

HEARING TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEW START TREATY AND PLANS FOR FUTURE REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR WARHEADS AND DELIVERY SYSTEMS POST-NEW START TREATY

WEDNESDAY, MAY 4, 2011

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:31 p.m. in room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator E. Benjamin Nelson (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Nelson, Udall, Shaheen, and Sessions.

Committee staff members present: Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk; and Jennifer L. Stoker, security clerk.

Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel; and Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member.

Minority staff member present: Daniel A. Lerner, professional staff member.

Staff assistants present: Hannah I. Lloyd and Breon N. Wells.

Committee members' assistants present: Ann Premer, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Casey Howard, assistant to Senator Udall; Chad Kreikemeier, assistant to Senator Shaheen; Lenwood Landrum and Sandra Luff, assistants to Senator Sessions.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR E. BENJAMIN NELSON,
CHAIRMAN**

Senator NELSON. Good afternoon. The subcommittee meets this afternoon to discuss implementation of the New START treaty and the next steps for possible future reductions in strategic systems beyond those in the New START treaty. With us today we have: Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Dr. Jim Miller; Commander of the Strategic Command, General C. Robert Kehler; former Secretary of Defense Dr. William Perry; and Dr. Keith Payne, Professor and Head of the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University.

Dr. Perry was the chairman of the Perry-Schlesinger Strategic Posture Commission. Dr. Payne was a member of that commission. Other than General Kehler, all of our witnesses this afternoon have testified on previous occasions on the topic of strategic arms reduction during the Senate consideration of the New START treaty.

The only reason General Kehler didn't is because he was appointed subsequent to that.

The organization of the hearing today is not the norm as we're having just one panel of witnesses, both government and private sector. Normally this hearing would have been conducted in two panels, but to allow us to take full advantage of Dr. Perry's limited availability today we're having one panel.

In that regard, I would note that Dr. Perry has to leave at 3:15 so he can catch his flight back to California for a speech. As a result, I'll forego additional opening remarks until later in the hearing, and I guess I'd ask as well our witnesses to forego some opening remarks, but ask each witness to make closing remarks at the end of the hearing.

Dr. Perry, we would like to have any closing remarks from you as well prior to departure at 3:15. Several people are watching the clock so that time doesn't get away from us and we keep you on schedule.

All written statements that have been received will, of course, be included in the record.

Now I turn to my ranking member, my good friend Senator Sessions.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's a pleasure to work with you. I know your expertise and interest in these important matters.

Today's hearing is a continuation of our dialogue on U.S. strategic posture in a post-New START treaty environment that appears to be the administration's intention—in what appears to be the administration's intention to change U.S. nuclear doctrine and targeting guidance in an attempt to pursue further reductions in the nuclear stockpile on the path to what many of us feel is a misguided and dangerous idea of a world without nuclear weapons.

I mean, I wish it were so, but we think—I believe that it's beyond unrealistic. It really could be dangerous if it clouds our thinking.

When we commissioned the bipartisan Perry-Schlesinger Strategic Posture Commission in 2008, we looked to a distinguished panel of 12 independent experts to address the current state and future role of nuclear weapons and strategic deterrence, among other crucial national security issues. Dr. Perry, thank you for your leadership. Dr. Payne, thank you for serving as a valuable member of that committee.

Among their many findings and recommendations, the Posture Commission emphasized the importance of achieving balance by sustaining a nuclear deterrence for the indefinite future while reducing reliance on nuclear weapons for deterrence. It is a balanced approach, and I'm concerned that the administration may be on the verge of abandoning that approach, opting instead for a nuclear weapons policy focused on unilateral reductions, an approach the commission warned would "weaken the deterrence of foes and the assurance of allies."

While the commission expressed differing visions of what might be possible in the long term, they urged extreme caution towards

pursuing any approach characterized as being lopsided and concluded that “So long as nuclear dangers remain, the United States must have a strong deterrence that is effective in meeting its security needs and those of its allies.”

So I look forward to hearing from Dr. Perry and Dr. Payne as we go forward to discuss the balance that we need to achieve.

Recent statements by the President’s National Security Adviser have prompted new questions in my mind about the administration’s intent to pursue additional reductions. In his speech before the Carnegie Endowment, National Security Adviser Tom Donilon, the President’s right-hand man, stated that the administration is currently “making preparations for the next round of nuclear reductions” already, and that the Department of Defense will be directed to “review our strategic requirements and develop options for further reductions in our current nuclear stockpile.”

Donilon continued, stating that in meeting these objectives the White House will direct DOD to consider potential changes in targeting requirements and alert procedures. Furthermore, by inferring that the New START treaty signified a “shared goal of disarmament,” his words, between the United States and Russia—so I question the reality and the seriousness of that goal, frankly.

The U.S. Senate did not consent to a goal of disarmament. That was not part of the New START treaty.

The U.S. Senate has also not agreed to or been consulted on unilateral nuclear reductions, which according to recent press reports the administration is also considering.

So I look forward to hearing our witnesses’ assessments of Mr. Donilon’s comments, to better understand from our DOD witnesses what actions they’ve been instructed to take, how such guidance could influence the ongoing modernization of the triad of nuclear delivery vehicles, and the potential operational impacts of such guidance on force posture, targeting, and alert procedures.

The outdated state of nuclear weapons complex and the overdue need for robust investment is an area of significant concern, and I think we share that. And I commend the President for working with Congress to address it. In response to the Posture Commission’s assessment and the urging of Congress, the administration has identified a need for more than \$200 billion over the next 10 years to modernize and sustain our nuclear deterrence. This is a level of investment that appears to be absolutely necessary to create the kind of weapons systems we need. Maybe some efficiencies can occur, but fundamentally we need to meet the goal we set of modernizing our facilities and our weapons systems.

We should remember that during the Cold War we devoted some one-quarter of our defense budget to the nuclear deterrence mission. Today our current spending will account for only some 3 percent of the defense spending. With a sustained, whole of government commitment to modernizing our forces, we will be postured to better face the challenges of the future. The conditions for further reductions in my opinion, however, do not exist today and, while a modernized and robust manufacturing and delivery capability will gradually instill greater confidence and increased deterrence, even then I remain unconvinced that the conditions will ever exist to facilitate reductions below the New START levels. I just

think there's a danger in going below this level and I think we need to be careful and thoughtful about it. The future threat remains dynamic. We look forward to hearing your testimony.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I welcome the witnesses.

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Senator Sessions.

Dr. Perry, I'll go with the first question here. You were the chairman of the Strategic Posture Commission, as indicated, and one of the commission's findings was that reaching the ultimate goal of global nuclear elimination would require a fundamental change in the world geopolitical order.

Did the commission have a view on the conditions for future incremental reductions beyond those in the New START treaty, number one? Number two, in your view what sort of changes, if any, in geopolitical order would merit additional reductions?

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM J. PERRY, PH.D., MICHAEL AND BARBARA BERBERIAN PROFESSOR, CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND COOPERATION, STANFORD UNIVERSITY, FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Dr. PERRY. The answer to the first question, Senator Nelson, is that the commission did not look directly at the question of what should follow. The commission did not look directly at the question of what should follow. It advocated support of the New START treaty, but did not seriously discuss the steps that would follow after that.

