

**A Rising China and East Asian Security:
Implications for the
United States**

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By

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A Rising China and East Asian Security: Implications for the United States

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Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Berman, Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear today to discuss how the rise of the People's Republic of China, its increasing military capabilities, and its growing assertiveness in foreign affairs affect U.S. interests.

The views I will present here today are my own. They are a product of my service on the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, some 40 years of experience assessing China for the U.S. military, and my experience from two tours of duty at the American Embassy in China as a military attaché.

For a number of years, diplomats and officials from China argued that Beijing will rise peacefully as a major power without upsetting the global system.¹ This "Peaceful Rise" theory advanced by China, however, was a matter of debate not only in the United States, but also inside the Chinese Communist Party. Former Party Chairman Jiang Zemin received push back regarding the theory from members of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), some of whom argued that the concept could limit China's ability to defend its own interests.

That inner-Communist Party debate was settled by a speech by new Party Chairman Hu Jintao to the PLA on December 24, 2004. Chairman and PRC president Hu Jintao set out what he described as four "Historic Missions" for the PLA.

This characterization of the PLA as having a series of "Historic Missions" provides the ideological basis for future defense research and the acquisition of new weapon systems. From the perspective of this committee, the formulation provides for a more assertive use of the armed forces inside and outside the region in defense of stated Chinese interests. For the PLA and the Chinese Communist Party, it is a transparent justification for the pursuit of a wider concept of national interests.² The "Historic Missions" are:

- To reinforce the armed forces' loyalty to the Chinese Communist Party in order to ensure the Party's vice-like grip on power;
- To help ensure China's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and domestic security in order to continue its national development;
- To help safeguard China's expanding national interests, especially in the maritime, space and cyber domains;
- To help ensure world peace and promote mutual development.³

As the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission documented in its *2009 Report to Congress*, "the effect of the *Historic Missions* speech on the People's Liberation Army has already translated into observable changes in China's military and security activities abroad."⁴ The Chinese military is transforming from one that primarily focused on domestic response and local contingencies on China's periphery to one that has a wide range of missions and activities.

The changes in military orientation have been accompanied by a more assertive foreign policy on the part of China. During the Commission's visit to China in 2010, and in other meetings with Chinese military personnel, government officials and scholars, I had the opportunity to discuss this more forceful stance. Although some American observers maintain that the more assertive posture is because of increased influence of the PLA in foreign policy-making, Chinese interlocutors deny that it is the military that is shaping policy. They attribute the change in policy to a general sense of nationalism and economic strength among China's populace, inside and outside of government.

The direct manifestations of the more assertive policy stance can be seen in China's recent activities in regards to its disputed territorial claims in the South and East China Seas. The Commission's *2010 Report to Congress* notes that China has pressured foreign energy companies to halt operations off the coast of Vietnam. Additionally, China has imposed fishing bans on parts of the South China Sea that are claimed by Malaysia, Vietnam and the Philippines. In the East China Sea there are conflicting claims in the Senkaku (or Diaoyutai) Islands, claimed by China, Japan and Taiwan, leading to incidents between Japan's Coast Guard and Chinese fishing vessels.⁵

Beijing also has forcefully objected to South Korean and United States military activities in international waters in the Yellow Sea. At the same time, Beijing ignored North Korea's sinking of a South Korean navy corvette, where 46 South Korean sailors perished.⁶ Beijing also refused to support a UN resolution condemning North Korea's recent shelling of a South Korean island, which resulted in the death of four South Koreans.⁷

The Commission's annual reports detail China's military modernization efforts. On December 27, 2010, Admiral Robert F. Willard, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, told a Japanese newspaper that a new "anti-ship ballistic missile system in China has undergone extensive testing," reaching an initial operational capability.⁸ This antiship ballistic missile system is part of what the United States refers to as the PLA's "anti-access/area denial" capabilities intended to hinder U.S. military access to the region.⁹ Other elements of this PLA effort involve supersonic antiship and land-attack cruise missiles, advanced submarines, fast attack craft, sea mines, and longer range fighters with refueling capabilities.¹⁰

When the United States moved two aircraft carrier battle groups into the vicinity of Taiwan in response to a series of threatening ballistic missile tests by China in 1996, PLA leaders were surprised and, for the most part, powerless to react. Not long after that, while I was in Beijing, I was told by a senior Chinese military officer that China would develop its missiles capabilities and devise a way to target an aircraft carrier battle group with ballistic missiles.

