

# NATO: THE CHICAGO SUMMIT AND U.S. POLICY

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## HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND EURASIA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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## **NATO: THE CHICAGO SUMMIT AND U.S. POLICY**

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**THURSDAY, APRIL 26, 2012**

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND EURASIA,  
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,  
*Washington, DC.*

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jean Schmidt presiding.

Ms. SCHMIDT [presiding]. Now I would like to open the subcommittee hearing on Europe and Eurasia. Since I have already given an opening statement, I am not going to say basically the same thing again, but echo that belief that we need to expand the membership in NATO to many of the countries that were mentioned here today.

But now I would like to ask Mr. Meeks if he has an opening statement.

Mr. MEEKS. I do. Since I gave mine, basically, on the Georgian markup and resolution, I do want to make some comments specifically about NATO and the Chicago Summit and U.S. policy.

I want to thank, again, Chairman Burton, for scheduling this hearing. It is very timely, as it is leading up to the Chicago Summit.

NATO remains the United States' premiere defense alliance and an essential instrument for peace, in my estimation. The Chicago Summit will take place this year as allied leaders grapple with severe budgetary constraints, wind down the ISAF presence in Afghanistan, and develop the capability to respond to increasing threats to global strategic stability and peace.

Contemplating these challenges, it is useful to look at the continuum of NATO policymaking or at least at recent history. At the 2010 Lisbon Summit, NATO adopted a new strategic concept which outlines NATO's vision for the coming decade. Realization of this strategy will enable the alliance to respond to a full range of evolving threats, including to energy and cyber security and migration, and will provide stability beyond the geography of the alliance.

But I mentioned constraints. In implementing this strategy and in anticipating, confronting, and eliminating threats to peace and stability, NATO must do more with less. In this age of austerity on both sides of the Atlantic, defense budgets, all budgets, are under pressure. Defense expenditures as a percentage of GDP vary from 4.8 percent in the United States to 0.8 percent in some member states, and raises the questions of readiness of NATO assets. This is a concern that must be addressed.

Some alliance members, for example Latvia, are working toward meeting the commitment despite financial difficulties. As they chart their way out of the financial crises, their long-term budget planning will raise defense spending to 2 percent of GDP by 2020. State Secretary of Latvian Ministry of Defense, Mr. Janis Sarts, recently stated that, "the current defense budget was appropriate for the time of the crisis, and we were able to do it thanks to the understanding of other NATO member states. But we should not expect that we will be able to live on the account of others in the future."

Since the Cold War, NATO has expanded from 16 to 28 members, a fact that has been a driver for reform and generated stability throughout Europe. The alliance vision for a Europe whole, free, and at peace remains unrealized. The goal is attainable; integration into Euro-Atlantic structures of all European countries that so desire is the path, the correct path toward it, in my estimation.

NATO allies Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Macedonia, and Montenegro have expressed their aspirations to join NATO, and alliance leaders recognized their aspirations at the Bucharest, Strasbourg/Kehl, and Lisbon Summits.

Passing complex reforms, maintaining high levels of public support, and, above all, committing troops, expertise, funding, material, and political support to critical operations in Afghanistan, Kosovo, and Libya, these nations have repeatedly asserted NATO membership as a strategic policy goal. We, the NATO member states, must acknowledge these gestures by providing these countries roadmaps to membership.

Two issues concern me, though, about NATO's enlargement prospects. My concern is that there is an apparent lack of cohesion within the alliance regarding Georgia becoming a member of NATO, and whether perception or politics, it is unhealthy for the future of NATO and the future of Georgia to let this question linger. I hope that the Chicago Summit will bring some clarity there.

My other concern relates to bilateral conflicts playing out within NATO. Today we are seeing bilateral conflicts between alliance members, aspirant countries, and partners; notably, Greece and Macedonia's disagreement over the name issue that keeps Macedonia out of NATO; Turkey and NATO-partner Israel's multi-dimensional discord that led to Turkey preventing Israel from attending partnership meetings at the NATO Summit.

I am troubled that these unresolved issues undermine core NATO values and hamper alliance functions and capabilities. I urge all parties, NATO members and non-NATO members, to consider the broader ramifications of using NATO as a venue to gain leverage in bilateral disputes. I call on my congressional colleagues and the administration to convey this message to all of the relevant parties.

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for holding this timely hearing. I look forward to hearing our witnesses' thoughts on how we can maintain a NATO as the essential forum for allied security consultations, decisions, and action.

Mr. BURTON [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Meeks.

I apologize for my temporary absence. We had a bunch of votes in another committee, but it is good to be back.

In less than a month, leaders of NATO member states will converge, as my colleague said, in Chicago for the Chicago Summit. As are my colleagues, I am a strong supporter of NATO. Based on the bedrock of the common principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law, over the course of the 63 years of its history, the alliance has evolved to protect the freedom and security of all of its members.

Is that call from the President for me? [Laughter.]

NATO will evolve through the Chicago Summit as it has done through the past Summits, including Riga, Bucharest, and Lisbon. We are here to discuss how NATO will evolve.

It is clear that the Summit will address Afghanistan and NATO's commitment through 2014 and beyond. The alliance should also take this opportunity to begin to formulate a coherent strategy toward the Middle East and North Africa, including Libya, Syria, and Iran, that works with and develops the alliance's partners in the region.

I was critical of the military action in Libya. As we have learned, once the military goes in and does its job, the next step often remains unclear as to what we do and not fully understanding the internal political dynamics of the countries that we are trying to help. The resulting instability can lead to greater threats and further instability. NATO needs to think beyond the military stage and prepare for the political realities after fighting.

Toward that end, a number of us have made statements on the Floor about the United States being involved in these affairs without Congress passing resolutions dealing with those things. I have stated in numerous articles that Congress needs to be involved in the decision making process and that neither the President nor one or more Senators should unilaterally make decisions to involve us in military conflicts without the consent and the support of Congress.

I am concerned with the effects of the European financial crisis on NATO. As I have previously stated, I am skeptical of the steps Europe has taken to solve the crisis and feel that the crisis is not over. Clearly, this ongoing crisis has impacted, and will continue to impact, the resources that the alliance's European members are willing and able to invest in defense. Of the 28 NATO members, only three currently meet the common commitment to spend 2 percent of their GDP on defense. At the same time, further cuts are expected, and that is something that we ought to all be concerned about.

I agree with the concerns then-Secretary Gates voiced last summer in Brussels; there will be growing difficulty for the U.S. to sustain its current support for NATO if the American taxpayer continues to carry the bulk of the burden of the alliance. NATO must always work to improve cooperation and coordination among its members; however, such actions are the very essence of what it means to participate in an alliance and are not a replacement for adequate funding. While I understand and embrace the need for austerity and reduced government spending on both sides of the Atlantic, particularly here, I urge all members of the alliance to incorporate the 2 percent commitment in their long-term budgetary goals. I hope that is discussed very thoroughly in Chicago.

However, at the same time, I urge the administration to make it clear that, despite the need for increased focus on Asia, the United States remains committed to achieving and maintaining the longstanding goal of a Europe: Whole, free, and at peace.

The concerns that I have just raised are based on my steadfast support of NATO. The alliance stands with the U.S.-EU economic cooperation as a cornerstone of global stability. The alliance must increase cooperation with key partners around the globe to better leverage transatlantic leadership in the face of diverse challenges. However, NATO must also remain committed to enlargement by providing paths for qualified aspirant countries that embrace the alliance's common values to enter the "open door." As we have seen in Afghanistan, such countries already provide the alliance with important capabilities.

If we do not provide clear pathways toward future admission into the alliance, and, thus, the transatlantic community, we create conditions where these countries can slide backwards, away from Europe and further away from democracy and stability.

Although the Summit would be far more productive if held in Indianapolis—that is my hometown—or Little Rock, as my colleague just said. Little Rock? Is that in America, Little Rock? [Laughter.]

Chicago will present an important opportunity for the alliance's leadership to solidify a final strategy for Afghanistan, formulate a coherent strategy for supporting stable democratic development in the Middle East and North Africa, and establish a unified vision for NATO's future that reaffirms its members' support for maintaining a robust alliance while enhancing cooperation with key global partners and maintaining a responsible open-door policy.

I am very eager to hear the testimony from our witnesses today and learn more about NATO's future.

Do we have any other members who would like to make an opening statement? The gentleman from New York, Mr. Engel.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Burton follows:]



**Remarks of the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman  
Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia  
Committee on Foreign Affairs  
U.S. House of Representatives**

**Hearing on: "NATO: The Chicago Summit and US Policy"**

**\*\*\*As prepared for delivery\*\*\***

**April 26, 2012**

In less than a month, leaders of NATO member states will converge in the Midwest for the Chicago Summit. I am a strong supporter of NATO. Based on the bedrock of the common principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law, over the course of its 63 year history, the Alliance has evolved to protect the freedom and security of its members. NATO will evolve through the Chicago Summit as it has done through past summits including Riga, Bucharest, and Lisbon. We are here to discuss how NATO will evolve.

It is clear that the Summit will address Afghanistan and NATO's commitment through 2014 and beyond. The Alliance should also take this opportunity to begin to formulate a coherent strategy toward the Middle East and North Africa, including Libya, Syria, and Iran, that works with and develops the Alliance's partners in the region.

I was critical of military action in Libya. As we have learned, once the military goes in and does its job, the next step often remains unclear as we do not fully understand the internal political dynamics of the countries that we are trying to help. The resulting instability can lead to greater threats and further instability. NATO needs to think beyond the military stage and prepare for the political realities after the fighting.

I am concerned with the effects of the European financial crisis on NATO. As I have previously stated, I am skeptical of steps Europe has taken to solve the crisis and feel that the crisis is not over. Clearly, this ongoing crisis has impacted and will continue to impact the resources that the Alliance's European members are willing and able to invest in defense. Of the 28 NATO members, only three currently meet the common commitment to spend two percent of their GDP on defense. At the same time further cuts are expected.

I agree with the concerns then-Secretary Gates voiced last summer in Brussels, there will be growing difficulty for the U.S. to sustain its current support for NATO if the American taxpayer continues to carry the bulk of the burden in the Alliance. NATO must always work to improve cooperation and coordination among its members; however, such actions are the very essence of what it means to participate in an alliance and are not a replacement for adequate funding. While I understand and embrace the need for austerity and reduced government spending on both sides of the Atlantic, I urge all members of the Alliance to incorporate the two percent commitment in their long-term budgetary goals.

However, at the same time, I urge the Administration to make it clear that, despite the need for increased focus on Asia, the United States remains committed to achieving and maintaining the longstanding goal of a Europe: whole, free, and at peace.

The concerns that I have just raised are based on my steadfast support of NATO. The Alliance stands with US-EU economic cooperation as a cornerstone of global stability. The Alliance must increase cooperation with key partners around the globe to better leverage transatlantic leadership in the face of diverse challenges. However, NATO must also remain committed to enlargement by providing paths for qualified aspirant countries that embrace the Alliance's common values to enter the "open door." As we have seen in Afghanistan, such countries already provide the Alliance with important capabilities.

If we do not provide clear pathways toward future admission to the Alliance and thus the transatlantic community, we create conditions where these countries can slide backwards, away from Europe and further from democracy and stability.

Although the Summit would be far more productive if held in Indianapolis, Chicago will present an important opportunity for the Alliance's leaders to solidify a final strategy for Afghanistan, formulate a coherent strategy for supporting stable democratic development in the Middle East and North Africa, and establish a unified vision for NATO's future that reaffirms its members' support for maintaining a robust alliance while enhancing cooperation with key global partners and maintaining a responsible "open door" policy.

I am eager to hear the testimony from our witnesses today and to learn more about NATO's future.

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to make a short opening statement to add to what I said before.

I think it is very important. You know, when the Soviet Union fell, and I was a member of this committee way back then, as you were, Mr. Chairman, I called for expansion of NATO as quickly as possible because I really believe that you strike while the iron is hot.

We now see that, since it is so much later and that Russia has to some degree regained its footing, it is opposing expansion of NATO as somehow a perceived threat to them, but it isn't.

I still believe that NATO should expand and that countries that want to get into NATO ought to become members of NATO. Georgia, the Ukraine, Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro, and Bosnia ought to become members of NATO. They want to, and we should welcome them with open arms. I think it is very, very important.

I know that I am eagerly awaiting the testimony of Ambassador Kaidanow, who I know served in Pristina, Kosovo, as our Ambassador. I am anxious to hear what she has to say about that as well.

I finally want to, again, reiterate what I said before. I think it is an absolute disgrace that Turkey is, as of now, blocking Israel from participating in the NATO meeting. Israel has participated in many NATO meetings before. I want to condemn it and hope that the government in Ankara changes its attitude.

With that, I want to say that I agree, essentially, with everything that has been said by all my colleagues on both sides of the aisle.

And with that, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. GRIFFIN [presiding]. Do any of the members want to make opening statements? Would you like to?

[No response.]

Okay. Then, I would like to introduce the witnesses. Thank you all for being here with us today.

Testifying on the first panel, on behalf of the Department of State, is Ambassador Tina Kaidanow, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Europe and Eurasia. Ambassador Kaidanow assumed her current position on July 1st, 2011. Previously, she served as the Bureau's Deputy Assistant Secretary responsible for issues related to Greece, Turkey, Cypress, and the Caucasus. Previously, Ms. Kaidanow served as the U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Kosovo. A career member of the U.S. Diplomatic Service, Ambassador Kaidanow has served in a variety of positions focused primarily on Southeastern Europe at the Department of State and the National Security Council.

Ms. Kaidanow holds a bachelor of arts and master of arts degree from the University of Pennsylvania and a master of philosophy degree in political science from Columbia University in New York.

Representing the Department of Defense is Mr. James J. Townsend, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and NATO Policy. In this position, Mr. Townsend is responsible for managing the day-to-day defense relationship between the United States, NATO, the EU, and the nations of Europe.

Before taking up his current position, which represents a return to the Pentagon, Mr. Townsend was Vice President of the Atlantic

Council of the United States and Director of the Council's Program on International Security.

Mr. Townsend has previously served as Principal Director of European and NATO Policy and Director of the Defense Plans Division at the U.S. Mission to NATO in Brussels, Belgium, among other positions, including the office of Congressman Charles Edward Bennett.

Mr. Townsend earned a BA from Duke University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in international economics and American foreign policy.

Thank you both for being here today.

Ambassador Kaidanow, if you would like to start?

**STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE TINA S. KAIDANOW, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE**

Ms. KAIDANOW. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Meeks, and members of the committee, thank you all for inviting us here today to discuss the NATO Summit, which the United States is proud to be hosting in Chicago on May 20th and 21st of this year.

Our hosting of the Summit is actually a tangible symbol of the importance of NATO to the United States, as well as an opportunity to underscore to the American people the continued value of this alliance to the security challenges that we face today.

With your permission, I would like to submit my full statement for the record and provide just a brief summary at this point.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Without objection.

Ms. KAIDANOW. Thank you.

At NATO's last Summit in Lisbon nearly 18 months ago, allies unveiled a new strategic concept that defines NATO's focus in the 21st century. Building on the decisions taken in Lisbon, allies have three objectives for this Summit, and I would characterize them as Afghanistan-related, capabilities, and partnerships.

On Afghanistan, the ISAF coalition, which is comprised of 90,000 U.S. troops serving alongside 36,000 troops from NATO allies and 5,300 from partner countries, has made significant progress in preventing the country from serving as a safe haven for terrorists and ensuring that Afghans are able to provide for their own security. These are both necessary conditions to fulfill the President's goal to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda.

At Chicago, the United States anticipates three major deliverables. One, an agreement on an interim milestone in 2013 when ISAF's mission will shift from combat to support for the Afghan National Security Forces, the ANSF. Second, an agreement on the cost, size, and sustainment of the ANSF beyond 2014. And third, a roadmap for NATO's post-2014 role in Afghanistan.

On capabilities, NATO's ability to deploy an effective fighting force in the field makes this alliance unique. However, its capacity to deter and to respond to security challenges will only be as successful as its forces are able, effective, interoperable, and modern.

In the current era of fiscal austerity, NATO can still maintain a strong defense, but doing so requires innovation, creativity, and efficiencies. The United States is modernizing its presence in Europe

at the same time that our NATO allies and NATO as an institution are engaged in similar steps. This is a clear opportunity for our European allies to take on greater responsibility. The United States continues to encourage allies strongly to meet the 2 percent benchmark for defense spending and to contribute politically, financially, and operationally to the strength of the alliance.

In addition to the total level of defense spending, we should also focus on how these limited resources are allocated and for what priorities. NATO has made progress toward pooling more national resources or what NATO Secretary General Rasmussen has described as "smart defense." These efforts are exemplified through the capabilities package that the United States anticipates leaders will endorse in Chicago, which includes missile defense, alliance ground surveillance, and Baltic air policing.

Finally, the Chicago Summit will highlight NATO's success in working with a growing number of partners all across the globe. Effective partnerships allow the alliance to extend its reach, to act with greater legitimacy, to share burdens, and to benefit from the capabilities of others.

Allies will not take decisions on further enlargement of NATO in Chicago, but they will, nevertheless, send a clear and positive message to aspirant countries in support of their membership goals. The United States has been very clear that NATO's door remains open to new members that meet the alliance's standards. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Georgia are all working closely with allies to meet NATO criteria, so that they may enter the alliance.

Macedonia has fulfilled key criteria required of NATO members and has contributed to regional and to global security. The United States fully supports the U.N. process, led by Ambassador Nimitz, and regularly engages with both Greece and Macedonia in order to find a mutually-acceptable solution to the name dispute in order to fulfill the decision taken at the NATO Summit in Bucharest and extend a membership offer to Macedonia.

In the case of Montenegro, the United States is assisting reform efforts by taking steps to embed a Defense Advisor in the Ministry of Defense. We encourage other allies to consider similar capacity-building measures.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the recent agreement on registering defense properties is a significant step forward toward fulfilling the conditions laid out at the NATO Foreign Minister's meeting in Tallinn in April 2010. NATO should spare no effort in assisting the Bosnian Government's implementation of this decision, which would allow them to submit their first Annual National Program this fall.

With regard to Georgia, U.S. security assistance and military engagement support the country's defense reforms, train and equip Georgian troops for participation in ISAF operations, and advance its NATO interoperability. In January, President Obama and President Saakashvili agreed to enhance this cooperation to advance Georgian military modernization, defense reform, and self-defense capabilities.

U.S. assistance programs provide additional support to ongoing democratic and economic reform efforts in Georgia, a critical part

of Georgia's Euro-Atlantic aspirations, where they have made important strides. U.S. support for Georgia's territorial integrity within its internationally-recognized borders remains absolutely steadfast, and our non-recognition of the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia will not change.

Finally, let me say a word about NATO's relationship with Russia. 2012 marks the 15th anniversary of the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the 10th anniversary of the NATO Russia Council. We commemorated those anniversaries at a NATO-Russia foreign ministers meeting last week in Brussels.

The NRC is founded on our commitment to cooperate in areas of mutual interest and address issues of disagreement. The best example of cooperation is our joint efforts in Afghanistan, where Russia's transit support has been critical to the mission's success. At the same time, NATO continues to seek cooperation with Russia on missile defense in order to enhance our individual capabilities to counter this threat.

While we strive for cooperation, we have also been frank in our discussions with Russia that we will continue to develop and deploy our missile defenses irrespective of the status of missile defense cooperation with Russia. Let me be clear. NATO is not a threat to Russia, nor is Russia a threat to NATO.

It is no secret that there are issues on which allies and Russia differ. Russia has been critical of NATO's operation in Libya. We also disagree fundamentally over the situation in Georgia. Since 2008, NATO has strongly supported Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

As we look to Chicago, these three Summit priorities that I mentioned, defining the next phase of the transition in Afghanistan, outlining a vision for addressing 21st century challenges in a period of austerity, and expanding our partnerships, all show just how much NATO has evolved since its founding six decades ago.

The reasons for the alliance's continued success are very clear. NATO has over the last 63 years proven to be an adaptable, durable, and cost-effective provider of security. In Chicago, the United States will work with its allies and its partners to ensure that the alliance remains vibrant and capable for many more years to come.

With that, I look forward to your questions. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Kaidanow follows:]

**“The Chicago Summit and US Policy”**  
**House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia**  
**Testimony by Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Tina Kaidanow**  
**April 26, 2012**

Chairman Burton, Ranking Member Meeks and Members of the Committee,

Thank you for inviting me here today to discuss the NATO Summit, which the United States is proud to be hosting in Chicago on May 20-21. This will be the first NATO Summit on American soil in 13 years and the first ever outside of Washington. Our hosting of the Summit is a tangible symbol of the importance of NATO to the United States, as well as an opportunity to underscore to the American people the continued value of the Alliance to the security challenges we face today. NATO is vital to U.S. security. More than ever, the Alliance is the mechanism through which the U.S. confronts diverse and difficult threats to our security together with like-minded states who share our fundamental values of democracy, human rights and rule of law. Our experiences in the Cold War, in the Balkans and now in Afghanistan prove that our core interests are better protected by working together than by seeking to respond to threats alone as individual nations.

As you know, NATO was founded in 1949 by 12 nations in order to stabilize a Western Europe that had been devastated by two world wars. For the next 40 years, we then stood united in purpose against the specter of communism. When the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, NATO helped to rebuild Central and Eastern European countries while integrating them into the trans-Atlantic community of democratic states. This alliance, now comprised of 28 members, has played an integral role in the realization of a Europe that is more united, peaceful and democratic than at any time in its history.

At NATO’s last summit in Lisbon nearly 18 months ago, Allies unveiled a new Strategic Concept that defines NATO’s focus in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. First and foremost, NATO remains committed to the Article 5 principle of collective defense. It is worth recalling that the first and only time in the history of the

Alliance that Article 5 was invoked was after terrorists attacked the United States on September 11th, 2001. The very next day NATO invoked Article 5 in recognition of the principle that an attack against the U.S. represented an attack against all.

In addition to being a *collective* security alliance, NATO is also a *cooperative* security organization. Unlike an ad hoc coalition, NATO can respond rapidly and achieve its military goals by sharing burdens. In particular, NATO benefits from integrated structures and uses common funding to develop common capabilities.

It is in this context that Allies and partners will be meeting in Chicago next month. Building on the decisions taken in Lisbon, the President has three objectives for the Chicago Summit. The centerpiece will be the announcement of the next phase of transition in Afghanistan and a reaffirmation of NATO's enduring commitment to the Afghan people. Second, we will join Allies in a robust discussion of our most critical defense capability requirements in order to ensure that the security that NATO provides is both comprehensive and cost effective. And finally, we must continue our efforts to develop NATO's role as a global hub for security partnerships.