In my own view, what would be required there is very difficult, but worth doing, is coming to an agreement with the Russians on the tactical nuclear weapons, of which they have several thousand and of which we only have a few hundred. There's a real asymmetry in forces between the U.S. and Russia in that regard, and there's a real asymmetry in threat perception, which leads the Russians to believe they need those tactical nuclear weapons. They live in a different neighborhood than we live in.

So I see this next—I'm very much in favor of moving forward with a follow-on treaty. I think it's going to need to include tactical nuclear weapons. I think that will be a very difficult task, but not impossible to arrive at a way of dealing with that problem.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Perry follows:]

[SUBCOMMITTEE INSERT]

Senator NELSON. But you don't see—from your perspective, you don't see the administration moving unilaterally to reduce the arms?

Dr. PERRY. No, I do not. I think all of the actions that I've seen from the administration and all the statements that have been made suggest they're going to move hand in hand with the Russians, and I think it's possible that they will be able to find some mode of agreement with the Russians on a follow-on treaty. But it's a treaty which will be bilateral and I think will look forward. If there's any movement beyond that, it has to be beyond bilateral; it has to include other nations that have nuclear weapons.

Senator NELSON. On April 18 in the op-ed in the Financial Times that my colleague has mentioned, Tom Donilon, the President's National Security Adviser, discussed the need to begin the next round of nuclear weapons reductions as the New START treaty is imple-

mented. He said that a review at President Obama's direction "will develop options for new reductions in the U.S. stockpile. Once complete, this will shape our approach to a new agreement with Russia."

Dr. Miller, has the review that Doctor—Mr. Donilon mentions, started? Who is participating in that review and would there be a time line for completion if there is such a review ongoing?

**STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES N. MILLER, JR., Ph.D., PRINCIPAL
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY**

Dr. MILLER. Mr. Chairman, that review has not yet officially kicked off, but we've had some initial discussions about both its content and the time line. We expect that when we do get presidential guidance to initiate the study it will take several months, and following that we would then expect to see changes to presidential guidance for nuclear weapons targeting, and all of this we expect to be consistent with the nuclear posture review.

Following any changes in presidential guidance, we would expect to see changes to Secretary's guidance, changes in the guidance from the Chairman, each of which, each layer from the President to the Secretary to the Chairman, is more detailed, and then the development of any revisions to operational plans by the commander of U.S. Strategic Command.

Mr. Chairman, I want to emphasize that all of this activity is entirely consistent with what has happened in the past after the completion of nuclear posture reviews and similar work, and that we are intending to undertake this consistent with the principles outlined in the nuclear posture review and intending to ensure that we continue to have effective deterrence and stability, that we have effective extended deterrence and assurance of our allies as well; and that, as Senator Sessions noted, the investments in our infrastructure and our delivery systems are critical as we move forward.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Miller follows:]

Senator SESSIONS. While we may be—while the administration may be moving forward in anticipation of a new reduction, anything that it's doing is not intended to be unilateral; is that—I heard Dr. Perry say something of that sort. Is that the way you see it?

Dr. MILLER. Senator Nelson, that's exactly correct. We said in the nuclear posture review that, while exact parity may not be as important as it was in the Cold War, there are still a number of good reasons why it's important that, if we go and as we go forward to any further reductions, that Russia join with us. That principle, articulated in the nuclear posture review, still remains valid and is a guiding principle for the review—excuse me—for the analysis that we expect to undertake and implement in the nuclear posture review.

Senator NELSON. Thank you.

Senator Sessions, would you like to ask questions?

Senator SESSIONS. Well, yes. I'm looking at the Associated Press article of April 5th by Desmond Butler. "In the mean time," it says, "the administration is looking for other ways to cut its arsenal. A senior administration official, speaking on condition of anonymity

because of the sensitivity of the issue, confirmed that the U.S. is considering these cuts independent of negotiations with Russia.”

So you know who made those comments and do they reflect the opinion of the administration, Dr. Miller?

Mr. MILLER. Senator, I don't know who made the comments and the policy of the administration has been and remains to move forward after—with any reductions beyond New START, in partnership with Russia, and to give priority to that. We have said in the past that we—and I believe that National Security Adviser Donilon made reference to this in his remark—that our intention is to propose reductions in strategic and non-strategic weapons, in both deployed and non-deployed weapons, in order to go after the asymmetry that Dr. Perry referred to, where Russia has much larger numbers of tactical nuclear weapons.

We could foresee some steps to improve transparency—we think that would be very helpful—to continue to work on strategic of tactical nuclear weapons, and ultimately to reduce their numbers.

Senator SESSIONS. Well, I'll be frank with you. I appreciated the agreement that the Congress asked for and insisted on as part of the START Treaty negotiations to spend the \$200 billion to modernize our arsenal and our facilities. But in the defense nuclear posture review the document had 31 references to the President's goal of zero nuclear weapons and a world without nuclear weapons. And the President has repeatedly stated that he wants to lead by example.

In this article I just quoted from from AP, it quotes the President as promising “To put an end to Cold War thinking, we will reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our National security strategy and urge others to do the same.” In other words, we will reduce and urge others to do the same.

Forgive me if it's making me feel like that this very strong commitment to zero nuclear weapons has led us—has put us in a position where we're going to lead without being assured that our nuclear competitors are participating equally.

Could you comment on that?

Dr. MILLER. Senator, thank you. Every President since the nuclear age began has advocated the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons with one exception. That was George W. Bush. All, each other since, since Truman, has advocated that as a goal. President Obama I think is therefore not unique in that goal, and he has noted explicitly that he does not expect it necessarily to occur in his lifetime.

Senator SESSIONS. Necessarily to occur, but it might. Do you think it's likely? Do you think it's likely we'll have zero nuclear weapons in President Obama's lifetime, recognizing he's even as a young man he is?

Dr. MILLER. Senator Sessions, I think it would take, as Dr. Perry referred to, fundamental changes in the security environment that are very difficult to foresee today.

Senator SESSIONS. Well, you would agree that somebody that wrote the defense nuclear policy—

Dr. MILLER. Posture review, sir.

Senator SESSIONS.—posture review, somebody took very seriously this goal, to a degree I've never seen before, to reduce nuclear weapons to zero.

Dr. MILLER. Senator, I believe it's—

Senator SESSIONS. I know Secretary Gates did the introductory letter and he made reference to zero nuclear weapons in his introduction. To what extent were you involved in that?

Dr. MILLER. I was very much involved in it, Senator.

Senator SESSIONS. Was it under your supervision?

Dr. MILLER. Sir, the nuclear posture review was under the supervision of the President. It was a report provided by Secretary Gates and I was honored to play a role in that.

Senator SESSIONS. What I would tell you is the White House, according to Mr. Donilon, the National Security Adviser, the White House will direct DOD to consider "potential changes in targeting requirements and alert procedures."

If you want—the policy we have today, the numbers we've agreed on today match, do they not—General Cartwright I believe testified they did—the targeting and alert requirements this country has?

Dr. MILLER. Senator Sessions, the—

Senator SESSIONS. Is that yes or no?

Dr. MILLER. The answer is yes, that the numbers agreed to under the New START are more than sufficient to meet the guidance that currently exists, which is the guidance that was inherited from the Bush Administration.