Since then, the PLA methodically put together a set of integrated military capabilities across all the domains of war (sea, air, land, space, and cyberspace or electromagnetic spectrum) to strengthen its operations. The PLA's new command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4SIR) systems facilitate a capacity to mass precision fires with missiles or artillery, bring multiple weapons together to bear on targets simultaneously, and to network combat ships, aircraft and missile systems in joint operations.¹¹ The Chinese military methodically built capabilities that will allow it to fight a campaign out to

about 2,000 kilometers from China's coast supported by electronic warfare, cyber warfare, and, if necessary, space warfare.¹²

Complementing these capabilities is a rapid growth in the PLA's capacity to conduct conventional missile strikes throughout the region. As the Commission points out in our most recent report, China has actively improved the number, accuracy, range, and payload of its conventional ballistic and cruise missile arsenal. For example, since 2000, the PLA has increased the number of brigades fielding conventional short range ballistic missiles seven fold. Most alarming for the United States, "the PLA's current missile force alone may be sufficient to close down U.S. air bases in the region in the event of a conflict between China and the United States."¹³

Backed by the confidence the PLA feels in this integrated military operations architecture, China has been more strident in its complaints about United States and allied operations in the western Pacific. Beijing strenuously objects to United States air and naval reconnaissance activities in international waters, advancing claims to waters in its exclusive economic zone, but beyond China's territorial limits, that no other country accepts. In the Yellow Sea, despite North Korea's aggression, PLA leaders have spoken out strongly against defensive exercises between the United States and South Korea.

Likely this assertiveness will not change with new Chinese leadership. The new cohort of leaders that the Communist Party is preparing to put into senior positions in the PLA is drawn from the relatives of some of the founders of the Chinese Communist Party. These new leaders, like Xi Jinping, who will probably replace Hu Jintao in 2012, are nationalistic and will not move to create a set of policies on security issues more accommodating to American interests.

Much of what the PLA has achieved originally was based on observing American military operations in Iraq, the Balkans, and Afghanistan. Today, however, the PLA is able to create its own unique military doctrine. Many of the new weapons and C4ISR capabilities originally were developed with Russian assistance or through technology purchased from some of our own allies. Today, China's military industrial complex is increasingly able to build its own indigenous systems. Our Commission's *2010 Report to Congress* points out that some technology and know-how that China's aviation industrial base is acquiring from its interactions with Western aviation manufacturers are being directly transferred to the defense sector.¹⁴

I also note that recently in Europe there was again talk of lifting the arms sales embargo against China. This was originally imposed in response to the Tiananmen Massacre in 1989. European nations have sold a great deal of military technology to China in the intervening years, but no weapons systems. Still, these sales have helped China's military to develop significantly. When I was at The Heritage Foundation, I proposed that if European defense contractors begin arms sales to China, they should be forced to make business decisions. That is, Congress should forbid those European companies from participating in U.S. defense programs or sales in the same technology areas as those companies choose to transfer to China. Let our European allies make choices—earn a few billion in an arms sale to China or take part in multi-billion dollar cooperative development programs with the United States. It also is useful if the Department of State actively reminds our European partners that human rights conditions have not improved in

China and that the PLA is still the main force of repression on which the Chinese Communist Party depends. As Congressman Henry J. Hyde wrote in 2005, “the choice for Europe could not be clearer: it is between policies that promote the development of democracy in China or those that support China’s military buildup and threaten U.S. security interests.”¹⁵

Our Commission, in a contracted report on “The Capability of the People’s Republic of China to Conduct Cyber Warfare and Computer Network Exploitation,” provided a case study of a multi-day penetration into the computer systems of an American high technology company and how the data was acquired and transferred to an Internet Protocol address in China.¹⁶ The report also discussed the principal institutional and individual “actors” in Chinese computer network operations as well as the characteristics of network exploitation activities that are frequently attributed to China. Cyber warfare is a strategic issue that the U.S. and Chinese defense establishment must address in some form of confidence-building and threat reduction measures, along with nuclear doctrine and space warfare doctrine.