Afghanistan: On Afghanistan, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) coalition – comprised of 90,000 U.S. troops serving alongside 36,000 troops from NATO Allies and 5,300 from partner countries – has made significant progress in preventing the country from serving as a safe haven for terrorists and ensuring that Afghans are able to provide for their own security, both of which are necessary conditions to fulfill the President's goal to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qaeda. At Chicago, the U.S. anticipates three deliverables: an agreement on an interim milestone in 2013 when ISAF's mission will shift from combat to support for the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF); an agreement on the size, cost and sustainment of the ANSF beyond 2014; and a roadmap for NATO's post-2014 role in Afghanistan.

At the NATO Summit in Lisbon, Allies, ISAF partners and the Afghan government agreed upon a transition strategy that would result in the Afghan government assuming full responsibility for security across the country by the end



of 2014. This strategy is on track, as approximately 50 percent of the population lives in areas where Afghan forces are taking the lead. As transition progresses, the role of ISAF forces will evolve. In Chicago, leaders will establish a milestone in 2013 when ISAF's mission will shift from combat to support as the ANSF becomes more responsible for security. Throughout the transition period, ISAF forces – including American forces – will continue to be fully combat ready and will conduct combat operations as required. The United States, Allies and partners remain fully committed to this Lisbon framework, as well as to the principle of “in together, out together”.

Leaders will also agree upon a plan for the future sustainment of the ANSF, which has been endorsed by the international community and the Government of Afghanistan and reflects what we believe will be necessary to keep Afghan security in Afghan hands. It is our goal that the international community will pledge one billion euro toward supporting the ANSF beyond 2014. We know this is not an easy pledge, particularly with some European governments facing difficult budget decisions as they work to recover from the economic crisis. Already, the British have stepped forward with a substantial commitment; we welcome early pledges from Estonia, Latvia and Luxembourg, as well. We are engaged in active diplomacy to encourage contributions. Secretary Clinton and Secretary Panetta were in Brussels last week for a series of NATO meetings and emphasized the importance of ANSF funding in every forum and in their bilateral meetings. We have also welcomed complementary efforts to encourage ANSF funding, such as the Danish-led Coalition of Committed Contributors initiative, which 23 nations have signed onto – including the U.S.

Finally, the Summit will make clear that NATO will not abandon Afghanistan after the ISAF mission concludes. In Chicago, the Alliance will reaffirm its enduring commitment beyond 2014 and define a new phase of cooperation with Afghanistan.

Capabilities: Turning to capabilities, NATO's ability to deploy an effective fighting force in the field makes the Alliance unique. However, its capacity to deter and respond to security challenges will only be as successful as its forces are able, effective, interoperable, and modern. Last year's military operation in Libya

showed that the requirements for a strong, flexible, and deployable force are as vital as ever. New threats require new defense responses that are as capable, immediate, and agile as the ones we had before, and perhaps even more so. Even when major operations in the field have ended, it is essential for the Alliance to continue to exercise, plan, and maintain its forces.

In the current era of fiscal austerity, NATO can still maintain a strong defense, but doing so requires innovation, creativity, and efficiencies. The United States is modernizing its presence in Europe at the same time that our NATO Allies, and NATO as an institution, are engaged in similar steps. This is a clear opportunity for our European Allies to take on greater responsibility. The U.S. continues to encourage Allies to meet the two percent benchmark for defense spending and to contribute politically, financially, and operationally to the strength and security of the Alliance. However, it is important not only to focus on the total level of defense spending by Allies but also to consider how these limited resources are allocated and for what priorities.

NATO has made progress toward pooling more national resources, including through the defense capabilities package that the U.S. anticipates leaders will endorse in Chicago. Two key elements of this package will be the NATO Secretary General's "smart defense" initiative, which encourages Allies to prioritize core capabilities in the face of defense cuts, cooperate on enhancing collective capabilities, and specialize according to national strengths, and his "connected forces" initiative, which aims to increase Allied interoperability. The package will also track progress on acquiring the capabilities that leaders identified in Lisbon as NATO's most pressing needs. The Alliance's record in the last 18 months has been impressive and includes several flagship capabilities programs. Let me cite three examples:

- At the Lisbon Summit, NATO Allies agreed to develop a NATO missile defense capability to provide protection for all NATO European territory, populations, and forces. The United States is committed to doing its part by deploying all four phases of the European Phased Adaptive Approach; in fact, the first phase is already operational. Poland, Romania, Spain and Turkey have agreed to host critical elements. We would welcome additional Allied

contributions. NATO remains equally committed to pursuing practical missile defense cooperation with Russia, which would enhance protection for all of us.

- A second key capability is intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) – the systems that provide NATO commanders with a comprehensive picture of the situation on the ground. Allies contributed more combat power in Libya than in previous operations (almost 90 percent of all air-to-ground strike missions in Libya were conducted by European pilots, as compared to 10 percent in the Kosovo air campaign in 1999). However, Libya demonstrated considerable shortfalls in European ISR capabilities as the U.S. provided one quarter of the ISR sorties, nearly half of the ISR aircraft, and the vast majority of analytical capability. This past February, NATO defense ministers agreed to fund the Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) program. The five drones that comprise this system will provide NATO with crucial information, including identifying potential threats, monitoring developing situations such as humanitarian crises, and distinguishing possible targets for air strikes.
- A third initiative is Baltic Air Policing. The 2004 enlargement of NATO forced the Alliance to examine burden-sharing among Allied militaries, as well as modernization programs that benefit the Alliance as a whole. In the Baltic states, for example, air policing is seen as a national defense imperative by three countries without national air forces. In February, NATO allies agreed to the continuous presence of fighters for NATO Air Policing of Baltic airspace. This helps assure the security of allies in a way that is cost effective, allowing them to invest resources into other important NATO operations such as Afghanistan. For their part, the Baltic states are working to increase their financial support for this valuable programs.

In addition, the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR) – which Allies will endorse in Chicago – will reaffirm NATO’s determination to maintain modern, flexible, credible capabilities that are tailored to meet 21<sup>st</sup> century security challenges. The DDPR will identify the appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional, and missile defense capabilities that NATO needs to meet these challenges, as well as reaffirm NATO’s commitment to making consensus decisions on Alliance

posture issues. The DDPR will outline the priorities that NATO needs to address, and the actions we need to take, to ensure that we have the capabilities needed to fulfill the three core missions identified in the new strategic concept, namely: collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security.

Partnerships: Finally, the Chicago Summit will highlight NATO's success in working with a growing number of partners around the world. Effective partnerships allow the Alliance to extend its reach, act with greater legitimacy, share burdens, and benefit from the capabilities of others. Non-NATO partners deploy troops, invest significant financial resources, host exercises, and provide training. In Afghanistan, for example, 22 non-NATO countries are working alongside the 28 nations of NATO. Some partners (such as Austria, Finland, Georgia, Jordan, New Zealand and Sweden) contribute to NATO's efforts to train national forces to prepare them for NATO missions. Partners (including Australia, Finland, Japan, Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UAE) also give financial support to either the Afghan National Army Trust Fund or the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program. Furthermore, partners participate in discussions on wide-ranging security issues from counterterrorism to cyber security.

In turn, NATO has worked to give partners a voice in decisions for NATO-led operations in which they participate, opened Alliance training activities to partners, and developed flexible meeting formats to ensure effective cooperation. Allies want the Chicago Summit to showcase the value of our partners, especially those who provide significant political, financial, or operational support to the Alliance. All these countries have come to recognize that NATO is a hub for building security, as well as a forum for dialogue and for bringing countries together for collective action. In light of the dramatic events of the Arab Spring and NATO's success in Libya, we envision a particular focus on further engagement with partners in the wider Middle East and North Africa region.

Allies will not take decisions on further enlargement of NATO in Chicago, but they will nonetheless send a clear, positive message to aspirant countries in support of their membership goals. The U.S. has been clear that NATO's door remains open to new members that meet the Alliance's standards. Bosnia and

Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Georgia are all working closely with Allies to meet NATO criteria so they may enter the Alliance.

Macedonia has fulfilled key criteria required of NATO members and has contributed to regional and global security. The United States fully supports the UN process, led by Ambassador Nimitz, and regularly engages with both Greece and Macedonia in order to find a mutually acceptable solution to the name dispute in order to fulfill the decision taken at the NATO Summit in Bucharest and extend a membership offer to Macedonia.

The United States is assisting Montenegrin reform efforts by taking steps to embed a Defense Advisor in the Ministry of Defense. We are encouraging other Allies to consider similar capacity-building support. The recent agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina on registering defense properties is a significant step forward toward fulfilling the conditions laid out at the NATO foreign ministers meeting in Tallinn in April 2010. NATO should spare no effort in assisting the Bosnian government's implementation of this decision, which would allow them to submit their first Annual National Program this fall.

With regard to Georgia, U.S. security assistance and military engagement support the country's defense reforms, train and equip Georgian troops for participation in ISAF operations, and advance its NATO interoperability. In January, President Obama and President Saakashvili agreed to enhance this cooperation to advance Georgian military modernization, defense reform, and self defense capabilities. U.S. assistance programs provide additional support to ongoing democratic and economic reform efforts in Georgia, a critical part of Georgia's Euro-Atlantic aspirations, where they have made important strides. U.S. support for Georgia's territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders remains steadfast, and our non-recognition of the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia will not change.

Finally, let me say a word about NATO's relationship with Russia. 2012 marks the 15<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the 10<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the NATO-Russia Council. The 1997 Founding Act expressed NATO and Russia's common commitment to end rivalry and build mutual and cooperative

security arrangements. It also provided reassurance that NATO's open door to new members would not undermine Russia's security. Five years after signing this act, our leaders met in Rome to develop an expanded framework for our partnership, the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), in order to have a forum for discussing the full range of shared security concerns. We commemorated these anniversaries at a NATO-Russia Foreign Ministers meeting last week in Brussels.

NATO-Russia relations cannot be defined by any single issue. Indeed, the NRC is founded on our commitment to cooperate in areas of mutual interest and address issues of disagreement. The best example of cooperation is our joint efforts in Afghanistan. Russia's transit support for NATO Allies and our ISAF partners has been critical to the mission's success. For the U.S. alone, more than 42,000 containers of cargo have transited Russia under NRC arrangements, providing materiel for U.S. troops and our ISAF partners. Since 2006, NATO Allies and Russia have worked together to provide counternarcotics training to more than 2000 law enforcement officers from Afghanistan, Central Asia and Pakistan. In addition, the NRC Helicopter Maintenance Trust Fund helps address the challenges of keeping the Afghan Air Force's helicopter fleet operation-ready. Beyond Afghanistan, NATO continues practical security cooperation with Russia in key areas such as counter-terrorism and counter-piracy.

At the same time, NATO continues to seek cooperation with Russia on missile defense. By working together, we can enhance our individual capabilities to counter the ballistic missile threat. We can also show firsthand that NATO's missile defense efforts are not a threat to Russia. In late March, the NRC held its first theater missile defense exercises since 2008, an important step. While we strive for cooperation, we have also been frank in our discussions with Russia that we will continue to develop and deploy our missile defenses irrespective of the status of missile defense cooperation with Russia. Let me be clear: NATO is not a threat to Russia, nor Russia to NATO.

It is no secret that there are issues on which the Allies and Russia differ. Russia has been critical of NATO's operation in Libya. We also disagree fundamentally over the situation in Georgia. Since 2008, NATO has strongly supported Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

As we look to Chicago, these three summit priorities – defining the next phase of the transition in Afghanistan, outlining a vision for addressing 21st century challenges in a period of austerity, and expanding our partnerships – show just how much NATO has evolved since its founding six decades ago. The reasons for the Alliance’s continued success are clear: NATO has, over the last 63 years, proven to be an adaptable, durable, and cost-effective provider of security. In Chicago, the United States will work with its allies and partners to ensure that the Alliance remains vibrant and capable for many more years to come. With that, I look forward to your questions.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Thank you.  
Mr. Townsend?

**STATEMENT OF MR. JAMES TOWNSEND, DEPUTY ASSISTANT  
SECRETARY, EUROPEAN AND NATO POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT  
OF DEFENSE**

Mr. TOWNSEND. Thank you, Chairman and Ranking Member Meeks, and members of the committee. Thank you for inviting me here today to discuss the NATO Summit, which the United States will host in Chicago in May.

I will describe for the committee what we hope to achieve at the Summit from the Defense Department point of view and its relevance for U.S. national security. I particularly look forward to hearing the committee's views on the Summit and the priorities you have for its outcome.

I would like to submit my full statement for the record and give you a summary of my statement this afternoon.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Without objection.

Mr. TOWNSEND. NATO heads of state and government come together at a Summit every few years not only to approve important pieces of alliance business, but also to renew at the highest level the commitment allies have made to one another in the North Atlantic Treaty. This commitment to come to one another's defense, as expressed in Article 5 of the Treaty, is a solemn one that has only been invoked once—after the United States was attacked on September 11th, 2001.

This commitment was critical during the Cold War to help deter the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact from attacking the United States and our allies. Even with the end of the Cold War, this Article 5 commitment remains the core of the alliance. NATO serves as the organizing framework to ensure that we have allies willing and able to fight alongside us in conflict, and provides an integrated military structure that puts the military teeth behind alliance political decisions to take action. In addition to ensuring the interoperability of our allies, NATO serves as a hub and an integrator of a network of global security partners.

The NATO air and maritime operation in Libya illustrates this point. The operation began as a coalition of the willing, involving the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. However, when NATO answered the U.N.'s call to protect the Libyan people, it was able to take on the mission and execute it successfully. Had NATO not been there, or had NATO been too weak an institution to take on such an operation, the coalition would have had to carry on alone.

Keeping NATO strong both politically and militarily is critical to ensuring NATO is ready when it is needed. This has been true for the past 20 years, when the turbulence of the international system has demanded that NATO respond nearly continuously to crises throughout the globe.

Today, for example, NATO forces are in Afghanistan, in the Balkans, countering pirates in waters off Somalia, and have concluded operations in Libya. Looking out into the future, challenges to the United States and our allies can come from ballistic missile proliferation, cyber attack, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, as



well as from the instability that can come from turbulence in the Middle East, North Africa, and elsewhere. We must be ready to meet emerging threats, and we would prefer to meet these challenges together with allies, and not alone.

So, the strategic context for the Summit, and for our work at NATO every day, is: How can we keep NATO and the allies ready and able to meet the challenges of today and in the future? This is especially complex today, as the European economic crisis compels allies to cut defense spending and force structure in order to reduce their debt and decrease government spending.

Allies, too, have different views and priorities regarding perceptions of the threat and the traditions of their own military forces. Not every ally sees the world and their role in it the way we do. But one thing we all agree on is that we need the alliance to be unified and strong. Allies look to the United States to lead the way in keeping NATO strong, capable, and credible.

That is where we come to the Summit. At Chicago, heads of state and government will agree or approve work that we committed to at the last Summit at Lisbon 18 months ago.

At Chicago, this work will focus on three areas: No. 1, an agreement on a strategic plan for Afghanistan. No. 2, military capabilities and how we can achieve and make certain of these capabilities in this time of austerity. And the third area is NATO partnerships.

The United States has three Summit objectives: No. 1, charting a clear path for the completion of transition and reaffirming NATO's commitment to the long-term security of Afghanistan. No. 2, maintaining NATO's core defense capabilities during this period of austerity and building a force ready for future challenges. And, No. 3, deepening the engagement of NATO's partner nations in alliance operation and activities.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to complete my statement here, as I said, submit my complete statement for the record, and go straight to questions.

Thank you very much for the opportunity to appear before you today.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Townsend follows:]

**“The Chicago Summit and U.S. Policy”  
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on European Affairs  
Testimony by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense James Townsend  
April 26, 2012**

Chairman Burton, Ranking Member Meeks and Members of the Committee:

Thank you for inviting me here today to discuss the NATO Summit which the United States will host in Chicago in May. I will describe for the Committee what we hope to achieve at the Summit from the Defense point of view and its relevance for US national security. I particularly look forward to hearing the Committee’s views on the Summit and the priorities you have for its outcomes.

NATO heads of state and government come together at a summit every few years not only to approve important pieces of alliance business, but also to renew at the highest level the commitment Allies have made to one another in the North Atlantic Treaty. This commitment to come to one another’s defense as expressed in Article 5 of the Treaty is a solemn one that has only been invoked once – after the United States was attacked on September 11, 2001.

This commitment was critical during the Cold War to help deter the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact from attacking the United States and our Allies. Even with the end of the Cold War, this Article 5 commitment remains the core of the Alliance. NATO serves as the organizing framework to ensure that we have Allies willing and able to fight alongside us in conflict, and provides an integrated military structure that puts the military teeth behind Alliance political decisions to take action. In addition to ensuring the interoperability of our Allies, NATO serves as a hub and integrator of a network of global security partners.

The NATO air and maritime operation in Libya illustrates this point. The operation began as a coalition of the willing involving the United States, the United Kingdom and France. However, when NATO answered the UN’s call to protect the Libyan people, it was able to take on the mission and execute it successfully. Had NATO not been there, or had NATO been too weak an institution to take on such an operation, the coalition would have had to carry on alone.

Keeping NATO strong both politically and militarily is critical to ensuring NATO is ready when it is needed. This has been true for the past 20 years, when the

turbulence of the international system has demanded that NATO respond nearly continuously to crises throughout the globe. Today, for example, NATO forces are in Afghanistan, in the Balkans, countering pirates in the waters off Somalia, and have concluded operations in Libya. Looking out into the future, challenges to the United States and our Allies can come from ballistic missile proliferation, cyber attack, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, as well as from the instability we see in North Africa, the Middle East and elsewhere. We must be ready to meet emerging threats, and we would prefer to meet these challenges together with Allies, and not alone.

So the strategic context for the Summit, and for our work at NATO every day, is how can we keep NATO and the Allies ready and able to meet the challenges of today and in the future? This is especially complex today as the European economic crisis compels Allies to cut defense spending and force structure in order to reduce their debt and decrease government spending.

Allies too have different views and priorities regarding perceptions of the threat and the traditions of their own military forces. Not every Ally sees the world and their role in it the way we do. But one thing we all agree on is that we need the Alliance to be unified and strong. Allies look to the United States to lead the way in keeping NATO strong, capable, and credible.

That is where we come to the Summit. At Chicago, Heads of State and Government will agree or approve work that we committed to at the last Summit at Lisbon eighteen months ago.

At Chicago this work will focus on three areas: an agreement on a strategic plan for Afghanistan, military capabilities, and NATO partnerships. The United States has three Summit objectives:

- Charting a clear path for the completion of transition and reaffirming NATO's commitment to the long-term security of Afghanistan;
- Maintaining NATO's core defense capabilities during this period of austerity and building a force ready for future challenges; and,
- Deepening the engagement of NATO's partner nations in Alliance operations and activities.

**Afghanistan.** While the past few months have been tumultuous in Afghanistan, U.S. forces, and those of our Allies and ISAF partners, have shown deep resolve and dedication to the transition strategy laid out at the 2010 NATO Summit in Lisbon. ISAF troops continue to perform exceptionally well, particularly in the

process of training and partnering with the Afghan National Security Forces, in our effort to ensure that the Afghans are ready to assume full responsibility for security in Afghanistan by the end of 2014. While ISAF troops will stand ready to conduct combat operations as required right up until the end of 2014, the fact is that Afghan forces are growing ever stronger and more professional. This was clearly demonstrated a few weeks ago when ANSF troops successfully repelled enemy attacks in and around Kabul.

Our strategy is working. What we do from now until the end of 2014 – whether on the ground in Afghanistan, back here in Washington or in Chicago next month – must build responsibly on what ISAF has accomplished to date. Our efforts must safeguard NATO’s primary objective in Afghanistan: to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda and ensure Afghanistan never again serves as a safe-haven for terrorists. I have no doubt that our resolve will be tested in the coming months, but I also have no doubt that the U.S. and our ISAF partners will remain focused on our Lisbon commitments. The two memoranda of understanding that the United States signed with the Government of Afghanistan in recent weeks, to my mind, stand as a testament to that focus, reflecting and recognizing the growing capacity of Afghan security forces.

The upcoming NATO Summit presents us with an important opportunity to send a unified message that we are on track to achieve our Lisbon goals. We view the Chicago Summit as a critical milestone in our effort in Afghanistan, as leaders come together to determine the next phase of transition and the future of our support for Afghanistan and its security forces. All of these steps will help define how we can responsibly conclude the war in Afghanistan while achieving our objectives and building a long-term partnership with the Afghan people.

**Alliance Military Capabilities.** One of the greatest challenges that NATO faces today is the need to maintain critical combat capabilities during this period of economic austerity, as defense investment decisions made now will affect the availability of defense capabilities five to ten years from now.

To help nations under financial pressure keep up their military strength and build for the future, NATO is putting together a capabilities package for approval at Chicago that provides an organizing framework to advance a range of capability initiatives, both old and new, to get us through the next 10 years with our capabilities intact and our forces strong. It protects a core of capabilities from further cuts and provides tools to help nations acquire military capabilities more affordably.

The major elements of the capabilities package are as follows:

- **Smart Defense:** Introduced by NATO Secretary General Rasmussen, Smart Defense is a concept by which NATO members can enhance security capabilities more efficiently through greater multinational coordination, collaboration, and coherence. The U.S. supports the Smart Defense approach, and will participate in many of the multinational initiatives, but Smart Defense must not be used as a means to justify further cuts to Allies' defense budgets. There can be no substitute for nations providing adequate resources and investment in their own domestic and our collective security. In addition to applying resources most efficiently in an austere fiscal environment, Smart Defense should also ensure investments are made in the right capabilities when economic conditions improve.
- **Missile Defense.** In Lisbon, NATO Allies took the unprecedented step of declaring that NATO would develop a territorial ballistic missile defense capability, taking on this critical mission in the face of the real and emerging ballistic missile threat to NATO European territories and populations. Since then, we have worked closely with our NATO Allies to turn this ambition into a real capability. In Chicago, we expect to further that goal by taking steps to advance the implementation of our missile defense system.
- **Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS).** At the 2010 NATO Lisbon Summit, Heads of State and Government identified AGS as one of the Alliance's top 10 critical capabilities. Recent operations in Libya highlighted Alliance shortfalls in surveillance and reconnaissance. The Alliance Ground Surveillance system will provide Alliance members with a significantly enhanced ability to conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations and all of the associated tasks.
- **Training.** I would like to highlight the improvements in training that I believe will be critical to implementing the Chicago capabilities package. This commitment is reflected in the changes the United States is making to its force posture in Europe. The NATO Response Force will continue to be the engine for transformation within the Alliance. Only through a robust exercise program can we develop and validate new doctrine, provide visible assurance of Alliance commitment to collective security, and institutionalize the interoperability we have developed over the past 10 years in places like Afghanistan, Kosovo, and Libya. The United States is refining plans to

rotate U.S.-based ground units to Europe twice during each NATO Response Force cycle to participate in NATO Response Force training and exercises. In addition, these units will be available to participate in full-spectrum training with individual Allies as well as multinational formations.

