THE REPUBLICAN STUDY COMMITTEE

Rep. Jim Jordan, Chairman
Paul Teller, Executive Director

RSC

202.226.9717
rsc.jordan.house.gov

RSC Policy Brief: Limiting Aid to Pakistan
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Background: In the 2013 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4310), which passed the House on May 18, 2012, several measures are taken to limit funding to Pakistan contingent upon Pakistan taking certain actions:

- The legislation freezes security assistance funding until Pakistan reopens vital supply routes to U.S. troops in Afghanistan.
  - After an alleged NATO attack that killed over 20 Pakistani troops, Pakistan has shut down supply routes to Afghanistan. This has made providing supplies to our troops much more expensive, as previously most supplies for our troops went through Pakistan.

- The legislation places a limitation upon reimbursement to Pakistan contingent upon the Secretary of Defense submitting a report that includes a certification that Pakistan is "committed" to:
  - Supporting counter-terrorism operations against Al Qaeda, its associated movements, the Haqqani Network, and other domestic and foreign terrorist organizations.
  - Dismantling improvised explosive device (IED) networks and interdicting precursor chemicals used in the manufacture of IEDs.
  - Preventing the proliferation of nuclear-related material and expertise.
  - Issuing visas in a timely manner for United States Government personnel supporting counterterrorism efforts and assistance programs.

What Else Should Be Done: The Pakistan provisions are a good start – but some conservatives may believe that more should be done. For example, the legislation could be more clear in limiting the Secretary of State's certification process.

Under the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009, Kerry-Lugar-Berman, the Secretary of State must certify that Pakistan is meeting certain counter-terrorism benchmarks before receiving foreign aid. However:

- In the past several years, new evidence shows that Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) may have been involved in the Mumbai terror attacks against India.
- Pakistan has taken minimal steps against the Laskar-e-Tayyiba, involved in the Mumbai attack.
- Pakistan refuses to engage the Haqanni network.

- o Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral [Mike Mullen testified before Congress](#) on September 22, 2011, that the Haqqani network, the militant group blamed for the September 13, 2011, attack on the U.S. embassy in Kabul, is a "strategic arm" of Pakistan's ISI.

- Despite these issues, last year, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton certified that Pakistan had met its counter-terrorism benchmarks, which released American aid (read CRS support on Pakistani aid [here](#)).

- Significant questions still exist about Pakistan's role in potentially sheltering Bin Laden. David Ignatius asked several good [questions](#) relevant to this issue in a column for the Washington Post:
  - "How did bin Laden come to Abbottabad in 2005, and what did Pakistani officials know about his whereabouts?"
  - "Who owned the compound in 2005, and how was it readied for the new guest? I'm told that the original property records have disappeared, so the answers here are murky. But one intelligence source tells me that the architect who worked on the compound was regularly employed by the ISI; the architect reportedly was told only that a 'highly placed VIP' was coming."
  - "What about the recent claim by former general Ziauddin Butt, former chief of the ISI, that the Abbottabad safe house was used by the Intelligence Bureau, another Pakistani spy agency? According to a December report in the Pakistani press, Butt said that bin Laden's stay at Abbottabad was arranged by Brig. Gen. Ijaz Shah, head of the bureau from 2004 to 2008, on Musharraf's orders. A Pakistani journalist named Arif Jamal recently published an article [describing Shah as bin Laden's 'handler.'](#)"
  - "Whom did bin Laden contact while he was at Abbottabad? Though materials taken from the compound don't show direct links with top Pakistani officials, U.S. analysts have found evidence that the al-Qaeda chief communicated with Mohammad Omar, leader of the Taliban, and with the Kashmiri militant group Lashkar-i-Taiba. The ISI is thought to monitor both groups closely; how did the messages slip through the net?"

Potential New Requirements for Limiting Aid to Pakistan

1. A certification process that Pakistan is confronting terrorism including within its own ranks (ISI). Pakistan must take tangible actions against the Haqqani network, come clean on its role in the Mumbai attacks and answer questions relating to the Bin Laden raid (read more on limiting aid to Pakistan here).
2. Pakistan must act against the network that shielded bin Laden. Even though the recently released bin Laden files did not reveal specific links between Pakistani militant groups (like the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and Haraka ul-Mujahideen) to bin Laden, other reporting has made these links (see NYT story on a phone number associated with the Pakistan-based Harakat-ul-Mujahideen linked to bin Laden's courier).
3. If these individuals were in contact with bin Laden, they likely are also in contact with Zawahiri now.
4. A.Q. Khan must either be turned over to the United States for questioning, or for extradition to be tried for his crimes. Pakistan should not be allowed to harbor one of the most dangerous criminals in the world, who has helped start the nuclear programs for Libya, Syria, Iran, North Korea and so many other countries.
5. The Secretary of Defense should certify that Pakistan's nuclear stockpile has a proper PAL system to ensure it can't be used by a rogue operative in the military structure.
6. Specifically limit American aid in the event of a coup by the Pakistani military.

RSC Staff Contact: Derek S. Khanna, Derek.Khanna@mail.house.gov, (202) 226-0718