, this is 21 during the NATO-led Operation Unified Protector. Is that 22 right?

23 A Yes.

24 Q Enforcing the no-fly zone?

25 A Okay. Yes.

1 Q Okay. When there were significant air and naval 2 assets that were available in that region. Is that your 3 understanding as well?

4 A I'm not sure when the no-fly zone got lifted, and I 5 would have to review.

Q Okay. Would posts ordinarily have at their
disposal the types of assets, these types of military assets
that we are describing here? Would they be in such close
proximity and have those type of resources? Is that
something that you have encountered elsewhere in the ordinary
course, maybe outside of the Iraq and Afghanistan context.

A I think I understand the question, but it is not usual. But, again, when managing any kind of situation there is things that the Department does, and not just for Benghazi, but that the Department does to try to better our position should we need to evacuate citizens and employees.

Q And just based on your experience with emergency evacuation plans, is it your understanding that there is a lot of planning that goes into developing and prepositioning of assets? Is that typical for emergency planning? Does it require a lot of effort and planning to go into developing these emergency plans?

23AYes. Post spends a lot of time and effort to make24sure that the plans are viable and are exercised.

25

Q Okay. I would like to return briefly, there was a

1	discussion about
2	in Benghazi. Do you recall that discussion
3	that we were having last hour?
4	A Yes.
5	Q Okay. You were describing some of the security
6	advantages, I think, of have
7	at that facility. Were you aware, was that
8	facility SECCA compliant? To your knowledge.
9	A I don't know.
10	Q What was your assessment of the security there,
11	aside from what we were discussing earlier? Were there any
12	disadvantages to residing in this compound from a security
13	standpoint?
14	Mr. <u>Evers.</u> Do you mean
15	Mr. <u>Kenny.</u> Yes.
16	Mr. <u>Evers.</u> Okay. Thank you.
17	Mr. Was there any disadvantages?
18	BY MR. KENNY:
19	Q To clarify, I don't mean is there a disadvantage to
20	I mean, was there a disadvantage based on that
21	specific facility from a security standpoint?
22	A No.
23	Q Okay.
24	A If I could say no relative to the hotel?
25	Q Okay. Why not stay at that facility then?

1 A The infrastructure was such that it couldn't 2 sustain the added load of our mission 3 0 Okay. During this time period, was there a lot of 4 discussion about alternative sites to which the Special Envoy 5 might be relocated? 6 A The special Envoy and I and the special envoy, the 7 physical security specialist, visited several locations to 8 see if they were suitable for us to move into to sustain our 9 operations. 10 Q Okay. And were there a lot of ready-made, off-the-shelf type facilities that were secure? 11 12 A No. They were rare. All of the things, all of the facilities that we looked at would require enhancements. 13 14 Okay. Do you recall about how many properties were 0 under consideration at that time? 15 16 A I could say that we probably visited at least seven 17 or eight, and I think that's on the low end. 18 Q Okay. So it at least sounds like there was some 19 deliberation then about which facility, and you were seeking 20 out different properties and weighing and evaluating them. 21 Is that fair? That's fair. 22 A 23 0 Okay. During the time that you were there, was there any other facility expert that was dispatched by the 24 25 Department to come to Benghazi to assist in this process?

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A Yes.

Q And who was that?

A There was a facilities maintenance -- I take that back. I'm not sure that at the time I was there that anyone else was dispatched. It was the physical security specialist, the Envoy, myself.

Q Okay. Does the name source sound familiar? A Sector was the physical security specialist, yeah. I know, it gets confusing. Because everyone needed a break at some point, they would, you know -- once source got done with his tour of duty, for that period of time they sent set in.

Q Okay.

A He's a physical security specialist.

15 Q Okay. And he assisted with review and evaluation 16 of the various proposed sites?

A I think the proposed site that was sent back was considered by the Department relative to the other seven or eight sites that we went to. A decision was made to go with that particular plat. Then where came in is, is that he was deployed to oversee the enhancements to that particular perimeter and to the facility itself from a security perspective.

Q Okay. But would he have participated at the outset in laying out what upgrades would be necessary for a

particular property?

A The individual beforehand, **Example**, did that role.

Q During the period that you were in Benghazi -- my understanding is it was a limited time here -- but were you aware of whether the Department made available or provided any funding specifically for physical security upgrades at any of these proposed compounds?

9 A What I do know is, is that, again, while I am not 10 sure that I received a specific what we call AOA, what I do 11 know is, is that whatever the funding that needed to be 12 available to do those enhancements would be provided.

13 Q Okay.

A And I had no doubt that they would do that.
 Q Did the Department, did the Bureau, seem fairly
 well engaged in this process of trying to find a new
 property?

18 A Yes.

Q Were they generally responsive to any needs thatyou had in this process?