- **Baltic Air Policing.** In the Baltic Region the United States is a key contributor to NATO's Baltic Air Policing Mission, which deploys fighter aircraft that are ready to launch at a moment's notice. The United States joined with all 27 other NATO Allies in February to ensure a continuing presence of fighters for NATO Air Policing of Baltic skies. NATO Air Policing helps assure the security of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in a way that is cost effective, allowing them to focus resources on other critical NATO priorities. We anticipate that for their part, the Baltic nations will increase their Host Nation Support for nations that deploy fighter aircraft. This mission demonstrates our commitment to the collective defense of all NATO members and is also a superb example of defense burden sharing through Smart Defense.

This capabilities package provides the ways and means to ensure Alliance forces are capable and effective. While tools such as Smart Defense will help us achieve these goals, all Allies must maintain a base consisting of essential operational capabilities. These core capabilities must be protected from further cuts to ensure that we will have the forces we need over the next ten years and that we have a sure foundation upon which to build NATO Forces in 2020 and beyond. One of the ways they will reaffirm NATO's determination to maintain modern, flexible, credible capabilities is by approving the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review which will identify the appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional, and missile defense capabilities NATO needs to meet today's challenges and tomorrow's emerging threats.

**Partnerships.** NATO is working more closely than ever with non-NATO partners to address global challenges. We saw the value of our partnerships in Libya, when our European partners as well as countries in the Middle East and North Africa helped the Alliance to protect the Libyan people, and we continue to benefit from our partners' contributions in Afghanistan, with 22 countries standing shoulder-to-shoulder with NATO. In Chicago we look to broaden and deepen our network of partnerships worldwide.

This Summit is an opportunity to carry forward the critical work our Alliance is conducting. At Chicago, we will underscore NATO's accomplishments in Afghanistan, Libya, and the Balkans – successes delivered despite financial crisis. But as we confront current challenges, we must also invest in the future. NATO relies on individual Allies for the bulk of the capabilities needed for future operations, but we must find a way to ensure NATO will be able to maintain critical capabilities in this period of austerity. We can ensure the greatness of this Alliance into the next decade in spite of fiscal and security challenges; but we must invest the extra effort to work collectively and to support those institutions that facilitate our multinational cooperation.

I look forward to your questions.

Mr. POE [presiding]. The chair will reserve its right to ask questions. I will turn to the ranking member, Mr. Meeks, for his questions.

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me start out with this: One of the questions that I am most frequently asked when I travel abroad, or am meeting with European officials or parliamentarians, relates to the administration's so-called "pivot to Asia." They have a concern, you know, those that I speak with. They ask about, what does that mean? Does pivoting to Asia mean moving away from Europe?

So, I would like to put that question to you. What does it mean, and how is the concept of a pivot playing out in NATO? How are NATO members approaching the issue with the administration as we get ready to go to Chicago?

Ms. KAIDANOW. Thank you, Congressman. I think that is a very important question, and you are right, it is important to address it very forthrightly.

What I would say is, first of all, that Europe remains a central preoccupation of the United States. Its security is essential to us, as well as its cooperation as a partner in terms of global endeavors. Pretty much everything we do globally, the Europeans are right there by our side. I think it is important to establish that right away. Our commitment to Article 5, which is the enduring commitment to European security, is very, very strong.

I would say that the notion of a pivot to Asia is really a mischaracterization in many ways. It is not a pivot away from Europe to Asia. I think what our strategic defense review was attempting to do—and my colleague can speak to this even more than I can—was to posit that we have now emerged from a decade or more of war, essentially, conflict. And in that decade, perforce, we had to devote our time, our attention, our energy, and our resources in many ways to Afghanistan, to Iraq, to other things. Thankfully, we are now emerging from some of that.

The question of how we utilize resources in the era after that is a salient one, it is important, and whether we are able to conserve some of those resources. So, I think the question for us now is really, how do we smartly, intelligently retool a bit, so not pivot to Asia from Europe, but maintain our commitment to Europe, which is just as strong as it ever was, but also take into account the impact of Asia and the Asia Pacific region as an increasingly-important part of what we do? So, I think we are doing both of those things very successfully.

You noted that you hear from some of our allies. Well, of course, we have been talking to our allies extensively about our force posture in Europe, and so forth. We will maintain a very strong posture in Europe. We actually are deploying new capabilities—again, my colleague can speak to that as well—but an aviation detachment in Poland, missile defense assets in Poland, Romania, Turkey, elsewhere. These are the kinds of things that I think are elements of a new approach and a new response to threats that are emerging over time.

I think our European allies have been very cognizant of the reasons for that. I think they agree that, whereas once upon a time it might have made sense to keep four heavy brigades, heavy com-



bat teams in Europe, that doesn't really make sense anymore. What makes sense now is this new approach that I outlined, including rotational elements from the United States that might help to augment NATO's response force and also train together with our European colleagues such that we have greater interoperability for the inevitable operations that will come our way.

So, there is, I think, good understanding among our European allies as to why we are doing a number of the things we are doing. We have talked to them extensively. We will talk to them more, of course.

Just recently, of course, Secretary Clinton and Secretary Panetta were there for the joint foreign and defense ministerial meeting to make this point, as they did in Munich earlier, and so forth.

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you. Because we know that, when we look at our values and where there are shared interests, the ones we turn to first and on whom we count on most in a crisis is our European allies.

Let me ask Mr. Townsend in the little time we have left. Another issue that I have been looking at is that in the past NATO leaders have recognized the importance of energy security, and energy security is important to me. At previous Summits, they committed themselves to addressing these issues as an alliance.

But there appears, however, to be a lack of an agreement on the importance of the Southern Corridor, the significance of the North Stream Pipeline, and the reliance or dependence of some NATO members on Russian energy resources.

And so, I was just wondering, has NATO ceased to pursue the goal of energy security as an alliance? I know I am out of time, but I am trying to sneak that in, and we will come back.

Mr. TOWNSEND. Thank you, Chairman. That is a great question, as was your first question that Ambassador Kaidanow so ably addressed, and that we can certainly come back to as well.

But on energy security, this is something that the alliance has been working on for at least 10 years now and grappling with. It is a tough question. It is not just a military question or a defense-related question. It involves economies, finance, geography, and business. It is something that, in terms of finding a home, is difficult. NATO talks about this because it involves security and the security of allies. And so, those discussions we have quite a bit within the alliance, as we look at future challenges and what NATO can do.

Energy security is discussed at the European Union as well, which certainly plays a large role in this. Nations themselves recognize that energy security is a security issue of the future that they need to grapple with now in terms of diversification, in terms of how can they meet their security needs in other ways. And so, it is something that is part of the context that we have to work within as we look into the future. We talk about future challenges in terms of ballistic missile proliferation or WMD. We look at it in terms of terrorism. But energy security is in there as well.

The NATO role in energy security is probably more limited than it is in these other areas, but it is something that is important as planners at NATO think about future areas of instability, what happens if energy is denied a nation, what role might come to the

alliance, what role might come to the European Union or to that particular nation, how might we have to help out in terms of the nation trying to handle the results of something coming out of an energy crisis.

So, it is part of the context. It is something that, as the years go on, we are going to have to work very closely with the European Union and with nations to make sure we are provided for in facing this kind of challenge.

Mr. POE. The chair will recognize the gentlewoman from Ohio, Ms. Schmidt.

Ms. SCHMIDT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

This is a question to both of you. As we approach the Chicago Summit, I believe it is important to send a strong message to the nations aspiring to have NATO membership that the United States remains committed toward that end.

As you both know, NATO's new strategic concept adopted at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010 reaffirmed the alliance's long-standing commitment to keep NATO's open door to any European country in a position to undertake the commitments and obligations of membership and contribute to the security of the Euro-Atlantic area. However, NATO hasn't added any members since 2009, despite the many contributions of our non-NATO partners such as Macedonia, Montenegro, Georgia, Bosnia, Herzegovina to the operations and stability of NATO.

So, it is a three-part question. First, does NATO enlargement remain a priority to this administration? And if so, why isn't it on the Chicago agenda?

Two, in recent remarks at the Heritage Foundation, former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice spoke strongly in favor of NATO expansion and stated that, in her opinion, Macedonia is ready for full membership. Would you agree with her assessment? And if not, why?

And three, in what ways is the United States assisting those countries, Georgia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia, to prepare them for NATO membership?

Ms. KAIDANOW. Thank you.

Congresswoman, I don't think we can agree strongly enough with you that keeping NATO's door firmly open is in U.S. interest as well as in the interest of the alliance. We have seen over the years the incredible stabilizing impact of the enlargement of NATO and the inclusion of countries in Central and Eastern Europe. I anticipate that that process will, in fact, continue, and we are very committed to it.

You asked whether this will be addressed on the Chicago agenda. In fact, it will. We didn't speak to it in my opening remarks, but I anticipate, and we have been very strongly supportive of, a ministerial-level that will likely be held with the four aspirant countries, to again underscore how important we believe the process of enlargement is, to make sure that everyone understands that that process will continue. And I am sure we will find other ways as well to highlight enlargement and to look—

Ms. SCHMIDT. So, you are going to be speaking to the four countries, but what about to NATO members as well, to open it up and have the question—

Ms. KAIDANOW. Right.

Ms. SCHMIDT [continuing]. Will we accept or not accept?

Ms. KAIDANOW. Such a meeting, if it is held—and I would anticipate that it will be, but NATO has not yet made final decisions—would include all allies. So, it would be the allies as well as the aspirants. But I think, again, the point here is to make sure that, both in word and in deed, we are doing everything we can.

Your third question, which I will skip to, is about our assistance to those aspirants, which I think I detailed at some length in my opening remarks is fairly extensive. In each of those cases, we have worked very, very closely with the aspirant countries, both on democratic and economic reforms, which are also a precursor to NATO membership, but as well on defense reform, defense modernization, and so forth.

You asked specifically about Macedonia. So, I will address that briefly. We have said, and as you articulated, I think former Secretary of State Rice also mentioned, that we believe Macedonia is ready for NATO membership. We saw at Bucharest that the alliance articulated that, subject to resolution of the name dispute with Greece. It is our deep desire and hope that they will, in fact, resolve that name dispute as soon as possible. And we very strongly support the process that has been undertaken by U.N. Special Envoy Nimitz, who has been engaged in this intensively.

It is our hope that that will happen as quickly as possible, although NATO is a consensus-based organization. And therefore, it will take that decision as an organization. And so, we will invest every diplomatic effort we can in trying to see that that dispute is resolved.

Mr. TOWNSEND. Thank you for the question, which, along with Ambassador Kaidanow, I have to say that from the Department of Defense view and my own personal view, having worked with these nations from the very beginning of Partnership for Peace and the whole enlargement process back in the mid-nineties, we on an everyday basis in the Pentagon as well as at NATO are working with these nations in terms of helping them in their defense reforms, in mil-to-mil, if you will, military-to-military channels, working specifically with their militaries to get them ready for membership, make sure they are able, interoperable, and a very credible candidate when their time comes to come into the alliance.

I want to say that, as far as Georgia is concerned, we have been very pleased with the kinds of work that Georgia has been able to do on its defense side. It was pointed out earlier that they are doing some very good work in Afghanistan, in a very tough area of Afghanistan. Our military, our Marines, have been working with them. Secretary Panetta, in fact, has talked and visited with Georgians as well.

So, this is something that, as the Ambassador said, we have taken—

Mr. POE. Summarize your statement there, Mr. Townsend.

Mr. TOWNSEND. Okay. Thank you.

We take it very seriously and we take it almost on a daily basis. Thank you.

Mr. POE. The chair recognizes Mr. Engel.

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Kaidanow, could you please tell me that the administration is working actively to get Turkey to reverse its position on blocking Israel from attending the Summit?

Ms. K Aidanow. Congressman, just to say, first of all, Israel is an active and a valued partner for the alliance and for the United States, but for the alliance, through what is known as the Mediterranean Dialogue. The Mediterranean Dialogue is essentially a grouping of seven countries from that region.

There has been no contemplation of a Mediterranean Dialogue Summit-level meeting at Chicago. So, I think we ought to be clear on that.

However, let me restate and say again how important and valued a partner Israel is for NATO. The United States is strongly supportive of that partnership. We hope that that partnership will continue and, in fact, we are very much engaged in Mediterranean Dialogue events. There was a meeting in Morocco in March to which we sent a representative from the State Department as well as other representatives. So, we are very committed to the NATO/Israel partnership, and we will continue to be.

Mr. Engel. But what is Turkey objecting to, then, if there are no plans to meet and discuss this?

Ms. K Aidanow. Again, the meetings that have been contemplated for Chicago are ISAF meetings—ISAF meetings are important, but Israel is not a contributor to ISAF—as well as an operational partners' meeting, which is also not something that Israel has been involved in.

So, I can't speak to what it is the Turks are speaking to, but I can tell you exactly what is the case, which is, again, that Israel is an incredibly valuable partner for NATO and we are strongly supportive of that.

Mr. Engel. Are we telling Turkey to knock it off?

Ms. K Aidanow. We have been very clear with all of our alliance partners, including the Turks, about our feelings with respect to Israel as a valued partner.

Mr. Engel. Okay, but it is not a matter of Israel being a valued partner. It is a matter of Turkey, out of the blue, because of some kind of personal dispute, in my estimation, not acting like a country that tries to do what is good for the alliance, but acting like a petulant child trying to use the alliance for its own purposes. I think that is important.

Ms. K Aidanow. Congressman, we have been very sorry, very regretful to see the deterioration in relations between Turkey and Israel. And it is our view that these are two important and valuable partners to us, and we would like to see them repair that relationship as quickly as possible.

Mr. Engel. All right. Let me ask you this, Ambassador: You know Kosovo as well as anybody here. As a former Ambassador, you are very much aware of—you and I have had many discussions about how much they want to join the key Euro-Atlantic institutions, including both NATO and the EU. They are making that progress toward that end. Yesterday, Brunei, the 90th country, recognized them. But the progress is very slow.

When Serbia became an EU candidate country, the EU immediately began a study on whether Kosovo should get a Stabilization

and Association Agreement. While Serbia has been granted visa liberalization by the EU, Kosovo has not even been presented a roadmap for visa liberalization.

Likewise, Kosovo aspires to eventual NATO membership, but the future is unclear. All of the other Balkan countries are either in NATO or members of the Partnership for Peace, not Kosovo. So, I think it is time for Kosovo's second-class status to end.

I am wondering if you could comment on that. Please describe whether Kosovo has a future in NATO. What is her path to eventual NATO membership? When can she join the Partnership for Peace and other NATO programs for other aspirants? And are there ways the Kosovo Security Forces can partner with U.S. forces?

Ms. KAIDANOW. Thank you, Congressman.

I would say several things. First of all, I think you know that the United States has been incredibly supportive of Kosovo's territorial integrity, its sovereignty, its independence. We are strongly in favor of supporting Kosovo's Euro-Atlantic future.

It is important, I think, in terms of regional stability as well as European stability more broadly, that Kosovo continue down a path toward both EU integration and eventually toward NATO accession as well, although that is a far distance away.

The one thing I would say, though, is we do have the institutional issue of some non-recognizers of Kosovo in the alliance. That presents certain obstacles that we do have to contend with.

I will say this: The United States is incredibly and strongly supportive of a future relationship between NATO and the Kosovo Security Force, the KSF. We think that there is an appropriate role for NATO to continue to help train the KSF within its mandate, which has been clear. And I think that there is room there for activity and for further kinds of interaction. We will continue to be supportive of that at NATO.

The rest of the things will follow. But I think, again, for now, we have a path forward and we want to pursue it.

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you.

If I might be able to slip in one more question, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. POE. Yes.

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. Thank you.

Let me ask Secretary Townsend, I would like to hear from you, actually, also from Ambassador Kaidanow, that the U.S. has no plans to reduce U.S. forces in KFOR in the foreseeable future.

During the last few years, we and our European partners have been reducing the number of troops in KFOR, but with increased tensions with Serbia in northern Kosovo, that process has been reduced. But I have heard that additional rapid-reaction troops have recently arrived.

I personally think that we should increase by at least a few battalions our force presence in Kosovo at least through the end of the year. With Serbian elections raising the temperature and continued lawlessness of criminality continuing in northern Kosovo, we simply cannot be too careful.

So, I am wondering if either one of you, or both, could describe plans for U.S. force commitments to KFOR now and for the foreseeable future? Are there enough troops in KFOR to handle likely

threats to peace and stability? And will KFOR work with UEX and Kosovo police to end the Serbian lawlessness in northern Kosovo?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Thank you, Congressman.

The situation in Kosovo, as we have been discussing right now, is one that causes concern. We rely very much on the KFOR commander and on SACEUR to advise us and to advise the alliance on what he feels he needs.

Right now, the word we are getting is that he has got the forces that he needs in terms of KFOR there. As you point out, UEX is there. There are other actors in the field. The situation on the ground will certainly dictate what the size of KFOR and what the alliance actions will be there.

Right now, we feel that the KFOR size is right. I think for the foreseeable future this will be the case. But we talk frequently to the KFOR commander and to SACEUR to make sure that, as things change, we are ready to take action.

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. POE. I am going to center on two countries, Georgia and Macedonia, and that is the two I want to address. Both of them have troops in Afghanistan; Georgia, 950, I believe, going to go up to a battalion level. And I want to talk about them first.

I was in Georgia a week after the Russians invaded. It made the international news for a couple of days and, then, nobody is talking about it except the folks in Georgia. They still don't like the Russians there.

I understand conflicting reports. But one reason Georgia doesn't get into NATO is because the Russians are still there. How does that factor in, if it does, in why Georgia is still not in NATO? Then, I will address Macedonia.

Ms. KAIDANOW. Thank you.

Let me state right away that it is our firm conviction that no sovereign nation should be in any way circumscribed from choosing its own alliances, and that, at the end of the day, it is for every nation to decide on its own allegiances and alliances. So, again, the Russian presence in the occupied areas of Georgia are not an impact or don't have an impact on our overall decisions with respect to Georgia.

The United States, again, has been very strongly supportive of Georgian sovereignty, of Georgian territorial integrity, as has NATO. I think we will continue to be in ways that are demonstrable. I spoke to some of those in my opening statement.

Just recently, as I said, the Presidents of the United States and of Georgia met here in Washington, had a very good set of conversations. We anticipate that we will have further conversations at high levels over the next little while. And so, again, I think our commitment has been shown.

Mr. POE. Madam Ambassador, I am certainly no diplomat. I have been called a lot of things in my life, but diplomat is not one of them.

The Russians are still there. I think they have occupied a sovereign country. Twenty percent or twenty-five percent of their nation is occupied, the Georgians. What is being done about that, if anything, besides talking about it?

Ms. KAIDANOW. I think, I mean, the reality of the situation is that what we are doing is actually multiple aspects of what we are doing on behalf of Georgia. What we have done rhetorically is important. I think it continues to be important that we assert our continuing support for Georgia's territorial integrity and its sovereignty. That is not unimportant; it is quite important.

But, in a practical sense, what we are doing, again, is we are supplying support for Georgia's multiple efforts across the board to sustain reform, democratic reform, economic reform, all of which are important and where Georgia has made some really significant and important strides.

You noted, Mr. Chair, that we are actually witnessing some of the benefits of that because Georgia has now, again, contributed in a very meaningful way in Afghanistan, continues to so do, without caveats, by the way. So, we are recognizing all of those things. We acknowledge them, and in ways that are much more concrete even—again, we are assisting them. This administration approved the final tranche of \$1 billion worth of assistance for Georgia. So, I think in all of those ways, again, we have been very forthright and very forthcoming and very appreciative of Georgia's efforts.

Mr. POE. Let's turn to Macedonia. Macedonia, likewise with Georgia, has troops in Afghanistan serving along with Americans, NATO troops, or even some of our NATO troops, our other NATO allies have not, in my opinion, shared the responsibility that they have under NATO. They are not in NATO because Greece continues or has blocked their admission into NATO, which is their right under the fact that they are a NATO member.

My understanding is that they blocked the membership of Macedonia into NATO when Macedonia agreed to apply for membership under the name the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. With that application, the Greeks then said no, although in December of last year the International Court of Justice ruled that Greece violated an agreement it had with Macedonia when it vetoed that membership. How does that factor into NATO membership of Macedonia with that International Court ruling against Greece, if it does?

Ms. KAIDANOW. Congressman, again, I think we have articulated many times, and we will say it many more times, that we are strongly supportive of Macedonia's accession to NATO under the conditions that were laid out by the allies at Bucharest. That means that, as soon as the name dispute is resolved, we will be in a position to allow Macedonia into the alliance.

Mr. POE. Time is short.

So, the court ruling is irrelevant as to whether or not they are going to get in, because the agreement is, if I understand you correctly, that Macedonia and Greece have to work out the name issue in spite of what the court ruled?

Ms. KAIDANOW. I wouldn't say it is in spite of the court ruling, and we do hope that the court ruling will provide the impetus for them to find a resolution, to which, again, we will invest some diplomatic effort. But the problem is that they have to find a mutually-acceptable resolution. It is a consensus-based organization, you are correct.

So, I think that is the ultimate point here, is we will help. We can help in some ways, but, ultimately, the two sides have to find a way forward.

Mr. POE. You wouldn't have any ideas on how they could resolve that, would you?

Ms. KAIDANOW. We always have good ideas. But, again, it is really up to them.

I do want to say that I think they have engaged themselves in some productive discussions. We want to encourage that. I think that we hope, certainly after the Greek elections, which are nigh upon us, that we will see, again, another effort on their part to actually engage.

Mr. POE. All right. Thank you.

Mr. Deutch?

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have a question now about Turkey again, just to follow up on what my colleague, Mr. Engel, discussed with you. I understand from your comments earlier that there are no Mediterranean Dialogue-level talks planned for Chicago. Is the reason that there are no Mediterranean Dialogue talks planned because Turkey objected to having them at all?

Ms. KAIDANOW. No. No. There just has not been contemplation of a Summit-level—and, in fact, as far as I am aware, there has never been a Summit-level dialog of the Mediterranean Dialogue, in other words, a Summit-level meeting of the Mediterranean Dialogue. It just hasn't occurred.

Mr. DEUTCH. I heard you explain that you don't know, since there is no dialog planned, Mediterranean Dialogue-level planned, you are not sure what it was Turkey was objecting to. If I can refer back to the earlier plan earlier in the year for Israel to contribute a missile ship to a NATO mission in the Mediterranean Sea, Active Endeavour, my understanding there is that that contribution was never made because Turkey objected and blocked that.

Secretary Townsend, I can ask you as well.

Ms. KAIDANOW. Maybe my colleague has more to offer on that. I am not aware, actually, of that particular incident or that particular issue, but we can certainly look at it.