With respect to Taiwan, improvements in economic and trade relations across the Taiwan Strait have not been matched by a reduction in the military threat from China. The Commission’s *2010 Report to Congress* notes that the cross-Strait military situation increasingly favors Beijing.¹⁷ China now has over 1,100 conventionally armed short-range ballistic missiles deployed opposite Taiwan and is developing and deploying a long-range, large caliber multiple rocket launcher system.

Most seriously, as our annual report notes, Taiwan’s capacity to maintain air superiority over its territory is handicapped by its inability to maintain its combat air fleet. Taiwan’s aircraft are aging, and the PLA Air Force has eclipsed Taiwan’s fleet in technology and weaponry. Our Commission concluded that “the cross-Strait military situation is of serious concern. China’s continued military buildup across from Taiwan is increasing the gap in military capabilities between the two sides. In particular, Taiwan’s air defense capabilities are degrading as its air force ages and the PLA’s air and missile capabilities improve.”¹⁸

My personal view is that Taiwan could do more by fully deploying a networked C4ISR system for its own forces. But Taiwan’s air forces badly need an infusion of new, more robust fighter aircraft.

China continues to provide weapons and equipment to international pariah states. For example, as the Commission’s 2010 report states, between 2000 and 2009, China sold Burma almost \$168 million worth of arms, including antiship cruise missiles, targeting radar, naval guns, and corvettes.¹⁹ In addition, from 2000-2009, China exported approximately \$810 million worth of arms to Iran, accounting for almost 30% of all Iranian weapon imports.²⁰ Chinese missile assistance has helped Iran to create its own modest antiaccess/area denial capabilities, which in turn could eventually affect the movement of U.S. maritime forces and hinder the flow of oil in the region.²¹ Data on China’s exports of arms to North Korea are generally not available. However, China does report its trade in small arms and bombs, grenades, and cartridges with North Korea. Although from 1995-2000, these sales reached over \$900 million, in recent years these reported sales have remained relatively small; in 2008, China sold only \$28,000 worth of small arms. Nevertheless, as North Korea’s main supplier of food, energy, and foreign direct

investment, China has indirectly enabled the North Korean regime to continue its nuclear proliferation efforts.²² Furthermore, China does not participate in international nonproliferation programs, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative, which seek to counter North Korea's proliferation efforts.²³

With respect to the expansive territorial claims China has made in the South China Sea and the more assertive actions taken to reinforce those claims, my view is that Secretary of State Clinton and Secretary of Defense Gates have set the appropriate tone in response in their remarks at the ASEAN meetings in Hanoi and the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. The United States has strong interests in freedom of navigation in the open seas and opposes the use of force in resolving the disputes.

In the Yellow Sea, and outside China's territorial waters and airspace, my view is that the United States should continue to insist on free passage and to conduct normal patrol and reconnaissance activities. In addition, neither South Korea nor the United States should modify their exercise activities because of the strident complaints of China's military.

It is critical to understand that the new antiship ballistic missile system that China is fielding means that in the event of conflict, or even heightened tension, military operations will necessarily extend into space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum. Our missile defenses are likely inadequate to neutralize this new threat. But the missiles and their guidance systems depend on space surveillance, a shared picture of the operating area through data exchange, and the automated distribution of common command and targeting data. Military operations therefore would necessarily extend into wider domains of war.

Madame Chairman, members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to address you today. I look forward to your questions.



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<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61015/zheng-bijian/chinas-peaceful-rise-to-great-power-status>.

² "CMC's Guo Boxiong Urges Improving PLA Capabilities to 'Fulfill Historic Missions,'" *Xinhua*, September 27, 2005, in Open Source Center CPP 20050927320021.

