On July 12, 2016, the arbitral tribunal adjudicating the Philippines’ case against China in the South China Sea ruled overwhelmingly in favor of the Philippines, determining that major elements of China’s claim—including its nine-dash line, recent land reclamation activities, and other activities in Philippine waters—were unlawful. Predictably, China reacted negatively to the ruling, maintaining it was “null and void.” China may take assertive and inflammatory steps to defend its position. The extent to which China abides by the ruling in the long term, and to which the international community supports and seeks to enforce the ruling, will have consequences for the utility of international law as a tool to ensure the peaceful, stable, and lawful use of the seas going forward.

China’s ability to conduct conventional cruise and ballistic missile strikes on Guam is growing, even as the island’s strategic importance to the United States is increasing. This report examines the reasons behind China’s development of new conventional weapons that can reach Guam, the array of forces it could employ against Guam in a potential conflict, and policy options for the United States to consider in response. Accuracy limitations and platform vulnerabilities render the current risk to U.S. forces on Guam in a potential conflict relatively low, but China’s commitment to continuing to modernize its strike capabilities indicates the risk will likely continue to grow going forward.

While the People’s liberation Army continues to build anti-access/area denial capabilities to deter or delay a U.S. military response to a potential conflict with China, Beijing also appears to be pursuing other options—including nonmilitary options prior to a conflict—likely intended to erode the United States’ strategic position, freedom of action, and operational space in the Asia Pacific. The nonmilitary options being pursued include engagement, coercion, and alliance splitting focused on U.S. allies and partners in the Asia Pacific region. Although Beijing’s attempts to limit U.S. force projection capabilities in Asia through these efforts have produced mixed results, there is little indication Beijing will abandon its efforts to mitigate the U.S. military presence in the region.

In February 2015, China and Argentina announced prospective weapons sales and defense cooperation agreements extending beyond the scope of any made between China and a Latin American nation to date. These plans include Argentina’s purchase or coproduction of 14-20 fourth-generation fighter aircraft, at least 100 armored personnel carriers, and five naval vessels; enhanced military-to-military exchanges; and China’s construction in Argentina of a space tracking facility in conjunction with satellite imagery sharing. If fulfilled, these agreements would vastly surpass China’s previous regional arms exports in value and achieve several new benchmarks in the breadth, competitiveness, and technological sophistication of its regional arms sales; altogether representing a new phase in China-Latin America defense engagement. These developments would present several implications for U.S. objectives in the region: U.S. arms suppliers would likely see continued market share reduction, the United States may face a new regional security hazard, regional actors might alter their political stances or use Chinese arms in ways unfavorable to U.S. interests, and the Falkland Islands dispute might briefly and temporarily intensify. Despite the rapid growth and proximity of China’s regional defense engagements, however, they present no direct security threat to the United States.