Jim?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Let us take that question. I am not aware of that, either, but let us check into it and get back to you or your staff.

Mr. DEUTCH. Okay. Just as you explore, my understanding from reports just today is that that would have been the first time that Israel actively participated in one of NATO's military operations. If you could both look into that and let us know if there are reports that they were asked not to participate because of a decision by Turkey, that would be most helpful for us to have that information.

Secretary, you also said in your exchange with Mr. Engel that there has been an invaluable relationship between Israel and NATO. Can you describe Israel's participation in NATO activities and some of the benefits of that participation?

Ms. KAIDANOW. The Mediterranean Dialogue is a forum, essentially, for those countries in that region to come together and discuss a number of different kinds of issues on which, hopefully,



again in the future we can find a little bit more granularity and a way to progress.

In fact, in this meeting in Morocco in March, there were a number of items on the agenda that were treated. I think Israel has an interest in a lot of that because, again, it is looking to expand its partnerships not just with NATO, but with some of the other countries involved. I think there is a lot of scope there for discussion. There has not necessarily been things that I can point to concretely that have been done thus far, but that is not to say that there isn't quite a lot of room for other kinds of endeavors.

If you would like more information on that, we can provide that as well.

Mr. DEUTCH. I would. I would like this.

Secretary Townsend, you mentioned earlier that you are pleased with Georgia's progress on defense. Georgia, as you know, has been the second-largest non-NATO contributor to ISAF forces. If their NATO candidacy continues to stall, do you see this affecting Georgia's strategic relationship with NATO, other NATO countries, or the United States?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Thank you.

Well, you know, in terms of its relationship with NATO, there is a NATO Georgia Commission which meets to assist the Georgians in making reforms and doing things to make sure that they stay and continue to build as a very good candidate to come into the alliance. So, there is already an institutional link between NATO and the NATO allies and Georgia.

On a bilateral basis with the United States, I did say that we have been very impressed with not just their own military reform efforts, but also their abilities that we saw on the ground in Afghanistan. So, this relationship between the United States bilaterally, between our Defense Department and the Georgians and our military will always be strong as well.

They work with other allies in Afghanistan, too. So, I think when you talk to many allies and they think about Georgia as a member of the alliance, they look at what the Georgians have done, the work in the NATO Georgia Commission, I think it is a very good story that we are all seeing. It is a matter of, as the Ambassador said, going through and making sure that as far as we are concerned on the defense side, that when they are ready to come into the alliance, that they are at their very best state.

Mr. DEUTCH. And if I could just ask a yes-or-no question, Mr. Chairman, just one last point of clarification?

Secretary, on the Mediterranean Dialogue piece again, I understand there are no Mediterranean-Dialogue-level talks in Chicago at the Summit. I assume as well that, as a result, since there won't be those talks, that they are no non-NATO Mediterranean Dialogue members who will be coming to Chicago to participate.

Ms. KAIDANOW. That is not necessarily the case, again, because some of these memberships in partnership organizations are overlapping. So, in other words, it may be the case that others that are members of the Mediterranean Dialogue would be there, but for other reasons, either for ISAF or for the operational partners' discussion.

Mr. DEUTCH. Okay. I would welcome some details in response to that question as well.

Ms. KAIDANOW. Sure. Sure.

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BURTON [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Deutch.

I just have a couple of comments, and I apologize for my tardiness. I had to do something for my spouse. She has a little bit of a health problem. So, I apologize for not being here for your whole testimony.

I have got two things I would like to mention. First of all, NATO was very instrumental and helpful in Libya. As I mentioned in my opening remarks, there are a number of us that did not mind seeing Colonel Gaddafi leave the scene. But the military attack on Libya with the help of the United States did involve billions of dollars, at least a couple of billion dollars of military funds. It also involved, I am confident, some boots on the ground, although they didn't say that there were any. I think it was there for probably intelligence purposes.

But, nevertheless, I hope that it will be conveyed to this administration, just like any other administration, that unless it is compliant with the Constitution or the War Powers Act, that the President does not have authority to take us into a military conflict without the support of Congress, Democrats or Republicans. I think it is extremely important that that message be sent very clearly, especially during this NATO meeting, because I know there will be people talking about Syria and going in there and maybe going into someplace else like the Sudan, where 400,000 people have been killed.

But before we go into conflict, the case needs to be made to the American people through their congressional representatives. I hope that message will be very clear, and I hope you will convey that.

The second thing I would like to say is that I have been over to Europe, along with my colleague, Mr. Meeks, and others. We were there very much concerned about the economic problems that Europe faces because it will have an impact on us, without any doubt, if everything goes south over there. So, we are very concerned about that.

Even though these countries that are having some difficulties right now are facing many of the problems we are, they still need to pony-up their 2 percent of GDP, as Secretary Gates said, to help us. We can't bear the burden of military action or supporting NATO without the help of our NATO allies. And there are only three of them that I think are doing that right now.

So, I hope that gets to them loud and clear. I don't know if any media is here or not. But it is extremely important that our NATO allies, even though I know there are economic problems over in Europe, that they are willing and ready and able to support NATO with their 2 percent contribution.

If you have any comments on that, that is fine.

Ms. KAIDANOW. I would just say, Mr. Chairman, that we understand the importance of the commitments that allies make. They understand the importance of those commitments, too, I would say.

I recognize that not all of them have met their 2 percent benchmark, and that is something we continue to press for. But I would also say that we are really struck by, even in a time of fiscal austerity and a time of difficulty in terms of financial crisis, a number of our colleagues and a number of our allies have really stuck to their commitments, particularly with respect to Afghanistan. They are very committed to the 2014 timeline that was outlined in Lisbon. I think we have seen really good solidarity in terms of their willingness to stick in with us. We should acknowledge that.

Mr. BURTON. Well, I think that is great, and I do appreciate that. I know that they are there, a number of those countries. But we have a \$15 trillion, almost \$16 trillion national debt right now.

Ms. K Aidanow. Agreed.

Mr. BURTON. And the country faces fiscal problems. And so, if we are going to do our part, and we want to do our part, we need to make sure that, even though they are having some of these problems, they know that they need to do it as well.

I yield the balance of my time to my good buddy, Mr. Meeks.

Mr. MEEKS. I just wanted to follow up real quick on something that you just indicated. I know that Secretary General Rasmussen has been clear that NATO has not discussed or begun even a preliminary planning for a possible intervention in Syria. But the debate is raging still here, whether you talk to Senators Lieberman or McCain, who believe that NATO should at least be actively considering the possibility.

And so, I was just wondering. I mean, I think that Mr. Burton indicated that we know that that possibility is going to come up. Well, people are talking about it.

I would just like to get your thoughts on whether or not NATO should be considering the lives that are being lost. I know the justification for going into Libya. I wonder what your thoughts are. Should we at least be discussing it?

Ms. K Aidanow. Congressman, I think it is still our deep desire to try to resolve the issues in Syria in a peaceful manner that allows for a transition away from the Assad regime to something else that will cause less bloodshed rather than more.

I think we are all watching the situation there very, very carefully. It is not an easy one, obviously. We are still weighing the best way to address this, and we are doing it in cooperation with a number of our partners, European partners, in particular.

I don't want to speculate necessarily on what NATO's role should or should not be. I will just say, again, that we are all watching it very, very carefully, particularly, obviously, those countries that are bordering on Syria, including Turkey, including some others. So, we want to just keep an eye on it and do everything that we can as the U.S. Government, again, to ensure a peaceful transition and to make sure that we end the bloodshed as quickly as possible.

Mr. BURTON. I want to follow up on that real quickly, and then we will go to our next panel. That is, NATO does not represent the Congress of the United States. I mean, the Congress of the United States represents the American people. If the case is to be made that NATO should take some action, then the case has to be made to the Congress of the United States, so that the people's representatives will pass a resolution to take action.

In previous administrations, almost without exception, we have not taken any military action without the consent and support of the Congress. That is in compliance with the Constitution and the War Powers Act.

And so, the President, to his credit, has been reluctant to take any action and has not talked to Congress about it. But I hope it is conveyed to him very clearly that, if he thinks it needs to be done, if our NATO allies think it needs to be done, they need to come to Mr. Meeks, myself, and other Members of Congress and make the case, and for us to pass a resolution to give the President the authority under the Constitution and the War Powers Act.

Thank you very much.

We will go to our next panel.

We really appreciate your being here.

Ms. KAIDANOW. Thank you.

Mr. TOWNSEND. Thank you very much.

Mr. BURTON. The next panel consists of Damon Wilson. He is the Executive Vice President of the Atlantic Council, where his work is committed to advancing a Europe whole, free, and at peace. From 2007 to 2009, Mr. Wilson served as a Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director of European Affairs at the National Security Council. Mr. Wilson has previously served as the Executive Secretary and Chief of Staff at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad and as Deputy Director of the private office of the NATO Secretary General, among other positions.

Mr. Wilson received his BA in political science from Duke—you have got a good basketball team there usually—and his MA from Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School for Public and International Affairs.

Mr. Luke Coffey studies and writes on U.S./UK relations as the Margaret Thatcher Fellow at the Heritage Foundation. He focuses, in particular, on defense and security matters, including the role of NATO and the European Union in transatlantic security.

Before joining Heritage, the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, in 2012, Mr. Coffey served at the UK Ministry of Defense as a Senior Special Advisor to then-British Defense Secretary Liam Fox. He was the only non-UK citizen appointed by Prime Minister David Cameron to provide advice to senior British ministers.

Mr. Coffey's work in British politics followed his service to the United States as a commissioned officer in the U.S. Army's Military Police Corps. He spent his entire time on active duty overseas and was stationed in Italy with the Army's Southern European Task Force. In 2005, Mr. Coffey deployed to Afghanistan for a year. He is responsible for developing theater-level policies for enemy detainees in U.S. custody and support of counterinsurgency strategy.

Mr. Coffey received his MS in politics and government at the European Union from the London School of Economics, and he also holds a BA degree in political science from the University of Missouri, St. Louis, and has an associate arts degree in military science from Wentworth Military Academy in Lexington, Missouri.

Dr. Stephen Flanagan holds a Henry A. Kissinger Chair in Diplomacy and National Security at CSIS. Before joining CSIS in 2007, he served as Director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies and Vice President for Research at the National Defense University

for 7 years. He held several senior positions in government between 1989 and 1999, where he helped develop U.S. strategy for the post-Cold War era. In 2009 and 2010, he served as lead advisor to former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in her capacity as chair of the group of experts that developed the foundation for NATO's strategic concept.

Earlier in his career, he was a professional staff member of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and he also held faculty and research appointments at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, the National War College, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and the Council on Foreign Relations.

He earned his BA in political science from Columbia University in 1973 and his PhD in international relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, in 1979.

You guys have great credentials. I am very impressed with that.

So, first, we will just start with you, Mr. Wilson. If you could keep your opening remarks to 5 minutes, it would be great. We will try to be liberal, if necessary. Oh, excuse me, conservative but liberal. [Laughter.]

**STATEMENT OF MR. DAMON WILSON, EXECUTIVE VICE  
PRESIDENT, THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL**

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Chairman Burton, Ranking Member Meeks. It is a pleasure to be with you today.

As NATO leaders gather in Chicago next month, they will seek to achieve consensus on a difficult mission in Afghanistan to protect military capabilities in a time of deep budget cuts and to forge more meaningful partnerships with allies in Asia and the Middle East. I would like to make the case that in Chicago NATO should also make room for a serious discussion, a future enlargement, and pursue a more ambitious partnership agenda. Furthermore, I believe the major allies must look beyond Chicago and focus on their own commitments within the alliance to ensure NATO's health into the next decade. I will briefly address these three themes and submit my full testimony for the record.

First, enlargement. NATO says that Chicago will not be an enlargement Summit. Indeed, the allies are not prepared to offer invitations to candidate nations. However, it would be a mistake not to use Chicago to give a boost to future enlargement.

First, the aspirants have earned it. Each has demonstrated it is able to contribute to security, including by providing forces to Afghanistan.

Despite economic challenges, allies should remember that enlargement makes Europe more stable and NATO stronger. In Chicago, leaders can make clear that NATO's open-door policy remains a cornerstone of the alliance's strategy.

Specifically, the alliance should underscore the urgency of resolving Macedonia's only obstacle to membership, the dispute with Greece over Macedonia's name; recognize Montenegro's rapid progress and uniquely-good relations with all its neighbors; make clear that NATO's commitment that Georgia will become a member is genuine, and agree that Georgia's path to membership is through the NATO Georgia Commission, and welcome Bosnia/Herzegovina

into the membership action plan, as it meets a key final benchmark.

Chicago should also announce that all nations of the Western Balkans who desire membership and are prepared to meet alliance obligations will be welcomed into NATO as they qualify, to include Serbia and Kosovo. And NATO leaders could commit to take decisions on enlargement at their next Summit in 2014. Such a statement would signal NATO's intention to enlarge and further incentivize candidates to implement tough reforms.

In conjunction, Washington, Paris, and Berlin should launch a concerted serious strategy to resolve the Macedonia name issue once and for all. With this approach, NATO can ensure that the lack of invitations does not signal that the enlargement process is stalling.

Second, ambitious partnership initiatives. Countries such as Australia, Sweden, the UAE, and Jordan have been crucial partners in Libya and Afghanistan. For NATO to remain effective in an era of borderless threats and emerging powers, it will have to develop stronger global partnerships. Chicago will spotlight the role of these partners, but a Summit can achieve more.

First, the Partnership for Peace should end its geographic limitations and open up its charter and programs to any nation that seeks to cooperate with the alliance, regardless of geography.

Second, the alliance should introduce a program for those who desire closer interoperability with NATO, short of membership, such as Sweden. These partners should be able to complete a process to qualify as NATO interoperable armed forces and, as such, be eligible for special access to alliance structures, including participating in decisions for operations in which their forces are deployed.

Third, NATO allies should help transformations in the Middle East and North Africa succeed by opening up the toolkit that proved so effective in assisting the transitions of nations in Central and Eastern Europe.

And finally, rather than pivot from Europe to Asia, the United States should consider an initiative that binds our European and Canadian allies with America's specific allies as a precursor to ultimately forging alliances with the alliance.

Finally, preparing for the next decade. Beyond the formal agenda in Chicago, I believe leaders must begin to repair a growing rift within the alliance. NATO's credibility is threatened by the debt crisis and major cuts in defense spending. The crisis has weakened Europe's military capabilities, sapped its ambitions for global leadership, and called into question U.S. leadership within the alliance.

An alliance adrift would be an historic, strategic setback for the United States. NATO remains home to the United States' most capable and willing allies. They serve as force multipliers for the United States foreign policy worldwide. The best example is 40,000 troops in Afghanistan.

Therefore, for NATO to thrive, the United States will have to demonstrate strong leadership of the alliance and Europe will have to maintain its global ambitions. If the U.S. disengages, it will find Europe less willing to act with us globally. So, as we draw-down forces and begin to end over a decade of continuous operations, the

U.S. military must redouble its efforts to train with allied forces to preserve their ability to fight together.

But U.S. leadership is no substitute for European political ambition. All allies have a responsibility to strengthen NATO, but France, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Turkey will determine whether Europe remains our top global partner. France needs to continue President Sarkozy's approach of cooperating, rather than competing with the United States. The United Kingdom must maintain the ambition and the defense investments necessary to preserve its special relationship with Washington. And Germany must begin to show the same level of ambition to influence global events as it does for its economic leadership.

And Turkey, NATO's only member growing in influence, should be challenged to act more responsibly within NATO by offering it a position of leadership in the alliance commensurate to the leading role it plays in the emerging Middle East.

With the right mix of U.S. leadership, European ambition, and stronger global partnerships, NATO and Chicago can begin to trade its dim and dismal future that Secretary Gates warned of for another decade of success.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wilson follows:]



**US House of Representatives  
Committee on Foreign Affairs  
Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia**

Hearing on

**NATO:  
The Chicago Summit and U.S. Policy**

April 26, 2012

Prepared testimony by

**Damon M. Wilson**  
*Executive Vice President  
Atlantic Council*

Chairman Burton, Ranking Member Meeks, Members of the Subcommittee, I am honored to speak before your committee on NATO's upcoming Chicago summit.

As NATO leaders gather in Chicago next month they will seek to preserve consensus on a mission in Afghanistan facing potential crisis, to maintain allied military capabilities in a time of deep budget cuts, and to forge more meaningful partnerships with allies in Asia and the Middle East. This is an important agenda for the Alliance and one addressed well by previous witnesses.

I would like to use my testimony today to make the case that, in Chicago, NATO should also make room for a serious discussion of future enlargement and pursue a more ambitious partnership agenda. Furthermore, I believe the major allies must look beyond Chicago and focus on their own roles within the Alliance to ensure NATO's health into the next decade. I will address each of these three themes.



On Afghanistan, NATO needs to achieve a united view of its strategy, especially on the pace of troop withdrawals and the nature of long-term support for the Afghan national security forces. With some contributors tempted to rush to the exits before 2014, and key allies sending conflicting public messages, agreeing on a single clear and effective drawdown strategy is essential. The summit should commit all contributors both to the concept of “in together, out together” and an enduring alliance partnership with Afghanistan. This will allow NATO leaders to communicate a more certain strategy on how to negotiate an end to the war while denying the Taliban a military and political victory.

NATO leaders must also commit at the Chicago summit to halt the rapid weakening of its military capacity through draconian and unwise defense budget cuts. Agreement on a new “Smart Defense” strategy may help to arrest the decline and better manage austerity, but allies need to commit and to develop plans to reinvest in defense as their economies strengthen to preserve NATO’s military credibility.

On both Afghanistan and capabilities, the Alliance must play defense. However, on enlargement and partnerships, NATO has an opportunity to go on offense and forge new policy.

#### **An Enlargement Agenda**

NATO officials often say that Chicago will not be an enlargement summit. Indeed, Allies are not prepared to offer invitations to candidate nations. However, NATO would make a mistake not to use Chicago to give a boost to the candidacies of Macedonia, Montenegro, Georgia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

First and foremost, the aspirants have earned it. Each has demonstrated it is able to contribute to security, including by providing forces to Afghanistan, committing niche capabilities to the Alliance, and following NATO’s “smart defense” model of cooperating with neighbors on joint defense projects. These nations’ integration into NATO will also help stabilize their regions, contributing to transatlantic security.

Despite economic challenges, NATO members must not forget the vision behind enlargement. The concept is simple. Enlarging NATO advances a Europe whole, free, and at peace by integrating once vulnerable European nations into a community of free-market democracies committed to each others’ collective defense. New members never again must worry about their survival as sovereign nations or domination by foreign powers. Enlargement makes Europe more stable and NATO stronger.

Chicago’s enlargement agenda should, first, be featured at a meeting between NATO leaders and leaders of those nations aspiring to membership. Such a meeting would back politicians who must take tough decisions to reform their nations as they prepare for membership and acknowledge those who are acting as de facto allies. Second, the leaders’ declaration should make clear that NATO’s “open door” policy remains a cornerstone of the Alliance’s strategy to promote security. Specifically, the leaders should underscore the urgency of resolving Macedonia’s only obstacle to membership, the dispute with Greece over

Macedonia's name; recognize Montenegro's rapid progress and uniquely good relations with all its neighbors; and make clear that NATO's commitment that Georgia will become a member is genuine and agree that Georgia's path to membership is through the NATO-Georgia Commission. Chicago should also welcome Bosnia-Herzegovina into the Membership Action Plan as it meets a final benchmark on ensuring federal control of defense properties.

Furthermore, Chicago should announce that all nations of the Western Balkans who desire membership and are prepared to meet Alliance obligations will be welcomed into NATO, to include Serbia and Kosovo. This declaration would dispel any misperception that enlargement would create new divisions within the region.

Finally, NATO leaders should commit to take decisions on enlargement at their next summit. Such a dramatic statement would provide candidate leaders additional political capital to advance difficult reforms, boost defense spending, and sustain contributions to Afghanistan.

Following Chicago, top NATO officials should travel to the candidates to recognize their progress, urge continued hard work, and make clear that the enlargement process remains alive and well. These visits should be the start of a campaign before the next summit to help the candidates succeed. Such a strategy means doubling down on support for efforts to advance the rule of law, strengthen democratic institutions, and implement defense reforms. This campaign should include a coordinated strategy among Washington, Paris, and Berlin to resolve the Macedonia name issue.

Some argue that adding more, small allies to NATO only complicates decision-making. The reality is that small allies rarely block decisions within the Alliance.

Some will argue that this agenda would alienate Russia further. NATO should continue to seek to cooperate with Russia on issues such as Afghanistan and missile defense and Allies should affirm that an even closer relationship, to include an "alliance with the Alliance," could be an option for a democratic Russia.

NATO's task is to ensure the lack of invitations in Chicago does not signal that the enlargement process is stalling.

#### **Ambitious Partnership Initiatives**

For NATO to remain effective in an era of borderless threats and emerging powers, it will have to develop stronger global partnerships. Valued partners such as Australia, Sweden, the UAE, Jordan, and others have been crucial partners in NATO operations in Libya and Afghanistan. NATO leaders should use the Chicago summit to forge arrangements that will allow the Alliance to form more flexible and durable partnerships with like-minded countries and regional organizations around the world. As long as threats can emerge from any corner of the globe, NATO should welcome a stronger relationship with partners who can contribute in addressing shared security objectives.

With the Libya mission completed and NATO's combat role in Afghanistan scheduled to conclude after 2014, the Alliance's challenge is to devise a means of maintaining effective relationships with valued partners. The administration is correct in insisting that partnerships occupy a primary place at the Chicago summit.

But for NATO to operate more effectively in a world in which security challenges can be of a global scale, the Alliance must think more creatively and ambitiously about how it engages its partners to both make them more meaningful and more expansive. A fundamentally different global security environment demands a fundamental rethink of NATO's partnerships. To this end, NATO should update its partnership strategy and respond with partnership initiatives reflecting the realities of the 21st century.

First, such an initiative would build on the Lisbon summit's decision to open up the Partnership for Peace's toolkit to all partners by relaunching the Partnership for Peace (PFP) as the Partnership for Peace and Security, opening up its charter and its programs to any nation that seeks to cooperate with the Alliance regardless of geography. Alliance partnership activities would no longer be hampered by regional tensions or exclude new partners because of geography.

Second, reflecting the value of those partners who already contribute effectively to NATO operations, the Alliance should introduce a program for those who desire a closer degree of interoperability with NATO short of membership, such as Sweden or Australia. Just as NATO's military command must certify any national unit prior to deployment to a NATO operation, partners should be able to complete a process that would lead to the formal designation of their militaries as NATO-interoperable armed forces. Such certified nations should then be eligible for special access to Alliance structures, including being invited to join NATO technical committees focused on interoperability, to place officers within the NATO integrated command, and to participate with the North Atlantic Council in decisions for operations in which they are deployed.

