For Immediate Release

May 25, 1999

Report of the Select Committee on Technology
Transfer to the People’s Republic of China

WASHINGTON, D.C. – One of the nation’s great leaders, the late Senator from Washington State Henry M. Jackson, used to say, "when it comes to national security, the best politics is no politics." His words were an inspiration to me at the outset and throughout the work of this Select Committee.

        When I accepted Dick Gephardt’s request to take this assignment in June of last year, the country was facing the prospect of the House impeaching the President, and the political environment in the nation’s capital was as partisan and as mean-spirited as I’ve ever seen it in 30 years here. Chris Cox and I agreed that for six months, nine members could be Americans first, putting aside partisan considerations

        The Select Committee was given the assignment by the House to investigate the transfer of technology to China, focusing first on the security breaches that took place surrounding the launching of U.S. satellites on Chinese rockets. The Committee soon found itself immersed in unraveling a major counter-intelligence failure at the Department of Energy’s national laboratories. Let me point out that this was a counter-intelligence failure that began as early as the late 1970's and it continued through the 1980's and into the 1990's. It is serious -- no doubt one of the worst counter-intelligence failures in the nation’s history. And it occurred even though two previous efforts were made to strengthen counter-intelligence in the last 10 years. It is now clear that these earlier efforts failed because DOE officials did not give counter-intelligence officials the authority, the staffing, the resources and the mandate within the Department to get the job done. After traveling to the laboratories and interviewing counterintelligence officials, the Department of Energy’s new Counter-intelligence Director, Ed Curran, reported in November, 1998:

        "The counter-intelligence program at DOE does not meet minimal standards ... there is not a counterintelligence (program), nor has there been one at DOE for many, many years."

        He concluded that the two past attempts to improve counter-intelligence capability at the labs faltered because counter-intelligence directors were not given direct access to the Secretary of Energy and because lab directors, in many cases, ignored the demand for change and thwarted the suggested improvements. It is probable that if the previous efforts had succeeded, a significant amount of nuclear warhead design data and information lost to the PRC would not have occurred. That’s why it is essential at this time for this Congress -- Republicans and Democrats alike -- to make certain that the serious program of counter-intelligence improvements now being implemented by Energy Secretary Bill Richardson and Counter-intelligence Director Curran are taken more seriously, and that the labs become more responsible and accountable.

        The Select Committee started its investigation in July 1998. In the fall of 1998 we received a briefing that presented the document given to the CIA by a walk-in that showed that the PRC had stolen design information on two nuclear warheads, the W-88 and the W-70, and had stolen information on five other U.S. warheads. When I saw the dimension of the counter-intelligence failure, I immediately went to my former colleague, Secretary Bill Richardson to urge him to accept all of the counter-intelligence recommendations of Director Ed Curran. Specifically, I urged acceptance of Mr. Curran’s recommendations to give the Counter-intelligence Director direct access to the Secretary, and that lab personnel with access to special access programs or top secret information on nuclear warheads be given periodic polygraph examinations. As we speak, Ed Curran is implementing a credible counter-intelligence program at our national labs. With support from Congress, and the leadership that Secretary Richardson is demonstrating now in the Department, we can get Mr. Curran’s complete program in place by Fiscal Year 2000.

        A few weeks ago, Chairman Chris Cox and I briefed the President on the Select Committee’s report, which he received in classified form in January. As was evident at that meeting, the President is thoroughly engaged on these issues: he has accepted our recommendations and has pledged to implement the vast majority of them. In fact, the President signed Presidential Decision Directive PDD-61 in February of 1998, ordering a new counterintelligence program at the DOE labs. This occurred four months before this Select Committee was created by the House.

        Some of the Select Committee’s recommendations will require legislative implementation by the Congress. In fact, Congressman John Spratt and I have worked with our colleagues on a package of amendments to the National Security Authorization bill. These amendments include giving the Counter-intelligence Director statutory access to the Secretary of Energy’s office.

        Let me also state that the conclusions of the report have been written in a "worst case" fashion. I am certain that academics and experts in and out of government will challenge some of our worse case conclusions. It was my intention, with the help of my colleagues, to add balance to the report, but I wanted foremost to assure that the DOE labs got the message this time. With the publication of this report, I believe we have succeeded in that objective.

        The PRC has obtained designs of two nuclear warheads and technical data on five other warheads. This clearly helps them advance the capability of their nuclear weapons program if they have the resources, engineering and scientific talent to do so. They clearly have made progress testing their version of the W-88 and the W-70.

        As of today, the PRC has not deployed a single new nuclear weapon based on the information they have obtained. In fact, they obtained the W-70 information in the late 1970's, tested it in 1988, yet it has not been deployed. They obtained W-88 information probably as early as 1984, tested it between 1992 and 1996, and yet have not deployed it. The DF-31 missile has been in development for 15 years, but it has not been deployed.

        So let us keep this report in perspective. The United States still possesses overwhelming nuclear superiority over China, with more than 6,000 strategic nuclear warheads currently in our inventory, compared to China’s total of about two dozen. The People’s Republic of China has for years had nuclear weapons capable of reaching the United States. But the PRC’s nuclear force is retaliatory in nature: the information obtained from the United States will not change that character. In addition, as I mentioned before, it remains to be seen what use the PRC can make of the information it has acquired. Even testing a nuclear device does not ensure its successful mating with a delivery vehicle. The PRC’s record of assimilating foreign technology has not been very good. The Committee also found that the amount of information the PRC has acquired from the United States pales in comparison to the amount it has been provided by other countries, notably Russia.

        This report should serve as a reminder that the United States remains a primary target of countries desiring advanced technologies for military and other purposes. The PRC has been successful in acquiring some technology: other countries are active as well. Preventing future losses requires vigilance by the government, both Congress and the Executive Branch, and by industry. Our defensive efforts have clearly not been good enough in the past 20 years, but I am confident that they will improve as a direct result of this report.

        Finally, I would like to express my personal thanks to all of the Members who contributed so much of their personal time and insight to this important task. The Committee worked long and hard, and their participation required great sacrifice, to say the least. And I should commend the Committee’s hard-working staff, and certainly Mike Sheehy, for their diligence and their endurance through what was supposed to be a six month effort launched eleven months ago. Most of all, I want to say to Chairman Cox, you did a first-rate job for the Congress and for the nation, and we thank you for your extraordinary leadership.

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