Senator SESSIONS. I believe it was General Cartwright that said they meet the requirements. That's what's required to meet the targeting and alert requirements. And if you want to reduce that number, then you need to get the Department of Defense to change the targeting requirements, do you not? Else your weapons system wouldn't meet your targeting requirements.

Dr. MILLER. Senator, we see it in the other direction, and that is that we're being asked to look at potential changes in nuclear targeting guidance and associated requirements and to then do so in a way that strengthens deterrence and extended deterrence and assurance of our allies, and also to do so in a way that over time will reduce the role of nuclear weapons. Those are all—

Senator SESSIONS. Well, that's your goal.

Dr. MILLER. Those are—

Senator SESSIONS. To reduce nuclear weapons. The goal should be, am I not correct, to ensure the defense and security of the United States of America?

Dr. MILLER. Of course that's the goal, Senator.

Senator SESSIONS. If you're going to reduce the targeting requirement, I come back to the thing, it seems to me that the President's goal is permeating the Department of Defense. He's not asking the Department of Defense, what do you need to meet your targeting requirements? He's asking the Department of Defense, apparently, through Mr. Donilon to change the targeting requirements, therefore to meet his goal of reducing weapons.

Dr. MILLER. Senator, case number one in the analysis will be what we have today and the planned forces under New START, and it will be a look—it will look at that with respect to current guidance. We already know that those two match up because that

was the analysis done during the nuclear posture review relating to the New START treaty.

The analysis will then look at alternative approaches to targeting and to hedging and to other steps that are also intended—all of them are intended to meet our deterrence and assurance requirements. Then we'll look at the associated numbers there. That is intended to inform future presidential guidance.

The alternative would be to say the President should provide guidance which all previous Presidents have done without the benefit of that analysis. So my perspective is it's a good useful thing to have the President informed as to the possible consequences of different types of guidance. It doesn't mean that any one will necessarily be selected. And that's the purpose of the analysis, is to inform that and to do it in a way that will help understand the implications of each for deterrence, extended deterrence, and assurance in particular.

Senator SESSIONS. Will you assure us that the military professionals, I hope, that are engaged in this will be protected and allowed to produce their independent, best independent judgment of what kind of targeting procedures we need?

Dr. MILLER. Yes, sir. Explicitly, U.S. STRATCOM played a central role in the nuclear posture review, including our analysis of what was appropriate under New START, and that will be the case in this analysis as well. The same will be true of the Joint Staff—you mentioned General Cartwright—and the services also and the Chiefs played a critical role in our analysis in NPR. That will be the case for this analysis as well.

Senator SESSIONS. Well, I believe the state of the record today is that it was General Cartwright, if I'm not mistaken—General Chilton, excuse me. I was confused about that. General Chilton has testified this is the force structure we need. His quote is: "I think the arsenal we have is exactly what is needed today to provide the deterrent."

So all of a sudden, as soon as we sign the New START treaty the President, who has repeatedly said his goal is to go to zero nuclear weapons, his goal is to set an example for the world, his staff person I'll acknowledge anonymously says that they might do it independent of Russian participation. It just causes me concern that there will be pressure on the Defense Department to produce targeting policies to meet and justify the reduction. I've been around here long enough to know that can happen, and I'm uneasy about it.

My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Senator Sessions.

Senator Udall.

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, gentlemen. I have some specific questions, but I did want to comment on the line of thinking that my friend from Alabama just explored. Dr. Miller, you said every President with the exception of George W. Bush starting with General Eisenhower has called for an ongoing reduction in nuclear arms consistent with the National security needs of the United States?

Dr. MILLER. Senator, every President starting with President Truman has called for the elimination of nuclear weapons, except for—except for President George W. Bush.

Senator UDALL. Is it fair to say that you look at the arc of history over those 60-some years now, that the civilized world, the developed world, with two exceptions I can think of, Iran and North Korea—and some would argue particularly the latter country is far from being developed—have come to understand that the reduction in nuclear arms can actually result in a safer, more stable world, as opposed to an arms race without limits?

Dr. MILLER. Senator, I think that's generally correct. We've also seen, as you know well, over this same period of time a number of countries pursuing nuclear weapons because of their—principally because of their regional security conditions. You can think of, for example, Pakistan in that category.

Senator UDALL. That's fair enough.

Dr. MILLER. And India as well.

Senator UDALL. Secretary Perry and Dr. Miller, I note that National Security Adviser Donilon wrote an op-ed in the Financial Times focused, I think, in particular on the reduction of tactical nukes in the European theater, as did Minister Ivanov and former Secretary of State Albright as well.

It seems to me that was a part of the debate we had on the floor of the Senate last year, that being can we do more to reduce tactical nukes, are we not putting ourselves at a disadvantage because of the Russian arsenal? So my interpretation of what they're doing is following through on the promises and the commitments that were made in the Senate and by our nuclear arms experts to continue to pursue ways to meet that concern.

Would you each care to comment?

Dr. PERRY. I think in my judgment an important goal of any follow-on treaty to New START would be to address the tactical nuclear weapons issues. This will be a very difficult issue to address because of the tremendous asymmetry between the United States and Russia in that case, the asymmetry being not only in the number of tactical nuclear weapons possessed—we have a few hundred, they have a few thousand—but in the asymmetry in the threat perception. The United States does not perceive any threat from our immediate neighbors, Canada and Mexico, whereas Russia perceives significant threats from several countries to the south of them, and their tactical nuclear weapons are directed to those threats.

Therefore, because of this asymmetry it's going to be very difficult to address that issue, but I think important to address it.

The other problem that we would have with such a treaty is that in strategic nuclear weapons we have verified agreements we have made by verifying the missiles themselves, which are quite easy to verify, relatively speaking, but in tactical nuclear weapons we don't have that database to begin with. We don't even know, to begin with, how many tactical nuclear weapons they have. So the verification issue is going to be very difficult. It's going to involve a much higher degree of intrusive inspections than we've ever had in the past.

Senator UDALL. Dr. Miller?

Dr. MILLER. If I could just confirm that you are accurate in your recollection. As you know, Declaration No. 11 of the Senate resolution of ratification calls upon the President to pursue, following consultation with allies, an agreement with the Russian Federation that would address the disparity in tactical nuclear weapons; and later on, just as Dr. Perry suggested, suggests taking steps to look to improve transparency and improve confidence in numbers as well.

So that is an important objective, just as the Senate, as Dr. Perry, as the National Security Adviser, has said. At this point we believe that the most effective way to pursue that is likely to be seeking a combined agreement that looks at overall numbers, including deployed and non-deployed, strategic and non-strategic or tactical. That is not a final decision, but that's certainly the approach that we have looked at to date.

Senator UDALL. I may be misinterpreting what I've heard, but it strikes me as a little strange that those who had concerns about the treaty, those who may have even in fact voted against the treaty, would be critical of attempts to begin to undertake this important mission to reduce the number of tactical weapons. I wouldn't ask you all to comment on that. That's an opinion I'm expressing. But it seems to me that the administration is keeping faith with those promises that were made to begin to do this important work.

