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THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE

STATEMENT OF

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Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Turner, members of the sub-committee, thank you for inviting me here today to testify on the progress we have made in implementing a phased, adaptive approach to missile defense in Europe since its announcement over a year ago. I am pleased to be joined by LTG Patrick O'Reilly, Director of the Missile Defense Agency; RADM Archer Macy, Director of the Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense Organization; and Mr. Frank Rose, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Space and Defense Policy.

European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) – Overview

In September 2009 the President approved the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a phased, adaptive approach to missile defense in Europe. The Defense Department recommendation for this new four-phased approach was based on an extensive analysis of alternatives conducted in the then-ongoing Ballistic Missile Defense Review.

To briefly summarize plans for the four phases of the EPAA:

In Phase 1, in the 2011 timeframe, deploy existing missile defenses to defend against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. BMD-capable Aegis ships carrying SM-3 Block IA interceptors will deploy to the Mediterranean, and a forward-based sensor will be deployed in Southern Europe.

In Phase 2, in the 2015 timeframe, deploy improved interceptors and sensors to defend against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. Expand the architecture with a land-based SM-3 site in Romania and the deployment of more capable SM-3 Block IB interceptors.

In Phase 3, in the 2018 timeframe, field a second land-based SM-3 site in Poland to improve coverage against medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. In this phase, after development and testing are complete, deploy the more advanced SM-3 Block IIA variant currently under development on land and at sea, along with additional sensors, to provide coverage to all of our NATO European Allies.

In Phase 4, in the 2020 timeframe, deploy the next generation SM-3 interceptor, the Block IIB, to improve our capabilities to perform early intercept against medium- and intermediate-range

ballistic missiles, and potential ICBM threats from the Middle East. This interceptor, with its higher velocity, is intended provide the ability to intercept longer-range ballistic missiles during their ascent phase.

The Administration plans to deploy all four phases of the EPAA. Further advances of technology or future changes in the threat could modify the details or timing of later phases – that is one reason this approach is called "adaptive." For example, as LTG O'Reilly will discuss, the Missile Defense Agency is investigating a number of sensors including Airborne Infrared (ABIR) on unmanned aerial vehicles that could augment the system's capabilities. As a second example, the Administration plans to complete testing of the 2-stage variant of the Ground Based Interceptor, as a hedge against future uncertainties, including both the uncertainty of future threat capabilities and the technical risk inherent to our own missile defense development plans.

European Phased Adaptive Approach Advantages

The EPAA offers significant advantages over the previously planned "Third Site" architecture, including the ability to:

- defend U.S. troops and our allies in Europe much sooner against the threat posed today by short- and medium-range missiles, starting in 2011 versus 2016-2018 for the previous approach;
- cope with larger and more complex ballistic missile attacks – dozens or scores of missiles versus only five for the previous architecture;
- adapt more rapidly to changes in the threat through the ability to deploy additional interceptors as needed to land-based sites and on ships;
- provide a more unique additional layer to defense of the United States through ascent phase intercept using the Standard Missile 3 Block IIB missile, rather than a 2-stage variant of the Ground Based Interceptor (GBI) which would share many of the same potential failure modes as the 3-stage GBIs already deployed at Ft. Greely, Alaska and Vandenberg Air Force Base, California to defend the United States; and
- offer more opportunities for our allies to participate, thereby strengthening both our combined defenses against the ballistic missiles and the solidarity of the NATO Alliance.

As the United States deploys SM-3 interceptors in Romania by 2015 and in Poland by 2018, a number of missiles will be deployed in their launchers on a day-to-day basis. Plans call for deploying 24 interceptors per site – a total of nearly five times more than the previous plan – plus additional re-loads, plus additional ship-based interceptors.

EPAA Implementation Progress

Since the President's announcement of the EPAA in September 2009, the Administration has made substantial progress in implementation, including most recently at the NATO Summit in Lisbon, where Allies agreed to pursue a territorial missile defense capability to protect NATO European populations and territories. EPAA will now become the U.S. contribution to the Alliance's territorial missile defense capability.

I will provide a very brief overview of progress on EPAA over the last year. My colleagues will then provide more details. LTG O'Reilly will summarize progress in developing, acquiring, and testing key system components. RADM Macy will discuss progress in making the system operational. And Mr. Rose will provide more details regarding discussions with NATO Allies.