A I think all the needs were recognized, both between the Department and those of us on the ground, to find the most suitable facility we could in order to sustain our operations. Because each facility that we looked at had some good points about it and some bad points. Ultimately what SECRET

1	was decided on was the best of all the facilities that we
2	looked at.
3	Q There was a brief discussion in the last hour about
4	a ceiling or a cap on the number of personnel that could be
5	in country. Are you aware of whether that ceiling, was that
6	tied to the security conditions? Was it tied to the
7	evacuation capability? Do you know generally what the
8	purpose of that cap was?
9	A It was tied to the evacuation capability.
10	Q Okay. And so was it your sense then that that was
11	a prudent measure to have in place, not to exceed the number
12	of people, given what your evacuation capability is?
13	A Yes.
14	Q So it is part of your risk-mitigation strategy?
15	A Yes.
16	Q Are you familiar at all with reverse tripwires? Do
17	you recall?
18	A My understanding of reverse tripwires are those
19	tripwires that are reached that would allow us to resume
20	operations or expand operations or things of that nature. So
21	essentially conditions are getting better, that's a reverse
22	tripwire within that, that decisions are made.
23	Q Do you recall preparing any for Benghazi
24	specifically?
25	A Yes.

Q Were they used at all during the time you were there, in the sense was there consideration of whether a reverse tripwire had been crossed or any discussion about those?

A I would need to see. In order for me to honestly give you an answer, I would need to see what was written.

Q Okay. But would these reverse tripwires, would that tie into the discussion about the cap on the number of personnel in the country as well, that if you crossed the reverse tripwire then you could perhaps consider lifting the cap on the number of people in country?

12 A That would be one of the considerations or one of 13 the results of reaching reverse tripwires that would be 14 considered.

Q Okay. And also just to help clarify because it was helpful when you were describing the conditions in Benghazi, but at this time in May, June 2011, was Benghazi considered a frontline in the war against Qadhafi?

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No.

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Q So when we talked about the DART teams, the USAID teams that would have deployed to other parts, I think Agedabia was one of the sites under consideration, were those a little closer to what would be considered the front lines? A Yes.

Q Okay. And because of the risks in operating in

1 those types of environments, is that why those types of teams 2 would have required an MSD escort in going to those --

A In my recollection, that was the first mission that was set up for Libya. It never took place, but that was the first one. So the MSD assets that we had available were assigned to that particular mission. That, and it is a little more difficult to operate in that environment.

Q Do you recall, was it a State Department decision that that mission would never take place? Was it something that because these personnel are operating and have an MSD? Were you involved in any discussions about whether that mission would go forward?

A I wasn't personally, no.

13

14QOkay. Would the DS Bureau have been involved?15AThe DS would have been involved in that, so would16IP.

17 Q Do you know whether they made the recommendation18 for them not to proceed?

A That I don't know. Again, our role in MSD, we're a support function. If the decision was made to go and do this, we would have gone. We don't have the -- now, they'll listen to our reasoning and recommendations, but ultimately we don't have the final authority to say go or don't go.

24 Q But do you know, was it a decision within the 25 Department that this is just too dangerous, we shouldn't send

1	people there?		
2	A That's my und	derstanding, yes.	
3	Mr. <u>Kenny.</u> Okay.	That will conclude our	round. We
4	will go off the record.		
5	[Recess.]		
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1 Ms. Jackson. Okay, let's go back on the record. We are 2 going to follow up and do a couple of questions and follow up 3 in a classified setting. And I am going to turn it over to 4 my colleague, Carlton Davis, for the questions. 5 BY MR. DAVIS: 6 So briefly, during your last discussion with Sharon Q 7 an hour ago, you guys read Exhibit 2, which was an email from you to Ambassador Stevens, Wednesday, June 6, 2012. In the 8 9 first paragraph, third sentence, you write, "As an office we 10 would gladly do it for both of you who have been so good to 11 us, but we have two emerging requirements similar to Tripoli 12 that requires the whole of our office essentially." 13 Do you see that? 14 A Yes. You mentioned that the two emerging requirements, 15 0 and one 16 you mentioned one IS that correct? 17 18 A As I recall. 19 0 And do you recall whether or not an MSD was in fact actually deployed 20 21 A No, an MSD was not deployed. 22 0 And do you recall if an MSD team was, in fact, actually deployed 23 ? 24 A We sent what we call a survey team and they did a survey of the airport there. 25

1 Q Is a survey team, is that MSD personnel? 2 A Yes. I'm sorry. It is an MSD component. 3 0 And how many people were on the survey team? 4 I believe there were two on that team. A 5 0 But would the two people that went to the 6 airport, are they part of the team of six MSD personnel that 7 normally go to posts or were they a separate entity? 8 They were a separate entity that we called the -- I A

9 believe it was tactical survey team. And they were a small 10 group of individuals. I believe there was a total of four in 11 this unit that was within MSD that had the ability to do 12 these types of surveys, and so they were utilized. They are 13 separate from the nine teams that we talked about earlier.