I think my time is about to expire, but I want to ask General Kehler just a quick question about the heavy bombers that under the previous START treaty literally we take them apart, as I understand, even cutting the fuselages in half. I don't know if that's on the long axis or the short axis. It probably doesn't matter. Either way, they don't fly very effectively after that.

The new treaty recognizes legitimate non-nuclear missions and allows for the bombers to be made non-nuclear capable. I think maybe that's the term that's used. Can you describe the methods by which the aircraft are modified so they are not able to carry nuclear weapons, and does that restrict, those modifications, the uses for the airplane in other missions and in other capacities?

**STATEMENT OF GEN. C. ROBERT KEHLER, USAF,
COMMANDER, U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND**

General KEHLER. Senator, you have to think about the heavy bombers, I think, in three contexts. There are is the context of those that are in the boneyard, essentially, that we don't want to have counted against any limits in the treaty, and that we will just take destructive measures to deal with.

Then there is a category of heavy bombers that will be dual-capable, nuclear-capable bombers that will also be available for conventional missions. Then there is a category of them that we will not have nuclear-capable at all, but will be available for conventional purposes. That's the category I think you're talking about, and in that case we will propose for our own compliance review group a series of steps that we would take that would make it clear that the bomber was not capable of carrying or delivering nuclear weapons, but still retained its full capability as a platform to deliver conventional weapons, to include precision guided weapons that are conventional.

So we haven't gotten to the complete end of that string yet about approvals to represent it that way with the Russians. That's pending and we believe we have a good way to do that that still allows them to be capable for conventional missions.

[The prepared statement of General Kehler follows:]

Senator UDALL. Thank you for that explanation.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. MILLER. Senator, if I could just add very briefly, just to divide that last part into two different parts. As General Kehler said, we're not at the end of the process yet. In particular for the B-52Hs that would be converted to conventional only, which we plan to do, we are still working through exactly how that will be done and have not yet done an exhibition of that to the Russians.

We did do an exhibition of the B-1B bomber because we have been, as General Kehler knows well, undertaking conversions of those to conventional for some time. That first exhibition of the B-1 bomber, that will allow them to be non-accountable, occurred just a few weeks ago.

Senator NELSON. Senator Shaheen.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you all very much for being here. I'm sorry I missed your statements, but I do want to begin by—I'm sure you probably referred to this—but by congratulating all of you on your role in passage of the New START treaty. It was an extensive debate in the Senate, as you know. I think finally we were able to get the bipartisan support that was required.

It was interesting to me that after support from virtually every living Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense from both sides of the aisle, that it took us so long to get agreement on the treaty. But it's there and I'm delighted and appreciate that now we have new challenges as we begin to implement it.

There was a lot of discussion during that debate about the importance of getting the treaty passed so that we could again resume on-the-ground inspections. Again, I apologize if you've already talked about this in your opening testimony, but can you talk about—I understand the first of these inspections was done in April, and I wonder if you could speak to what we've learned from that inspection and how—were there any surprises or did it go about the way we expected?

Dr. MILLER. Senator Shaheen, first thank you for your words about the New START treaty.

The first U.S. inspection was undertaken in April. It was of an SS-19 base, which is a MIRVed ICBM that's kept in silos. I think that I can say that the inspection went about as expected, and I think in an open session, given our expectations about what's discussed in inspections, that that's about all I should say.

I will also note that we've exchanged databases, we've had the first meeting of the Bilateral Consultative Commission to work through the process through which any future debates would be resolved with respect to inspections.

But I think with respect to this one inspection that's probably all I should say.

Senator SHAHEEN. General?

Senator NELSON. Senator Shaheen, by prior agreement, Dr. Perry has to leave at 3:15 and we're going to give him 5 minutes to summarize anything that he'd like to say. He's got to catch a plane. So if you suspend just for a minute—

Senator SHAHEEN. I'm happy to do that.

Senator NELSON.—we'll finish that.

Senator SHAHEEN. I'm pleased that Dr. Perry's here.

Senator NELSON. Yes.

Dr. PERRY. First of all, I must apologize. I must apologize for this restriction. When I was Secretary of Defense, the answer to the question, when does the plane leave, is when I get there. That's not the answer any more, so I need to be there, and I have to give a talk tomorrow morning in California.

I want to make a few comments, though, in wrapping up, and pointing out that the threats of nuclear weapons to the United States today are in two very different categories. One is the threat that the nuclear weapons could be used by a terror group against us. So the proliferation and nuclear terrorism is one set of threats, and dealing with that set of threats takes a certain set of actions.

In addition to that, we have not yet—are not yet able to dispense with deterrence. So we have two different requirements we have to meet: maintaining deterrence while at the same time working to decrease this threat of proliferation and nuclear terrorism. So we have to have a balance in dealing with those two.

That has been recognized, I think, since the end of the Cold War. The policy that we had in the Clinton Administration, which was really followed before that and since then, but not by the same name, was called "Lead But Hedge." We lead in the reduction of nuclear arms, we lead in programs to prevent the proliferation, but we hedge against adverse political developments by maintaining our deterrence.

That policy was strongly reaffirmed in the nuclear posture review. The Strategic Commission which Keith Payne and I were both on, we also reaffirmed that, but that was prior to the nuclear posture review, and I must say I think the nuclear posture review got it just right. It said the U.S. goal was to reduce nuclear weapons, but we will not do it unilaterally, we will maintain deterrence.

Secretary Miller can tell you, but I can also affirm, that the President was intimately involved in this nuclear posture review and these are his goals, not just the goals of the people who wrote the report.

The hedging has been achieved, I think, very effectively. We have stated that we're going to maintain a safe, secure deterrence and we're going to do that without building new weapons. We're going to strengthen the scientific program at the three laboratories and that is being done. We're going to rebuild the infrastructure, nuclear infrastructure. That is being done. Very substantial requests for appropriations are in for doing that right now.

We have said we were going to increase the stockpile stewardship program, which has been a great success to this date, but is in danger of deteriorating. So the increased funding of that was very important. And we said we're going to increase the emphasis on the life extension program.

Those are all commitments that were made in the nuclear posture review. Those are substantial commitments, and in my judgment they are being carried out, with the support and enthusiastic support, I might say, of the U.S. Congress. So I think we are striking that balance. But I would say again that part of the balance is leading on this reduction of nuclear weapons and the move to deal with proliferation and nuclear terrorism. I think that is very important also.

So we cannot debate this issue by looking at just one of these goals. We have to look at both of them at the same time and understand that sometimes they're in conflict and we have to strike a balance between them. In my judgment, we have done a very effective job, the administration has done a very effective job, of striking that balance, and I think in as much as the nuclear posture review states clearly and explicitly the goals of the administration I think that is the proper test of how they're doing.

You then have to see, are they following up on the commitments in terms of their requests for support, and I believe that the requests for support in this field that went in with this last budget does just that, and now it's up to the Congress, I think, to pass those requests. From what I hear, I think the Congress is likely to do that.

So I'm feeling very good at this stage about meeting these two goals, the lead on the one hand, which I think the President is doing very effectively, but still maintaining that edge, still understanding this is a dangerous world and we have to maintain the deterrence of a nuclear force.