Phase 1 (2011 timeframe)

In Phase 1, Aegis BMD ships will be allocated to support the European BMD mission. In early 2011, a BMD-capable Aegis ship carrying SM-3 Block IA interceptors will be deployed to the Eastern Mediterranean. By the end of Phase 1, we anticipate three or more Aegis BMD capable ships will be available for the defense of Europe in a crisis.

We plan to deploy a forward-based AN/TPY-2 radar in Southern Europe in 2011 to provide early data about missiles launched from the Middle East. We are in discussions with potential host-nations about the location of this radar, and while no decision has been made, we expect to meet the planned deployment timeline in 2011. The specific radar to be deployed has been identified and will be ready.

Since LTG O'Reilly will address the programmatic elements of the EPAA in detail, I will just note that DoD has procured 112 SM-3 Block IA interceptors as of the end of FY 2010, for

delivery by FY 2012. Some 180 SM-3 IBs will be delivered by FY 2015. In addition, the Navy currently has 20 BMD-capable ships and plans to have a total of 37 BMD-capable ships by FY 2015.

Phase 2 (2015 timeframe)

In February of this year, Romania agreed to host the land-based SM-3 site in Southern Europe. We plan to deploy 24 SM-3 interceptors in Romania, with additional interceptors stored for re-load. The SM-3 Block IB will be utilized at the Romanian site and will also be phased in at sea for use by our Aegis BMD ships.

On June 17, Under Secretary of State Tauscher met with her Romanian counterpart in Bucharest to begin the negotiations on a missile defense basing agreement. We just completed our third round of negotiations on the text of that agreement in September, and we have seen consistent progress with each round of negotiations.

The Department of Defense plans to procure approximately 324 SM-3 Block IBs by FY 2015, for delivery by FY 2017.

Phase 3 (2018 timeframe)

In October 2009, Poland agreed to host a land-based SM-3 interceptor site on its territory, as part of Phase Three of EPAA (in the 2018 timeframe). This site will be located at the same former military installation in northwestern Poland that would have housed the GBIs under the previous "Third Site" plan.

On July 3, 2010, Poland and the United States signed the Protocol Amending the Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement. In addition, we have signed and ratified a Supplemental Status of Forces Agreement with Poland.

The SM-3 Block IIA, a cooperative development program with the Japanese, will have its first intercept test in 2014 and will enter service by 2018.

Phase 4 (2020 timeframe)

The key additional capability in Phase 4 in the 2020 timeframe will be the deployment of the next generation SM-3 interceptor, the Block IIB, which will provide the ability to perform early intercept against medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, and potential ICBM threats from the Middle East. The MDA is conducting SM-3 Block IIB concept and component technology development during this fiscal year. The Request for Proposals (RFP) for the concept development for the SM-3 Block IIB was issued in October 2010, and MDA expects to begin flight-testing the SM-3 Block IIB, which will use the same fire control system as the SM3 IIA, in 2016.

NATO Territorial Missile Defense

In announcing EPAA, the President said we would work with our Allies to develop a NATO territorial missile defense capability, with the EPAA as a U.S. contribution to that capability. As part of that we signaled our interest in expanding the emerging NATO missile defense command and control system to provide the Alliance with such a capability. We have made considerable progress on this front as well.

Support for the EPAA within NATO began at the time of our September 2009 announcement, and we have worked with our Allies to steadily build that support ever since. We have sought to place the EPAA in a strong NATO context. At the December 2009 NATO Foreign Ministerial, the governments of all NATO members unanimously welcomed the EPAA by a statement that read: "We welcome the new phased adaptive approach of the United States to missile defence, which further reinforces NATO's central role in missile defence in Europe." We continued working with our Allies over the past year on our approach, culminating this November at the NATO Summit in Lisbon.

At the Lisbon Summit, NATO leaders took the unprecedented step to decide to develop a missile defense capability to protect the Alliance's populations and territories in Europe against ballistic missile attacks, noting that this capability contributes to the indivisible security of the Alliance. Missile defenses are most effective when deployed in layers to provide multiple opportunities to intercept threat missiles. The EPAA will be the U.S. contribution to the Alliance's territorial

missile defense. This structure will allow our Allies to plug in their national missile defense capabilities to achieve even greater capabilities over time.

Further, at the Lisbon Summit, NATO also decided to expand its existing missile defense command and control backbone — the Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense or ALTBMD — to encompass territorial missile defense. This expanded capability will make current and future Alliance missile defense assets interoperable, and will allow for NATO command and control of the lower tier assets during an actual engagement. The net result will be more efficient and effective NATO missile defenses.