Third, NATO allies must not miss the historic window of opportunity to defuse their greatest security threat by launching a partnership initiative to help political and economic transformations in the Middle East and North Africa succeed. The circumstances differ dramatically among Arab nations and therefore the Alliance must develop and offer an approach tailored to each. But NATO should not wait for new, struggling governments to formulate specific requests for assistance; allies need to be working with these governments to help them develop and articulate such requests. In each Arab nation in transition, the role of the military has been critical in determining the trajectory and level of violence during the uprisings; the role of the military will likely be decisive in determining the success or failure of these transitions. While NATO nations will often take the lead bilaterally or work through other international institutions, NATO must play a role in opening up the toolkit that proved so effective in assisting the transition of nations in Central and Eastern Europe.

Fourth, rather than "pivot" from Europe to Asia, the United States should consider how to better link its allies in Europe to its allies in Asia through more concerted cooperation. A

specific initiative to more closely bind our European and Canadian allies with America's Pacific allies could serve as a precursor to multilateralizing US treaty alliances in the Pacific and ultimately forging alliances with the Alliance.

Fifth, NATO should expand its partnership dialogue with rising democratic countries such as Brazil, India, and Indonesia. The goal of these dialogues would focus on joint assessments of the security landscape, possible cooperation on shared challenges, officer exchange programs, and means to encourage transparency. The aim would be over time to transition from competition to convergence to cooperation with key emerging democratic nations who could become valuable Alliance partners in the future.

Finally, the Alliance should focus its partnership outreach efforts on helping to train individual nations or organizations such as the African Union on crisis management. Over the last decade and a half NATO has developed a strong brand in training and developing security forces of partner countries. Investing in security sector reform and development in strategic countries or valued partners hedges against the prospect of regional insecurity and instability and can lead to more capable partners when NATO undertakes operations. Such an initiative will allow NATO to decide not to lead an operation, but to play a critical role in preparing others to lead such operations.

#### **Preparing for the Next Decade**

Beyond the formal agenda in Chicago, leaders must begin to repair a growing rift within the Atlantic Alliance. Over the last several years, the credibility of NATO has been threatened by the debt crisis and major cuts in defense spending. The crisis has weakened Europe's military capabilities, sapped its ambitions for global leadership, and called into question US leadership in Europe and within the Alliance. The decline in European defense capabilities has grown so severe that outgoing US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates warned of a 'dim if not dismal' future for NATO if allies fail to act.

An Alliance adrift would be an historic strategic setback for the United States and its Atlantic allies. For all its shortcomings, NATO remains home to the United States' most capable and willing allies. The Alliance is the glue that binds the United States, Canada, and Europe into the greatest community of shared values, democratic governance, and prosperity on the planet. A stronger, more ambitious, and more united transatlantic partnership will be essential in shaping a future in which the West accounts for a relatively smaller share of the world economy, population, and military might. For the United States to achieve its international aims in a competitive world, it needs a strong, capable, and ambitious Europe.

Fortunately for the United States and its Atlantic allies, a dismal future for the Alliance is not foreordained. For NATO to build a better future, the United States will have to demonstrate strong leadership of the Alliance, Europe will have to maintain its global ambitions, and the Alliance will have to strengthen its engagement with global powers.

Strong US leadership has been a crucial element of Europe's peace and prosperity since World War II. This formula will remain relevant to the revitalization of the Alliance. Unfortunately, many in the United States today view Europe as passé given the emergence of China and other Asian powers. This perspective blatantly ignores the fact that our European allies serve as a force multiplier for US foreign policy initiatives worldwide. Afghanistan serves as a primary example, where Europe has 40,000 troops fighting alongside their US counterparts. If the United States withdraws from Europe and turns away from its primary allies, it will likely find Europe less willing and able to assist the United States in achieving its foreign policy priorities. As the United States draws down its forces stationed in Europe and begins to end over a decade of continuous NATO operations, the US military must redouble its effort to train and exercise with allied forces to preserve their ability to fight together.

But US leadership of the Alliance is no substitute for European political ambition. While all allies have a responsibility to strengthen NATO, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Turkey in particular will play key roles in determining whether Europe remains Washington's top global partner. France will need to continue the path initiated by President Nicolas Sarkozy that views cooperation with the United States and within NATO, rather than competition with the United States, as the best means to enhance France's influence. The United Kingdom – America's closest and most stalwart ally – will have to maintain the ambition and make the investments in defense necessary to preserve its 'special relationship' with Washington. Germany must begin to show the same level of ambition to influence global events that it shows in its economic leadership of the Eurozone crisis.

And Turkey, a crucial bridge between west and east and NATO's only member growing in influence, should be offered a position of leadership in the Alliance commensurate to the leading role it is playing in the emerging Middle East. In turn, Ankara needs to stop obstructing Alliance activities over issues such as Cyprus, Israel, or NATO's work with the European Union.

Furthermore, NATO's next tier of allies – Poland, Italy, Spain, and Canada – should be challenged to step up their roles within the Alliance and bear more of the burden of NATO operations. As they do, these allies should be given greater say in leading the Alliance.

The NATO summit in Chicago will not solve all the challenges facing the Alliance. But it can set the table for a brighter future for the Alliance. With the right mix of US leadership, European ambition, and stronger global partnerships, NATO can begin to trade its 'dim and dismal' future for another decade of success.

Thank you Mister Chairman, Ranking Member, and Members of the Committee. I look forward to answering your questions.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Wilson.  
Mr. Coffey?

**STATEMENT OF MR. LUKE COFFEY, MARGARET THATCHER  
FELLOW, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION**

Mr. COFFEY. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, members of the committee, I am honored to speak before your esteemed committee about the upcoming NATO Summit in Chicago.

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I will summarize my full statement that I would like to submit to the record.

Having lived and worked in Europe before joining the Heritage Foundation, I have firsthand understanding why a strong transatlantic relationship is a necessity for America and not just a luxury. This is why the Summit in Chicago will be so important.

The top three items on the Summit's agenda will likely be Afghanistan, Smart Defense, and NATO partnerships. Mr. Chairman, I would like to take these in turn.

First, Afghanistan. For the Chicago Summit to be considered a success, two outcomes regarding Afghanistan must be realized. First, even as more of the country is transitioning from ISAF to Afghan security lead, this cannot be used as an excuse for our NATO members to leave the country prematurely. Any withdrawal of ISAF forces from Afghanistan should be based on improved security conditions on the ground and on sound military advice. When these security conditions are met, NATO's eventual withdrawal from Afghanistan should be a phaseout and not a walkout. There should be no rush to the door.

Supporting this, the conditions-based language that was used in the 2010 Lisbon Summit declaration should also be used in the Chicago Summit declaration. Secondly, there must be a clear commitment made by NATO to Afghanistan post-2015, in particular, regarding the financial support for the AMSF. So far, the United Kingdom, with the third largest GDP in NATO, has been the only country to publicly commit funds for the AMSF after 2015. However, with the budgetary requirements of \$4 billion per annum, the \$110 million that the UK has pledged will pay for the first 10 days of the year. So, in this area, NATO has a long way to go.

After Afghanistan, Smart Defense will feature on the Summit's agenda. Smart Defense aims to encourage allies to cooperate in developing, acquiring, and maintaining military capabilities in a more economically-efficient manner in this age of austerity. At the Summit, we expect NATO to agree to a number of Smart Defense measures. While the aims of Smart Defense are noble, I fear that the initiative is likely to amount to little beyond a list of aspirations if there is no new funding attached to these proposals.

As Libya pointed out, Europe relies too much on the U.S. to pick up the slack when key enablers are required for alliance operations. This is a result of a decrease in defense spending across Europe combined with a lack of political will to use military capability when and where it may be needed.

Mr. Chairman, as you have already pointed out, only three of the 28 NATO members meet the 2 percent mark of GDP spending. As expected, France fell below the 2 percent mark in 2011. Spain, with

the world's 12th largest economy, was only able to spend less than 1 percent of GDP on defense.

To put this into perspective, with an annual budget of \$4.5 billion for the NYPD, New York City spends more in policing than 13 NATO members spend on their defense. Spending on EU defense initiatives also exacerbates the dire financial situation since it can divert scarce resources away from NATO. Every euro or pound that is spent on EU defense is one less that can be invested into the NATO alliance.

For this reason, the U.S. should send a clear message that it does not support deeper EU defense integration. The language describing Smart Defense may read well in a Summit declaration, but until there is real money backing up real investment, delivering real capability to the battlefield, Smart Defense will be meaningless to the men and women serving on the frontlines.

Finally, the issue of NATO partnerships. In light of the 2011 popular uprisings across North Africa and the Middle East, there is a renewed focus on how NATO works with regional partners. NATO has done little to enhance the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. This needs to change.

A step in the right direction out of Chicago would be a formal invitation for Libya to join the Mediterranean Dialogue. Building on lessons learned, working with Gulf states during the Libya operation, there could be more concrete proposals to enhance the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative by expanding its membership or agreeing to individual partnership and cooperation programs with the Gulf states.

Another aspect of NATO's partnerships is enlargement or, in the case of Chicago, the lack thereof. Regarding enlargement, there are two specific issues I would like to highlight. The first is Georgia. Georgia spends approximately 4 percent of GDP on defense and, as was already mentioned, will soon become the largest per-capita troop contributor to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. The Summit declaration must include strong and clear language reaffirming NATO's commitment to Georgia's eventual membership to the alliance.

Secondly, Macedonia should have been given full membership 4 years ago and should be given membership at Chicago. It is an absurdity that the Greeks, who, frankly, relied heavily on the financial goodwill of their European neighbors, continue to veto Macedonia's membership because of a name dispute. And the U.S. should apply more pressure to the Greeks to agree to a compromise with Macedonia.

In conclusion, it is in America's interest to see a successful Summit. With the perception that the administration is shifting its defense priorities from Europe to Asia, America's NATO allies should not be forgotten. NATO has done more to promote democracy, peace, and security in Europe than any other multilateral organization, including the European Union. It is essential that the United States continues to be an active participant in the alliance's future.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to taking your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Coffey follows:]



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*CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY*

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**NATO: The Chicago Summit and  
U.S. Policy**

**Testimony before  
The Committee on Foreign Affairs'  
Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia  
United States House of Representatives**

**April 26, 2012**

**Luke Coffey  
Margaret Thatcher Fellow  
The Heritage Foundation**



Chairman Burton, Ranking Member Meeks, Members of the Committee, I am honored to speak to you today about the upcoming NATO Summit in Chicago.

My name is Luke Coffey. I am the Margaret Thatcher Fellow in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom at The Heritage Foundation. The views I express in this testimony are my own, and should not be construed as representing any official position of The Heritage Foundation.

Having lived and worked in Europe dealing with defense and political issues for the past ten years before recently joining the Heritage Foundation, I have first hand understanding why a strong trans-Atlantic relationship is a necessity for America, and not a luxury. This is why the Summit in Chicago will be so important.

On May 20-21, 2012, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will hold its first summit in the U.S. in more than 13 years. This will also be the first NATO summit in the U.S. ever to be held outside Washington, D.C.<sup>1</sup> The theme running through the conference is expected to be renewing the transatlantic relationship between North America and Europe.

The agenda is likely to contain three major items:

- 1) Afghanistan: Finalizing the transition plan by the end of 2014 and establishing an enduring political and financial commitment to Afghanistan after 2015.
- 2) Smart Defense: Realizing the ambition of the NATO Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, to better coordinate investment in defense capability in the era of reduced defense spending.
- 3) NATO's Partnerships: In light of the interdependent and globalized nature of the world, examine how NATO can better work with non-NATO partners.

Other issues, such as solidifying agreements made at the Lisbon Summit on NATO transformation, the future of NATO's ballistic missile defense, NATO's open door to enlargement, and the future of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, will also be addressed at the Summit.

Absent from the Summit will be enlargement, even though Macedonia is more than ready to formally join the alliance; Russia, which has chosen not to attend, and any meaningful discussion on Syria.

This Summit will also bring unique challenges for some NATO leaders. With the U.S. presidential election being held later this year the Administration will want a carefully choreographed and "good news" summit. The British Prime Minister David Cameron

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<sup>1</sup> Press Release, "We Know Chicagoans Will Warmly Welcome our NATO Allies," Offices of U.S. Senators Mark Kirk (R-Ill.) and Dick Durbin (D-Ill.), March 30, 2012, at [http://www.kirk.senate.gov/?p=press\\_release&id=467](http://www.kirk.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=467) (April 19, 2012).

will be attending the Summit at a time when he is experiencing his lowest poll numbers since the election in May 2010. Finally, whoever wins the second round of the French presidential election on May 6 will be heading straight into the NATO Summit only a fortnight later.

### **The Road from Lisbon.**

In November 2010 NATO leaders met in Lisbon, Portugal, for the Alliance's 24<sup>th</sup> Summit. The main focus of this summit was publishing NATO's new Strategic Concept, which defined the Alliance's strategic priorities for the next decade. However, what the Summit was most remembered for was the formal beginning of the Afghan transition strategy and agreement by NATO to end combat operations by the end of 2014.

There were several notable outcomes of the Lisbon Summit:

*Transition plan for Afghanistan.* In addition to the usual Summit Declaration, two Afghan related declarations were also agreed: Declaration by NATO and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on an Enduring Partnership and the Declaration by the Heads of State and Government of the Nations contributing to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The Summit formally agreed that ISAF-led combat operations would end in Afghanistan by the end of 2014 with full security transition to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) taking place during this time.

*The publication of the Strategic Concept.* This was the third NATO Strategic Concept published since the end of the Cold War. The document aims to chart a path for NATO over the next decade by examining what capabilities the Alliance will need in order to best be prepared for future threats.

*NATO Transformation.* This was probably the biggest accomplishment of the Summit but the one left largely unnoticed. After decades of bloated and costly NATO command structures, the new command structure agreed at Lisbon represents a significant reduction in the number of headquarters and in manpower totaling a savings of 35%. Also, agreed was the reforming and consolidation of NATO's 14 Agencies with the aim of reducing this number to three: namely the Communications and Information (C&I) Agency, the Support Agency, and the Procurement Agency.<sup>2</sup>

*NATO-Russia relations.* There was a NATO-Russia Council meeting at Lisbon which focused on mutual security concerns including Afghanistan, regional terrorism, and counternarcotics. Although vague, there was language in the Summit Declaration that invited Russia to cooperate with NATO on missile defense. However, there was also strong language in the Declaration calling on Russia "to reverse its recognition of the South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions of Georgia as independent states."

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<sup>2</sup>Press Release, "NATO Achieves Important Milestone in Reform of its Agencies," North Atlantic Treaty Organization, January 23, 2012, at [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news\\_83637.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_83637.htm) (April 18, 2012).

In addition, NATO agreed at the Lisbon Summit to:

Develop a missile defense capability to protect all NATO European populations, territory, and forces.

Continue to review NATO's overall defense and deterrence posture. This further delayed the decision on U.S. tactical Nuclear weapons in Europe.

Maintain its open door policy for democratic European countries wishing to join the Alliance. Although NATO didn't grant Georgia a Membership Action Plan, the Alliance reaffirmed its commitment to eventual Georgian membership agreed at the 2008 NATO Summit in Bucharest.

### **What to Expect from the Chicago Summit**

#### *Afghanistan*

The current situation in Afghanistan remains stable but fragile. As a result of the surge of U.S. and coalition troops, and the implementation of a robust population-centric counterinsurgency strategy in 2010, there have been notable security gains on the ground.

Levels of violence are also lower across the country, and the recent attacks in Kabul should not be viewed in isolation. Although Kabul accounts for almost 15% of Afghanistan's population, the city accounts for less than 1% of the country's violence. Nationally, the level of enemy-initiated attacks during the last three months is 21% lower compared with the same period in 2011. Each month since May 2011 had fewer enemy-initiated attacks than the corresponding month one year before. This is the longest sustained downward trend in enemy-initiated attacks recorded by ISAF.<sup>3</sup>

Since late 2009 the main effort for the military campaign in Afghanistan has been in the south and southwest of the country—mainly in Zabul, Kandahar, and Helmand provinces. This was considered to be the center of gravity for the Taliban-based insurgency. With the security situation largely improved in the southwest of Afghanistan<sup>4</sup> the main effort will shift to the east of the country, primarily Paktika, Paktiya and Khost provinces (known as the P2K region). This area is directly across the border from Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas, contains many of the traditional avenues of approach from the Pakistani border regions to Kabul, and is the operating home base for the Haqqani Network. Also, securing Highway One between Kabul and Kandahar will be a priority for ISAF.

<sup>3</sup> International Security and Assistance Force, ISAF Monthly Data Trends through March 2012, April 22, 2012, at [http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/20120422\\_niu\\_data\\_release\\_final.pdf](http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/20120422_niu_data_release_final.pdf) (April, 24 2012).

<sup>4</sup> In Regional Command Southwest, enemy initiated attacks in the last 12 months are 35 percent lower compared to the same 12 months one year earlier.

At the 2010 Lisbon Summit NATO agreed on a plan to transition security responsibility to the Afghans. The first tranche of provinces, districts, and municipalities comprising 25% of Afghanistan's population was handed over to the Afghans in July 2011. The second tranche of provinces, districts, and municipalities to be transitioned was announced in November 2011. Currently, the Afghans have the security lead for more than 50% of the country's population.<sup>5</sup> The next round of transition will take place before this summer and the final stages are expected to be decided at the Chicago Summit. The goal is that by the end of 2014 all of Afghanistan would have transitioned over to Afghan security lead.

For the Chicago Summit to be considered a success two outcomes regarding Afghanistan must be realized.

First, even as more of the country is transitioning from ISAF to Afghan security lead this cannot be used as an excuse for countries to leave Afghanistan prematurely. Any withdrawal of ISAF forces from Afghanistan must be based on improved conditions on the ground and on military advice. When these security conditions are met, NATO's withdrawal should be a phase-out and not a walkout.

The language used in the Lisbon Declaration stated that "transition will be conditions-based, not calendar-driven, and will not equate to withdrawal of ISAF-troops."<sup>6</sup> Since then the use of "conditions-based" language has all but disappeared. NATO leaders must ensure that similar language is used in the Chicago Declaration. However, words are not enough and NATO must implement a conditions-based strategy in practice.

Many European NATO allies are coming under considerable public and political pressure to leave Afghanistan. The situation was exacerbated earlier this year when Defense Secretary Leon Panetta stated that the transition process could be completed by 2013<sup>7</sup>—earlier than the end of 2014 deadline agreed at the Lisbon Summit.<sup>8</sup> Comments suggesting that the U.S. may end combat operations earlier than agreed at the Lisbon Summit could potentially persuade many of our European allies to leave Afghanistan sooner than originally planned.

<sup>5</sup> Press Release, "Statement by NATO Secretary General on Afghan transition announcement," North Atlantic Treaty Organization, November 27, 2011, at [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-656CC458-77FAA000/natolive/news\\_81068.htm?mode=pressrelease](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-656CC458-77FAA000/natolive/news_81068.htm?mode=pressrelease) (April 20, 2012).

<sup>6</sup> Press Release, "Lisbon Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Lisbon," North Atlantic Treaty Organization, November 20, 2010, at [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official\\_texts\\_68828.htm?mode=pressrelease](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm?mode=pressrelease) (April 21, 2012).

<sup>7</sup> Press Release, "Media Availability with Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta," Department of Defense, February 1, 2012, at <http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4967> (April 23, 2012).

<sup>8</sup> Press Release, "Lisbon Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Lisbon," North Atlantic Treaty Organization, November 20, 2010, at [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official\\_texts\\_68828.htm?mode=pressrelease](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm?mode=pressrelease) (April 21, 2012).

The UK will soon decide its rate of withdrawal when its National Security Council meets later this year. In fact, it would come as no surprise if Prime Minister Cameron announced further troop reductions at Chicago. Such an announcement would be popular back in the UK at a time when the government is polling low. It is well known across Whitehall that there are cabinet members in the British government who would leave Afghanistan tomorrow if given the opportunity.

Some European partners have announced troop reductions for 2012. The issue of Afghanistan has featured prominently in the recent French presidential campaign. President Nicolas Sarkozy has promised to speed up France's withdrawal timetable, pulling out 1,000 troops instead of the originally planned 600 by the end of 2012 with the rest of French troops leaving the country by the end of 2013.<sup>9</sup> His socialist presidential contender, Francois Hollande, has campaigned on bringing all French troops home in 2012.

Most recently, Australia has announced that all of its troops will be leaving Afghanistan by the end of 2013 instead of the end of 2014, as previously planned. There are concerns in Australia that this announcement was politically motivated by Prime Minister Julia Gillard, as the new timeline of withdrawal would mean that Australian troops would be home before the next general election.<sup>10</sup>

On a positive note, it is worth pointing out that Georgia is the only country committing more troops to Afghanistan in 2012. It will be doubling its contribution later this year in Helmand Province, making it the largest per capita troop contributing nation in ISAF—an example for all of NATO.

Secondly, there must be some clear commitment to Afghanistan made for the NATO-Afghan relationship post 2015. Afghanistan will need financial support from the international community for the foreseeable future.

A major part of the post-2015 commitment to Afghanistan will be mentoring, training, and funding the ANSF. The current size of the Afghan National Army is 176,350 and more than 143,000 for Afghan National Police. Added to this will be integrating the members of the Afghan Local Police<sup>11</sup> program currently numbering around 12,000 personnel with a goal of 30,000.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>9</sup> News Wires, "France to leave Afghanistan in 2013, Sarkozy says," Associated Press, January 28, 2012, at <http://www.france24.com/en/20120127-karzai-sarkozy-visit-paris-military-withdrawal-afghanistan-nato> (April 22, 2012).

<sup>10</sup> British Broadcasting Cooperation, "Australian PM Sets Out Afghan Exit Plan", April 17, 2012, at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-17737592> (April 22, 2012)

<sup>11</sup> Established in July 2010, the Afghan Local Police allows local Afghan villages to have a stake in their own security where there is limited or no formal ANSF presence. The ALP is closely monitored and falls under the responsibility of the Afghan Ministry of Interior.

<sup>12</sup> CJ Radin, "Report: Afghan Local Counterinsurgency Programs Prove Successful," *The Long War Journal*, April 4, 2012, at [http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2012/04/report\\_local\\_counterinsurgency.php](http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2012/04/report_local_counterinsurgency.php) (April 22, 2012).

Under current plans the total number of the ANSF is expected to fall to 240,000 sometime after 2014. This will come with a price tag of approximately \$4 billion per year for the international community— or equal to what the U.S. currently spends every 12 days in Afghanistan.<sup>13</sup> While an agreement may not be finalized at Chicago, it is important that the groundwork is laid for the next international summit on Afghanistan in Tokyo this summer.

