Amash (MI)

#18

Provides protection against reprisal to government employees and contractors for communicating with the Inspector General in the course of the audit mandated in Sec. 108.

Carney (DE)

#2

Expands reporting requirements of NSA programs to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, as well as the House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Carney (DE)

#3

Requires the GAO to produce an annual report analyzing the effectiveness of NSA programs for the preceding fiscal year. This annual report would include the following information: statistics from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court detailing the number of times the NSA applied for warrants, the number of times they received those warrants, any violations the NSA committed of U.S. surveillance laws, a description of actions taken in response to these violations, and a description of the minimization procedures the NSA used to ensure Americans’ privacy when carrying out each provision.

DelBene (WA), Carney (DE), Lofgren (CA)

#5

Adds government transparency reporting requirements that would provide the public with information about the total number of requests under specific authorities, and the number of individuals affected by each.

DelBene (WA), Lofgren (CA)

#7

Restores the compromise reached during the Judiciary Committee mark-up on transparency and public reporting, by striking a provision that would require a 2-year delay on any government request received with respect to a new platform , product, or service.

DelBene (WA), Lofgren (CA)

#8

Restores the compromise reached during the Judiciary Committee mark-up on transparency and public reporting, by preserving the ability to provide the # of customer accounts affected under Title VII orders in bands of 1000.

Gohmert (TX)

#6

Clarifies that the authority to carry out an investigation to protect against clandestine intelligence activities under the FISA Business Records statute, the FISA Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device statute, and the National Security Letter statute are confined to clandestine intelligence activities conducted by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.

Holt (NJ)

#19

Modernizes and strengthen whistleblower protections for Intelligence Community employees and contractors.

Holt (NJ)

#20

Prohibits the federal government from forcing manufacturers of electronics and software from building in “backdoors” that bypass the encryption or privacy technology of such device or software.

King, Steve (IA)

#4

Allows intelligence agencies to negotiate and contract with telephone companies (private entities) to store call detail records that may be of national security value.

Lofgren (CA)

#9

States that the certification requirements under 702 were changed in the 2008 FISA Amendment from requiring that a primary purpose of the acquisition be for obtaining foreign intelligence to merely requiring obtaining foreign intelligence to be a “significant purpose”

Lofgren (CA)

#10

Clarifies that the government can only use selectors to collect communications to or from the target of an authorized investigation.

Lofgren (CA)

#11

Fixes the definition of foreign intelligence information by removing "foreign affairs" from the definition of “foreign intelligence information” to ensure that the foreign intelligence gathered under FISA and/or for 702 in particular is only for counterterrorism, proliferation of WMDs, or to protect armed forces.

Lofgren (CA)

#12

Prevents the FBI, Attorney General, or the Director of National Intelligence (or any agency at their request) from mandating that a device manufacturer, software developer, or standards organization build in a backdoor to circumvent the encryption or privacy protections of its products.

Lofgren (CA)

#13

Clarifies that probable cause is needed to search the 702 database for communications of US persons, consistent with the rest of Title VII and the Fourth Amendment.

Lofgren (CA)

#14

Requires that before the government can obtain telephone metadata, it must show probable cause that the information obtained is for an intelligence operation not involving a US person or relevant to an ongoing investigation to protect against terrorism.

Lofgren (CA)

#15

Requires that before the government can obtain telephone metadata using pen registers or trap and trace devices, it must show probable cause that the information obtained is for an intelligence operation not involving a US person or relevant to an ongoing investigation to protect against terrorism.

Lofgren (CA)

#16

Clarifies that business records do not include the content of communications.

Lofgren (CA), DelBene (WA)

#17

Lowers the reporting bands to 100, and allow for the reporting of account affected for all orders.

Sensenbrenner (WI), Goodlatte (VA), Conyers (MI), Nadler (NY), Scott, Bobby (VA), Forbes (VA)

#1

SUBSTITUTE Ends bulk collection on Americans’ records while still protecting national security. Puts real, effective limits on what information the Government can gather. Creates more transparency and gives more information to the American people.