Other people can testify better than I how well we're doing that. We have General Kehler here today and he can tell you whether or not he feels confident that we're maintaining our deterrence in the face of these changes.

I very much appreciate the opportunity to speak with this committee and I apologize again for my needing to leave a little early.

Senator NELSON. No need to apologize. We're mindful of your time constraints and thank you so very much. And not that you need to be, but you are excused.

Dr. PERRY. Thank you very much.

Senator SESSIONS. Dr. Perry, thank you for your work and leadership on the commission and for your commitment to the United States.

Dr. PERRY. Thank you, Senator Sessions. And questions on the commission as they come up in the latter part can be answered very ably by Keith Payne, who is a very close colleague of mine and we worked closely together on the commission. Thank you.

Senator NELSON. Thank you.

Senator Shaheen.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you.

I think, General Kehler, you were about to also respond to my question about the inspections.

General KEHLER. I was, Senator. Let me just make two points, if I could. First is, the debate that you described, the conversations on the nuclear issues, were also noted in Omaha and I can tell you that across Strategic Command the feedback that I get is that they very much appreciate the fact that these issues are getting national

attention. So I think that was a point that was not lost on them and they're very appreciative of that fact.

Second, I would just expand on what Dr. Miller said. We are committed to implementing the New START treaty. There are many steps that are already under way. We have less than 7 years already, not a lot less but under 7 years, to bring all of the pieces together. Since the treaty entered into force on the 5th of February, we have done the following things.

Dr. Miller mentioned we've done the first New START database exchange. He also mentioned we've done a required exhibition of B-1 bombers. There has been a required exhibition of the Russian road-mobile SS-27 ICBM and launcher. There has been a required exhibition of our B-2A bomber and, as he described, the first of the U.S. New START onsite inspections. In this case, the Russian SS-19 at Kazelsk has also been accomplished.

There's a lot more to do, but I did want to let you know that there is a full range of activities that are already under way in implementing New START.

Senator SHAHEEN. Well, thank you. I know that we have until 2018 to bring our nuclear force structure into compliance with the treaty limits. Is there the possibility of moving up that timetable in any way?

General KEHLER. Senator, from my perspective we are right now working with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff to point together and finalize our plans for what our force mixture will look like as we implement the New START treaty. The 1251 report that was submitted to Congress back in the fall and updated again in the fall describes a baseline force structure that has a certain number of submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers associated with it, a certain number of—up to a certain number of ICBMs, up to a certain number of bombers.

We are now working our way through how do we make those balances and tradeoffs in that mixture. We expect that something will go to the Chairman here in the not too distant future. Some of the precursor steps in order to do those force structure—to execute those force structure decisions, like going to single-warhead ICBMs, we will have to, in a budgetary sense anyway, get going sooner rather than later in the period so that we can have all the pieces in place by they industry of the period.

So I think what you will see as we sequence these steps, that some things will actually have to begin sooner simply because it will take us a certain number of years to cycle ballistic missile submarines through the wharves, handle the weapons, do the things that we're going to need to do.

Dr. MILLER. Senator, if I could just briefly add to General Kehler's excellent, accurate response two thoughts. One is that once that time line is defined the United States under the terms of the treaty, as will Russia, will have flexibility to mix forces should that be required because of a problem in one leg or another of the triad—one of the advantages of sustaining the triad, as we intend to do under the treaty.

The second is I wanted to explicitly acknowledge that the administration remains cognizant of the Senate resolution of ratification, its Declaration No. 5, and it talks about asymmetry in reductions

and directs that the President should regulate reductions such that no strategic imbalance endangers the National security interests of the United States. So as we look at this we'll also assess the likely time line and path for Russian reductions as well.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you.

My time has expired, but I actually have to say I was pleased, but a little surprised, to hear how optimistic Dr. Perry was about the commitment to continue to fund all of the requirements for our nuclear arsenal. I'm not quite as sanguine as he is about the continued commitment of Congress to do that, given the current budget debate that we're having. So I may get some time later to ask you to comment on that, but thank you.

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Senator.

Some critics of the administration have suggested that the administration's primary goal is getting to zero nuclear weapons and that this is a shift away from the lead-hedge tradition which we just heard Dr. Perry reference and the need to maintain deterrence. Dr. Payne, do you see the administration continuing with the lead- hedge tradition or not?

STATEMENT OF KEITH B. PAYNE, PH.D., PROFESSOR AND HEAD, GRADUATE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND STRATEGIC STUDIES, MISSOURI STATE UNIVERSITY (WASHINGTON CAMPUS)

Dr. PAYNE. I do. In terms of the material that, for example, my friend Dr. Miller has provided, the Nuclear Posture Review of 2010, which I think in general is a very commendable document, it certainly reflects a continuing commitment to the goals of deterrence, assurance, limited defense, and extended deterrence.

On the other hand, it's true that concern has been raised with regard to other voices in the administration which seem to subordinate those traditional goals to the goal of nuclear reductions. Senator Sessions quoted National Security Adviser Donilon's announcement of the forthcoming reviews. We should note that National Security Adviser Donilon stated specifically that the forthcoming nuclear reviews are for the purpose of finding further U.S. nuclear reductions. Other senior administration officials have similarly described the purpose of these reviews as being to facilitate nuclear reductions on the journey toward nuclear zero.

In addition, the administration itself has said that, "for the first time"—and that's a quote—for the first time," it places atop the U.S. nuclear agenda nonproliferation as an element moving toward nuclear zero. So this isn't a concern that comes out of imagination. It's concern that comes directly out of the way these goals have been described by some administration officials on some occasions.

So I conclude that what we see is in a sense two competing dynamics within the administration regarding the prioritization of U.S. goals and the calculation of force requirements. One, as is well and ably presented by Dr. Miller, one is committed to sustaining effective strategic capabilities for deterrence, assurance, extended deterrence, and limited defense. The other, however, places, appears to place, top priority on arms control and movement towards nuclear zero in the calculation of force adequacy.

I should note, as Secretary Perry noted earlier, reconciling these two dynamics will be very difficult and ultimately impossible. So the fundamental question, I think, that we're presented with—and Senator Sessions identified this early in this discussion—is with regard to the administration's nuclear reviews, which of these two different views or dynamics with regard to U.S. priorities and requirements will dominate?

My concern and the concerns that have been raised by others who see these competing priorities is that the goal that places priority—or I should say, the approach that places top priority on movement towards nuclear zero and other arms reductions will dominate those considerations and by definition subordinate these other goals that have been consistently supported by U.S. Democratic and Republican administrations for 5 decades.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Payne follows:]

Senator NELSON. General Kehler, from your perspective are you satisfied that the movement is in the right direction in terms of reduction, and are you concerned that the administration will then begin on its own to reduce the number of warheads unilaterally?

General KEHLER. Sir, I would make two points. The first is, on the levels, the force levels that are described in the New START treaty, I don't have any concerns with those force levels at all. I think that Dr. Miller earlier described STRATCOM's role in this entire process and our role really is at the right-hand side of the process. If it starts on the left with presidential guidance, that's refined by both the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman. STRATCOM takes that guidance and does mission analysis, and at the end of that mission analysis process we are able to articulate what from our military perspective we believe are the requirements for both force capability and force capacity.