However, there is currently a debate inside NATO on how big the ANSF should be. Of course, this will affect its future funding requirements. NATO leaders should not be tempted to reduce the size and capability of the ANSF, and therefore the security of the Afghans, simply for financial reasons. As the Afghan Defense Minister, Gen. Abdul Rahim Wardak, recently pointed out:

Nobody at this moment, based on any type of analysis, can predict what will be the security situation in 2014. That's unpredictable. Going lower [in Afghan troop numbers] has to be based on realities on the ground. Otherwise it will be a disaster, it will be a catastrophe, putting at risk all that we have accomplished together with so much sacrifice in blood and treasure.<sup>14</sup>

The ANSF are for the first time reaching a standard of capability required to carry out autonomous operations. The ANSF are far from being perfect, but that was never the goal. The goal is to get the forces to a level where they can handle the insurgency themselves, without tens of thousands of Western troops on the ground. Paraphrasing T. E. Lawrence on the Arabs, it is better that they do it tolerably than we do it perfectly.

#### *Smart Defense*

After Afghanistan, the Smart Defense initiative will feature prominently on the Summit's agenda.

According to the NATO website, Smart Defense aims to encourage allies to cooperate in developing, acquiring, and maintaining military capabilities in a more economically efficient manner in the new age of economic austerity and defense cuts. In sum, the goal is to do more with less as a result of changing NATO members' mindset on how to do business and being "smarter" when investing in defense capabilities.

Smart Defense is the brainchild of the NATO Secretary General and he has invested a lot of personnel and political capital in developing it. While the aims of Smart Defense are noble, and the plan is ambitious, it is likely to amount to very little in terms of substance

<sup>13</sup> Based on an American monthly expenditure of \$10 billion.

<sup>14</sup> Yaroslav Trofimov, "Afghan General Sounds Alarm: Defense Minister Says New U.S. Proposal to Cut Local Troop, Police Forces Risks Endangering Nation," *The Wall Street Journal*, February 18, 2012, at <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204059804577229081438477796.html> (April 20, 2012).

and real capability. For this reason NATO leaders should avoid placing all of their hope on Smart Defense as the panacea for NATO's capability shortfalls.

Although Smart Defense was not a Lisbon Summit issue, the leaders of NATO endorsed the Lisbon Package of reforms which planted the seed of Smart Defense.

The goal of the Lisbon Package was to provide a renewed focus inside the Alliance to ensure that critical capabilities required by members were available on time and on budget. In turn, this would allow NATO to meet the demands of its ongoing operations, prepare for evolving and emerging security challenges, and acquire key enabling capabilities.<sup>15</sup> While NATO has been good at identifying the trend of future threats, its members have not been good at funding the capabilities needed to address them.

As Libya and other NATO campaigns have demonstrated time and again, Europe relies too much on the U.S. to pick up the slack when key enablers such as air-to-air refueling and ISTAR are required for Alliance operations. This is mainly the result of a decrease in defense investment by the members of NATO since the end of the Cold War and the lack of political will to use military capability when and where it is needed.

Many leaders in Europe say that the first duty of government is the defense of the realm, but few leaders actually implement this view in practice. Spending is about setting national priorities. To this end Europeans have become complacent about their own defense and overly dependent on the U.S. security umbrella.

Since 2008 16 European members of NATO have decreased their military spending. Real-terms declines for many of these countries have exceeded 10%.<sup>16</sup> Information provided by NATO shows that in 2011 just three of the 28 NATO members—the United States, Britain, and Greece—spent the 2% of GDP on defense that is required. As expected, France fell below the 2% mark in 2011.<sup>17</sup> However, Estonia claims it might reach the 2% requirement this year.<sup>18</sup>

To put this into perspective, with an annual budget of \$4.5 billion, New York City spends more on policing than 13 NATO members spend on defense.

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<sup>15</sup> Press Release, "Lisbon Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Lisbon," North Atlantic Treaty Organization, November 20, 2010, at [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official\\_texts\\_68828.htm?mode=pressrelease](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm?mode=pressrelease) (April 21, 2012).

<sup>16</sup> Press Release, "Military Balance 2012" International Institute for Strategic Studies, March 7, 2012, at <http://www.iiss.org/publications/military-balance/the-military-balance-2012/press-statement/> (April 22, 2012).

<sup>17</sup> Press Release, "Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence," North Atlantic Treaty Organization, April 13, 2012, at [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news\\_85966.htm?mode=pressrelease](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_85966.htm?mode=pressrelease) (April 22, 2012).

<sup>18</sup> Claudio Bisogniero, "Speech on NATO's Smart Defence Initiative" North Atlantic Treaty Organization, December 15, 2012, at [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-59141228-30D24899/natolive/opinions\\_83096.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-59141228-30D24899/natolive/opinions_83096.htm) (April 22, 2012).

The UK is currently meeting the 2% benchmark only because of its expenditure on combat operations in Afghanistan. The current British government has only committed to the 2% benchmark through the end of its current Parliament in 2015.<sup>19</sup> It is difficult to tell if America's number one ally will even meet the NATO threshold by 2015.

What makes this even more worrying is that the definition used by NATO to define what can be counted towards the 2% benchmark is very generous. It includes the core defense budget, extra expenditure on operations, and expenditure on military pensions. Even so, only a handful can meet this benchmark of 2%.

Spending on European Union (EU) defense initiatives also exacerbates the dire financial situation since it diverts scarce resources away from NATO. For example the proposal to create a permanent EU headquarters would have cost hundreds of million of euros at a time when NATO is streamlining and reducing the number of its headquarters. Thankfully, this was vetoed by the British.

Every euro or pound spent on EU defense is one less that could be invested in NATO. For this reason the U.S. should send a clear and unequivocal message that it does not support EU defense investment and integration.

Proponents of EU defense integration argue that EU capabilities can be also be made available to NATO. I would caution against the belief that capabilities developed through the EU will be readily available for NATO. There are six veto-wielding members of the EU that are not members of NATO. Some of which, for example Cyprus, are politically hostile towards NATO as an alliance.

The European Union can never be a serious defense actor, because it has six neutral member states<sup>20</sup> and it excludes two important NATO defense partners, Norway and Turkey, from its defense and security decision-making process. Furthermore, NATO and the EU cannot formally cooperate because Cyprus regularly blocks NATO-EU cooperation for self-serving reasons. Therefore, EU defense initiatives are not only a waste of resources but also are politically pointless.

At the Chicago Summit we can expect NATO to agree on a number of Smart Defense measures. These measures will include areas such as force protection, communication, surveillance and intelligence gathering, and missile defense.

However, some of NATO's best examples of Smart Defense have proven to be neither new nor smart. For example, two examples of Smart Defense regularly given are Allied Ground Surveillance (AGS) and Baltic Air Policing.

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<sup>19</sup> UK Ministry of Defense, "Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review," October 2010, p. 3 at [http://www.direct.gov.uk/prod\\_consum\\_dg/groups/dg\\_digitalassets/@dg/@en/documents/digitalassets/dg\\_191634.pdf](http://www.direct.gov.uk/prod_consum_dg/groups/dg_digitalassets/@dg/@en/documents/digitalassets/dg_191634.pdf) (April 17, 2012).

<sup>20</sup> Sweden, Finland, Ireland, Cyprus, Malta, and Austria.



Allied Ground Surveillance is a NATO initiative designed to increase the Alliance's intelligence gathering and surveillance capabilities. However, the development and agreement of AGS by NATO took 20 years—hardly a model for Smart Defense.

The addition of Baltic Air Policing in 2004 was the natural extension of the comprehensive system of air surveillance that has been in place since the 1970s—not particularly a new way of doing business.

It is also expected that the Chicago Summit will formally approve the Secretary General's Connected Forces Initiative as a key part of Smart Defense. According to the Secretary General the Connected Forces Initiative will complement Smart Defense by “mobilizing all of NATO's resources so we strengthen our ability to work together in a truly connected way.” There are three parts to the Connected Forces Initiative:

- 1) Training and education—getting more value for the alliance from national education facilities
- 2) Increased exercises—a result of NATO training being reduced over the years due to the high operational tempo of NATO forces in places like Afghanistan. As these operational commitments decrease, the number of training event should increase.
- 3) Better use of technology—improving interoperability between NATO partners through the use of technology.<sup>21</sup>

For Smart Defense to work there must be willingness by NATO members to potentially give up certain capabilities so that the Alliance can collectively fund and maintain them. However, there is a risk that the capability being shared by NATO won't be available, or be authorized for use, when it might be needed by a member state.

For example, AWAC<sup>22</sup> planes have been shared by the Alliance since 1982. This has allowed member states to pool a niche capability that allowed them to free up investment for other capabilities. However, during the run-up to the 2003 Iraq war Turkey requested support from NATO, in the form of NATO AWACs, to defend its airspace, against possible Iraqi intrusion. Initially, this request for NATO support was vetoed by Germany, Belgium, and France on the grounds that any move by NATO to protect Turkey's airspace would be implicit support of the pending U.S.-led invasion of Iraq.

Eventually an agreement was made and NATO assets were deployed but only after a parliamentary procedure was used allowing NATO to agree to deployment inside its Defense Planning Committee, which at the time did not include France. With French opposition sidelined, Germany and Belgium eventually supported the move. If it wasn't

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<sup>21</sup> Anders Fogh Rasmussen, “Remarks at the Munich Security Conference,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, February 4, 2012, at [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-AD1FADE5-491706F7/natolive/opinions\\_84197.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-AD1FADE5-491706F7/natolive/opinions_84197.htm) (April 19, 2012).

<sup>22</sup> Airborne Warning and Control System.

for this fact Turkey would have been denied the use of a capability that it had invested in and in which it thought was required for its national security.

A similar situation occurred with AWACs during the recent NATO-led Libya operation. Germany would not allow its crews to operate the NATO AWACs over Libya so German crews had to backfill other NATO crews serving in Afghanistan so they could be diverted to support NATO operations over Libya.

The Smart Defense initiative runs the risk of allowing European countries to believe that they can do more with less, when in actuality they will be doing less with less. Smart Defense has been the topic of countless conferences, meetings, and seminars across Europe but has resulted in very little beyond a list of aspirations. The language describing Smart Defense may read well in a Summit Declaration but until there is real money, backing up real investment, delivering real capability to the modern-day battlefield this will be meaningless to the men and women serving on the front lines.

For Smart Defense to work, it requires real military capability and real money. No clever nomenclature can get around this problem.

#### *NATO Partnerships*

The 2010 Strategic Concept states that cooperative security is one of NATO's three essential core tasks<sup>23</sup>. As NATO becomes a security actor in more places around the world the Alliance will have to continuously adjust how it manages its external relationships.

There is not a NATO led mission currently taking place that does not include non-NATO partners. There are 22 non-NATO partners in Afghanistan.<sup>24</sup> There are seven non-NATO partners in Kosovo as part of NATO's KFOR, including more than hundred Moroccans.<sup>25</sup> NATO's counter-piracy mission, Operation Ocean Shield, regularly cooperates with non-NATO countries, including Russia and India. Most recently, the NATO led operation in Libya included four non-NATO partners. So it is important that NATO is able to plan, coordinate, and fight alongside non-NATO partners.

Currently, NATO manages its relationships with regional and global partners through a myriad of networks with non-NATO countries. These are:

*The Euro Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace.* These form the basis of NATO's relations with Euro-Atlantic partners who are not formally part of the alliance for various reasons.

<sup>23</sup> Collective Defense and Crisis Management are the other two.

<sup>24</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "ISAF troop numbers and contributions." April 2012, at <http://www.isaf.nato.int/troop-numbers-and-contributions/index.php> (April 23, 2012).

<sup>25</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "Kosovo Force: Key Facts and Figures," March 30, 2012, at [http://www.nato.int/kfor/structur/nations/placemap/kfor\\_placemat.pdf](http://www.nato.int/kfor/structur/nations/placemap/kfor_placemat.pdf) (April 22, 2012).

*The Mediterranean Dialogue.* Launched in 1994, this grouping forms the basis of NATO's relations with its Mediterranean partners. Participants include Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia. Although these relations are normally done on a bilateral basis (NATO+1) there have been occasions when this forum meets as NATO+7, meaning Israel would be at the same table as some of its regional neighbors, where it otherwise would not be.

*Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.* Launched in 2004, this grouping forms the basis of NATO's relations with the Gulf States. Initially all six countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council were invited to join but only four, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Kuwait, have become participants so far.

*Contact Countries or Global Partners.* This concept allows NATO to cooperate with countries well out of the traditional Euro-Atlantic area such as Japan, Australia, and South Korea.

Any nation participating in any of these schemes can also agree to establish an Individual and Partnership Cooperation Program (IPCP).<sup>26</sup> The IPCP allows increased political and security cooperation on a bilateral basis in order to meet the specific needs of the participating country.

The Lisbon Summit Declaration agreed to further develop political dialogue and practical cooperation with NATO partner nations. The importance of these relationships was strongly reiterated but there were few concrete proposals beyond the usual flowery language to take these relations to the next level.

Although it has been touted as one of the big three agenda items, it is unclear how NATO leaders plan to enhance NATO's partnerships at Chicago. However, in light of the 2011 popular uprisings across North Africa and the Middle-East, the nuclear threat from Iran, and the recent NATO-led operation in Libya, many in NATO have rightly decided to place a renewed focus on how NATO works with regional partners on its periphery.

To date both the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative have received mere lip service. Beyond the occasional meeting or limited joint training exercises little has been done between NATO and these organizations. One proposal that could come out of Chicago would be a formal invitation for Libya to join the Mediterranean Dialogue. This idea has already been floated by the U.S. Ambassador to NATO.<sup>27</sup> This would illustrate NATO's commitment to the new Libyan government simply formalize an already existing relationship.

<sup>26</sup> Formally known as the Individual Cooperation Program.

<sup>27</sup> Press Release: "Foreign Press Center Roundtable with Ambassador Ivo Daalder, U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO: The Success of NATO Operations in Libya and the Vital Contributions of Partners Outside of NATO." U.S. Department of State, November 7, 2011 at <http://nato.usmission.gov/fpcroundtable2011.html> (April 23, 2012).

Building on lessons learned from Libya there could be more concrete proposals to enhance the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. For the first time air forces from the UAE and Qatar were fully integrated into a NATO command during the Libyan operation. This experience could be used to increase cooperation and reach out to other countries in the Middle East who are not participating in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. . The Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, with its focus on the Gulf region, could become increasingly important as Iran continues to develop its nuclear weapons program.

In the Mediterranean Dialogue only Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Mauritania, and Tunisia have IPCPs with NATO. None of the participants in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative have an IPCP with NATO. The Chicago Summit could offer an opportunity to invite Gulf States like Qatar and the UAE, both of which have proven to be credible partners, to agree to IPCPs with NATO.

Absent from the Summit's agenda: the enlargement of NATO. Since taking office, President Obama has done little to support the membership of qualified candidates.

NATO's "open door policy" is critical to mobilizing Europe and its allies around a collective transatlantic defense. According to Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, any European state that fulfills the requirements of the treaty and demonstrates the competency to contribute to the alliance's security is eligible for membership. The U.S. should take steps to make sure that the open door policy is not stifled.

There are four countries that are considered NATO aspirant countries: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Macedonia, and Montenegro. On a positive note there is expected to be a "NATO+4" meeting during the Summit.

*Macedonia.* Upon completing its Membership Action Plan (MAP) in 2008, Macedonia anticipated an invitation to join the alliance at the NATO summit in Bucharest. Yet, despite fulfilling all necessary requirements for membership, Macedonia's accession was unilaterally vetoed by Greece, with which Skopje is engaged in a long-standing dispute regarding its constitutional name. The International Court of Justice found last December that Greece's veto was in blatant violation of the 1995 United Nations-brokered Interim Accord, in which Athens agreed not to impair Macedonia's integration into Europe. Greece has jeopardized NATO's open door policy and NATO members should pressure Greece to work with Macedonia to seek reconciliation.

*Montenegro.* Montenegro is making steady progress in its path toward NATO membership. Having received a MAP in 2009, Montenegro is currently in its second Annual National Program (ANP) cycle. Despite its progress, Montenegro will not be ready to join the alliance by May.

*Bosnia and Herzegovina.* Offered its MAP in 2010, Bosnia and Herzegovina must make substantial improvements politically and militarily before it can be considered a serious NATO aspirant. Bosnia and Herzegovina has made some progress and has even deployed troops to Afghanistan. However, before its government can begin work on the MAP, it

must register all immovable defense properties as state property, for use by the country's defense ministry. Little progress on this has been made.

*Georgia.* At the Bucharest Summit in 2008, Georgia was promised NATO membership. However, owing to opposition from France and Germany, the alliance substituted a MAP for the NATO–Georgia Commission. Unfortunately, the NATO–Georgia Commission is not expected to meet during the Chicago Summit.

Georgia has made significant strides toward defense reform and spends approximately 4 percent of GDP on defense, when the NATO average is less than half of that. While many NATO members have announced troop reductions in Afghanistan for 2012, Georgia is the only country committing more troops to the mission this year. Georgia has become a serious security actor in recent years. In addition to Afghanistan, Georgia has contributed to peacekeeping missions in the Balkans and, at the time of the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008, was the second-largest troop contributor to Iraq after the United States.

The biggest hurdle for Georgian membership from a western perspective is the continued Russian occupation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, equating to 20% of Georgia's internationally recognized territory. Privately, Georgian officials say that they are happy to accept a NATO membership arrangement/compromise that temporarily excludes the two occupied territories from NATO's Article 5 security guarantee until there is a peaceful resolution to the matter with the Russians. NATO should continue to support and assist with Georgia's reform process and offer a MAP. However, the U.S. should also point out that MAP is not the only way towards NATO membership.

In conclusion, it is in America's interest to see a successful Summit. With the perception that the Administration is shifting its defense priorities from Europe to Asia, America's NATO allies should not be forgotten.

NATO has done more for Europe to promote democracy, peace, and security than any other multilateral organization, including the European Union. It is essential that the United States continue to be an active participant in the Alliance's future.

Thank you Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee.

I look forward to answering your questions.

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Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Coffey.  
Mr. Flanagan?

**STATEMENT OF STEPHEN FLANAGAN, PH.D., HENRY A. KISSINGER CHAIR IN DIPLOMACY AND NATIONAL SECURITY, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES**

Mr. FLANAGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is an honor to be here before you today, and, Mr. Meeks, coming back.

I have a prepared statement that reviews the political and strategic context of the Chicago Summit and offers some perspectives from the vantage point of U.S. interest in each of the three principal elements of the Summit agenda: Afghanistan, military capabilities, and partnerships. I also comment on some of the missing elements of the agenda that we have touched on already today: Enlargement and the further development of partnerships, but also the Nuclear Posture Review, the Defense and Deterrence Posture Review, which we haven't touched on yet today.

But I would ask that my prepared statement be made available for the record, sir.

The vision and the mission statement articulated in the 2010 Lisbon Summit, the strategic concept which articulated a notion of active engagement and modern defense remains valid. I think the Chicago Summit needs to illustrate that the alliance is actually implementing and delivering on those Lisbon decisions, particularly on Afghanistan.

But, given the dramatic changes in the international environment and in the fiscal situation in both Europe and the United States, the Obama administration and other allied governments I think have rightly chosen to make this more than an implementation Summit and to demonstrate that they are adjusting and adapting NATO's strategy to cope with these developments.

The Chicago Summit, on a political basis, also needs to reaffirm both sides of the transatlantic commitment. We have touched on some of this already, as members of the committee know.

You need no reminder on the whole question of inequitable burden-sharing and the continued slide in European defense spending. And indeed, the sad news is that even the NATO figures early this month have now reduced to only two countries meeting the 2 percent target goal, the UK and Greece. France has just slipped below 1.9.

American leaders, rightly, should have the expectation that Chicago should come up with some kind of a credible plan to redress this imbalance. Smart Defense and other military capabilities initiatives expected to be endorsed at Chicago have the potential to at least staunch the erosion of European military capabilities by assuring allocation of their remaining, and still considerable, defense resources is done more wisely.

At the same time, and we have touched on this earlier in the discussion today, a number of European leaders are concerned—and, Mr. Burton, you raised it earlier; it was Mr. Meeks, I am sorry, that raised it—hearing a number of Europeans concerned about how committed the U.S. is in the context of this realignment of our engagement and military assets toward East Asia and the Pacific, and the sense that perhaps Europe is going to be left to its own

in future crises or more in the lead, with the U.S. in a supporting role.

So, I think President Obama and others would do well to affirm in Chicago what he noted on the eve of the Lisbon Summit and several times since: That the United States does not have any other partner in any other region of the world like our European allies, and that we will continue and remain committed to European security and to working with our European allies to maintain our interests around the world in a more effective partnership.

Now, to talk a bit briefly about some of the successful outcomes, I think there are three, and we have touched on most of them already today. First of all, there has to be a credible commitment for assisting Afghanistan in maintaining its security through the transition to an Afghan lead in 2014 and beyond.

Secondly, I think we need a long-term strategy for allied defense planning and integration with some flagship initiatives and a detailed implementation plan to ensure that NATO has the critical military capability it needs for collective defense in addressing emerging security challenges.

There needs to be greater transparency in national defense spending and planning, so that allies can have a better sense of how their national decisions that are being made on an annual basis are having an impact on the overall capability of the alliance in various future contingencies.

Concrete steps also need to be taken, I think, for strengthening NATO's diverse networks of partnerships. These would include measures to engage some of the key contributors to alliance operations more effectively, but also I think, as we have touched on earlier today, to enhance our engagement with some of the countries in the Mediterranean Basin.

Now we can talk about the effectiveness and the viability of all of these commitments I think perhaps in the questions and answers. But let me just talk a little bit about a couple of the missing elements of the agenda.

Since the Lisbon Summit, we have made progress on what is called the Berlin Partnership Package in the alliance. That is to allow NATO to work more flexibly and more nimbly with all of its allies, to open up the entire partnership tool-kit to various partners according to their interests and level of capacity. But, still, this partnership agenda seems to be the least-developed element of the Chicago agenda.

Of course, one of the big missing elements has been any kind of progress on the partnership with Russia, which of course has been hampered by progress on the missile defense dialogue, even though cooperation on Afghanistan has continued. So, there won't be a NATO Russia Council meeting in Chicago, but there is hope that Russia will come to the ISAF contributors' meeting. I think we still do need and should welcome Russia's support on some of those elements of our operations in Afghanistan.

Under consideration, as I said, is this issue of how to deal more effectively with the key contributors to our current operations and how to do that in a way that gives recognition and gives them some sense of a stake in some of these operations that they are contributing to in very effective ways.



But, as I say, there is also an opportunity to leverage some of the gains that we have made both with a number of Arab countries after the Libyan operation, but also the Mediterranean cooperation that we have had, particularly in the area of maritime security, to continue to enhance that capability, so that we can deal with a number of potential contingencies and instabilities in the Mediterranean Basin, but also to try to help advance the security sector reform in those areas.