Our commitment to ensure protection of NATO Allies does not mean NATO will have a "veto" over the protection of the United States and our deployed forces. Interoperability with NATO command and control systems will not diminish our ability to defend U.S. deployed forces, our partners, and, of course, the U.S. homeland.

Missile Defense Cooperation with Russia

As part of the announcement of EPAA last year, the Administration welcomed Russian cooperation to bring its missile defense capabilities into a broader defense of our common strategic interests. Over the past 14 months we have moved forward transparently in this area as well.

In conducting these discussions, the Administration has made clear to Russia and Allies that the United States will not agree to any limitations or constraints on U.S. ballistic missile defenses, and that the United States intends to continue improving and deploying BMD systems to defend the U.S. against limited missile launches, and to defend our deployed forces, allies, and partners against regional threats.

Seeking missile defense cooperation with Russia is not new. President Ronald Reagan proposed such cooperation with the Soviet Union in the 1980s. Much more recently, President G.W. Bush pursued cooperation on missile defense with Russia throughout his administration. NATO has also sought missile defense cooperation with Russia for many years, and a number of missile defense exercises were conducted with Russia both bilaterally and within the NATO-Russia Council from the mid-1990s through the middle of the last decade. Furthermore, a U.S.- Russia

Defense Technology Cooperation Agreement, which would allow further missile defense and other types of technology cooperation, has been in negotiations since 2004.

In September 2010, Secretary Gates and Defense Minister Serduykov agreed to create the new Defense Relations Working Group. This body is intended to be a venue for discussing defense policy topics such as missile defense. I will co-chair two sub-working groups: Missile Defense Cooperation and Defense Technology Cooperation. The first meeting of these sub-working groups is planned for early next year.

There are also opportunities for cooperation with Russia through NATO. The Lisbon declaration on territorial missile defense clearly states that the Alliance will seek cooperation with Russia and in fact invites Russia to become involved. At the NATO-Russia Council on November 20, Allies and Russia agreed to study territorial missile defense cooperation. The agreed declaration also states that NATO and Russia will resume cooperation on theater missile defense, in particular on defense of deployed forces against shorter-range ballistic missile threats.

Way Ahead

The Administration, working with our Allies, has made considerable progress to implement EPAA over the last 14 months. We have a robust plan in place and mechanisms to oversee implementation. The EPAA has the unanimous support of our Allies in NATO, and we have agreements for land-based sites in Romania and Poland.

With NATO's recent decision to pursue a territorial missile defense capability, the Administration has begun the technical work to make EPAA the U.S. contribution to NATO missile defense. For example, at Lisbon, NATO tasked its experts to develop the specifics of how command and control of NATO territorial missile defense capabilities will be handled.

With Russia, we are pursuing missile defense cooperation in defense of our broader common strategic interests both bilaterally and through the NATO-Russia Council. We have made it absolutely clear that the United States will not accept any constraints or limitations on current or future missile defenses.

Finally, it is important to note that as we continue to implement EPAA, we also continue to maintain and improve our defenses of the homeland. The U.S. homeland is currently protected against the threat of limited ICBM attack, as a result of investments in the system based on Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD). The United States has deployed a total of 30 Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs), at Fort Greely, Alaska and Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, along with a global architecture of sensors and command and control systems. The United States now possesses a capacity to counter the projected threats from North Korea and Iran for the foreseeable future.

At the same time, because the threat is unpredictable, the United States is well hedged against the possibility that threats develop more rapidly than expected. This includes the benefits derived from the EPAA. We have planned for a number of possible hedge capabilities, including: improvements in sensors to support an Early Intercept of missiles before they can deploy countermeasures; completing Missile Field 2 at Fort Greely, Alaska to allow for the rapid emplacement of up to eight additional GBIs; continuing development of the two-stage GBI; and development of new airborne and space-based sensors to track and target adversary missiles.

Conclusion

As we continue to implement the EPAA, it is important to remember that one of the hallmarks of this approach – its adaptability – uniquely postures the United States to adjust to the unpredictable. Defenses, particularly ship-based systems, can be shifted, reallocated globally to address near term threats that may emerge. No longer are we building systems anchored in one place and wedded to the current assessment of the threat. We can adapt.

The threat posed by ballistic missiles is real, and it is growing. After years of development, our missile defenses today are also very real, and our capabilities are growing. We look forward to working with Congress in ensuring continued progress in implementing the EPAA.

Thank you and I look forward to your questions.