Based upon the guidance that was used to arrive at the New START treaty, I have no concerns whatsoever. I believe that, given that guidance, that we are capable of achieving our deterrence objectives. I think that remains our role as we go forward. Our role will be to examine alternative guidance packages, if you will, and perform the same kind of mission analysis on those, to describe from our military perspective what the implications of various guidance alternatives might be.

I do see that as our rightful role in the process. I am fully expecting that we will be involved as deeply in this process as the command was in the New START discussions and as it was in the nuclear posture review itself. The preliminary, although we haven't seen any official taskings, the preliminary discussions that we've had with Dr. Miller's office and others lead me to believe that our advice is going to be sought.

Senator NELSON. Dr. Miller?

Dr. MILLER. Mr. Chairman, I will just state for the record General Kehler and STRATCOM's advice is being sought and that will continue to be the case.

Senator NELSON. Thank you.

Senator Sessions.

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you.

Dr. Payne, National Security Adviser Donilon in this speech said that "The New START treaty represents a commitment by the

world's two largest powers to the goal of disarmament." Do you think the Russians, by signing this treaty, in any way evidenced an inclination to go to disarmament? How would you assess the state of the Russian mind?

Dr. PAYNE. I would suggest that, based on the statements, the various statements from senior Russian officials and senior military officials, both in the lead-up to New START and following the ratification of New START, that the chances of the Russians agreeing to nuclear disarmament are so close to zero that we might as well call them essentially zero.

They identify, that is Russian senior officials, both in the military and on the civilian side, identify the great value they place, continue to place in nuclear weapons, including for what we would call here warfighting purposes. They have said specifically that because their conventional forces are in poor shape and not likely to get into better shape for many years to come, that they are deeply reliant on nuclear weapons for their security, and in fact virtually all of the senior Russian officials who have commented—I may have missed some—virtually all of the senior Russian official comments that I've seen with regard to the future of tactical nuclear weapons and reductions of tactical nuclear weapons have in a sense said they're not interested in moving in that direction and certainly not in any time soon.

Senator SESSIONS. Well, I'm sure the administration raised it in the New START negotiations and they faced a stone wall because the Russians refused, and so we acquiesced and focused on the strategic.

Dr. Miller, on what basis does the President's National Security Adviser conclude that the New START treaty represents a commitment to disarmament?

Dr. MILLER. Senator Sessions, if you look at the preamble to the treaty, it notes both parties' commitment to nuclear disarmament over the long term. I think it's fair to say that the reductions in nuclear warheads, in deployed nuclear warheads and strategic delivery vehicles, represent a step in that direction.

Senator SESSIONS. Well, I will just say if the

President had said to the United States Senate, this is a, the New START treaty is a start toward disarmament, I guess it would have caused more concern than we had. This does not strike me as a wise approach and it is part of the concern that I have as we wrestle with these very, very important issues.

I do feel like that President Bush, George W. Bush, our recent President Bush, unilaterally drew down weapons substantially, nuclear weapons substantially. He did not do that pursuant to a treaty, but he made clear he was going to a level, as I understood it, he thought was sufficient for our National security and that we were free to take other action if necessary to strengthen that capability to protect our National security. So I'm just worried about this trend.

Dr. Payne, there are other players in the world than Russia. One of the problems we have is that as we draw down our weapons it seems to me that China may have an incentive to seek equivalence with the United States, nuclear parity with the United States, as might other countries, frankly. According to the report of the Stra-

tegic Posture Commission, the Chinese have some 400 nuclear warheads in their arsenal, and according to the Department of Defense China deploys 60 long-range ballistic missiles capable of targeting our homeland.

How can we know with any certainty how many nuclear weapons the United States needs to maintain in order to disincentivize China to seek nuclear parity with the United States? Is that a concern?

Dr. PAYNE. Senator Sessions, that's one of the very difficult questions that confronts us in all of these areas of deterrence and assurance of allies, is how do we know now what's going to be necessary 5 years from now what's going to be necessary 5 years from now or 10 years from now, what it will take, for example, if the occasion arises to deter China or to assure an ally.

That's why in my view—and I know General Kehler concurs with this and I suspect that Jim does as well—that retaining the flexibility of our force to adapt to changes and the resilience of our forces and force structure to adapt to changes is so important.

So I guess the conclusion that I draw on that is no one can give you a number right now and give you any kind of confident prediction that this number will be enough to deter 10 years from now or to assure allies 10 years from now, for the simple reason that threats change and opponents change and conditions change. So the requirements for deterrence and assurance similarly shift and change, and so our force structure needs to be agile and resilient and flexible enough to change with the changing threats.

Senator SESSIONS. Isn't it true that other nations depend on the U.S. nuclear umbrella, that there is a political, psychological dimension to clear and strong nuclear capability, and that as a member of the commission you were able to ascertain that nations around the world who don't now have nuclear weapons, good civilized nations, become concerned as the United States draws its weapons arsenal down too low?

Dr. PAYNE. Yes, sir. What the commission learned through a whole series of briefings by senior officials from abroad is that they place enormous value on the U.S. extended nuclear umbrella, and that umbrella is provided for some 30 countries, allies, in NATO, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and so on.

So what we learned through that exercise was the high priority that these countries place on the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent for their security, and a number of them suggested to us that they are beginning, were at that time beginning to be concerned about the credibility of the U.S. extended nuclear umbrella and were potentially concerned that if we drew our forces down too far that the credibility of that extended nuclear umbrella would no longer be sufficient in their eyes. Some of them even suggested if that were the case they were going to have to reconsider their commitment to being non-nuclear states.

I should add that we've heard subsequently senior voices, for example, in Japan have said that the threshold at which point they start becoming very worried about the credibility of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent is if the U.S. starts moving down too around a thousand nuclear warheads. So it strikes me that the number that the New START treaty provides of 1550 is well above

that. But when we start looking at numbers that go potentially well below that, we will be potentially jeopardizing the credibility of our nuclear, extended nuclear deterrent, as judged by our allies, and they are the ones who judge that.

Senator SESSIONS. The perverse consequence of too much reduction could actually be a proliferation of nuclear weapons in other countries that previously did not feel the need to have them.

Dr. PAYNE. Yes, sir. I think it's widely recognized that the U.S. extended nuclear umbrella, extended deterrence, is one of the most important tools for nonproliferation, and to the extent that it is degraded or rendered less credible we would actually be promoting nuclear proliferation, which obviously runs against one of the highest goals of the Obama Administration.

Senator SESSIONS. Dr. Miller, briefly, you wrote in your March 2, 2011, House testimony that "The lack of transparency surrounding China's nuclear program, their pace and scope, as well as the strategy and doctrine that guide them, raise questions about China's future strategic intentions." As we deal with the proper level of nuclear weapons, don't we need to consider also what may be in China's plans for the future?

Dr. MILLER. Senator Sessions, let me divide the answer into two parts. One is about numbers, which you mentioned earlier, and one is about—one is about their doctrine and so forth.

With respect to numbers, the United States and Russia still have 90 to 95 percent of nuclear weapons in the world and that will still be the case after the New START treaty is implemented. We released unclassified about a little over a year ago the number of nuclear weapons in the U.S. stockpile, as of now almost a year and a half ago. It was 5,113 in the stockpile plus several thousand awaiting dismantlement. Russia is broadly in the same ballpark.