As I said, there are two big issues that are out of the agenda that perhaps we can come back to in the discussion and question and answer. The whole question of enlargement, I do think that the Summit can set the framework for further decisions, reaffirm the commitments that have been made already in previous Summits going back to Bucharest and since, but also to set the stage for 2014, when the next Summit will be held, to actually move ahead with the membership of a number of the four—and, hopefully, one will be sooner; that is Macedonia—that those four recognized aspirant countries will go forward.

But, lastly, the alliance does need to come up with a clear strategy for maintaining an appropriate mix of nuclear forces, conventional, and missile defense in our overall alliance strategy. There has not been a consensus, particularly over some of the aspects of the nuclear question, within the alliance to achieve that. That was one of the Lisbon Summit taskings. It didn't have any specific timeline, but it is one that I think still warrants being addressed in the coming years. But, in the interim, there are some other steps that we can take to enhance that dialogue and, also, the discussions with the Russians over enhancing regional stability.

So, thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Meeks. I look forward to the questions and answers.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Flanagan follows.]

**U.S. House of Representatives  
Committee on Foreign Affairs  
Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia**

Hearing on

***“NATO: THE CHICAGO SUMMIT  
AND U.S. POLICY”***

Prepared Statement by

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**April 26, 2012**

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### **Prepared Statement**

Chairman Burton, Ranking Member Meeks, Members of the Subcommittee, I am honored to appear before you today to discuss U.S. policy with respect to NATO's May 20–21 Chicago Summit. After considering the strategic context of this Summit, I will then offer an assessment of successful outcomes at Chicago from the perspective of U.S. interests in each of the three principal elements of the summit agenda—Afghanistan, military capabilities, and partnerships.

In brief, I would consider the Chicago Summit a success if it yields:

1. a credible NATO commitment for assisting Afghanistan in maintaining its security through the transition to an Afghan lead in 2014 and beyond;
2. long-term strategy for enhancing allied defense planning and integration, with some flagship initiatives and a detailed implementation plan, to ensure NATO has the critical military capabilities it needs for collective defense and addressing emerging security challenges; and
3. concrete steps for strengthening NATO's diverse network of partners around the world, including measures to engage key contributors to Alliance operations more effectively.

### **Implement Lisbon; Adapt to New Strategic Realities; Reaffirm the Transatlantic Link**

When allies decided to schedule the Chicago Summit only 18 months after the landmark November 2010 Lisbon Summit, there was some sentiment that it would be an "implementation summit." After all, Lisbon capped an inclusive, two-year process of reflection and dialogue on the core missions and purpose of the Alliance and endorsed a new Strategic Concept to guide it in an era of global security. Lisbon also articulated a number of major commitments on Afghanistan, military capabilities, and partnerships. Fortunately, given the dramatic changes in the international environment since Lisbon—including the Arab Awakening, NATO's operation in Libya, the deepening of the European sovereign debt crisis, the rebalancing of U.S. diplomatic and military engagement toward Asia, and the continuing potential that Iran will develop nuclear weapons—this is not the course that the Obama administration and other allied governments have chosen to pursue. Individually and collectively, these developments call for adjustments to many Lisbon decisions.

The vision and mission statement articulated in the 2010 Strategic Concept—Active Engagement, Modern Defense—remain valid and Chicago needs to illustrate that the Alliance is actually implementing it and delivering on other Lisbon decisions and commitments. However, allies also need to demonstrate that they are adjusting their strategy to cope with European fiscal realities and the other strategic shifts I noted. NATO's mission in Libya illustrates this challenge. Operation Unified Protector made good on several Lisbon commitments—to better integrate its political and military tools for crisis management and to contribute to cooperative security in partnership with various countries and international organizations—and was successful in protecting the Libyan people from Gadhafi's butchery. However, the Libya air campaign also revealed major shortcomings in allied military planning, intelligence sharing, command and control, and sustainment. So Libya should rightly be heralded as a success, but it was also a stark

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reminder that allies need to redouble national and cooperative efforts to ensure that critical capabilities are available for future crisis response operations.

The Chicago Summit also needs to reaffirm both sides of the transatlantic commitment. Members of this subcommittee need no reminder of the simmering discontent among American political leaders with Europe's unequal sharing of burdens and risks in the maintenance of common defense and security. The corrosive consequences of this discontent for the Alliance were articulated most forcefully by former Secretary of Defense Gates in his valedictory speech in Brussels last June. American political leaders should rightfully expect their European counterparts to come to Chicago with a credible plan to redress this imbalance. The Smart Defense, Connected Forces, and other initiatives expected to be endorsed at Chicago have the potential to staunch the erosion of European military capabilities by ensuring wiser allocation of still considerable defense resources. At the same time, some European leaders are concerned that the reduction of the U.S. military presence in Europe and the Obama administration's realignment of diplomatic and military assets to East Asia and the Pacific will leave Europe to fend for itself in future crises. The U.S. decision to encourage European militaries play a leading role in the Libyan operations fed these fears. So President Obama would do well to reaffirm in Chicago what he noted on the eve of the Lisbon Summit and several times since: that the United States does not have another partner in any other region of the world that shares "such a close alignment of values, interests, capabilities and goals," such that Europe will remain Washington's partner of choice for the foreseeable future.

#### **The Afghanistan Commitment**

The most contentious items on the Chicago Summit agenda are reaffirming the Alliance's commitment to Afghanistan during the transition to an Afghan lead in security and defining the scope of NATO's post-2014 support. Despite differing signals earlier in the year about the exact timetable of the transition, allied defense and foreign ministers, along with representatives from 22 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) partners, reaffirmed last week their commitment to the current strategy and the 2014 timeline. Following the ministerial, it was reported that 23 nations had so far signed on to a "coalition of committed contributors" to fund the Afghan security forces after 2014, but for force levels considerably smaller than previously envisioned—230,000 in 2014 down from its expected peak of 352,000 this year. The total cost of supporting the smaller force is expected to be \$4 billion a year. It appears the United States is seeking \$1.3 billion a year from allies and a contribution of \$500,000 from the Afghan government. President Karzai is reportedly asking for a \$2 billion annual commitment from the U.S. as part of the U.S.-Afghan Strategic Partnership agreement initialed earlier this week.

It remains unclear whether all allied governments will hold to the 2014 transition date. François Hollande has already declared that he will pull French forces out of Afghanistan before 2014 if he is elected President next month. The scope of the NATO training and assistance programs in Afghanistan after 2014 is also uncertain. While the United States has declared a willingness to retain a military presence in country until 2024, the positions of other allies are less clear. Most allies have not met their pledges to the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan over the past four years, so their willingness to do so after ISAF withdrawal, when they will be even more dependent of Afghan forces for their security, seems dubious. There are good reasons to question

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the effectiveness and sustainability of the Afghan security forces now envisioned, particularly the police. Nevertheless, it remains in the U.S. interest to secure allied financial and training commitments for those forces after 2014.

#### **Safeguarding Critical Capabilities: NATO Force 2020 and Smart Defense**

The Chicago Summit must come to grips with the continuing decline in European defense budgets and capabilities exacerbated by the prolongation of the sovereign debt crisis. Absent some politically difficult and costly course corrections, the tight fiscal circumstances over the next five years will further erode overall European military capabilities already suffering from two decades of under investment. Among 37 European countries studied by CSIS, total defense spending adjusted for inflation declined by a compound annual average of 1.8 percent between 2001 and 2009 (€251 to €218 billion). During the early stages of the financial crisis, the 26 European Union countries participating in the EU's Common Security and Defense Policy reduced their aggregate defense expenditures by 4 percent. According to the latest NATO data, only two European countries (the UK and Greece), spent more than 2 percent of GDP on defense in 2011. These spending trends will continue to produce serious shortfalls in European military capabilities, particularly if implemented with little coordination.

A 2011 CSIS study which I led concluded that NATO Europe will be able to make only marginal improvements in capabilities to undertake various missions absent significant restructuring and defense integration. Most European allies will probably be able to contribute no more than a battalion to future expeditionary operations. In the naval domain, allies will be able to contribute surface combatants for modest counter-piracy and sea control task forces, but reduced force levels will limit operational flexibility and global presence missions. Air Forces will suffer from aging aircraft and declining readiness due to limited training. While recent operations, particularly Afghanistan, have advanced the transformation of European forces and made them more expeditionary, the readiness, equipment, and training of forces not involved in those operations are likely to continue to erode. Moreover, the political will to undertake demanding expeditionary operations is being undermined by economic constraints and operational fatigue.

Given these fiscal realities, allies agreed at Lisbon to achieve more efficient use of defense resources through enhanced defense planning, multinational development of capabilities, and broad reforms of NATO structures including downsizing its military commands and civilian agencies. Last year, NATO Secretary General Rasmussen began a campaign for "Smart Defense" to get more value and effect from available resources through better prioritization, multinational cooperation, and specialization. Following an intensive study of opportunities for multinational cooperation in 2011, NATO's Allied Command Transformation (ACT) has recommended an initial package of projects as candidates for greater pooling and sharing, each with an assigned lead nation and grouped according to the critical capability shortfalls they address.

In February, Secretary of Defense Panetta called for a long term plan to achieve the forces that the Alliance should have by the end of the decade—NATO Force 2020. The Obama administration encouraged allies to integrate the reforms agreed to at Lisbon, the Smart Defense initiative, proposed improvements in training and exercises (Connected Forces initiative),

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enhancements to the NATO defense planning process—to include greater transparency in national defense budget decisions, and investments in critical capabilities. A successful Summit would also secure allied endorsement of:

1. a package of multinational projects that address critical capability shortfalls;
2. several longer-term multinational projects to include missile defense, Alliance Ground Surveillance, and air policing;
3. and strategic projects for 2020 to enhance Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance and air-to-air refueling.

Given the political and fiscal constraints confronting European governments, such a package strikes me as about the best that can be achieved, and would encourage all allies to work in a more integrated fashion to maintain NATO's current level of ambition.

### **Partnerships**

The Lisbon Strategic Concept concluded that in today's complex global security environment, partnerships with other nations, regional and international organizations, and many non-governmental organizations have become essential to NATO's success. It called for developing more flexible ways to work with various regional partners. In April 2011, allied foreign ministers approved the "Berlin partnership package" to allow NATO "to work on more issues, with more partners, in more ways." The goal is to make more of the "partnership toolkit" available to all partners depending on mutual interest and capacity.

This appears to be the least developed part of the Chicago agenda. Advancement of NATO's partnership with Russia has been hampered by lack of progress on the missile defense dialogue, even as cooperation on Afghanistan has continued. There will not be a NATO-Russia Council meeting in Chicago, but Russia has reportedly been encouraged to participate in the meeting with contributors to ISAF.

One concept under consideration is to find ways to work with the "core partners" who have made sustained contributions to allied operations. However, there are also opportunities to leverage the success of NATO's cooperation with Arab partners in Libya and decade-long continuing cooperation with many Mediterranean littoral states on maritime security under Operation Active Endeavor, to find ways to deepen these partnerships and coordinate transatlantic support to security sector reforms in the transitioning states of the Middle East and North Africa.

### **Conclusion**

There are several carryover issues from Lisbon for which there remains insufficient political consensus among allies to move ahead on major decisions in Chicago including the deterrence and defense posture review and further enlargement.

The Lisbon Summit called for a comprehensive review of NATO's overall military posture to include consideration of the appropriate mix of conventional, nuclear, and missile defense forces required to deter and defend against the full range of threats to the Alliance. It also reaffirmed

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NATO's commitment to existing arms control agreements support for further arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation efforts. Much attention was given in this review to the future role of tactical nuclear weapons in Alliance strategy. Various official and non-official proposals to reduce or consolidate these weapons or change declaratory policy have not gained broad political support among allies. There is no question that NATO needs to complete this review to ensure that the political and resource support for an appropriate mix of forces can be sustained over the coming decade. At the same time, allies should commit to pursue various transparency and confidence building measures with the Russians to enhance stability and security throughout the Euro-Atlantic region.

The Lisbon Summit reaffirmed that NATO's door will remain open to "all European democracies that share the values of our Alliance, which are willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, which are in a position to further the principles of the Treaty, and whose inclusion can contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area." Allies recognized the strategic importance of the Western Balkans, and the contributions that Euro-Atlantic integration could provide to the consolidation of democratic values, peace, and stability in that region. Allies reiterated their 2008 Bucharest invitation to welcome Macedonia into the Alliance as soon as a mutually acceptable solution on the name issue is reached with Greece. They also reaffirmed their support for the aspirations of Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina to become a member of the Alliance and Serbia's interest in developing cooperation with NATO. NATO also reaffirmed its commitment to deepening its partnerships with Georgia and Ukraine and 2008 pledge that Georgia will become a member. Given the lack of the progress on the Macedonian name issue and of political consensus on extending membership offers to the three other recognized aspirant countries, this will not be an enlargement summit. However, I expect allies to affirm all these commitments in Chicago and to set the stage for decisions on further enlargement at the 2014 Summit.

The Chicago Summit will provide allied leaders an opportunity to demonstrate that the transatlantic relationship remains vibrant in the face of economic constraints and that the Alliance is implementing a sustainable strategy for transition in Afghanistan and addressing emerging threats. European governments could answer U.S. concerns about diminishing military capabilities by making a sustained commitment to Smart Defense and other initiatives needed to realize a credible and effective NATO military posture for 2020. The Summit should also set in motion additional steps to deepen NATO's partnerships with countries around the globe and reaffirm NATO's Open Door policy.

Thank you Mr. Chairman, Mr. Meeks, and members of the subcommittee for this opportunity to present these views.

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Mr. BURTON. I don't think you heard me a while ago when I mentioned you couldn't remember who asked the question or made the comment. I said Mr. Meeks and I look an awful lot alike, so I can understand the confusion.

Mr. MEEKS. He is my dad. [Laughter.]

Mr. BURTON. He is my buddy.

I want to be serious for a moment. I was shaving the other morning, and before I ask questions, I want to mention something. I was shaving and I had the television on. I heard them say something about a young man who was injured in Afghanistan with an IED. And I walked out and I saw a picture of him with his wife and his child. You talk about a good-looking American family; this was it. He lost both of his arms and both of his legs. It is a human disaster that I can't hardly fathom.

And the reason I bring that up is we have so much technology now and so many war materials and systems that we can actually, from a satellite and a guy sitting at a computer 1,000 miles away, we can put a missile right down somebody's chimney and blow them all to hell.

I am probably one of the biggest supporters of the military and of strong defense, and a big supporter of NATO. And I don't know that anybody at NATO is going to hear what I am going to say, but I really believe that we ought to take a different look at how we conduct wars. With the technology we have and the satellites that we have, it seems to me that we could pinpoint, maybe with some observers on the ground and some intelligence people on the ground, we could pinpoint the figures that we have got to knock out and do it without putting ground troops in that are going to come back in pieces.

It is just tragic. We have been there 10 years. This young man's life is ruined. His wife's life is ruined. His children's life is, I am sure, going to be affected adversely.

I started thinking about World War II. You guys are too young to remember it, and I was just a kid, a baby. But we invaded Europe and we went after Japan. We used whatever technology we had to limit the casualties. We did that by firebombing Dresden, Germany, and firebombing Berlin, and hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians were killed. In Japan, hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians were killed. But we probably saved 0.5 million American lives and allied lives by not invading the island of Japan.

Now the reason I mention this is—this is just one man's perspective—we need to evaluate how we conduct military wars in the future. We don't need to send 100,000 or 150,000 young men and women into combat and have them come back in pieces when we have the technology that we have.

We see bad guys, bad regimes, and we want to get rid of them. We could do it like that. And I don't want to see any more young men come back with no arms and no legs. I am so sick of this.

When I hear people talk about NATO and about our allies and about war, and everything, it is always the troops. And, Mr. Coffey, I understand what you are saying; we don't want to have a unilateral pullout right now. We don't want to let the Iranians and the Taliban and al-Qaeda know that we are pulling, stopping, and running and leaving.



But, at the same time, we need to start realizing that there is no antiseptic war. There are going to be civilian casualties. We saw that in World War II to the tune of about 40- or 50 million people.

When it comes to allied forces and American young men and women, I want to start using the technology that we have so we don't put them at any more risk than is absolutely necessary. The bad guys, I want to kill them. I don't want to see Americans killed any more than has to happen.

This idea that we are going to have an antiseptic war, and we are going to put hundreds of thousands of troops in there, when we know we have the technology to knock out most of the bad guys by just using the technology we have, I just don't understand it.

So, that is just my little tirade today. I hope somebody is listening out there because, if we are going to go after bad regimes and bad guys, and we make a collective decision to do it, then do it. Then do it with what we have without risking any more lives than are necessary.

Now I just have one question, and you can all answer this. You may not agree with me; Mr. Meeks may not agree with me. I don't know.

But when we go to that NATO meeting in Chicago, as you said, there are only two countries now that meet the 2 percent. I think we do, more than do that. But there are only two countries.

The allies that are putting up the money and the resources need to be very firm and say, "Look, if Greece can reach 2 percent and they are bankrupt, then, by golly, the others can cough up that money." I hope that gets in the paper someplace. If Greece can do it with all the fiscal problems they are having, then the others ought to be able to do it as well.

If you have any comments here, you are welcome to make them.

Mr. COFFEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

On the point about the lack of spending by our European allies, I couldn't agree with you more. What I think that the administration needs to do more of is to publicly point out and make this point and press this point home.

I had a unique experience working in British politics and seeing things many times from the other side, from maybe more of a European point of view, how American policy can impact our allies in Europe and our special relationship in the UK.

I can tell you that at the many NATO ministerial meetings I attended, or even the NATO Summit in Lisbon, I saw how effective American leadership can be when it is used, and how many of our European allies value the leadership attributes that America brings to the table.

When former Secretary Gates gave his farewell address in Brussels, it sent shockwaves through many European capitals. It was talked about in bilateral meetings. It was talked about in the press, the commentators, the editorials. It was major news in the defense world.

But, then, when he left, that sort of drive to really focus this issue and not be scared to name and shame kind of went away. When Secretary Panetta gave his first speech at Brussels, everyone was on edge—I remember this—about what Secretary Panetta is going to say. Is he going to pick up where Secretary Gates left off?

And his speech was much more tame. Now it could be because he was new and he wanted to be polite the first time at a NATO ministerial. But it was noticed. So, I don't think we should underestimate the effect American leadership can have when we raise these issues publicly. That is my first point.

The second point I would like to point out is sometimes in the U.S. we fail to realize the lack of importance attached to the ministries of defense in Europe relative to the importance we attach to the DoD in the U.S. or the MOD in the UK. In many European countries, the ministry of defense has a lower stature in terms of Cabinet ranking.

So, we can talk until the cows come home to defense ministers in European capitals, but if you really want to start to unlock this, you are going to have to start addressing this issue at the foreign ministerial level and, better yet, at the head-of-government level.

Thank you.

Mr. BURTON. Anybody else?

Mr. WILSON. If I might just add to your first point, I just want to thank you for your powerful opening remarks there. I had the opportunity to serve in Iraq as a diplomat at our Embassy and in Afghanistan with NATO, and I understand where you are coming from with your poignant remarks.

I think it really puts an emphasis on two things, technology and tactics. If you think about what we need to be able to do with our allies, in the Kosovo air campaign the air campaign was 90 percent U.S., 10 percent Europeans, because they weren't up-to-speed with precision-guided munitions, the kind of technology that is required in modern warfare to minimize civilian casualties.

The reality is in Libya it was the reverse, 10/90, where we had pushed our European colleagues to be able to fight in all weather environments, using precision-guided munitions. It wasn't perfect and there are still real challenges, but I think this puts an imperative on keeping our allies with us as we move forward on technology. That is why the alliance acquisition of UAVs and precision-guided munitions remain a top priority in the capabilities package.

But it is also the tactics. We are in 10 years of Afghanistan, but we just have completed the Libya operation without troops on the ground with no casualties, with probably the most minimal civilian casualties of the modern military operation. It is fairly remarkable.

And then, finally, I think your comments inform NATO strategy and Afghanistan post-2014. If the alliance is going to remain in a training capacity, the real issue is how do we continue to have counterterrorism capabilities that can use more modern technology, more pinpointed strikes, that de-emphasize the importance of ground troops. I think that is a key part of what role the alliance will play post-2014.

Finally, on defense spending, I would say we should give a nod to some of our allies. Norway and Estonia are two of the smaller allies that are keeping up on the defense-spending side. But the reality is that American haranguing on the 2 percent hasn't produced results. Part of what the challenge is, is that political ambition of our European allies is going to drive their decisions on defense. So, we have to bring them with us to feel a sense of responsibility and ownership for the challenges we are facing on the global agenda.

This is why you take our European allies with us as we pivot to Asia. We don't pivot away from Europe to Asia. We have to bring them with us to underscore that our European partners are our go-to partners in solving any problem. And therefore, a sense of ownership and political ambition will help drive defense spending.

In the near-term, they are dealing with budget crises. And so, I think our expectations should be for them to develop, if not to see in the budget today, for us to see them with plans that show over the next coming years, as their economies recover, that they have a plan to restore spending, so that they get back up to 2 percent. If not in 1 year, we see the 5-year plan.

Mr. FLANAGAN. Mr. Burton, I just had two other perspectives on your very compelling statement about the nature of warfare in recent years. I think that Libya is actually an example of the way in which the U.S. conducted that operation and addressed your concerns in two ways. First of all, it did apply technology. It was precision-guided munitions that a number of allies had, including a number of smaller allies who were quite successful with this. Support was provided and refueling and target acquisitions by the United States, but, nonetheless, a number of these allies did. Of course, you had the results that were alluded to earlier of relatively limited civilian casualties with enormous damage to the capacity of Gaddafi forces to go after innocent civilians and to wreak the kind of slaughter in Benghazi and other cities that were in the horizon.

But, secondly, I think the decision to—and there were a number of reasons motivating this—but the decision to let two willing and capable European allies, the UK and France, coupled with a number of other very capable smaller allies, to play the leading role in some of the actual conduct of strike missions, with the U.S., again, completely embedded in the operation and supporting, but not playing a leading role, once again, in yet another operation in the Arab Middle East, I think this was a way to encourage Europeans and to show them that—and it certainly wasn't pretty and there were many shortcomings, but it did show that Europe could play a leading role in dealing with a relatively-simple contingency on their periphery with some U.S. support.

Again, I wouldn't say this is a model for all future operations, but there are instances where Europe has taken action somewhat independently along its periphery, lesser operations in the Balkans and elsewhere. I think we should be encouraging that at a time when the U.S. is going to be feeling a heavy sense of demand on engagement in the Far East and other areas of the world.

Thank you.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Meeks?