³ Hu Jintao, "Understanding the New Historic Missions of our Military in the New Period of the New Century," December 14, 2004, <http://gfjy.jiangxi.gov.cn/y.l.asp?id=11349.htm>; also see Daniel Hartnett, testimony before the U.S. China Economic and Security Review Commission, March 4, 2009.

http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2009hearings/written_testimonies/09_03_04_wrts/09_03_04_hartnett_statement.pdf

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- ⁵ U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, *2010 Report to Congress* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, November 2010), pp. 134-36.
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<http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4649363>; and Peter S. Green and Frances Yoon, "China Declines to Condemn North Korean Shelling as South Prepares Drill," *Bloomberg*, December 19, 2010.
<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-12-19/china-declines-to-condemn-north-korean-shelling-as-south-prepares-drill.html>.
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- ⁹ Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China, 2010* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2010), pp. 29-33; and Jan van Tol, Mark Gunzinger, Andrew Krepinevich, and Jim Thomas, *AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept*, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategy and Budgetary Assessments), p. 21.
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- ¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 221-22. See also Larry M. Wortzel, *The People's Liberation Army and Space Warfare: Emerging United States-China Military Competition* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, October 17, 2007).
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- ¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 6.
- ¹⁵ Henry J. Hyde, "Don't Sell Arms to China," *Wall Street Journal*, February 23, 2005, p. A16; and Kristin Archick, Richard F. Grimmert, and Shirley A. Kan, "European Union's Arms Embargo on China: Implications and Options for U.S. Policy," *CRS Report for Congress* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, May 27, 2005), p. 4.
- ¹⁶ *US-China Economic and Security Review Commission Report on the Capability of the People's Republic of China to Conduct Cyber Warfare and Computer Network Exploitation*, an assessment prepared for the Commission by the Northrop Grumman Corporation, Maclean, VA, October 9, 2009.
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- ¹⁷ U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, *2010 Report to Congress* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, November 2010), p. 149.
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- ¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 7.
- ¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p.131.
- ²⁰ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, "Arms Transfer Database," April 19, 2010. http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/trade_register.php .
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<http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c27732.htm>


Charts and Figures for Dr. Larry Wortzel Testimony

Figure 1: China's Territorial Disputes



Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China, 2010* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, p. 16.

Figure 2: The First and Second Island Chains




Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Military Power of the People's Republic of China, 2009* (Washington, DC: Department of defense, 2009), p. 18.

Figure 3: China's Main Conventional Missile Arsenal


<i>Missile Type</i>	<i># of Missiles</i>	<i>Estimated Range</i>	<i>Targets</i>
<i>Ballistic Missiles</i>			
<i>DF-11</i>	700-750	300 km	Taiwan only
<i>DF-15</i>	350-400	600 km	Taiwan, South Korea
<i>DF-21C</i>	85-95	1,750 km	Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan
<i>DF-3</i>	15-20	3,000+ km	Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, and Guam
<i>ASBM (DF-21D)</i>	<i>Underdevelopment</i>	1,750+ km	Large surface vessels
<i>Cruise missile</i>			
<i>DH-10</i>	200-500	1,500+km	Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan

Source: Adapted from U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, *2010 Report to Congress* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, November 2010), p. 149.
http://www.uscc.gov/annual_report/2010/annual_report_full_10.pdf

Figure 4: China's Networked C4ISR Capabilities




**Figure 5: Comparison of Modern* and Legacy PLA Navy Combatants
(2000 vs. 2009)**



Source: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, *2009 Annual Report to Congress* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, November 2009), p. 129.

*This chart categorizes the following Chinese classes as modern vessels. Destroyers: *Luhai*, *Luhu*, *Luyang (I & II)*, *Luzhou*, and *Sovremenny*; frigates: *Jiangkai (I & II)*, and *Jiangwei (I & II)*; and submarines: *Jin*, *Kilo*, *Shang*, *Song*, and *Yuan*.

**Figure 6: Comparison of Modern* and Legacy Fighter Aircraft in the PLA Air Force
(2000 vs. 2010)**



Source: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, *2010 Annual Report to Congress* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, November 2010), p. 76.

* Here modern fighter aircraft include 4th generation fighters, such as China's SU-27, SU-30, J-10, and J-11, as well as older-generation fighters that have been outfitted with modern components, such as advanced radar or avionics. Examples include recently improved variants of the J-7, the J-8, and the JH-7.