If the numbers cited about China are correct—and I won't say in this forum what the best estimate is from the intelligence community—if those are correct, we're ten times plus above, and we have not seen anything approaching a rush to parity. Instead, we've seen action by China that's consistent with their stated doctrine of wanting to have the ability to deliver in a second strike a relatively limited number of nuclear weapons.

The second part, with respect to transparency—

Senator SESSIONS. You say there's a lack of transparency—

Dr. MILLER. Yes, sir.

Senator SESSIONS.—as to their pace and scope. I don't know how you can be so confident, with that testimony.

Dr. MILLER. Well, I think if we look out—sir, that's the second part, exactly. If we look out from today into the future, today we would like to understand more about their doctrine. It's true for nuclear, it's true for space and cyber space as well, and we've asked for a strategic dialogue with them on these issues.

As we look to the future and try to understand where they might be going, I think that uncertainty grows and our ability to go forward certainly beyond any next round will depend on what—will depend in significant measure on what China does.

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you.

Senator Shaheen.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you.

Dr. Miller, the administration, though, has always said that we'll maintain a strong deterrent as long as nuclear weapons exist, right? That's been one of the pillars of this administration's nuclear policy. While I appreciate the dichotomy that's been talked about, in fairness that has been one of the things that the President has said from the very beginning; is that right?

Dr. MILLER. Senator, that's correct, a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal as long as nuclear weapons exist. I also should add that that applies not just to deterrence of attack on the United States, but to deterrence of attack on our allies as well. We have consulted very closely with our allies during the nuclear posture review and during the New START treaty and have in fact established some new bilateral dialogues with allies to have discussions about both nuclear deterrence and broader elements of deterrence, to ensure that we sustain the effective extended deterrence and assurance of our allies.

Senator SHAHEEN. I know that you mentioned that NATO is soon going to undertake its deterrence and defense posture review. Can you give us some insight into what we would like to see NATO come out with as part of that posture review process?

Dr. MILLER. Senator, let me first note that the deterrence and defense posture review is starting from the premises outlined at the NATO summit, and that includes that NATO will remain a nuclear alliance as long as nuclear weapons exist. So that therefore the purpose of the DDPR, the deterrence and defense posture review, is to examine the appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional, and missile defense capabilities.

So what we would like to do is to ensure that as that takes place that we have the continued principles that have been at the foundation of the alliance, including risk-sharing and burden-sharing, as foundational elements of where we go, and that, just as is the case for the targeting assessment that we've talked about, that we look—while we could look at changes in posture, that we fundamentally look at what's required for effective deterrence and assurance as well.

Senator SHAHEEN. As NATO engages Russia in some of these discussions, what's been the reaction from our allies in the Eastern European countries?

Dr. MILLER. NATO in general and including the Baltic States and Eastern European countries have been particularly concerning about gaining more transparency about the status of Russian tactical nuclear weapons and to ensure that those weapons are under the safest possible security arrangements. So what we've seen in discussions with our allies is encouragement to look to initial steps following New START, even prior to considering reductions that aim at increased transparency, and that continue some of the efforts at improved security that in fact the Senate and the Congress have supported over the years, including through the Nunn-Lugar program.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you.

General, do you want to add anything to that?

General KEHLER. Senator, I would just offer that we understand the relationship between our strategic weapons and the requirements of extended deterrence. We understand that not only the

NATO alliance, but other friends around the world, do rely on that, and we are mindful of that as we go about our force planning.

Senator SHAHEEN. As we're looking at the future of arms control and thinking about China, for example, as Senator Sessions mentioned, and what's happening there, have we—have we begun to engage them at all in the debate about arms control and how they might fit into that, whether they might be willing to consider engaging in arms control talks at any point in the future?

Dr. MILLER. Senator Shaheen, we see that, for nuclear arms control, we see an appropriate next round to be bilateral between the U.S. and Russia, given that we, as I said, account for 90 to 95 percent of nuclear weapons in the world, even after New START. We have often expressed an interest to have discussions with China sooner rather than later, as Senator Sessions referred to, to particularly look at transparency and to understand how they think about planning, how they think about doctrine, and to have a better sense of where they intend to go also with respect to numbers in the future.

We've seen some signs that the Chinese may be open to strategic dialogue in general and I hope that the nuclear issue will be one of those that they pick up on.

General KEHLER. If I could add to that, my predecessor last fall had a counterpart visit in Omaha with one of the senior Chinese defense officials. We would like to see greater military to military contact. Of course, Secretary Gates was in China in January and approached that same issue. We have invited Chinese representatives at lower levels in their military structure to come and participate in our public deterrence seminars, for example, and we will do so again this year.

But we would like to see greater contact, certainly at the military level, with the Chinese. There are some questions about their intent. We are supposed to look at capabilities and it's very hard to understand their capabilities on the surface if you don't understand the intent that goes behind it.

Senator SHAHEEN. This is a topic that I haven't heard raised since I've been here this afternoon. Has there been any reaction from Iran upon the passage of the New START treaty? Have they responded to that? From anybody on the panel?

Dr. MILLER. Senator Shaheen, I have not—I have not seen any such reaction. I recall an Iranian reaction to the nuclear posture review, which, as you recall, for nuclear doctrine it essentially eliminated what we described as the Iran loophole. So that if a country's not meeting its obligations under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, then our so-called negative security assurance doesn't apply. They noted that that appeared to affect their posture, and I think that was a positive—from our perspective of encouraging them to meet their obligations, I think that was a positive thing, that they noticed.

Dr. PAYNE. I can add to that, Senator Shaheen, that one of the most recent statements that I've seen coming out of Teheran was to suggest that the current events in Libya show what a mistake it was for Libya to give up its weapons of mass destruction, and the leadership in Teheran says: We take note of that.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you.

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Shaheen mentioned, and so did my colleague Senator Sessions, about engaging in conversations with China about nuclear reduction. Given the situation with Pakistan quite apart from the events of this week, but the fact that they're a nuclear power and things are less stable in Pakistan, would it be appropriate for us to begin to engage in discussions there with Pakistan about nuclear reduction? Or would we have to do it in conjunction with Pakistan, India, and the United States?

Dr. Miller, do you have any thoughts about that?

Dr. MILLER. Mr. Chairman, we have offered any assistance that Pakistan might desire with respect to our approach in thinking about the most effective means for strategic of nuclear weapons. I don't believe that we've ever suggested that we should at this point include them in any arms control negotiations.

Senator NELSON. Is there a particular reason not to or is it just it doesn't seem to be the time?

Dr. MILLER. Mr. Chairman, I think that in order to look to make—take additional steps in the coming years, we've made the judgment that it makes sense to look to, for any formal arms control, to a bilateral step that would follow a New START.

I might note that, if I recall correctly, that the Strategic Posture Commission also recommended an initial first step, given that the START Treaty was expiring, and then to look for further steps after that. We think that more—once you go beyond that point, we need to deal with the questions of the security of nuclear weapons globally, the global lockdown that President Obama has talked about, has more than talked about, has advocated and acted on with the nuclear security summit and our follow-on activities. Our real focus in the near term in that regard is to ensure the security of nuclear materials worldwide and to have as much possible, and indeed all, fissile materials under the safest possible arrangements.