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As I sit here and listen, I am reminded more and more why this alliance is so important. Being a New Yorker, of course, 9/11 was significant. The day after 9/11 was the first, and I believe the only, time that NATO invoked Article 5, emphasizing the point of an attack against one of us was an attack against all of us. That is so significant as I listen and think.

I agree with Mr. Burton in that no one wants to see our young men and women coming back maimed and hurt and families dis-

seminated as a result of war. If we have technologies to prevent such, we want to do so.

I just want to add—and I am pretty sure Mr. Burton would agree—that not only am I talking about American casualties and innocent individuals, but our allied casualties and civilians, innocent civilians. We don't want the loss of innocent lives, because all of us are human beings. We want to save as many people as we possibly can, civilians, those that are not committing heinous acts, those who are not the bad guys.

We want to go after the bad guys and save as many of the good guys, because oftentimes that is the reason why we go to war. That is the reason why we went to war in Libya. We wanted to help the good guys and help save civilian lives, and not have innocent people die. Surely, if we can do something to prevent our young men and women from being victims during war, I think that we should move in that direction.

My question, I guess, that I throw out first, because there is this great need, I think, of having NATO. Dr. Flanagan, you just talked about the model that was used in the Libya mission, which I pretty much agreed with. The only concern that I have is that the threat perceptions or the cost/benefit analysis looked different within the alliance.

You mentioned how we let Britain and France take the lead, and it was a successful operation because we also had Sweden and the Gulf states involved. But there were other partners that stayed out.

That raises the question of, what about future operations? Will it increasingly be, say, the coalitions of the willing within the alliance? If that is so, then what does that mean for the future of NATO?

Again, I stress I think that these are important, but one of the concerns that I have, just now analyzing what took place in Libya and thinking about the future. So, I would love to get your response on that.

Mr. FLANAGAN. Yes, Mr. Meeks, I think that is very good insight. I do think that is a challenge that the alliance is going to confront. Among an alliance of 20 countries, you don't have the common assessment. There wasn't certainly the sense that some of the Northern European allies had, particularly one big one, Germany, had about the situation in Libya and how it affected their security.

What I think is important is the key thing is what enabled the alliance to move forward so effectively was the degree of integration and interoperability that developed through the unified military structure. It is important to maintain that.

And this is going to be important in the context of a Smart Defense debate because of this whole notion of if countries move toward specialization, and they don't have certain capabilities, are they going to be available to them from other allies when they need them, when the alliance as a whole wants to put together either a coalition of the willing under an alliance framework or even some other kind of ad hoc operation that would still benefit from the levels of military integration that exist? So, I think it is important that we not encourage this to be the preferred option, but I think

we have to live with the reality that it may be the option because not all allies will see as much urgency on certain operations.

But, to me, the key thing is to maintain the integration that exists within the military structure to continue, and particularly with our residual presence in Europe, to maintain the kind of training and interaction with European forces after our withdrawal from Afghanistan, to ensure that we can work effectively with all of our European partners to deal with a range of different contingencies; and that even if it is not full-blown, it is not all 28 countries contributing, as we have seen in Afghanistan and elsewhere before, still, it can be an effective and a more legitimate operation, blessed by the entire alliance, even if it ends up being sort of this notion of a less-than-full contribution by all member states.

We have never had, even in the old defense of the central region, we never had a fully equitable contribution by all allies in defense of the alliance or in the conduct of some of those preparations. But the key thing is to have that sense that there is resolve and commitment of all allies to any operation that the alliance undertakes.

Thank you, sir.

Mr. WILSON. Congressman Meeks, if I might add to that, I was working at NATO headquarters on 9/11, working for Secretary General Lord Robertson. I was watching on the TV in his office as the second plane hit the second tower in New York. As an American at NATO headquarters, on the one hand, I felt a sense of frustration and helplessness that I couldn't do anything, that I wasn't in the United States, that I wasn't able to help respond.

As the alliance went into action that day and began to consider invoking Article 5 for the first time in its history, it underscored to me how solemn this commitment is and the extent of this degree of solidarity, and how unique this alliance is. At a time of our nation under attack, these countries are willing to say that they will consider it an attack on themselves and be there with us.

If you think about Afghanistan and the casualties that our allies have suffered in Afghanistan, on September 10th, 2001, I never would have guessed that you could imagine our European partners would have deployed to us in combat 3,000 miles away in Afghanistan for a decade. It was inconceivable. And yet, despite all the flaws and problems and caveats, that is what they have done. It is a pretty remarkable feat.

First and foremost, most of them have done it out of a sense of solidarity with us. I think it is easy to take that for granted. So, I value your comments.

On the Libya point, I think part of NATO's strength is its adaptability, its flexibility. That is good for us. That is good for the alliance. But, at the end of the day, the reason NATO is enduring is because of the sense of solidarity that we felt on 9/11. It really is about trust among allies and partners.

And so, this issue of some of the allies not contributing to Libya is a serious issue. Now some of the smaller ones didn't really have assets that would have been applicable in an air campaign over Libya. But Germany, Poland, they did. I think as we think about the alliance and the way forward, while its flexibility is a strength, and while there should be allies that can step up and step back in certain operations, it is something that we have to constantly work

at because it is a sense of trust and solidarity that at the end day makes sure that Article 5 itself is actually credible. And so, we can't take that for granted.

While I think Libya was a success in many regards, it is a warning bell, I think as you have said. If you let this go too far—in fact, some allies told us that, because they sensed that Libya wasn't a first-order priority of the United States, because it wasn't important enough to us, that maybe it wasn't going to be important enough for them to commit forces. I think that is a potentially corrosive trend over the long-term and something that we have to guard against.

Mr. COFFEY. Congressman Meeks, I cannot agree with you more and with my two colleagues here around the table, the value NATO brings in terms of solidarity with the United States. I want to see NATO as an alliance succeed. I want to see it transformed. I want to see it ready to take on 21st century threats.

While I will point out the positives, and there are many, as Damon said, about 10 years later, imagining so many European troops fighting in Afghanistan, I will also not make excuses for my friends, because I don't think that is what friends do. Friends help friends.

In that regard, with Libya, I think Libya was a success insofar as NATO was able to quickly stand up the command structure to allow the operation—

[The microphone shuts off.]

Mr. MEEKS. Try the button.

Mr. COFFEY. I will speak loudly.

Mr. MEEKS. Hit the button. The button didn't get hit by accident?

Mr. COFFEY. As was pointed out, only half of NATO members actually contributed anything to the operation. I think only seven actually conducted air-to-ground strike operations.

There were some notable surprises, especially with the Norwegians, the Danes, and the Belgians, who at the time were at about the 2-year mark without having government, which probably says something.

But I think that we should really focus on how we can learn lessons from Libya and how to improve similar operations in the future. But I would caution against comparing Libya to other campaigns such as Afghanistan or other NATO contingency operations in the past because it was on a completely different scale.

For example, well, every day there are roughly about 200 air sorties flown in Libya. Compare that to, roughly, 2,000 that were flown every day in the opening days of Iraq. So, again, a completely different scale.

Compared to what we are trying to achieve in Afghanistan, which is basically trying to train-up an indigenous force, the Afghan National Security Forces, to take over an insurgency, again, that is completely different from what we were experiencing in Libya.

I would like to conclude by going back to Afghanistan and say that we have all been touched. I would say most Americans have been touched in one way or the other, by losing colleagues, friends, or family members in Afghanistan, in Iraq, and other wars. But we

need to make sure that we set clear objectives for what we are trying to achieve.

In Afghanistan, the standard for NATO should be a pretty low standard. It should be simply to create the conditions where the Afghans can take over the counterinsurgency mission, so western troops can leave. The AMSF are the ticket out for western troops. It is their country. It is their fight. It will ultimately impact on our security if they don't get it right. That is why we have to help them. But that is where we need to be.

By 2014–2015, we need to see an AMSF that is capable of carrying on with the counterinsurgency campaign. And by 2015, there will be an insurgency in Afghanistan. We should prepare the public for that now. But India, with the largest democracy in the world, still fights two insurgencies inside its borders. So, it doesn't mean that we have failed.

I think maybe that is another aspect of Chicago that will be important that I failed to mention, is that we should start preparing the public for what we should eventually expect out of Afghanistan when western troops withdraw.

Thank you.

Mr. BURTON. Let me just ask one real quick question regarding Libya. As I understand it, the NATO treaty is, if there is an attack on one, it is an attack on all and they all respond collectively to the threat. That was not the case in Libya. There was no attack on any NATO ally. There was a decision made by some of the leaders, France and the United States as well as some others, that there were humanitarian tragedies going on, and that Muammar Gaddafi was a tyrant and should be replaced. There was no threat to any country that I know of.

And so, since there was no attack on anyone, I can understand why Germany and other countries might say, "Hey, wait, why are we getting into this thing?" So, I think that needs to be made very clear. NATO was designed, as I understand it, to be a defense mechanism against attacks on any one of the NATO allies. But if there is no attack, obviously, there is a question about whether there is an obligation for all of the NATO allies to go in and attack a country because one or two countries may say, "Hey, this guy has got to go."

Real quickly, yes, sir?

Mr. COFFEY. I will quickly comment on that, Mr. Chairman.

You are right that it wasn't an Article 5 mission. In fact, as was already pointed out, there has only been one Article 5 declaration since the beginning of NATO. But, actually, the Article 5 declaration isn't for ISAF and Afghanistan. It was as a result of September 11th. Those were Operation Eagle and Operation Active Endeavour.

There have been many NATO operations in the past that have—well, in fact, by definition, since it has only been invoked once, Article 5, every other NATO operation has been a non-Article 5 operation. So, I wouldn't say that, just because something isn't a direct threat to the alliance, that the alliance shouldn't act.

But I would certainly agree with you. Actually, I was one of the ones who was very cautious and skeptical in the beginning about intervening in Libya. I would agree with you that NATO needs to

be very selective when and where it intervenes and how it intervenes, because Libya is not a closed book, and there is still a lot to be said for what is going to happen with Libya.

Thank you.

Mr. MEEKS. Let me just real quick, again, just feeding off of you a little bit, because it is compelling and history makes you think. When do you get involved? When don't you? I think of the innocent lives in Rwanda. Should we have gotten involved in the Sudan? Could we have saved thousands, hundreds of thousands, of Jewish lives if we had gotten involved earlier during the Holocaust?

What are our responsibilities as countries and as human beings? So, all of that has a play in this. Sometimes, I guess, when you get involved, you don't know what the outcome, what the recording of history will say, whether you acted too late, as I believe we did with reference to the Holocaust, and we didn't do much of anything in Rwanda. Or whether you interceded when you should not have. I mean, that is something that I think that is all part of our decisionmaking process as we move forward, which is a very challenging and difficult thing for any country to make a decision.

I would hope that that is why the alliance is built, so that we can have those kinds of conversations and trying to make those kind of collective decisions and not leave it just to one country to make that decision, but let's try to work together for our united selves to make that decision, which I think, then, would put us in a better place as we move down the road. Another reason why I just think that the alliance is so important, so important.

Let me just get off this topic because we have been here long enough. But I do want to ask one, because we asked a lot of questions of the administration in regards to Georgia's aspirations to join NATO. I would just like to know from you whether or not you think that, without government control of the Russian-occupied territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, how would NATO's Article 5 apply to those occupied territories? I would just like to get your thoughts on that.

Lastly, I think, Dr. Flanagan, you were there this morning, a meeting; the EU delegation is hosting a big symposium today about the EU's common security and defense policy and NATO/EU cooperation. I would just like to get your assessment on this cooperation.

Mr. WILSON. If I might start on Georgia, if the alliance said that Georgia could not enter NATO until Russia withdrawal from Abkhazia and South Ossetia, we, by default, would be giving Russia a veto over our decisions about enlargement. That is a path the alliance can't go down, shouldn't go down. So, this is a complicated and difficult issue. But we brought Germany into the alliance when it was divided.

I think that part of the resolution of this difficult situation in the South Caucasus in Georgia will be clarity on the part of the alliance that its commitment at Bucharest that Georgia will be a member, that we demonstrate that that is genuine. And it would continue to work with Georgia through the NATO Georgia Commission to help it both with defense reforms, internal political reforms, to better prepare it, and that, as it prepares, we are serious about bringing it into the alliance.



This will have to create and force the dynamic that creates a more auspicious environment for the negotiations over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. But if we back up and lead and say we can't touch Georgia until Russia withdraws, we basically have acceded the turf to a decision in Moscow, and we can't go down that path in my view.

Mr. COFFEY. Following up quickly on Georgia before Dr. Flanagan goes on to talk about CSDP, I think that the Georgians actually need to make clear that they are happy for there to be some sort of compromise or arrangement with eventual Georgian membership into NATO that excludes South Ossetia and Abkhazia for the time being, until that situation is peacefully resolved with Russia.

I believe this is the stated policy of the Georgian Government. I don't believe that they have done a very good job of conveying this message to NATO allies. But President Saakashvili has made a non-use-of-force pledge on regaining the two occupied territories. So, by definition of pledging not to use force, he has automatically implied that he sets aside NATO's Article 5 commitment if Georgia was to become a member of NATO.

Thank you.

Mr. BURTON. I might just add real quickly here that Russia's accession into the WTO could have been stopped by Georgia. And so, Georgia has already acceded to one aspect of the problems that they face in those occupied territories.

I think you are absolutely right, it will be the same thing.

Mr. COFFEY. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman. Actually, that decision, the agreement made between Georgians and the Russians over this issue of Russia's membership in the WTO actually shows that President Saakashvili is willing to take a pragmatic stance when it is required.

Thank you.

Mr. FLANAGAN. Mr. Meeks, yes, with regard to the CSDP, the Common Security and Defense Policy, I think the theme of some of this morning was that, well, some had declared that perhaps it was, if not dead, nearly dormant. But I think we heard that there are important operations still underway, some not very prominent in Central Africa, and helping Sudan and others. But some actually quite significant, including the Atalanta anti-piracy operation which is working with both NATO and the U.S. task forces that are operating out there in that region.

The EU has not set up lots of duplicative structures, as many had feared. They don't have the resources to do it. I think one of the strengths that the EU can bring to these kinds of operations, in particular, in their mission in the Horn of Africa, they have also been providing some financial support to assisting the Somalians with enhancing their security, with some of the legal elements of going after some of the piracy money and finances.

So, the notion that the EU can bring, because of the other elements of the EU institutions that can bring along some of the areas of civilian capacity, together with the European military capacity, I think is some of the kinds of things we should encourage.

Again, not big and duplicative missions that should be focused on NATO, but some of these lesser activities where, in showing that

Europe is building the Union in all of its dimensions, that this is something that I think in the end provides net benefit to the United States and to all of the allies.

Thank you.

Mr. BURTON. Gentlemen, thank you very much. This has been a very informative panel. I am sorry we kept you so long, but it was worth the wait, I think. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 5:04 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

# A P P E N D I X



MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

**SUBCOMMITTEE MARKUP AND HEARING NOTICE**  
**COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS**  
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515-0128

**Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia**  
**Dan Burton (R-IN), Chairman**

April 25, 2012

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign Affairs' Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia, to be held in **Room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building (and available live via the Committee website at <http://www.hcfra.house.gov>)**:

**DATE:** Thursday, April 26, 2012  
**TIME:** 2:30 p.m.  
**SUBJECT:** NATO: The Chicago Summit and U.S. Policy

**WITNESSES:** Panel I  
The Honorable Tina S. Kaidanow  
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary  
Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs  
U.S. Department of State  
  
Mr. James Townsend  
Deputy Assistant Secretary  
European and NATO Policy  
U.S. Department of Defense

Panel II  
Mr. Damon Wilson  
Executive Vice President  
The Atlantic Council

Mr. Luke Coffey  
Margaret Thatcher Fellow  
The Heritage Foundation

Stephen Flanagan, Ph.D.  
Henry A. Kissinger Chair in Diplomacy and National Security  
Center for Strategic and International Studies

**By Direction of the Chairman**

*The Committee on Foreign Affairs seeks to make its facilities accessible to persons with disabilities. If you are in need of special accommodations, please call 202/225-5021 at least four business days in advance of the event, whenever practicable. Questions with regard to special accommodations in general (including availability of Committee materials in alternative formats and assistive listening devices) may be directed to the Committee.*



## COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

MINUTES OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON Europe and Eurasia HEARINGDay Thursday Date April 26, 2012 Room 2172Starting Time 2:30 Ending Time 5:04Recesses  (\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_) (\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_) (\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_) (\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_) (\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_) (\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_)

Presiding Member(s)

Dan Burton, Jean Schmidt

Check all of the following that apply:

Open Session Electronically Recorded (taped) Executive (closed) Session Stenographic Record Televised 

TITLE OF HEARING:

"NATO: The Chicago Summit and U.S. Policy"

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:

Dan Burton, Gregory Meeks, Theodore Deutch, Eliot Engel, Tim Griffin, Ted Poe, Jean Schmidt

NON-SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: (Mark with an \* if they are not members of full committee.)

NoneHEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Yes  No 

(If "no", please list below and include title, agency, department, or organization.)

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (List any statements submitted for the record.)

*Chairman Burton's opening remarks*  
*Rep. Meeks's opening remarks*  
*Witness statement of the Honorable Tina S. Kaidanow, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Europe and Eurasia, U.S. Department of State*  
*Witness Statement of the Honorable James J. Townsend, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and NATO policy, U.S. Department of Defense*  
*Statement of Damon Wilson, Executive Vice President, The Atlantic Council*  
*Statements of Luke Coffey, Margaret Thatcher Fellow, The Heritage Foundation*  
*Statement of Stephen Flanagan, Henry A. Kissinger Chair in Diplomacy and National Security, Center for Strategic and International Studies*  
*Questions for the record submitted to Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Tina Kaidanow by Representative Gus Bilirakis*  
*Questions for the record submitted to Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Tina Kaidanow by Representative Theodore Deutch*  
*Questions for the record submitted to Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Tina Kaidanow by Representative Eliot Engel*  
*Congressional Research Service Hearing Memorandum*  
*The NATO Lisbon Summit Declaration*  
*The NATO Financial and Economic Data report*

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE \_\_\_\_\_

or

TIME ADJOURNED 5:04 PM

*TBH*  
 Subcommittee Staff Director  
 Professional Staff

**Question for the Record Submitted to  
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Tina Kaidanow by  
Representative Gus Bilirakis  
House Committee on Foreign Affairs  
April 26, 2012**

**Question:**

Last week, my Hellenic Caucus co-chair, Carolyn Maloney and I introduced H.Res. 627, calling upon FYROM to work within the framework of the United Nations process with Greece, in finding a mutually acceptable name. UN Security Council Resolution 817 (1993) states that the international dispute over the name must be resolved to maintain peaceful relations between Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and regional stability.

With all of the issues that are pressing on NATO, do we have this Administration's assurances that regardless of FYROM's propaganda and continued policies, activities, rhetoric, and misinformation directed against Greece – a NATO and U.S. longstanding ally – the U.S. remains committed to work in partnership with NATO allies to uphold previous NATO Summit decisions, with regard to the enlargement issue and extend an invitation to FYROM as soon as a mutually acceptable solution to the name issue has been reached within the framework of the United Nations?

Moreover, will the U.S. call on FYROM to abstain from hostile activities and stop the utilization of materials that violate provisions of the United Nations-brokered Interim Agreement between the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Greece?

**Answer:**

Allies stand by the decision taken at the 2008 NATO Summit in Bucharest to invite Macedonia into NATO once the dispute with Greece over its name has been resolved. The United States continues to support the

ongoing UN effort, led by Special Representative Matthew Nimetz, to help the two countries settle the issue. We will support any mutually acceptable solution, but ultimately it is the parties themselves that must resolve the name issue.



**Questions for the Record Submitted to  
Deputy Assistant Secretary Tina Kaidanow by  
Representative Eliot L. Engel (#1)  
House Committee on Foreign Affairs  
April 26, 2012**

**Question:**

Specifically, does the United States support future membership of the Republic of Kosova in NATO? Do the countries recognizing Kosova which are members of NATO also actively support Kosova's future membership? What is the next step for Kosova to take toward its intention to join NATO in the future, as many of its neighbors already have or are on track to do? Can Kosova join the Partnership for Peace? If not, why not? What is the road map and series of steps for Kosova to join NATO? What type of programs can Kosova participate in? What is the US and NATO doing to train Kosova's security forces?

**Answer:**

We strongly believe that Kosovo's integration into international institutions is in the interest of regional stability, and we will continue to advocate Kosovo's full integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions.

NATO decisions are taken by consensus. The four Allies who do not recognize Kosovo will likely be an impediment to deepening Kosovo's relationship with NATO. We believe that these constraints on Kosovo's integration and development detract from the goal of the Alliance to promote stability in the region.



the North Atlantic Council, which again requires consensus among Allies. We continue to emphasize with the four non-recognizers in the Alliance that Kosovo's independence is a fact that cannot be undone and occurred under a unique set of circumstances. While NATO does not have a formal partnership agreement with Kosovo, we want to explore ways to deepen the existing NATO-Kosovo relationship. In particular, we support NATO taking a more active role in the development of the Kosovo's Security Force (KSF).

The United States also contributes training and equipment to build the capacity of the Kosovo Police (KP), especially in priority areas such as police restructuring and reform, counter-terrorism, combating organized crime, and immigration/border control. The United States works closely with the European Union (EU), including providing advisors and technical assistance to the European Union rule of Law Mission (EULEX) in Kosovo. We enhance EULEX's monitoring, mentoring, and advising mandate with targeted bilateral programs. Our equipment donations come with important training, so that host-country personnel can use new technology effectively. For instance, we conduct "train-the-trainers" sessions that ensure Kosovo

personnel.

The United States is also proud to have a State Partnership Program between the Iowa National Guard and the Republic of Kosovo, which focuses on senior leader development and helps develop the KSF's capabilities within its mandate for crisis response, civil protection, disaster preparedness, and explosive ordnance disposal.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to  
Deputy Assistant Secretary Tina Kaidanow by  
Representative Eliot L. Engel (#2)  
House Committee on Foreign Affairs  
April 26, 2012**

**Question:**

Understanding that Kosova's security forces are new, small, and lack substantial training and armaments, are there opportunities for a unit from Kosova to participate in a security or operation in Afghanistan, Iraq, or elsewhere?

**Answer:**

Contributions to NATO operations by non-NATO nations must be approved by all 28 NATO Allies, four of which do not recognize Kosovo's independence. It would be difficult at this time to achieve consensus for Kosovo's participation in a NATO operation among all 28 Allies. As you noted, the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) still has much to accomplish within Kosovo. Its current mandate sets limits on its activities, and thus the contributions it can make to operations abroad, as well. Nevertheless, the KSF has demonstrated its ability to deploy and contribute to civil emergency missions, for example in operations last year in the wake of flooding in Albania.