Senator Webb Reiterates Concerns Over Long-term Occupation of Iraq

Confirms End of Commitment of U.S. Combat Forces in 2011

At a Senate Committee on Armed Services hearing, Senator Jim Webb (D-VA) pressed U.S. Ambassador to Iraq James F. Jeffrey and General Lloyd James Austin III, Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq, for confirmation that the formal commitment of U.S. combat forces will conclude by the end of 2011.

“There were concerns, which I wrote about before the invasion, that this invasion of Iraq would create the possibility of a long-term occupation by the United States in a part of the world where we should not be an occupying power,” said Senator Webb. “The Strategic Framework agreement [with Iraq] is not airtight in terms of the requirement for United States military withdrawal… There are people in the Senate who have argued that the United States should remain in Iraq in the same sense that it has remained in Korea as a projection force…

“To clarify the point, it is your understanding that as of the end of 2011, the formal commitment of the United States’ combat forces will have ended, and the transition would be into advisory roles as we've been discussing today?”

In response, Ambassador Jeffrey confirmed, “Under the current agreement, Senator, we are not going to keep combat military forces in Iraq after 2011… So we're going to be there with [the Iraqis], helping them do this in a very broad and extensive way, but at this point not with combat troops on the ground.”


The full text of Senator Webb’s questions at the hearing is below:


WEBB:  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Jeffrey, General Austin, I'd like to thank you and all the people who are working with you during this transitional period as we climb out of a hole that we dug eight years ago, which came from an enormous strategic blunder in the view of many people including myself. 

We were worried, and were saying so at the time, that this endeavor would harm the country's economy--that it would blow the top off the price of oil.  I recall when the Congress voted to go to war in Iraq, oil was $24 a barrel.  It went up to $143.  Today, it's about $102.  We were concerned that this activity would empower rather than contain Iran, that it would encourage greater activities of Al Qaida in a country where it had not been active to any degree before, and that it had the potential to destabilize the region.

Most importantly, there were concerns--and I shared them and wrote about them before the invasion—that this invasion of Iraq would create the temptation or the possibility of a long-term occupation by the United States in a part of the world where we should not be an occupying power. 

I think this last point has been the underlying premise of a number of questions raised today about what is going to happen to the military presence in Iraq in the immediate future.  I've read the Strategic Framework Agreement, which is not airtight in terms of the requirement for the United States military withdrawal. 

There are people in the Senate who have argued that the United States should remain in Iraq in the same sense that it has remained in Korea as a projection force. Some arguments were made during the past campaign that we should be there for another 50 years.

There are two different questions when it comes down to whether our military should remain in Iraq.  The first is whether they are needed in domestic terms there. 

The second and most important one is beyond this transition period. Are you discussing the notion of providing bases in Iraq as a projection force that could be used externally from Iraq or for situations other than the domestic concerns that you are talking about. Ambassador, have you had any discussions of that role?

JEFFREY:  We haven't, Senator, but to go back to 2008, I was involved peripherally in the negotiation of these agreements when I worked on the National Security Council.  The Iraqis made it very clear at that time, and it is in the agreement somewhere between articles 24 and 27, that we are not to have permanent bases.  We are not to use our presence in Iraq to project power of any sort or in any way outside of Iraq.  That was the explicit understanding that the Administration at the highest levels--and I was present for these deliberations--went into with that agreement: that our presence in Iraq as we moved forward from 2008 to the end of 2011 would be solely to help the Iraqi security forces and the general stability of the country. 

Our belief, Senator--after 20 years of having highs of 500,000 troops in '91 and lows of a few tens of thousands of troops with Operation Northern Watch and Southern Watch--was that securing Iraq, making it a relatively peaceful place that wasn't requiring these kinds of military commitments...was a great security benefit in and of itself.

Therefore, we decided to keep the forces on to finish the fight, if you will, and we think we're pretty close to there by the end of this year.  The Iraqis have no intention of having us have bases or project power, and that's not our intent at all, sir.

WEBB:  There has been a lot of discussion this week, in the previous Foreign Relations Committee hearing and in this one as well, that Iraq is not at present capable of providing security against external threats.  I assume we are keeping military forces in Iraq to address that issue for some period of time or that is a part of the formula.

JEFFREY:  Under the current agreement, Senator, we are not going to keep military forces in Iraq after 2011.  What we will do, given the fact that Iraq does not have a foundational conventional defense, external defense capability … is to continue our training and equipping program... So we're going to be there with them, helping them do this in a very broad and extensive way, but at this point not with combat troops on the ground, sir.

WEBB:  In an advisory capacity as opposed to with independent units?

JEFFREY:  That's the plan exactly.

WEBB:  In the strategic framework agreement, there was loose language in the sense of a further agreement being possible if the Iraqi government, for instance, decided that it needed help beyond this period of time.

JEFFREY:  In the first security agreement, Senator, there is an article that says that either side can ask to extend it, just like either side can ask to terminate it.  In the Strategic Framework Agreement, there's a section on security, that's Section 3.  Section 10 basically states that additional agreements within the framework of the Strategic Framework Agreement can be set up to do one of the many purposes of the Strategic Framework Agreement, which can be culture, it can be energy, and it could be security.

WEBB:  So it is your understanding that as of the end of 2011, the formal commitment of the United States combat forces will have ended, and the transition would be into advisory roles as we've been discussing today?

JEFFREY:  It is our plan that we will have a security relationship, Senator; quite possibly, a follow-on agreement under Article 10 to talk about how we would do that advisory and training function, but that it would be an advisory and training function until Title 22 authorities under the State Department as a security assistance organization, as opposed to a combatant commander subordinate force, sir.

WEBB:  Thank you, General.