Q And so just to be clear, in your email back to Ambassador Stevens, are you the one that is determining these emerging requirements or are you simply passing along the word that folks up the chain have told you about these emerging requirements?

A This is based off of what I understand from up thechain that may be emerging requirements.

Q And up the chain?

A Is essentially IP.

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22

23 Q Okay. So once the team **24** and the team **24** fell through, did those two MSD teams get deployed 25 elsewhere?

A My sense of it is, is yes, they did. Now, I have to clarify that this is going on in June. I'm leaving in July **Exercise**, so I apologize, sir, I don't know. But what my sense of it is, is that the optempo was such that they were utilized as needed. I don't have the actual list of what missions that we were running after that.

7 Q So the decision not to go decision, the 8 decision not to go decision, do you know if that was made 9 while you were still head of MSD or had you moved on to 10 decision at that point?

A At some point the Embassy in -- well, I do know at some point -- and, again, I have to be careful. My understanding of when I say these emerging requirements, that it was those two posts. But we did send people to do that survey. Whether it happened before or after this email, I can't recall correctly, but the thought was is that we may have to provide MSD to support

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20 21 Q So if the decision not to send an MSD team 22 22 Note: , and if the decision came that the MSD team was no 23 longer needed 2000, if you had moved on to 2000 at 24 that point, you would likely not have been aware that those 25 decisions had been made?

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A That's correct.

Q So there would have been no opportunity for you to go back to Ambassador Stevens and inform him that those two emerging requirements were no longer needed?

5 A Could you rephrase it? That I would then --6 Q Sure. Do you recall ever passing along Ambassador 7 Stevens' request to your successor as the head of the MSD? 8 A I don't recall.

9 Q And the person who succeeded you at the head of MSD 10 would be who?

A

Ms. Jackson. Before we go off the record, does the
 minority have any questions on our questions in this area?
 Mr. Kenny. Yes. I will take the opportunity now before
 we go into unclassified.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q So I would just like to pick up where Carlton left off. And again, this is a discussion of the email, the two emerging requirements. You identified one

Is that correct?

A That's what I believe at this time that I was
 referring to, several years later.

23 Q Okay. Focusing first **Construction**, was that 24 requirement, to send a complement of MSD teams, a full 25 complement of MSD agents there, or was that just for the two 1 TSS agents?

2 A The TSS agents went and did their survey and 3 brought it back. And then the potential that we would have 4 to go remained. That was the emerging possibly a 5 requirement. 6 0 Okay. But that requirement would have required 7 more than those two to redeploy Agreed. If we did any kind of like operation 8 A 9 there, we would have had to, you know. 10 0 Do you recall what sort of numbers were being discussed? 11 A My sense of it is, if I recall correctly, and, 12 13 again, it's been a very long time, I would say at least two 14 teams. 15 0 So at least two teams. So two teams times six agents. We're talking 12 DS agents just 16 For 60 days and then rotate. 17 A And the requirement, same line of 18 0 questioning, so did you have a sense of what the size of that 19 20 effort would have required? 21 A We would have gotten in whatever we could at that 22 time. We were looking at -- and, again, I don't know the 23 exact times, but there was a period of time where we wanted to get to the RSO **control** to provide her help, but there 24 25 were certain constraints that precluded MSD from getting in

1 there in order to help her.

2 Q Can you help maybe compare the threat environments? 3 Was that a dangerous post at that time? 4 A Absolutely.

5 Q Okay. And was your sense that the post required 6 additional resources to bolster their security?

A Yeah, yes.

Q Okay. And to clarify, you were asked who sets the -- where the requirements come from, and when you used the phrase up the chain, you referred to DS/IP. Could you clarify, is your office subordinate to DS/IP?

No. I'm sorry. DS/IP and the T Directorate, 12 A 13 Training Directorate, are equals. So you have IP and you have T. Underneath T, you have MSD, so we are one level 14 15 down. But generally speaking, IP would go over to T and say we have a requirement for MSD to do this particular mission. 16 Mr. Kenny. Okay. That's all. 17 18 Ms. Jackson. Okay. All right. We'll go off the record. 19 20

[Whereupon, at 4:00 p.m., the interview was concluded.]

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1	Certificate of Deponent/Interviewee		
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3			
4	I have read the foregoing pages, which contain the		
5	correct transcript of the answers made by me to the questions		
6	therein recorded.		
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11	Witness Name		
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Errata Sheet

Select Committee on Benghazi

The witness reviewed the accompanying transcript, certified its accuracy, and declined to provide corrections to the transcript.