Senator NELSON. Well, you raise a good question about the security discussions and offers of assistance on the security in Pakistan. On a CODEL I think in late 2001, I asked General Musharraf how confident he, President Musharraf, how confident he was that they had the security of all their nuclear weapons under control. After a little bit of thought, he said: 95 percent.

So he remembered that, that discussion. So after when we had the unfortunate occasion of flying nuclear weapons all over the United States unknowingly, the next time I saw him he asked me how confident I was that we had our nuclear armaments, nuclear force, under control. And I said: 96 percent. [Laughter.]

But in working on this issue, I think the question that is out there that's bothering my colleague Senator Sessions and some others is is there a plan to just sort of unilaterally bring our numbers down without regard to a bilateral agreement with our Russian counterpart? I think that is the question.

Apparently, Mr. Donilon's comments may have obviously helped trigger this question, but would it be possible to get a statement somewhere along the way that would clarify what his speech was about, because that seems to be what the issue, what has triggered the issue at the level that we're dealing with it right now?

I think we're seeing assurances, we're hearing assurances, and I understand that, but there is written documentation out there that seems to be leading in another direction and causing maybe undue concern, but we don't know that it's undue, and that's I think what's truly my colleague's concern.

Dr. Miller?

Dr. MILLER. Mr. Chairman, I will want to state that I read and heard the National Security Adviser's speech differently and I found it entirely consistent with what we had said in the nuclear posture review and the idea that we would conduct analysis first of how to sustain effective deterrence and assurance and then look to associated numbers. I will take back the question that you've asked, however.

Senator NELSON. Let's see. I think next would be Senator Sessions.

Senator SESSIONS. Well, I think the National Security Adviser's comments were troubling. I don't think they can be blithely set aside. Having just returned from the Baltics and the Ukraine and Georgia, Dr. Payne, what we heard was a very, very unease about a concern over tactical nuclear weapons. Apparently, the German foreign minister seems to believe that tactical—we should—I don't know if it's the position of the government, but the foreign minister's view is that tactical nuclear weapons should be drawn down in Europe. I got the great concern that ours should be drawn down; and that these nations are really worried that we might reach an agreement that would make the situation even more precarious for them.

Do you have any thoughts about that, any observations about the dynamics of the ten to one or so advantage, plus, advantage that the Russians have on tactical nuclear weapons?

Dr. PAYNE. Yes. The Russian numeric advantage in tactical nuclear weapons that you mentioned is of great concern to some allies. Other allies are less concerned, but some allies are particularly concerned, including allies in the Baltic States. This concern I think is increased by the Russian position that Russia will not agree to, in a sense, negotiations or to begin the discussions on tactical nuclear weapons until the United States withdraws its nuclear weapons from Europe. So in a sense they say, we don't want to start talking about this until you've withdrawn yours from Europe.

Of course, the problem with that is that I believe we have very little leverage with regard to the Russians on tactical nuclear weapons now. If we withdraw all of our tactical nuclear weapons from Europe as the starting-out point of discussions, I think that leverage is reduced further. Many of our allies understand this, which is why they're concerned both about the asymmetry in capabilities and also the Russian demands with regard to what would happen before discussions could take place.

Senator SESSIONS. Do you think it would assuage their concerns if the Russians were to drop theirs 20 percent and we dropped ours 20 percent, or the Russians said, well, we'll pull back our tactical nuclear weapons 300 miles from Eastern Europe and not have any there? Would that make them feel any better?

Dr. PAYNE. I would refrain from speaking for our allies, but I suspect it would not make some of them feel any better at all.

Senator SESSIONS. In fact, that's what they expressed to us, is a concern that there might be some sort of agreement reached with the United States and that they would make a token reduction or a token pullback, but it would enhance or certainly not diminish the advantage they have.

Now, Dr. Miller wrote about the lack of transparency surrounding China's nuclear programs, their pace and scope, as well as their strategy and doctrine that guide them. It's a plain fact, is it not, Dr. Miller, that the Chinese are playing hardball on this? They're not wanting to talk with us. General Kehler, they've been willing to come over to the United States to some degree and snoop around and see what they can see, but they're not inviting us to China to tell them—to tell us what they're doing, and they're being pretty hard-nosed about this, are they not?

Dr. MILLER. Senator Sessions, the Chinese have taken a different approach to thinking about deterrence and have emphasized historically not transparency, but almost the opposite, that for effective deterrence it's useful to have uncertainty on the part of the other party. We have attempted to make the case that in fact stable deterrence and stable relations between the United States and China would be strengthened by this type of dialogue.

As I said, while we don't know the answer yet, we've seen some positive signs that they will be willing to engage in a strategic dialogue that may include this, among other issues.

Sir, if I could just add very briefly with respect to NATO, what we said in the nuclear posture review was that any decisions about nuclear weapons and NATO would not be undertaken unilaterally by the United States, but any decisions would be taken at NATO by NATO. And that is precisely what is going on as we begin this deterrence and defense posture review. It's an opportunity for NATO to come together and to have a conversation about the role of nuclear weapons—I should put that differently—about how—what is the appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities to continue to sustain effective deterrence over time. The guidance that's come from ministers has explicitly stated, just as mentioned in the New START resolution of ratification, that any further steps, any steps by NATO, have to take account of the disparity with respect to Russia.

Senator SESSIONS. Well, Mr. Chairman, thank you for a good hearing. Thank you for calling this. You've allowed us to air these issues at my request. I feel like you were very forthcoming about that.

These are important issues. I don't pretend to know the answers. I know the President, from all his great skill and talent, has not had the kind of experience in these matters over a period of years. I've been on this committee 14 years and I still feel like I'm pretty much a novice, I suppose, to it. So his repeated statements about what I consider to be an unrealistic goal of going to zero nuclear weapons and his very strong desire to have treaties and agreements with Russia, even causing I think the negotiations to not be as rigorous as I would like to have seen with regard to the New START treaty, hopefully it doesn't place us in danger. Hopefully

the numbers are something we can be comfortable with. But I've been uneasy about that, and I intend to fulfill what I think my duty is to ensure we're thinking clearly, realistically, about the threats we face, the nature of the world in which we live. It's not where we would like it to be. It is the world that is and we have to live in that real world. So I am uneasy about it.

I will probably submit some written questions, but I to date am hopeful that the new funding that the President has supported and the Congress seems willing to support will put us on the road for first time in a number of years to see us reconstitute or refurbish our commitments and nuclear capabilities. So that's good news.

I thank each of you for your service to your country very much.

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Shaheen.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don't have any further questions, but apropos the NATO discussion I would like to just point out that all of our NATO allies came out very strongly in support of passing New START, and one of the strongest statements came from Poland. So I think, while I appreciate some of the issues that have been raised about next steps, I think it's important to point out that they were very supportive of the passage of the treaty.

Thank you all very much.

Senator NELSON. I want to thank you as well. Thank you, Senator Shaheen, for your service and for being here today; and just to suggest maybe a clarification that might eliminate any confusion that's been raised and discussed during the hearing today.

Thank you all. We're adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:58 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]